Is Rorty a linguistic idealist?

• Authors: Tomáš Marvan
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The paper addresses the recurrent charge that Richard Rorty is a “linguistic idealist”. I show what the charge consists of and try to explain that there is a charitable reading of Rorty’s works, according to which he is not guilty of linguistic idealism. This reading draws on Putnam’s well-known conception of “internal realism” and accounts for the causal independence of the world on our linguistic practices. I also show how we can reconcile this causal independence of things and the sense of our discourse being guided by them with our autonomy with regard to the construction of various “vocabularies” with which we describe, or cope with, reality. In the final part, I address in some detail Rorty’s animadversions concerning the idea of the intrinsic nature of reality. I show them to be only partly successful.

Keywords

EN

Rorty; linguistic idealism; internal realism; intrinsic structure of reality; representation

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Human Affairs
• Year: 2011
• Volume: 21
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 272-279

Dates

published

2011-09-01

online

2011-09-22

Contributors

author

Tomáš Marvan

• Czech Academy of Sciences

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/s13374-011-0028-2