Pragmatism, Experience, and the Given

• Authors: Scott Aikin
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

The doctrine of the Given is that subjects have direct non-inferential awareness of content of their experiences and apprehensions, and that some of a subject's beliefs are justified on the basis of that subject's awareness of her experiences and apprehensions. Pragmatist criticisms of the Given as a myth are shown here not only to be inadequate but to presuppose the Given. A model for a pragmatist account of the Given is then provided in terms of refinements of Dewey's theory of experience. The doctrine of the Given is implicated in the functions of inquiry insofar as one must take it that experience is a source of justification.

Keywords

EN

Myth of the Given; experience; pragmatism; John Dewey; Wilfrid Sellars

• Publisher: Sciendo
• Journal: Human Affairs
• Year: 2009
• Volume: 19
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 19-27

Dates

published

2009-06-01

online

2009-03-21

Contributors

author

Scott Aikin

• WKU Glasgow Regional Center, 500 Hilltopper Way, Glasgow, KY 42141-7966 USA

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Identifiers

DOI

10.2478/v10023-009-0016-x