TWO KINDS OF MENTAL REALISM

• Authors: Demeter Tamas
• Languages of publication: HU

Abstracts

EN

In this paper the author argues that there is a distinction to be drawn between two kinds of mental realism. The difference consists in the content of these realist positions: it may be, on the one hand, the interpretation of folk psychology, or the ontology of mental entities, on the other. First he reconstructs the manifest view of folk psychology, i.e. those presuppositions which our everyday psychological practice relies on. Then he turns to the reconstruction of the common element - i.e. the commitment to the fact-stating character of the discourse - which is a necessary part of realism about folk psychology. From this view, he separates the realism about mental entities which he defines as ontological commitment towards these entities. Besides putting forward a definition of these two positions, he points out that they are mutually independent, and this provides us with the possibility of considering folk psychology as not being in cognitive competition with scientific psychology.

Keywords

EN

FOLK PSYCHOLOGY; MANIFEST VIEW; MENTAL REALISM

Discipline

• PSYCHOLOGY: PSYCHOLOGY

• Publisher: Hungarian Association for Psychology
• Journal: Magyar Pszichologiai Szemle (Hungarian Psychological Review)
• Year: 2007
• Volume: 62
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 215-137
• Document type: ARTICLE

Contributors

author

Demeter Tamas

• Tamas Demeter, no address given, contact the journal editor

Identifiers

CEJSH db identifier

10HUAAAA073911