A R T I C L E S

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CHAOS AND STRATEGY IN MANAGING THE DIPLOMATIC SERVICE. THE CASE OF ANDRZEJ TARANOWSKI'S MISSIONS TO MICHAEL THE BRAVE IN 1600*

Abstract

In 1600, Sigismund III, King of Poland-Lithuania, sent an envoy to Michael the Brave the Voivode of Wallachia, three times. His mission aimed to conduct negotiations on the treaty between Poland-Lithuania and Wallachia. In brief, the treaty stipulated that Michael the Brave should become a voivode of Moldavia and, therefore, Sigismund III's vassal. The contents of that pact came into conflict with both the reality and the general policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Although it might seem surprising, talks gave an extra opportunity to save time. It was the moment of his highest military activity when Wallachian troops would be unchecked power near to Polish-Lithuanian border. Taranowski's mission represented unofficial and chaotic moves in establishing contacts with the Danubian Principalities, but still clearly shows how diplomatic practice worked in Poland-Lithuania at the end of the sixteenth century.

Keywords: Polish-Lithuanian diplomacy, Andrzej Taranowski, Michael the Brave, Moldavia, Wallachia

The Long Turkish War marked the end of the sixteenth century on the Ottoman border. One of the most significant events in this time was the short period of military-political activity of Michael the Brave. Emperor Rudolf II supported the forays of the Wallachian voivode into Transylvania (1599) and Moldavia (1600). Military actions between the conquest of Transylvania and the forays into Moldavia significantly changed the image of the theatre of war.[1] In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the nobility closely monitored Michael the Brave's activity.[2]

Since the fifteenth century, Moldavia played a vital role in Polish-Lithuanian policy as a centre for news and information about the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, Poland-Lithuania was an attractive partner for the principality as a big state with good or at least correct relations with Habsburgs and Ottomans. In the last decade of the sixteenth century, the Moldavian nobility emigration successfully pushed on political life in Poland-Lithuania.[3] For example, Jan Zamoyski helped Movilă's family obtain the Polish-Lithuanian grant of nobility (the so-called *indygenat*) and promoted the marriages between the Moldavian and Polish noble families. In 1595 at Țuțora, Zamoyski finalised the peace treaty with the Tatars. Under its provisions the Principality of Moldavia remained under Movilă's reign and Polish troops would stayed in permanent there.[4] Peace treaty confirmed by Sultan Mehmed III

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[1] Jan Paul Niederkorn, *Die europäischen Mächte und der 'Lange Türkenkrieg' Kaiser Rudolfs II. (1593–1606)* (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1993), pp. 493–94; Alexander Randa, *Pro Republica Christiana. Die Walachei im 'Langen' Turkenkieg der Katolischen Universalmächte (1593–1606)* (München: Rumänische Akademische Gesellschaft 1964).

[2] Zbigniew Wójcik, 'Polish Diplomacy at the time of the elective kings (1572–1699)', in *The history of Polish diplomacy X–XX c.*, ed. by Gerard Labuda and Waldemar Michowicz, transl. Aleksandra Rodzińska-Chojnowska (Warsaw: The Sejm Publishing Office, 2005), p. 190.

[3] Ilona Czamańska, 'Czy naprawdę były to awantury? Interwencje polskie w Mołdawii w latach 1595–1616', *Balcanica Posnaniensia Acta et studia*, 28, no. 2 (2021), 57–79.

[4] Michał Wasiucionek, *The Ottomans and Eastern Europe. Borders and Political Patronage in Early Modern World* (London–New York–Oxford–New Delhi–Sydney: I.B. Tauris, 2019), pp. 164–68. More about Zamoyski's links with Moldavia see: Dariusz Milewski, 'A Campaign of the Great Hetman Jan Zamoyski in Moldavia

started an almost twenty-year-long period of closer collaboration between the two countries; of course, this rapprochement was possible only after the Ottomans agreed.

In January 1600, Andrzej Taranowski started his journey from Warsaw to the Voivode of Wallachia. His mission was to conduct negotiations on the treaty between King Sigismund III of Poland-Lithuania and Voivode Michael the Brave of Wallachia. The treaty stipulated that Michael the Brave would become a voivode of Moldavia and, as such, King Sigismund III's vassal.[5]

The contents of that pact came into conflict with both the reality and the general policy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. King Sigismund III could not give Moldavia as a fief because Moldavia had been under the formal Ottoman suzerainty since 1538.[6] Supporting the Wallachian voivode opposed the Polish-Moldavian alliances promoted by Great Hetman and Great Chancellor of the Polish Crown Jan Zamoyski. The idea of undoing the diplomatic efforts of the last decade in foreign relations with Moldavia and the Ottoman Empire was a ridiculous step without any reasonable explanation. The motive behind the treaty between Sigismund III and Michael the Brave is considered an attempt to secure the rule of Jeremiah Movilă in Moldavia.[7] Missions conducted

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(1595). Part I. Politico-diplomatic and military preliminaries', *Codrul Cosminului*, 18, no. 2 (2012), 261–86; Cristian Antim Bobicescu, 'Tyranny and colonization: Preliminary considerations about the colonization plans of Moldavia during the time of Jan Zamoyski', *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, 54, no. 1–4 (2016), 99–118; id., 'Pe marginea raporturilor lui Jan Zamoyski cu Moldova şi Ţara Românească', *Studii si Materiale de Istorie Medie*, 20 (2002), 201–06.

[5] Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych (Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, hereafter cited as AGAD), Metryka Koronna (hereafter cited as MK), Libri Legationum (hereafter cited as LL) 27, *Przysięgi jakie miały być między królem Jego Miłością a Michałem Wojewodą Multańskim przez pana Taranowskiego podczaszego halickiego uczynione i namówione*, Braşov, 28 III 1600, fols 155–56.

[6] Viorel Panaite, 'The Legal and Political Status of Wallachia and Moldavia in Relation to Ottoman Porte', in *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. by Gábor Kármán and Lovro Kunčević (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 21–23.

[7] Henryk Wisner, 'Dyplomacja Polska w latach 1572–1648' in *Historia dyplomacji polskiej (połowa X–XX w.)*, 2: *1572–1795*, ed. by Zbigniew Wójcik and Gerard Labuda (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1982), p. 75.

by Andrzej Taranowski were regarded as the official embassy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth with official instructions. Their purpose was to convince the Wallachian voivode to break up alliances with the Holy Emperor Rudolph II and establish friendly relations with Moldavian Voivode Jeremiah Movilă.[8]

The circumstances, nature, and the course of Andrzej Taranowski's activity at the Wallachian court have evaded Polish historians' interest. Romanian historians explored this issue as a part of Michael the Brave policy. They emphasised secrecy and the chance to create the basis for 'the Romanian state'. Of course, this kind of state-forming interpretation is flawed, but the attention to secrecy and Andrzej Taranowski's work is worth noting.[9]

The preserved documents provide an excellent ground for researching the methods of action in creating foreign policy by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the verge of the seventeenth century. The text is based mainly on the documents issued in January, April, and May 1600, the copies of which became part of the official state collection *Metryka Koronna* (Crown Metrica) in *Libri Legationum*, held at the Central Archives of Historical records in Warsaw. That is why the content of the documents should be considered an official record.[10] Apart from the text of the treaty project, there is a large collection of correspondence kept in various archives and published, mainly in Romanian editions of primary sources devoted to the history of Michael the Brave. The main sources are the letters written and sent by Great Chancellor Jan Zamoyski,

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[8] Wojciech Sokołowski, 'Schyłek działalności politycznej Jana Zamoyskiego', in *Kultura, polityka, dyplomacja. Studia ofiarowane Profesorowi Jaremie Maciszewskiemu w sześćdziesiątą rocznicę jego urodzin*, ed. by Andrzej Bartnicki (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1990), p. 387.

[9] Illie Corfus, *Corespondență inedită asupra realţiunilor între Mihai Viteazul şi Polonia Culeasă din arhivele din Varşovia* (Cernăuţi: Tipàrul Glàsul Bucovinei, 1935), pp. 15–19; *Negocierile lui Andrei Taranowski, intime şi secrete, duseră deci la formularea acestui tratat de alianţă, care avea menirea să creeze un stat românesc, unitar, cu întinderi nebănuite, sub dinastia lui Mihai Viteazul – ereditară şi în linie bărbătească- sub suzeranitatea însă a Poloniei. Cauzele ce au făcut ca această alianţă să nu se încheie nu ne sunt cunoscute, iar evenimentele ce se precipitară, mânară pe Mihai contra aceleiaşi Polonii, cu care nu se putuse alia* (Corfus, 1935), p. 19.

[10] AGAD, MK, LL 27.

and especially the regular correspondence between Zamoyski and Vice-Chancellor Piotr Tylicki, who was his informer at the court of King Sigismund III. These sources make it possible to reconstruct the information flow and management of the diplomatic service.

This paper aims to show European diplomatic practices and strategies of the era. The example of Taranowski's activity makes it possible to observe the complicated mechanism of multiple contacts between actors from various European courts. Finally, the article will attempt to answer the question about the Polish-Lithuanian diplomacy strategy.

THE OFFICIAL DIPLOMAT AND A PRIVATE MESSENGER

On 28 December 1599, Vice-Chancellor Piotr Tylicki wrote to Great Chancellor of the Polish Crown Jan Zamoyski that King Sigismund III sent to Michael the Brave his chamberlain (Lat. *camerarius*, Pol. *komornik*), Adam Skrzynecki. His mission aimed to make a reconnaissance of the situation in Wallachia and deliver the king's letter to Taranowski.[11] Skrzynecki and Taranowski were responsible for the contacts with Wallachian Voivode Michael the Brave in the next six months. There is little information on this first envoy, Adam Skrzynecki. He served at the court of King Stephan Bathory and then as a chamberlain at the court of Sigismund III. In 1599, he obtained lifelong tenancy of the villages of Jaromirka, Kujałów, and Szykowice in Podolia. The last mention of Skrzynecki comes from 1601. All traces of his activity then ceased.[12]

The second team member was Andrzej Taranowski (born c. 1540), a Catholic.[13] Taranowski started his career as a secretary in the royal Chancellery of Stephan Bathory,[14] and then pursued his career in politics

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[11] Piotr Tylicki's letter to Jan Zamoyski, Warsaw, 28 Dec. 1599, in *Mihai Viteazul și Polonii: cu documente inedite in anexe*, ed. by Illie Corfus, Series: Studii și cercetări, 29 (București: Imprimeria Națională, 1938), p. 261.

[12] Krzysztof Chłapowski, *Ordynacja dworu Zygmunta III z 1589 roku* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo DiG, 2004), p. 87.

[13] Ştefan Andreescu, *Restitutio Daciae. Studii cu privire la Mihai Viteazul (1593–1601)*, 3 (București: Editura Albatros 1997), p. 261.

[14] Leszek Kieniewicz, 'Sekretariat Stefana Batorego. Zbiorowość i kariery sekretarzy królewskich', in *Społeczeństwo staropolskie*, 4, ed. by Anna Izydorczyk and Andrzej Wyczański (Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 1986), pp. 66–67.

with missions to Denmark and Sweden.[15] He worked as a diplomatic envoy from the time of King Sigismund August until Sigismund III. Taranowski was sent to Constantinople in 1569–70, 1572, 1574–75, and 1579, to Moscow in 1573, and two times to the Crimean Khanate in 1577–78.[16] During his time in Crimea, he was trapped in Perekop and freed thanks to the efforts of Jan (Ibrahim) Bielecki.[17] During his career, he gained the title of *karbarz* (the supervisor of salt brewing) of the Wieliczka saltworks in 1589.[18] Taranowski was the cupbearer of Halicz and the owner of several villages.[19] Alexander Randa called him a 'Maximilianist', as he was a member of the pro-Habsburg faction during third election in Poland-Lithuania in 1587.[20] In the last decade of the sixteenth century, he was a regular envoy to the Danubian Principalities.[21] His diplomatic activity finished along with Michael the Brave in the autumn of 1600. He probably spent his last years away from court and politics.[22]

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[15] Anna Biedrzycka, 'Taranowski Andrzej', *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, 52 (2018), 188; Jerzy Pertek, *Polacy na morzach i oceanach*, 1 (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1981), p. 219; Roman Żelewski, 'Organizacja dyplomacji za Zygmunta Augusta', in *Polska służba dyplomatyczna XVI–XVII wieku*, ed. by Zbigniew Wójcik (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1966), p. 117.

[16] Lajos Tardy, István Vasary, 'Andrzej Taranowskis Bericht über seine Gesandtschaftreise in der Tartarei (1569)', *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, 28, no. 2 (1974), 213–52 (p. 217); Biedrzycka, 'Taranowski Andrzej', pp. 189–93.

[17] Andrzej Dziubiński, 'Poturczeńcy polscy. Przyczynek do historii nawróceń na islam w XVI–XVIII w.', *Kwartalnik Historyczny*, 102, no. 1 (1995), 27.

[18] *Księga wpisów podkanclerzego Wojciecha Baranowskiego z okresu marzec 1588 – grudzień 1590. MK 135 z Archiwum Głównego Akt Dawnych w Warszawie*, ed. by Wojciech Krawczuk, Michał Kulecki, Sumariusz Metryki Koronnej. Seria Nowa, 4 (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo DiG, 2010), p. 276.

[19] *Urzędnicy województwa ruskiego XIV–XVIII wieku. Spisy*, ed. by Kazimierz Przyboś, Series: Urzędnicy dawnej Rzeczypospolitej, 3 (Wrocław, etc.: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1987), p. 53; *Księga wpisów podkanclerzego Wojciecha Baranowskiego*, p. 179; Biedrzycka, 'Taranowski Andrzej', p. 193.

[20] Randa 1964, p. 239.

[21] *Mihai Viteazul în conştiinţa europeană*, 1: *Documente Extrene*, ed. by Ion Ardeleanu, Series: Mihai Viteazul în conştiinţa europeană, 1 (Bucureşti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1982), pp. 104, 108–09, 160–61, 176, 437, 440–41, 484–490, 509.

[22] Biedrzycka, 'Taranowski Andrzej', pp. 191–93.

The last uncertain mention came from Cracow in 1601. Taranowski probably stayed at Michael the Brave.[23]

The most significant event in Taranowski's career was the mission to Constantinople in 1569. During that mission, he recorded his activities. The text was printed in 1571 and translated into German in Nuremberg. In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, his diary was produced in handwritten copies until 1860, when Józef Ignacy Kraszewski edited the original text.[24] Taranowski described his journey from Warsaw to Constantinople and Astrakhan to Warsaw in 1569–70.[25] This mission not only helped him become a conscientious diplomat but also allowed him to specialise in Ottoman issues. The training made him later the expert on the Danubian Principalities. The first Taranowski's activity in this area occurred before 1595 when he brought to Cracovian court news from Wallachia.[26]

Studying the careers of Skrzynecki and Taranowski, even without information about Skrzynecki's life, we can imagine how the diplomatic service worked at the turn of the seventeenth century. Adam Skrzynecki was placed at the royal court as a *camerarius*. In late-sixteenth-century Poland-Lithuania, the office had no clearly defined duties. C*amerarii* were messengers or envoys still in contact with the king.[27] The collaboration of two persons working on one assignment – one from the court and another from the Chancellery – meant that King Sigismund III and Great Chancellor Zamoyski created a double-checked collaboration system.

However, it is worth mentioning that the last reference of Skrzynecki and Taranowski is from 1601. Most likely, this was an accidental

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[23] *Mihai Viteazul în conştiinţa europeană*, 4: *Relătri şi presă*, ed. Ion Ardeleanu, Series: Mihai Viteazul în conştiinţa europeană, 4 (Bucureşti: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1986), p. 380.

[24] Tardy, Vasary (1974), pp. 218–19.

[25] Ibid., p. 247.

[26] Sigismund III to Jan Zamoyski, Cracow, 15 June 1595, in *Mihai Viteazul şi Polonii*, 29, p. 203.

[27] Walter Leitsch, *Das Leben am Hof König Sigismunds III. von Polen*, 3 (Wien–Kraków: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften–Polska Akademia Umiejętności, 2003), p. 237.

coincidence. However, the negative influence of the 1600 missions on the final stage of their careers cannot be ignored.[28]

CONSTRUCTING AN ALLIANCE

Adam Skrzynecki went to Moldavia and Wallachia at the end of January 1600. He followed Taranowski, who had already been there.[29] Both were set to cross Moldavia with the official letter signed by King Sigismund III.[30] Nevertheless, Taranowski had no credentials or other confirmation of his mission. According to the sources, his journey was informal. He went to Wallachia on his own, in line with the king's letter to Moldavian Voivode Jeremiah Movilă. The king asked for free passage for Taranowski to the unknown destination.[31] In December 1599, Taranowski received a letter from Walenty Walawski, a Polish colonel in Wallachian service. Walawski presented the current situation in Wallachian troops and Michael's friendly attitude to Poles. He proved that service for Wallachian voivode could be lucrative.[32]

The king's letter to Andrzej Taranowski was enigmatic, proving his secret activities. On the secrecy of Taranowski's actions at the court of Michael the Brave wrote the emperor's commissaries in Wallachia – David Ungnad von Weißenwolff and Mihály Székely von Kövend.[33] The correspondence between the commissaries and Emperor Rudolf II

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[28] Chłapowski, *Ordynacja*, p. 87; Biedrzycka, 'Taranowski Andrzej', p. 193.

[29] Piotr Tylicki to Jan Zamoyski, Warsaw, 28 Dec. 1599, in *Mihai Viteazul și Polonii*, 29, p. 261.

[30] Sigismund III to Jeremiah Movilă, Warsaw, 26 Jan. 1600, in ibid., p. 268.

[31] Sigismund III to Andrzej Taranowski, Warsaw, 26 Jan. 1600, in ibid., p. 269; The King wrote: 'tam, gdzie pisałeś księdzu podkanclerzemu' [where you wrote about that to the Vice-Chancellor].

[32] Letter from Walenty Walawski to Andrzej Taranowski, [Alba Julia], 14 Dec. 1599, in *Documente privitoare la istoria Ardealului, Moldovei și Țării Românești*, 5: *Acte și Scrisori 1596–1599*, ed. by Andrei Veress (București: Caertea Românsecâ, 1932), pp. 332–37.

[33] Franz von Krones, 'Ungnad David', in *Allgemeine Deutsche Biografie*, 39 (München: Historischen Kommission bei der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1895), pp. 305–06; *Historiai értekezés a' nemes székely nemzet' eredetéről: hadi és polgári intézeteiről a'* régi időkben, ed. by Ferencz Kállay (Aiud: Kollégyom betűivel Fiedler Gottfried, 1829), p. 282.

is a fruitful source to investigate Taranowski's tasks. The Polish envoy was in Alba Iulia before 20 February 1600, and he planned to go with Michael the Brave to Braşov in the next three days. During this time in Wallachia, Taranowski also met with Jesuits from Cluj, who described him as a good Catholic who helped Jesuits in their talks with Michael the Brave.[34] On 19 February, he visited Ungnad and Székely. However, the commissaries felt resentment toward him. David Ungnad said he knew Taranowski, as they met in Constantinople 27 years before. They were at the court of Selim II at the same time, fulfilling their diplomatic duties.[35] Taranowski explained to the commissaries that he came to Wallachia as a private person, but they doubted it. They had information about a plan of alliance between Michael the Brave, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and the Ottoman Empire. King Sigismund III planned to break Michael's collaboration with Emperor Rudolf II and take control of Transylvania. Additionally, Taranowski warned that the commissaries could not trust Michael the Brave. He complained about the Wallachian voivode and his plan to attack Moldavia with the sultan's forces.

The information among diplomats was spreading. To confirm news, Ungnad and Székely needed other references. They probably met one of the best-informed people on the Danube, Giovanni de Marini Poli.[36] He was a merchant of Ragusan origin who became the high official at the Michnea the Turk and Michael the Brave court. On October 1597, he came to Michael the Brave as an emperor's agent.[37] Marini

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[34] Andreescu, *Restitutio Daciae*, p. 261.

[35] 'Regesták Mihály vajda történetéhez', ed. by Lajos Szádeczky, *Magyar Történelmi Tár*, 7, no. 3 (1884), 48–49. I would like to say many thanks to Fruzsi Györke for translation support.

[36] Ludwik Bazylow, *Siedmiogród a Polska, 1576–1613* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1967), p. 118. Bazylow incorrectly called Govanni de Marini Poli ambassador of Rudolf II.

[37] Lidia Cotovanu, '"Chasing Away the Greeks" The Prince-State and the Undesired Foreigners (Wallachia and Moldavia between the 16th and 18th Centuries)', in *Across the Danube: Southeastern Europeans and Their Travelling Identities (17th–19th C.)*, ed. by Olga Katsiardi-Hering and Maria A. Stassinopoulou (Leiden: Brill, 2016), p. 225; Cristian Nicolae Apetrei, 'Greek merchants in the 16th century Romanian Principalities. New case study: The Vorsi Family', *Istros*, 18, no. 1 (2012), 405–33

Poli explained to Ungnad and Székely that Michael the Brave planned to send one of his brothers-in-law with Ottomans forces to Moldavia. He added that Taranowski was not dealing with his own business, 'sondern auch in arcanis publicis maximi momenti rebus'. To prove it, the Wallachian voivode showed Marini di Poli letters from King Sigismund III without revealing their content.[38]

Marini Poli probably saw the same letters Taranowski brought a few days earlier. Taranowski's contacts with Michael the Brave were not secret for the emperor's agents, although the Polish envoy tried to keep up appearances of privilege.

It is necessary to explore in greater detail the document brought by Taranowski, kept by Michael and seen by Marini Poli. Taranowski's mission aimed to prepare the text of the alliance between King Sigismund III and the Wallachian voivode Michael the Brave. The draft resembled the texts of other fief acts drawn up by the Crown Chancellery of Poland-Lithuania. King Sigismund III wrote that he would stay voivode's ally without instigating conflict and respect the Moldavian neighbours' peace. He swore he would inform the Wallachian voivode about any attacks against him or his family. He also would not support any of Michael's enemies and their forces.[39] The content of Michael's promises mirrored Sigismund III's words. He also swore that he would not make agreements with other rulers, Christian or pagan.[40]

The most surprising was the Polish-Lithuanian king's plan to hand over the reign in Wallachia and Moldavia to Michael the Brave. Moreover, Michael's son Nicolas would obtain the Polish *indygenat* (literally meaning: the right of local birth, i.e. rights and immunities of the Polish nobility). At the next session of the Polish-Lithuanian Sejm, Michael the Brave, as voivode of Wallachia and Moldavia, would

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(pp. 426, 428); Noel Malcolm, *Agents of Empire. Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 382.

[38] David Ungnad and Mihály Székely to Rudolph II, Alba Iulia, 20 Feb. 1600, in 'Regesták Mihály vajda történetéhez', p. 49.

[39] AGAD, MK, LL 27, fol. 155, *Przysięgi jakie miały być między królem Jego Miłością a Michałem Wojewodą Multańskim przez pana Taranowskiego podczaszego halickiego uczynione i namówione*, 28 March 1600.

[40] Ibid., fols 155ᵛ–56.

be counted as one of the Polish-Lithuanian voivodes, which provided him with the opportunity to buy lands in the Commonwealth.[41] These provisions go further than the privileges obtained by the Movilă family in Poland-Lithuania. The Movilăs made not only political contacts but also matrimonial ones through marriages with members of the nobility.[42]

In the case of Michael's death, King Sigismund III would care for all the voivode's family, and his oldest son would reign in Wallachia, Moldavia, and Transylvania as King Sigismund III's vassal. In this way, the provinces would be united under a new dynasty and the care of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.[43] The new order proposed in the documents appears remarkably like an improved version of Movilă's deals with Jan Zamoyski, but this decision was made with the Ottomans' knowledge and approval.

The following points of the draft brought many farfetched promises. Apart from the oath of allegiance, Michael promised to add to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth all the conquered lands. He pledged to exchange Kilia, Bender, Ochakiv, and Izmail for the confirmation of the fief to Michael's ancestors.[44] As far as the fealty project seemed legitimate, the conquest plan was ridiculous. The offer of Polish-Lithuanian reign in towns and cities on the Black Sea shore made Sigismund III mocked upon.

Of course, when we leave out the fiction and look at the plan, we can see the concept of Michael's argumentation. Ovidiu Cristea wrote that the success of the Wallachian voivode was based on taking over trade routes, which gave him a chance to fight a small-scale war.[45] Kilia was the most important town at the crossroad of the trade routes to

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[41] Ibid., fol. 155.

[42] Michał Wasiucionek, 'Kanclerz i Hospodar – klientelizm nietypowy? Na marginesie stosunków Jana Zamoyskiego z Jeremim Mohyłą', *Wschodni Rocznik Humanistyczny*, 6 (2009), 65–72 (p. 68).

[43] AGAD, MK, LL 27, fol. 155, *Przysięgi jakie miały być między królem Jego Miłością a Michałem Wojewodą Multańskim przez pana Taranowskiego podczaszego halickiego uczynione i namówione*, 28 March 1600.

[44] Ibid., fol. 156.

[45] Ovidiu Cristea, 'Michael the Brave, the long war and the "Moldavian road"', *Revue des Études Sud-Est Européennes*, 51, no. 1–4 (2013), 239–53 (pp. 248–49).

Constantinople, Sinope, and Trebizond.[46] A takeover of this city would be fruitful not only to the voivode but also to the king. The last decades of contact with the Ottoman Empire were based on the instrument regulating international relations, called *ahdname*.[47] There was no reason to cut a deal because of the Wallachian voivode.

As a future Polish vassal, Michael the Brave promised to renounce the autonomy in foreign affairs and to defence the Polish Crown, Lithuania, Ruthenia, Podolia, Volynia, and Kyiv district against Tatars. In the case of the Polish-Lithuanian mass levy (Pol. *pospolite ruszenie*), he promised to send troops of 2500.[48] Most of Michael's declarations were empty promises to persuade the king and his officials to deal with the Wallachian voivode. The project of the agreement tried to cut off Michael the Brave from the emperor's support and broke the fragile peace between the Ottomans and Poland-Lithuania. However, there was no place for Movilă's reign in Moldavia, which was entirely out of the current policy of the Commonwealth.

On the one hand, King Sigismund III was dealing with Michael the Brave by Taranowski; on the other, in March 1600, he sent an official letter to the voivode. In it, he wrote that Moldavia was related to the Commonwealth, and by this connection, he kindly asked for a no-invasion pledge.[49] Sigismund III perhaps tried to play both sides, which would explain this decision. The information would be prepared by Great Chancellor and Crown Hetman Jan Zamoyski. He knew about the project and would use a good servant Taranowski to arrange a fake contact with Michael the Brave. What was the aim of this activity? At first, it was simply playing on time to save Moldavia. In the broader political context, it would be Zamoyski's attempt to find evidence against the king.

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[46] Andrzej Dziubiński, *Na szlakach Orientu: handel między Polską a Imperium Osmańskim w XVI–XVIII wieku* (Wrocław: Leopoldinum, 1997), p. 25.

[47] Dariusz Kołodziejczyk, *Ottoman-Polish Diplomatic Relations (15th–18th Century). An Annotated Edition of* 'Ahdnames *and Other Documents*, Series: The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage. Politics, Society and Economy, ed. by Suraiya Faroqhi, Halil İnalcık, 18 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 3–7.

[48] AGAD, MK, LL 27, fol. 155ᵛ.

[49] AGAD, MK, LL 27, fols 151–51ᵛ, Sigismund III to Michael the Brave, Warsaw, March 1600.

After more than two months in Wallachia, Taranowski came back to Warsaw. According to Ungnad and Székely's report, he returned with nothing because of the treaty between Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire. However, the Wallachian voivode could not accept the terms of the agreement. Rudolph II's envoys had a similar problem during the negotiation in Warsaw. The Polish-Lithuanian nobility proposed to emperor's envoys 40 000 of Talars to be paid monthly for 40 000 Polish-Lithuanian troops.[50]

Taranowski appeared at the court in Warsaw before 31 March and gave an account of his voyage to King Sigismund III. Vice-Chancellor Piotr Tylicki sent the information about the meeting to Jan Zamoyski. Tylicki wrote to Zamoyski about 'the case' of Sigismund Bathory, who was collecting money and people for his restoration in Transylvania. In Taranowski's verbal report, Sigismund Bathory gave Stanisław Gulski 300 horses and supported Stanisław Chański and other nobility in Podolia.[51]

It is interesting because Stanisław Gulski and Stanisław Chański were close followers of Zamoyski.[52] Information from Tylicki can be confirmed by the Ungnad and Székely letter to the emperor from Braşov written on 4 March, cited by Ludwik Bazylow as uncertain. The emperor's commissaries wrote that Taranowski revisited them and warned that Zamoyski had been preparing support for Sigismund Bathory.[53] News from Braşov showed that Taranowski's activity at Michael's court was somewhat out of Jan Zamoyski's policy, even though the chancellor knew about the king's plans. Taranowski's actions, as seen by the emperor's agents, departed from the instructions given to him by the Polish-Lithuanian king. This poses another question: Did Zamoyski control Taranowski's action at the Wallachian court?

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[50] David Ungnád and Mihály Székely to Rudolph II, Alba Iulia, 13 March 1600, in 'Regesták Mihály vajda történetéhez', pp. 60, 62.

[51] Piotr Tylicki to Jan Zamoyski, Warsaw, 31 March 1600, in *Mihai Viteazul şi Polonii*, 29, p. 271.

[52] Wojciech Tygielski, *Listy, ludzie, władza. Patronat Jana Zamoyskiego w świetle korespondencji* (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Viator, 2007), p. 53.

[53] Bazylow, *Siedmiogród*, p. 119; David Ungnad and Mihály Székely to Rudolph II, Alba Iulia, 4 March 1600, in 'Regesták Mihály vajda történetéhez', p. 56.

Taranowski conveyed some news, but both Taranowski and Skrzynecki brought the official answer of Michael to the king's letter. It is worth noting that Ungnad and Székely revisited only Taranowski. What was Skrzynecki's role? Probably he was 'just' the official envoy. In his response, the Wallachian voivode claimed that the rumours about this planned attack on Moldavia were spread by Jeremiah Movilă. He declared he did not want to hurt even a hen in Moldavia.[54] He complained about Jeremiah Movilă's claims to Turks and Tatars and explained that his intervention in Transylvania resulted from Movilă's corruption. Michel the Brave declared that he had proof of Jeremiah Movilă manipulation of Zamoyski, Andrzej Bathory, and the Ottoman sultan against him. The Wallachian voivode hoped for improved communication in the future.[55] The content of the letter brought by Taranowski and Skrzynecki meant nothing. The factual information came from Taranowski at the audience in Warsaw. Comparing the treaty draft between the rulers with the official letters, we can see the two-faced nature of the Polish-Lithuanian policy conducted by King Sigismund III.

The royals' activity ended with the assembly of senators with King Sigismund III and Taranowski. It was a turbulent meeting. The confirmation of a treaty with Michael the Brave was unnecessary in the opinion of senators, and the process was illegal. It took place without consultation of the resident senators or the Polish-Lithuanian Sejm.[56] The official decision of senators was to send Taranowski again to Wallachia after talks with sejmiks (local land assemblies) and the Sejm.[57] This postponed Taranowski's mission for the following year. King Sigismund III's contacts with Michael the Brave were unofficial, out of

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[54] 'if our people have done any harm in his land [Moldavia] or if they have killed a single hen […] [in Polish: *jeśli ludzie nasi w ziemi jego szkodę jaką uczynili i jeśli aby jedną kokosz w ziemi jego zabili*]', see: AGAD, MK, LL 27, fol. 151, *Respondet Michael Waivoda R(egiae) M(aies)t(a)ti*, Michael the Brave to Sigismund III, 11 March 1600.

[55] Ibid., fols 151ᵛ–52.

[56] Anna Kalinowska, '"Ja jednak posła wyprawię…" Społeczeństwo szlacheckie a dyplomacja w XVII w.', in *My i Oni. Społeczeństwo nowożytnej Rzeczypospolitej wobec Państwa*, ed. by Wojciech Kriegseisen (Warszawa: Instytut Historii PAN, 2016), pp. 52–53.

[57] Lew Sapieha to Krzysztof Radziwiłł, Warsaw, 7 Apr. 1600, in *Archiwum Domu Sapiehów*, 1: *Listy z lat 1575–1606. Archivum Domus Sapiehanae*, I: *Continet codicem epistolarem 1575–1606*, ed. by Antoni Prochaska (Lwów: [nakładem rodziny], 1892), p. 236.

Zamoyski's control, and, on the other hand, the Taranowski's mission delayed Michael's attack on Moldavia.

THE SECOND MISSION TO WALLACHIA

King Sigismund III sent the response by Taranowski, who was called 'royal secretary'. He was going to Wallachia as a private person, not as a king's envoy. The letter he carried upheld the general demand for peace in Moldavia. Sigismund III explained that Zamoyski did conspire against Michael. He had opportunities to conduct foreign affairs but never used this right without the King's knowledge.[58]

On the decision of the Royal Council, Taranowski left Warsaw at the beginning of April 1600. Like during his first mission, he had no specified aims.[59] He delivered the letter from Sigismund III to Michael. The king explained that the latest agreement was invalid because Taranowski returned with the document after the session of the Polish-Lithuanian Sejm ended. So, the nobility of the Commonwealth needed to discuss the treaty's provisions. The king recommended ending the conflict between the voivodes, and he proposed mediation. In the case of Sigismund Bathory staying in the Polish-Lithuanian state, the king promised an intervention.[60]

King Sigismund III explained to Michael that he stopped the Wallachian envoys to Moscow because the voivode, as a future vassal, could not conduct his own foreign policy. As an example of good practice, he mentioned Taranowski's missions to Wallachia. In his opinion, the private and unofficial envoy was the best means of communication with the Wallachian voivode.[61]

Taranowski was in Alba Iulia on 10 April 1600. He was seen at Michael's court by Jesuit Peter Georg Vásárhely. Taranowski told Ungnad and Székely about the agreement between Poland-Lithuania and the

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[58] Sokołowski, 'Schyłek działalności', p. 387.

[59] Piotr Tylicki to Jan Zamoyski, Warsaw, 8 Apr. 1600, in *Mihai Viteazul şi Polonii*, 29, p. 272.

[60] AGAD, MK, LL 27, fol. 157, Sigismund III to Michael the Brave, Warsaw, Apr. 1600.

[61] Ibid., fol. 157ᵛ.

Ottoman Empire. When Michael the Brave heard about this treaty, he sent letters to Sigismund Bathory, probably pressed by Taranowski.[62] Otherwise, Michael the Brave would have started a conflict with Poland-Lithuania, Ottomans, and Tatars.[63]

Commissaries knew about Taranowski's meeting with the Wallachian voivode in Brașov. According to them, Taranowski tried to convince the voivode to cede the reign in Transylvania to Sigismund Bathory in exchange for the Moldavian throne with the Ottomans' agreement. However, they wrote to Emperor Rudolf II with information about the secret meeting of Taranowski, Michael the Brave, and the unofficial Bathory's envoy in Brașov, whose name remains unknown. According to the imperial agents, this assembly's result was to stand against the emperor collectively. Taranowski returned from Brașov on 30 April and had to return within the next six weeks.[64]

During the second mission to Michael the Brave, Taranowski presented a different political vision of Polish-Lithuanian relations with Wallachia. Respect to the legal process and good relations with the Ottoman Empire and peace in Moldavia was an effect of the senators' influence on Taranowski, who became a tribune of the good relations with Sigismund Bathory—the same Bathory who a month earlier was, along with Zamoyski, the greatest plotter. At the heart of the change were the intervention at the Warsaw court and the improvement of contacts between Sigismund Bathory and Emperor Rudolf II.

RAID ON MOLDAVIA 1600

Michael the Brave became a prisoner of his own goals. In May, he decided to raid Moldavia, which closed negotiations and antagonised nobility from the southern district of the Polish Crown. This situation strongly impacted Andrzej Taranowski's mission.

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[62] Mihály Székely to Rudolph II, Alba Iulia, 10 Apr. 1600, in 'Regesták Mihály vajda történetéhez', p. 259.

[63] David Ungnád and Mihály Székely to Rudolf II, Alba Julia, 16 Apr. 1600, in ibid., p. 262.

[64] David Ungnad and Mihály Székely to Rudolf II, Alba Iulia, 30 Apr. 1600, in ibid., pp. 270–71.

The first group who reacted to Michael's raid were Polish troops from Suceava, who moved to Kamianets-Podilskyi after the attack. They reported that Michael went to Moldavia with the Szeklers, Serbian, Wallachian, and Transylvanian forces. They had information about Michael's threat and were sure that he wanted to conquer Podolia and Lviv and, next, the whole Commonwealth, putting Archduke Maximilian on the throne in Warsaw.[65]

Soon after, the Wallachian voivode sent a letter from Suceava to King Sigismund III. He wanted to defend his lands against Sigismund Bathory and Jan Zamoyski, who planned to attack his domain with the Tatars' and Ottoman support. He presented himself as Jeremiah Movilă's victim because the Moldavian Hospodar would try to hurt Michael with magic and poisons. That is why Michael decided to act in the face of danger. He wanted to have a chance to send an official envoy to Sigismund III.[66]

The Wallachian voivode pointed out that he saved Khotyn because of the messenger Taranowski, who had been going to the stronghold.[67] Field Crown Hetman Stanisław Żółkiewski disproved Michael's declaration about Khotyn. Żółkiewski reported to Jan Zamoyski that Khotyn, as a stronghold on the borderland, was a heavily fortified and well-equipped castle, so he vouched for his safety.[68] Michael the Brave was near Khotyn, but probably due to the excellent fortification and short distance to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, he cancelled his plans to conquer it.[69]

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[65] *Nowiny o porażeniu Jeremiego Mohyły Hospodara mołdawskiego przez Michała siedmiogrodzkiego i wołoskiego wojewody*, 19 May 1600, in *Mihai Viteazul şi Polonii*, 29, pp. 284–87.

[66] AGAD, MK, LL27, fols 152–53, Sigismund III to Michael the Brave, Warsaw, 21 May 1600; Biblioteka Czartoryskich (The Princes Czartoryski Library), Teki Naruszewicza 98, fols 103–05.

[67] Ibid.

[68] Stanisław Żółkiewski to Jan Zamoyski, Khotyn, 2 VII 1600, in *Listy Stanisława Żółkiewskiego: 1584–1620*, ed. by Jan Tadeusz Lubomirski (Kraków: [s.n.] 1868), pp. 102–04.

[69] Bazylow, *Siedmiogród*, p. 124.

THE THIRD MISSION

Taranowski's third mission in 1600 was full of problems. It is hard to explain how many people knew about the first mission to Wallachia. The second mission was much more widely known at the court. Jan Zamoyski, by regular correspondence with Piotr Tylicki, knew Taranowski's planned actions and activities.

Nonetheless, the information flow on Taranowski's missions was limited to the court and Chancellery. Such measures inevitably raised the attention of the nobility in Podolia. The first who wrote to Zamoyski with the wake-up call was his brother-in-law, Voivode of Belz Stanisław Włodek.[70] He wrote about the king's letter of agreement on free recruiting of the people to Michael's troops. This was financed by the Wallachian voivode and carried out by Andrzej Taranowski. Włodek wrote:

> It is not good to confide to the letter, but those whom the King His Majesty trusts are fostering Michael. I do not think they know the danger because they have the king's permission. [Mikołaj] Jazłowiecki, Kamieniecki [Jan Potocki], [Andrzej] Taranowski have been to Terebovlia meeting.[71]

It was the first sign that the information on Taranowski's missions was slowly entering the nobility's consciousness through rumours and whispers. After Michael's raid on Moldavia, all of Taranowski's tasks were treasonous. News of this event reached the nobility via Kamianets-Podilskyi, the seat of the general of Podolia and Voivode of Bratslav, Jan Potocki.[72] In Kamianets-Podilskyi, the first rumours regarding Taranowski's collaboration with the Wallachians said that he

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[70] *Urzędnicy województwa bełskiego i ziemi chełmskiej XIV–XVIII wieku. Spisy*, ed. by Henryk Gmiterek and Ryszard Szczygieł, Series: Urzędnicy Dawnej Rzeczy-pospoliej XII–XVIII. Spisy, 3: Ziemie Ruskie, no. 2, ed. by Andrzej Gąsiorowski (Kórnik: Biblioteka Kórnicka, 1992), p. 71.

[71] 'Zwierzać mi się listowi nie godzi, ale ci, którym Król Jego Miłość ufa są bardzo Michałowi przychylni. Nie baczę ja aby sam się oni na to niebezpieczeństwo oglądali i owszem radziby temu gdyż mają po sobie to dozwolenie K. Jego M(iłoś)ci. Zjeżdżali się w Trębowli Jazłowiecki, Pan Kamieniecki, Taranowski', Stanisław Włodek to Jan Zamoyski, Sieniawa, 7 May 1600, in *Mihai Viteazul şi Polonii*, 29, p. 277.

[72] Andrzej Lipski, *Potocki Jan*, *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, 28 (1984–1985), 24–25.

attempted delivery of weapons and Cossacks to support the skirmish of the Michael's and Moldavian troops.[73]

The rumours served to accuse Taranowski of treason and arrest him in Kamianets-Podilskyi.[74] He was captured there because he changed his route after the governors from Podolia convinced him of the danger of the Habsburg troops on the Transylvanian border. He thus walked into an ambush in Kamianets-Podilskyi, where he was questioned and accused of high treason and called an enemy of the state.[75]

Taranowski was charged with secretly conducting a mission unknown to Chancellor Zamoyski. He was accused of preparing the treaty with the Wallachian voivode and also of providing gunpowder, leading Michael's troops, and contacts with Cossacks and the free people of Podolia, who were recruited to his forces.[76] These allegations were false. Zamoyski knew of the mission and had copies of many documents sent by Taranowski.[77] Taranowski explained this procedure to Zamoyski.[78] The accusers cited all the phrases from the papers delivered by Taranowski during his first and second mission.[79] As we can see, the claims were related to Stanislaw Włodek's letter to Zamoyski. [80]

How did the troops in Kamianets-Podilskyi gain knowledge of the contents of the earlier documents or Włodek's letter? Of course, Jan

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[73] Polish troop's report, Kamianets-Podilskyi, 18 May 1600, in *Mihai Viteazul și Polonii*, 29, pp. 284–87.

[74] Wojciech Tygielski wrote that Taranowski's arrest would be prepared by Jakub Potocki. Tygielski missed the aim of Taranowski's mission, it was Moldavia, not the Ottoman Empire; see Tygielski, *Listy*, p. 268.

[75] Andrzej Taranowski to Jan Zamoyski, Lublin, 13 July 1600, in *Mihai Viteazul și Polonii*, 29, pp. 305–06.

[76] Andrzej Taranowski to Jan Zamoyski, Lublin, 13 July 1600, in ibid., pp. 305–06. Similar complains sent Moldavian Voivode Jeremiah Movilă; he wrote that Taranowski used the Michael's seal and wrote the letters to numerous Cossacks and other peoples: 'Dał też znać Hospodar jego Miłość o pana Taranowskiego, który uczyniwszy pieczęć Michała Wojewody, imieniem jego listy do Kozaków i do inszych niemało pisywał', Jeremiah Movilă to Sigismund III, [n.d.], *Documente privitoare la Istoria lui Mihai Viteazul*, ed. by Petre P. Panaitescu (Bucuresti: Fundaţia Regele Carol I, 1936), p. 103.

[77] Piotr Tylicki to Jan Zamoyski, Warsaw, 8 Apr. 1600, in ibid., p. 272.

[78] Andrzej Taranowski to Jan Zamoyski, Lublin, 13 June 1600, in ibid., p. 305.

[79] Piotr Tylicki to Jan Zamoyski, Warsaw, 8 Apr. 1600, in ibid., p. 272.

[80] See fn. 71.

Potocki and his people were based on rumours but cited almost direct quotes from the treaty's draft. All the links appear to lead to Zamoyski, who compared all the proofs against Taranowski. The second question is why they charged an envoy and not the king. All accusations of treason should go to the court, not to the messenger, because of the policy made at the court by the king and his advisors.

Probably Taranowski played the role of a scapegoat who received all punishment for the king's transgressions. The best evidence of this is the lively intervention of Field Crown Hetman Żółkiewski in Kamianets-Podilskyi. Żółkiewski came to the stronghold and talked with Taranowski, who told him about Michael's verbal aggression: Michael said that he wanted to attack not only Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth but also Ottoman Empire. He wished to conquer like the ancient ruler Alexander the Great. After this talk, Żółkiewski released Taranowski.[81] One wonders how easily Żółkiewski received news from Taranowski and how fast he released him.

Taranowski was free but could not understand why he had been arrested and charged with secrecy when Jan Zamoyski knew about all his activities. He sent a letter to Zamoyski with deliberations, which was good evidence of his situation. He paid the price for the fall of the Wallachian negotiation. He was captured in Kamianets-Podilskyi because the nobleman of Podolia needed the scapegoat. Taranowski explained to Zamoyski that he was old and could not withstand the rough treatment. He noted that after staying in Kamianets-Podilskyi, he needed a few days of recovery before returning to Warsaw.[82]

Finally, Taranowski returned to the court in Warsaw, where he made a report. King Sigismund III decided to condemn Michael's raid. The king charged him with attacking Moldavia. He prepared an official answer to Michael's letter dated 21 May 1600. The king demanded Moldavia's return to the Movilă family. The king reminded that the official answer must be written to both hetmans of the Polish Crown and the Parliament and Royal Council because only in this way would

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[81] Stanisław Żółkiewski to Jan Zamoyski, Kamianets-Podilskyi, 28 May 1600, in *Mihai Viteazul și Polonii*, 29, pp. 297–99.

[82] Andrzej Taranowski to Jan Zamoyski, Lublin, 13 July 1600, in ibid., pp. 305–06.

the king be able to sign the official letter of invitation to the Wallachian envoys.[83] An unknown Wallachian envoy left for Warsaw on 28 July 1600.[84] The agreement for his mission resulted from the necessary compensation for the damages made by Michael's troops.[85]

MISLEADING AS DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE?

Argumentation provided by Sigismund III was calling to use the law. Noteworthy is that only the last letter to Michael the Brave mentioned that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth needed both king and nobility to make an administrative decision. It would be evidence of a bogus treaty prepared by Sigismund III. In cooperation with the Chancellery, especially Vice-Chancellor Piotr Tylicki and Great Crown Chancellor Jan Zamoyski, the king would mislead the Wallachian voivode and the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II, Ottoman Sultan Mehmed III or Sigismund Bathory and Jeremiah Movilă. The signs of this disinformation were well seen in the correspondence of Ungnad and Székely to the emperor, which shows the kind of uncertified and false information present at the court in Prague.

Jan Zamoyski knew about the documents and projected treaty. He pretended to lack knowledge, as shown by Podolia nobility's worries written by Włodek. It proves that Taranowski's arrest in Kamianets-Podilskyi was a show for the nobility of Podolia that needed the scapegoat and proof against the conspirator who supported Michael the Brave. They easily believed that Taranowski's missions were acts of conspiracy, and they stopped any evil intentions. Żółkiewski's first appearance in the stronghold for his talks with Taranowski may show that Zamoyski kept an eye on the matters. Taranowski was released and could go back to Warsaw. However, the ending was puzzling because Taranowski disappeared after the last audience at Sigismund III's court. There is no more information on him other than the uncertain date of his death.[86]

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[83] AGAD, MK, LL 27, fols 153–54, Sigismund III to Michael the Brave, Warsaw, 8 July 1600.

[84] Ibid., fol. 154ᵛ, Michel the Brave to Sigismund III, Alba Iulia, 28 July 1600.

[85] Ibid., fols 154ᵛ–55, Sigismund III to Michael the Brave, Warsaw, 19 Aug. 1600.

[86] Biedrzycka, 'Taranowski Andrzej', p. 193.

The last news about the investigation on the contacts with Michael the Brave was sent by Jan Drohojowski. He informed that King Sigismund III was the victim of Taranowski's intrigue.[87] Such a course of action explains that Taranowski was to play the role of a puppet to cover the plans of the king and the chancellor. Taranowski, however, was almost sixty and had spent many years in the Ottoman Empire. Could such an experienced nobleman be really an unwitting tool in the hands of others? According to his confession, he sincerely believed in his duties.

The case of Taranowski's activity at Michael the Brave's court shows the intricate structure of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic service. The treaty draft between King Sigismund III and the Wallachian voivode presented the King in a bad light. The proposal to support Wallachia was against the plan of the emperor and sultan. Furthermore, it would attempt to break the many years of Polish-Lithuanian balance between the two empires. It is hard to explain why the pope and the emperor could not gain the declaration like Michael the Brave had.

CONCLUSIONS

By investigating Taranowski's subsequent activity in Wallachia in 1600, it is easy to show that chaotic and incomprehensible actions can form a unified whole. The treaty drafts postponed the Wallachian invasion of Moldavia and missed the emperor and his diplomatic service. The last Taranowski's mission to Michael the Brave shows that unclear policy conducted by the Polish-Lithuanian envoy had also been kept secret in Poland-Lithuania. Thanks to the work of one capable envoy, the number of rumours and whispers give a possibility for preparation and reaction on Michael's inevitable ride to Moldavia. A fake treaty and disinformation used by Sigismund III and Jan Zamoyski against Michael the Brave's policy mirrored the image of the methods used by the Wallachian voivode. Regarding the mechanisms of the Polish-Lithuanian diplomatic service and the envoy's role, the sources show that Taranowski strongly believed in his missions and duty.

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[87] Jan Drohojowski to Jan Zamoyski, Przemyśl, 17 June 1600, in *Mihai Viteazul și Polonii*, 29, p. 309.

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