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The Real Fourth Political Theory

Abstract:

Aleksandr Dugin is sometimes called “Putin’s brain,” and there can be no question that Putin’s global strategy for expanding Russian power has followed quite precisely a strategic plan created, published, and advocated by Dugin beginning in 1996. This aggressive plan of political destabilization, economic hostage-taking, and ultimately militaristic invasions has been defended with a philosophical patchwork called “the Fourth Political Theory.” Dugin claims his “National Bolshevism” can stand alongside communism, fascism, and liberalism as a genuine contender in ontology, the philosophy of history, and political philosophy; and that it is the only theory that stands in genuine opposition to neo-liberalism and corporate capitalism. I show that this view, built from a distortion of Heidegger’s idea of “human-being” as Dasein, is not a coherent philosophy or worldview. I contrast it with personalism, which has always opposed the very aspects of communism, fascism, and liberalism that Dugin opposes, and does so quite effectively and without militarism, expansionism, or the need to take the nation state as some final end of human political development.

Keywords:

Dugin, the fourth political theory, Dasein, Heidegger, personalism

The Context of Dugin’s Theory

It is difficult to know for certain, but it is widely reported that the Russian political philosopher, Aleksandr Dugin, has captured the imagination and has the ear of Vladimir Putin. Dugin definitely advocated for the taking of Georgia and defended the idea of “Greater Russia” which appears to inform current Russian

foreign policy, which is to say, it informs Russian aggression. Some say Dugin is the brains behind the annexation of Crimea and he is definitely the source of the ideas associated with making Ukraine just an administrative district of Russia. There is no serious dispute about the statements he has made publicly which tend to confirm his advocacy of and probable complicity in these unfortunate events. I can clearly see the work of ideology in the US Wikipedia article on Dugin, and in just about everything disseminated in the West concerning him. I also want to acknowledge that my own country has been aggressive in similar ways, in the past, and I do not think that I am in a position to criticize Russia, as a citizen of the US, but as a personalist, I must criticize aggression wherever it exists. I have criticized my own country for many years, but here want to talk about Dugin's theories. In no way does the criticism imply a moral superiority of my own country, in my view.

What follows will have to be classified as a "response" to Dugin, from the standpoint of a philosopher of culture who favors a version of personalism over other philosophical perspectives.¹ There is not space here to set out a full personalist alternative, which is a project that badly needs doing. But it would require at least a book. I will suggest directions and reasons to see personalist philosophy of culture as an alternative to Dugin, but these will remain more leading principles, to use Dewey's phrase, than developed alternatives. Dewey is a good source both for the responsible critique of liberalism, fascism, and communism, and for alternatives in keeping with democracy. I hope that democracy, messy as it is, is not the end of human political evolution, being as Churchill famously said, the worst form of government on earth, except for all the others.² But it is the best we have now, and it should be developed and defended.

Dugin as Person

Because I seek here to give a personalist assessment of Dugin's theories, the critique included must be careful to treat him as a person, in as full a sense as any of us would want to be treated. In much of what I say here, subsequently, I will find areas of agreement with Dugin, but I want to make it plain that in no way do I endorse his policies or ideas about what Russia should do on the basis of his theory. The reason we must talk about him is due to his effects on the world. I have no knowledge whatsoever of Dugin's moral character, nor would I trust any reports that come through the media or the electronic underground about that important question. I believe a person whose private moral standards are very high could still be, from the standpoint of history, a moral monster. I believe the clear results of Dugin's views are indeed monstrous, although I do not know how much responsibility he bears for the atrocities of the wars that prosecute his aims.

1) My own version of personalism is communitarian and follows (while modifying) the positions of Josiah Royce and Martin Luther King, Jr. See Auxier, *Time, Will, and Purpose*, especially ch. 7; and Auxier, "On Knowing, Being, and the Dignity of Persons." For my understanding of the background of American personalism and where my own view is situated historically, see Auxier, "The History of American Personalism." From the standpoint of the philosophy of culture, I have done some work in an explicitly political direction. See Auxier, "Politics and the Rule of Law in the Context of the Philosophy of Culture," 136–58; and more broadly, Auxier, "Coming of a New Humanism," 7–26; and Auxier, "To Serve Man?," 190–204. I have discussed the personalist themes in many other writings, but none wholly dedicated to articulating a personalist political theory. That will have to be a goal for the future. For now, the response to Dugin is more pressing.

2) Churchill is actually recorded as saying, on the floor of parliament;
Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.

Churchill, House of Commons, November 11, 1947.

There is a difference between *theorizing* these ideas for a “Greater Russia” and giving the orders to invade. Yet, as Richard Weaver famously said, “ideas have consequences.”³ And while a person’s private moral character is always of the highest importance, I believe one could grant that perhaps Dugin is, privately, a good person (who knows?), and it would not affect anything I have to say here. Hannah Arendt famously allowed that Eichmann was just a bureaucrat, but I think a philosopher bears a higher level of responsibility than a bureaucrat. A philosopher should know that ideas may lead to action, and should be careful with the ideas. Bureaucrats, as such, do not have their own ideas. Dugin seemed reasonable enough in his much-publicized debate with Bernard-Henri Levy.⁴ If I live long enough, I might get history’s judgment of Dugin as a person.

Dugin as a Theorist

Dugin’s manifesto is called *The Fourth Political Theory*.⁵ I want to offer an assessment of and response to the position he describes in this book. Of course, there are elaborations and explanations in his other writings that must be considered. And in fairness, he says his theory is “extremely far from any dogmatism or proposal for a complete answer to the stated problem.”⁶ Yet, it is complete enough and close enough to dogma to bear some responsibility for years of aggression by Russia, subordinating Georgia, Belarus, Chechnya, and “mediating” the relations of Azerbaijan with its neighbors (i.e., occupying). It is developed enough to bear significant responsibility for the horrible war in Ukraine. Dugin’s basic idea is to patch together his Fourth Theory from the “good parts” of the other three theories (fascism, communism, liberalism) that he has “dismembered,” claiming that “they consist of elements that do not belong to them.”⁷

His plan extracts and re-assembles the supposedly constructive elements of the older systems around a new theory of human nature; “a revision of the three political ideologies, and an analysis of each in unconventional ways, can give certain clues to the substantive content of our own theory.”⁸ It sounds reasonable enough, as a plan, and everything would depend upon the theory of human nature at the core of the effort (which I will address later). But, the results are not only incoherent, remaining a patchwork, the theory of human nature is deeply flawed and does not suffice for Dugin’s aims. The honest assessment has to be that this theory is not really driven by imperatives that are compelling theoretically or morally. It has nothing of the theoretical and moral strength of Locke or Montesquieu, or the Hegelian descendants, Marx or Lenin, Giovanni Gentile or even Carl Schmitt.

The driving force is rather a fear of losing what has already been lost by Russia, and the world (including the Americas), which he calls its “identity.” Add to this fear a stubborn unwillingness to go into the future as part of a world community, that is, mere nationalist chauvinism, indefensible by any theory. Loss of identity in

3) Weaver, *Ideas Have Consequences*. Our rhetoric is not wholly separable from its results, a common sense idea, but worth repeating in Dugin’s case.

4) Cited below.

5) See Morgan, *The Fourth Political Theory*. I have read this book only in English and may thus be subject to errors of translation (which I am not in a position to correct). Dugin knows English very well, but I do not know whether he has authorized the translation of this book. Regarding Dugin’s command of English, which is complete fluency, see Nexus Institute, “Bernard Henri Levy” for his famous debate. There are many videos available in which Dugin makes arguments similar to those considered here from his book, for those who find the book difficult to obtain.

6) See Morgan, *The Fourth Political Theory*, n. 50.

7) *Ibid.*, just below note 57.

8) *Ibid.*

the sense that Dugin's theory of human nature describes it, if such identity ever really existed, is gone forever already. I do not say that our re-making into an increasingly homogeneous global culture is a good thing. Like any change, it is a problem and an opportunity. Personalism answers it, I will argue, and does so with a theory of human nature that leaves room for the aspects of identity that are compatible with a universal diversity of human beings and other natural beings. Preserving "identity" is an attempt to stop both time and evolution. There are no permanent species of animals, and there are no permanent types of human beings. The attempt to freeze time always fails in the ultimate sense.

The only question is what intermediate forms we should adopt on our way to whatever is next, which is as true in politics as in biological evolution. The nation state as a phase of human development has run its course. The empire based on a dominant culture, embodied in a nation state, is the business of the past. Neo-liberalism does not regard this structure as very useful. Resistance is futile. You will be assimilated. But that is the strength of neo-liberalism: it is thorough, evolutionary, and adaptive. One needs a political philosophy that is adaptive: as flexible as liberalism itself.

The question is how we should guide the process of economic and political change, that is already well advanced, so as to conserve the most important aspects of what we have gained in our bloody struggle over the past five-hundred years (the era dominated by European greed and conquest), and move into a future that makes room for everyone and for nature. Can we get some good from the horrendous suffering inflicted on humanity by this European adventurism (in which Russia is also deeply implicated)? Dugin's patchwork is very far from being the answer. It has been driven negatively by the development in the West I described earlier, but it can hardly be called "Americanization," as he names it. Yet, Dugin's fear of this juggernaut has bred hatred in him, of a militant and dangerous sort.

John B. Dunlop of the Hoover Institution recognized the potential threat in Dugin's theories and influence and offered a thorough analysis and warning in 2004:

Dugin's militant views on geopolitics, as expressed in his 1997 "textbook" (*Foundations of Geopolitics*),⁹ presumably will strike Western readers as both crude and mad, representing a slight improvement over the ravings of Duma deputy speaker Vladimir Zhirinovskii. Although Dugin's ideas and prescriptions are indeed extreme, dangerous, and repellent, it should be emphasized that they are very much in the tradition of the writings of interwar fascists and adherents of the European *Nouvelle Droite*. Historically speaking, fascist thought more than once has resulted in explosive expansionism. It should be noted that Dugin does not focus primarily on military means as a way of achieving Russian dominance over Eurasia; rather, he advocates a fairly sophisticated program of subversion, destabilization, and disinformation spearheaded by the Russian special services, supported by a tough, hard-headed use of Russia's gas, oil, and natural resource riches to pressure and bully other countries into bending to Russia's will. Dugin apparently does not fear war in the least, but he would prefer to achieve his geopolitical goals without resorting to it.¹⁰

9) This book is available in English only in a machine-translated version. See Dugin, *Foundations of Geopolitics*.

10) Dunlop, "Dugin's Foundations," 41–57.

Dunlop's entire piece has proven prophetic.¹¹ We were warned. It is difficult today, knowing where this view has taken Russia, to respond in a calm manner, and to treat with intellectual seriousness a view that has produced destruction and death beyond measure. Yet, I think it is advisable that we do look seriously at this view, and indeed, we should learn to see it as the continuation of a line of thinking that needs to be addressed so that those who are susceptible to such arguments can assess them for their portion of truth, and see them in a cool daylight.¹²

Americanization?

If Dugin were wrong in everything he says, there would be little need to answer him. The trouble is that there is a veneer, and in some places more than that, which describes real problems sensed by many people. Not the least of these is what he sees as Americanization, or US cultural imperialism. It goes by many names. Those like Dugin seem to think that it is part of a plan by the US to take over the world. That is giving too much credit to those who plan for and lead the US. The fact of human greed and a brand of capitalism, which happens to be slightly worse in the US, is quite beyond the control of the political powers of the West.¹³ If this way of life also appeals to a lot of Russians (and it does), Dugin needs to focus on cultural reform of his own people, rather than political and military ideas. If the Russians want this kind of life, no amount of politics and military force is going to stop them, as he should know, since this was among the key factors in the failure of the Soviet Union. What he thinks of as Americanization is not a political plan, and treating it as such is foolish and likely to fail (indeed, it *is* failing, *again*). If there is something wrong with this greed and laxity, and there is, it is not an American problem, it is a *human* problem. Politics and military power have become expressions and enforcers of this flawed value system, it is true, but changing them temporarily does not address the deeper problem, it worsens it.

Yet, there are steps that can be taken to bring the world to a less destructive collection of social habits. Thus, there is something Dugin has overlooked, and he should not have missed it, but he did. Dugin claims that we live in a post-ideological era because there is no "ideology" (in his sense of the word, which is odd to Americans but familiar to Europeans), that opposes the neo-liberal juggernaut that has taken over most of the world. To

11) He adds in his conclusion:

In a moment of exultant imperial elan, Dugin revealingly trumpets at one point in his book, "The battle for the world rule of [ethnic] Russians has not ended" (Dunlop, 213). It is necessary to speak the unvarnished truth. An official adviser on geopolitics to the speaker of the Russian Duma is a dangerous Russian fascist. As has been noted, Dugin also reportedly enjoys close ties to elements in the presidential administration, the secret services, the military, and the parliament. Although Dugin's influence should not be exaggerated, it also should not be understated. One is required to ask whether Russian fascism – a tendency which exhibits contempt both for international borders and for international law – has a realistic chance of emerging as the "new political thinking" in international affairs in Vladimir Putin's Russia. In late 1998, Russian academic Andrei Tsygankov appropriately warned that the discourse of Dugin and of like-minded "Eurasians" is in reality "the discourse of war." (Dunlop, 50)

It is good to bear in mind that the aversion to the use of the Russian military that held in 1997 was a detectable feint even in 2004. Militarism can be counted as one of Dugin's values.

12) Rose has nicely documented the strand of political theory to which Dugin is heir (although he does not mention Dugin, I would be very surprised if he did not accept this conclusion). See Rose, *A World after Liberalism*. Especially important is his chapter on Julius Evola.

13) There is call for a serious study of how the Corporation of the United States of America (founded 1871) has affected the growth of neo-liberalism. The US does business differently than nations that have a national bank (Andrew Jackson abolished the US national bank, established at the founding of the republic by Alexander Hamilton. In 1871 there was an act of Congress called the United States Reorganization Act of 1871. It incorporates the District of Columbia and makes all of the states in the US corporate divisions of this corporation. This is the body that does business for the USA. It is effectively a shadow government, although this was not foreseen when it was established. See Brown, *Cooperative Federalism*.

Americans, all “ideology” is bad and to be avoided (not that they manage to avoid it) – it is just the way the word is used. But Dugin’s sense, and the European sense of this word, is that ideology is the over-arching theory that informs one’s politics, good or bad. He seeks to frame an ideology that can oppose liberalism, neo-liberalism, and modernity in general. Such a theory has, in his understanding, a chance of bringing liberalism back to the status of an “ideology,” that is, a political view that has to be defended because it is opposed by formidable alternatives. He believes that no one bothers to defend liberalism because, after the fall of communism and fascism, there is no formidable alternative. He seeks to frame that alternative as “the fourth political theory.”

Liberalism vs. Neo-liberalism

Dugin confuses liberalism with its successor, neo-liberalism, but he is surely correct in seeing it as brooking no contenders, and therefore having few active defenders (one remembers Rawls and Rorty, both dead for quite some time now). Yet, the difference between liberalism and neo-liberalism is stark enough that a word should be given. The classical liberalism that informed the growth of the US ran its course in the nineteenth century, but it was not adequate for the twentieth. The adaptation began with the incorporation of the United States in 1871, but really began to accel with the entry of the US into the colonizing race for territory in the 1890s, with the overthrow of the Hawai’ian monarchy (1893). The US ignored John Locke’s historical call for a separate federative branch of government that would have handled foreign relations independent of the legislative, judicial, and executive powers. Investing the executive branch with the federative power, with only slight oversight by the legislative, set a time bomb in the history of the US. As the US became, against Washington’s advice, “entangled” in the enterprises of Europe, the need of a separate federative branch became increasingly clear.

The fight came to a head when the US was unable to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, due to animus between the executive and legislative branches; the US was unable to join the League of Nations. *That* was the end of classical liberalism in the US, such that gunboat diplomacy and militarism grew unchecked thereafter because of the failures of US foreign policy, as they accrued. As the twentieth century ended the executive branch began using foreign policy to control domestic conditions. The executive branch hoarded power by using the big stick of nearly unchecked control of foreign policy. The War Powers Act of 1973 was a last ditch effort by Congress to stop this hoarding and use of military power, passed over the veto of Richard Nixon. It proves that people were aware of what was happening. But it was not enough. Andrew Bacevich wrote an important assessment of this trend in 2005, which connected this use of the US military with its debtor standing.¹⁴

Individual freedom of a classical liberal sort became a relic of a day when freedom was a *political* idea. But as power shifted to global economics (especially the multinational corporations, but also the World Bank, IMF, etc.), freedom became a matter of privilege among those who could buy it. *That* is what was being resisted by both communism and fascism. Dugin tries to praise these movements for what they had right, but he does not see clearly what they were truly resisting: they were trying to keep the State *political*. This is quite old-fashioned, and it is over. The communist and fascist ideas regarding freedom were of the common good, the general welfare, as in the US Constitution states, conceived politically. But to call this spread of greed into its hegemonic control over freedom an “American problem” is far from adequate, and to associate it with liberalism is equally simplistic. Its proper name is neo-liberalism, and all forms of US conservatism, excepting the neo-fascists, are types of neo-liberalism.¹⁵

14) Bacevich, *The Limits of Power*. This book was prophetic in many ways about the issue of using the US military instead of diplomacy due to the economic weaknesses of the US. Dugin could benefit from studying it and making analogies.

15) These categories are nicely arranged and criticized in Stiegler, *Adapt!*.

The Genuine Alternative to Neo-liberalism

Dugin is also completely wrong to think that there is no formidable alternative, but perhaps he overlooked the alternative because it is not an “ideology” – it is not, in the strict sense, a political theory. Yet, there is, and there has been, a clear alternative to the creeping tentacles of unchecked capitalism for over two centuries. It is called “personalism.” It should never be confused with liberalism. Although liberalism *can* be personalist, as it was in the hands of Martin Luther King, Jr., for example, it often is not an easy companion with liberalism. As Lech Wałęsa said in his 2008 address before the International Conference on Persons in Warsaw, he did not resist communism and bring his country away from that ideology only to see it consumed by the individualism and corporate capitalism. Some personalists hold the individual to be the most basic unit of social reality, but others hold that the community is a person in the most concrete sense, while the individual is an abstraction from it. Even in its individualist form, personalism sometimes saves liberalism from its baser and impersonalist tendencies, and that is a constant struggle.¹⁶

Classical liberalism atomizes the human individual and that move, if it is ontologized in the wrong way, atomizes into hyper-individualism, while impersonalizing individuals: leaving them vulnerable to ideology, to consumerism, to social alienation, to propaganda, to politicization, to fanaticism, to fundamentalism, to narrow nationalism, and to militarism. This is the real problem Dugin is worried about, but he does not know how to describe it rightly. The problem is admittedly difficult to understand from a European point of view. The European view assumes a background and weight of history that simply has no hold over the minds of people in the Western Hemisphere. Europeans do not really imagine or believe this lifting of the burden of history until they spend years in the West – and this freedom from the grip of history is as much true of Latin America as of the Northern two nations.

The Relational Person

Personalism insists upon a relational interpretation of “person” (although the nature of that relation is not agreed upon) and holds the relational person as a value that both transcends and includes all political association. That is why it is not an ideology. Politics does not define person, person defines politics. But it must be admitted that personalists have been slow to articulate the political dimension or their worldview, as Juan Manuel Burgos has pointed out in his recent writings.¹⁷ As I have said, that problem with personalist philosophizing needs to be rectified.

I do not think we can afford to wait until personalists resolve the issue of whether the human individual is the exemplary or the only real “person.” Arguments and traditional intuitions about the soul of the human individual favor such a view. I cannot agree. I think the human individual is an abstraction, created by and for the community, which is more concrete and temporally enduring, and I point out that this is also the traditional view of Church – the Church is a person, and is so more deeply and properly than any individual. I would say the same is true of a community in which a *sensus communis* is an indwelling energy – call it a spirit or a soul if you wish, but I do not favor that language. The human community is not separable from the resources that support it or from the culture it creates. That will always involve religion, but it should not be reduced to that – the community is more than its religion. Having stated my view, and my respect for the

16) One may think of Brightman’s tendencies to individualism, counter-balanced by Muelder’s social personalism in the Boston University School. See Auxier, “The History of American Personalism.”

17) See Burgos, “Why Integral Personalism?” See also Burgos, *Personalist Anthropology*.

arguments of the realist individualists, we must move on to aspects of the person we can agree on, even where our ontologies differ.

The Personalist Position

I want to begin the personalist critique by imagining a slightly different historical path than the one that has actually unfolded. And I want to offer the alternative – one that satisfies the expectations we form both from what Dugin has right and what he has wrong. We must recognize, however reluctantly, the power of his ideas, but we must assess them without the militarism, nationalism, and (the key term) *fatalism* that come with his theory.¹⁸ I will take up the problem of fatalism toward the end of this essay. First, the alternative.

I want to emphasize that I am not a gloom-and-doom philosopher or specialist in political theory. But as I mentioned, personalists must do more to develop an explicit political philosophy. Personalists are not automatically liberals, but they are one and all, anti-fascist and anti-communist. Both views are impersonalist. Personalists must also address the present and future world. Personalists have maintained for two centuries that moral philosophy *is* political philosophy, and have focused on the former.¹⁹ The separation of morality from politics that is usually traced to Machiavelli is rejected by all personalists. Personalists may disagree on many things, but they agree that political action is first and foremost *moral* action. Thus, when they think of the political world, they think of a world which cannot be held apart from our moral ideals – freedom, dignity, empathy, and so forth. But the world does not well understand this position and it must be clarified. Yet, political action *is* first and foremost moral action.

The Moral and the Political

Dugin also wants a close connection between moral philosophy and politics, but he places politics in the superior position, and then makes moral philosophy (and even religion and tradition), conform to what he sees as certain political necessities. This is the one-sidedness of a purely *political* philosopher. For him, everything is reduced to political theory. This tendency makes plain one of the common problems with auto-didacts: they will have holes in their understanding they do not recognize. Dugin needs training in moral philosophy that he clearly lacks. Levy's criticisms, excellent as they are, do not help in this regard. Dugin clearly believes that the dignity of Russia depends on its *political* standing. To this perverse view, he adds imperatives from economics that in practice govern his ideas about morals. A good teacher would have made plain to him, when he was young and could still be corrected, that this is ideology in the bad sense of the term.

18) Levy calls the whole combination “nihilism,” which is a tempting label. But he is not quite right; it is a kind of fatalism, which is different. I will explain below. Dugin criticizes fatalism in various places (e.g., *The Fourth Political Theory*, 174 ff.), but the views he associates with the term are post-modern. I mean this term in its more traditional sense, and the quality of it associated with Russian history and thought in particular.

19) There are several good histories of personalism, but none spends much time on political philosophy. See Bengtsson, *The Worldview of Personalism*. One unusual exception to this habit of setting politics aside is in Auxier and Davies, *God, Process, and Persons*, which includes a sharp debate over Hitler and fascism. This part of the correspondence is analyzed in an appendix by Davies, “The Pacifism Debate,” 121–31. Both are personalists, but Brightman defends a doctrinaire pacifism and Hartshorne believes Hitler must be stopped by any means necessary. In many ways this debate characterizes personalism, with its serious leanings to non-violence, but its recognition of the rights of self-defense (even Martin Luther King allowed for this). Borden Parker Bowne, for example, had no compunction about using violence to stop impersonalist aggression.

In my view, Dugin's formula would suit Satan better than Jesus, and indeed, Dugin might well begin his re-training in moral philosophy with Satan's tempting of Jesus in the wilderness. I recommend this because Dugin regards himself as a serious Christian, but I think he has missed some lessons. There is surely such a thing as economic dignity, but the idea is that persons as such must be treated as ends, not that their personhood depends on prosperity or economic independence. In allowing this kind of thinking into his philosophy, Dugin concedes the moral argument to neo-liberalism. If our dignity is about economic power, then our politics will reflect that in seeking economic dominance. That kind of strategy will not work for Russia, although it has become obvious only recently that such an approach cannot work.

One might add to Dugin's philosophy a few things about "we do not live by bread alone," and remind him of the difficulty for the rich to find the Kingdom of God. We might add that political power is given over to Satan, who offers it to Jesus and to us, and it is something to be overcome rather than to be sought. In the world, Mr. Dugin, you will find tribulation, but be of good cheer, since Jesus has overcome the world. That would be one direction he might consider, if he were sincere rather than cynical in his religiosity. When one "knows" these things, in the religious sense, political power and economic power take on a rather different tone. One might look at the examples of Gandhi and King.

Some Historical Facts

Let us look at some actual history to contextualize Dugin's theory.

As we know, some old-style Soviet communists (the circle of Putin), pulled Russia back from the brink of being consumed by these forces of neo-liberal, corporate capitalism. Dugin associates this pressure on Russia with the US, and one has to admit that is fair. The US is, since the decline of the European empires, the driving force behind this terrible change in human history, toward consumerism, and a neo-Darwinian picture of our bio-history, in which the struggle for survival becomes an economic calculation in their macroeconomic ideology. This view recognizes only growth and devalues anything that cannot readily be measured in its contribution to the GDP of a nation, or whatever abstract measure or calculation is currently dominating their equally abstract concept of "the economy."

Further, there is no denying that the US and NATO have not kept their promise, made when Germany re-unified in 1990, that NATO would not expand. When the Soviet Union moved into Cuba, it is not as if the US was willing to stand down. Yet, NATO has pressed the borders of Russia itself, and has taken in a number of former Soviet Republics as NATO members. One wonders what the US would do in analogous circumstances, except that one need not wonder very long. The US has taken down leftist governments all over Latin America for well over a century.²⁰

Yet, Dugin seems to overlook that his view, just like neo-liberalism, necessarily places nations at odds with one another. It is not as if his Theory can dispense with the global economy. This is a lesson Russia is learning the hard way. Therefore, drawing strict nationalist boundaries, as Dugin advocates (along with well-defined spheres of influence), will leave some nations sinking and hence colonized and dominated by those rising. The real problem driving Dugin was that Russia was becoming a neo-colony of this sort, its resources extracted,

20) This habit seems to have begun with Cuba in 1906, although it was not always leftist governments; sometimes it was just "unfriendly" political regimes. The Monroe Doctrine has been the pretext for ignoring world criticism of behavior very similar to Putin's. Like Putin's philosophy, the Monroe Doctrine is a self-serving piece of ideology, but it has the distinction of being very old. For an incomplete list of US "activism" see Wikipedia, "United States Involvement in Regime Change." Notably, this list omits Woodrow Wilson's invasion and occupation of the Dominican Republic (1916–1924) and Reagan's invasion of Grenada (1983). These actions were almost always condemned, and the condemnations ignored, while the US made arguments no stronger than Putin makes regarding Ukraine.

its people increasingly the servants of McDonald's and other corporatized neo-liberal entities. It was in this context that he announced "the American Empire should be destroyed." He calls it "the evil of unipolarity."²¹ And that was unacceptable to him, and to many, clearly. Yet, strengthening national boundaries makes this situation worse, not better. Opposition to this destructive kind of capitalism cannot derive from an atomized nation state (i.e., the U.S. alone), any more than it can come from an atomized human being. The spheres of influence do, however, create unwilling vassal states. This is not a path forward. One must reluctantly agree with Dugin here, but there are far more responsible critics of neo-colonialism who do not pair their legitimate critique with a militaristic plan for destabilization of the globe (as we can now easily understand the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to have done. That destabilization – the sheer scale of it – surprised many people. One assumes that Dugin did not wholly foresee the consequences for Russia.

To Dugin, this aggressive capitalism looked like the deliberate policy and purpose of the US, to undermine Russia (and anyone else who got in the way). He believed that like China, Russia "had to respond" decisively in order to maintain its autonomy, or otherwise become what the Western Hemisphere had become: a part of the US trading bloc, and hence a "division" of the US economy. NAFTA formalized that situation in the West, with Canada supplying the resources and Mexico supplying the labor. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was attempting to do something similar to the Pacific Rim, before Trump killed it. One cannot deny that these plans must look like US aggression, to China and to Russia. And one cannot deny that the US does not seem to be interested in really working with any government or group that will not play by the rules of its version of corporate capitalism (witness Trump's semi-successful trade war with China).

What would prevent Russia or China from becoming an exploited source of natural resources and labor, for the EU and the West, only lower in the pecking order? But the fear of becoming like the US, only not as rich, strikes me personally, as not worthy of fear at all. The thing to fear has little to do with the US or any other nation state, and far more to do with the degraded form of humanity begotten by corporate capitalism itself. It is not as if the average citizen of the US is happy about becoming part of that corporate behemoth, Wal-Mart Associates and McDonald's "team" members. And that problem of being ground up in the gears of corporate capitalism is not peculiar to the US at all, it is a problem of modernity. Dugin recognizes it in his clearer moments, but then starts his rant all over again about America and the West without seeing the suffering cause by corporate capitalism on the *other* side of the globe. Do Americans (I mean North and South) seem happy or content on the whole? How many countries in the Western Hemisphere are suffering from dangerous political polarization, while the rich get richer and the poor get poorer? Nearly all of them, *including* the US.

It is very difficult, in my opinion, to justify on moral grounds these developments toward consumerism, although the *practicality* of it is difficult to deny.²² People want what they want, and what they want turns out to belong to what Jan Olof Bengtsson (following Irving Babbitt and Claes Ryn) calls a "lower romanticism."²³ Under this corporate-begotten consumerism, we go after the very things that actually undermine our dignity. Dugin does not want this, but I think he does not understand how to resist it. He thinks the West *likes* this and insists on it for everybody. But there is nobody driving that bus. He wants to fight, as if this sort of cultural

21) Dugin, *The Fourth Political Theory*, 193. See also the early warning by Heiser, "The American Empire." Heiser uses Eric Voegelin's famous formula for the kind of fatalism I am describing here.

22) McCloskey has documented the practicality of what she calls "the bourgeois deal" in a massive three-volume study of the rise of the middle class. See McCloskey: *The Bourgeois Virtues*, and *Bourgeois Dignity*, and *Bourgeois Equality*. This analysis would cause nightmares for a theory like Dugin's and being adequately empirical, as history, it is an argument he would have to answer. The basic thesis is that "the bourgeois deal" improved the condition of the entire human race, and the evidence is undeniable. The libertarian posture of the author does not change the data, even if it does undermine the persuasiveness of the argument.

23) See Ryn, *Will, Imagination, and Reason*.

force can be fought by fighting the persons who are in its grip. That fight is counter-productive. In fighting the Westernization of Ukraine, Dugin thought he was fighting the abstractions that populate his theories. In fact, he was slaughtering persons whose infinite worth he should have recognized.

The way neo-liberal, corporate capitalism justifies its impersonalist sort of “development” is by saying that in the long run, *everyone* does better. The problem lies with the meaning of “better.” If one means material prosperity, there is a strong empirical argument in support of that claim (see McCloskey, cited above). Neo-liberalism makes people, on the whole, materially better off. If one associated “better” with wider values – spiritual, moral, environmental, religious, and so forth – that argument is undercut quickly. Yet, you cannot use an army or the government of a nation state to fight this sort of lower desire, nor can you use these coercive powers to promote the higher values. If it is the duty of the nation state to improve us morally, the nation state is a dismal failure. Dugin has no clear plan for making us better at protecting the dignity of persons.

Thus, I believe from reading Dugin, that *he* believes he understands the US and the West far better than he does, and that he should therefore measure his assertions in light of the real suffering in the West. Levy asked him, in the famous debate, whether he really knows anything about the US, and Dugin said he does, and has been there; but is currently under sanction and unable to visit. But I think he is not seeing the sources of his discontent very clearly. This is not about the US, as a political entity, it is about the structure of human desire and how it can distort personality. So, it is more complicated than he thinks, and far harder to change. There is as much or more resistance to the *real* problem: impersonalist corporate capitalism, in the US as anywhere else in the developed world. But the effect of the dominant trend in the US on the world is pretty much what he says it is, and perhaps some will say he can be excused if the details are not thoroughly considered. But I do not think we can excuse him.

An Imaginative Flight

What effect is that? The effect of consumerist corporate capitalism? In short, it is to turn everything into McDonald’s and Wal-Mart and Hollywood. That seems about right, in terms of the particulars about what the US has actually done, although it certainly has not done it alone. The cooperation of those who were being neo-colonized was not exactly difficult to obtain. And if one does *not* want one’s country to become more like that, one had best resist. Dugin does do that. But how? It is not pretty, and it is not morally excusable. I also do not want *my* country to become more like that, but it has. The fact that there is much nuance and variation does not matter unless one can carve out a pocket free of those nefarious influences, and that is very hard to do. Geopolitics seems less effective than localized resistance. How to resist the forces of impersonalization while keeping the values of home and dignity, and future? Attack one’s neighbors?

Personalists, for over two centuries, have focused consistently on the human prospects for defeating our demons and having a better future. Let us be bold enough to imagine a different past so as to get at that alternative future. The purpose of this imaginative flight is to put us in a more reflective and less emotional frame of mind. Some philosophers would call this a thought experiment, but I do not have much sympathy with what they call “conceptual analysis,” the idea of using thought experiments as intuition pumps. I am not interested in getting you to consult your moral or even ontological intuitions in what follows. I am interested in getting reflective distance, calming our justified emotional response to the genocidal results of Dugin’s ideas, and asking “why does anyone believe him?” But many do.

This said, let us imagine: Dugin is roughly my age, so 60-ish, as of this writing. But that means he and I were both raised under Cold War conditions, absorbing, as children, the Cold War ideologies. He was told that the Soviet Union had won the war against fascism. Indeed, that is a fair assessment. I was told the US and

its Western allies won that war, which is stretching the truth, but study allows one to overcome such one-sided history, *if* one lives in the West. I realized that the Soviet Union basically won that war with Germany when I was about 50, and that the US and its allies played a vital supporting role. (I speak here only of the European theater.) The point is: Dugin was fed something approaching the truth, while I was fed something closer to a lie, on this important topic. As our ideas were forming, he was working with better material on some points than a typical American had. Yet, I believe I was in a better position overcome the lie, than he was to situate in a historical context the more accurate version of history he got. Why? Simply put, the freer flow of information makes bad history harder to defend. Meanwhile, even accurate history is not very helpful in a situation of restricted flow of information. Result: the legacy of liberalism is not wholly bad, although one must admit that it is harder to find the “facts” today than at any time I can remember. The freer flow of information provides opportunity for broader perspectives, but does not cause them.

Let us go back, to 1989. I date the true beginning of neo-liberalism to the end of the Cold War. (In 1989, I was 28, Dugin was 27. For those who were once that age, I invite imaginative identification. One knows something, but not nearly so much as one believes.) The Berlin wall came down, and the break-up of the Soviet Union followed. Corporate capitalism went wild. These were all world-shattering events. We knew *about* it but did not really understand it. And we *knew* that we did not understand it. Finally, information was flowing, and almost immediately, Clinton, Blair, and company (the godfathers of neo-liberalism), were in charge for the entire decade of the 90s, of how this shift would be guided and governed. I can imagine better leaders. God help us, but, for example, Nixon and Kissinger, maybe John Major. (Am I really saying that?) And the Clinton-Blair axis turned the world toward a corporate globalism and, one by one, dragged the developed countries into that chomping capitalist maw. (I personally saw what was happening and became an environmental leftist, as Clinton sought to clear cut every forest in the US, and in opposition to this juggernaut of development and destruction of all that was dear and irreplaceable in nature. I see no reason to believe that was a bad choice, for a youngster, at the time.)

Dugin also made his choices. He watched his country, or at least its elite and powerful, get in bed with this neo-liberal resource extraction orgy, and he watched the few become the masters of the many, with no decency or sense that Russia was anything other than one more repository of natural resources to be raped by the corporations, backed by the military power of the West (does one dare say NATO?). Germany re-unified, and NATO promised never to expand. Meanwhile Dugin got in a lot of trouble, getting kicked out of school and was flirting with prison more or less constantly. Is it possible that could have happened to someone like me, or you, if it was our country going down the bad path? I think so. It is what happens when a young person with a social conscience sees things going terribly wrong all around him/her. My point is that, in Dugin, we must remember that we are dealing with a person. That cannot be ignored. I do not think a regular person could have become Dugin, but what about auto-didacts with intellectual pretensions (and for argument’s sake, a very smart auto-didact). Granting, that is not a common profile, but it exists. Indeed, the figures treated by Matthew Rose in *A World after Liberalism* are mostly of this sort (Spengler being a clear exception).

If that is what Dugin saw, given who he was, it is a fair observation about what was happening and what was likely to happen. Self-restraint has never been a built-in feature of capitalism, and opposition to it has a history of poor self-restraint as well. The restraint has to come from elsewhere, from outside the dialectic that corporate capitalism creates. What Dugin seems not to realize, still, is that something similar was happening in North America, as the corporate elite raped Canada’s resources and exploited Mexico’s workers. That angry bunch of populists got screwed by neo-liberalism, and they are wreaking havoc in the US. There was resistance in the US, but it was ineffective at the time the deals were being made. It is not as if the American working class benefitted from the assault of NAFTA and the government serving the corporations. I think Dugin may

be failing to grasp how similar the 90s were for Russia and North America. The FBI is not the KGB, and my groups of environmental activists did not get in too much trouble for raging against the machine. The machine created by the North Americans was pre-fitted for absorbing such rage.

During this time, 1990 to 2001, it is possible that I might have met Dugin. I began studying Russian in 1994 because my university at that time needed professors to go to Russia, as it opened up and received the West. Academic neo-colonialism. I was promised a year in Russia if I could become minimally able to use the language. In the end, the university decided to hire some people already fluent in Russian for its programs, including an exchange with Moscow State University, which was to become Dugin's university. I genuinely might have met him. What would I have said? What would *we* have said? He was already a nationalist and a traditionalist, but among academics, we regularly talk across such lines, do we not? Would I have had a chance to tell him about personalism, and how it opposes the things he is most worried about? What if I had pointed out the personalists among Russian thinkers, Nicolai Berdyaev, Lev Shestov, and the strong tradition of personalism in the Russian Orthodox Church? Would he have been open to studying these figures? Might personalism have rescued him from the patchwork he was assembling from the fragments of communism and fascism? I want to imagine that conversation so as to get a handle on how Dugin's theories evolved, and where the contingencies were that later became impossible to change.

Bengtsson's Commentary

Dugin certainly would have said he has read the Russian personalists, even agrees with them. That is something I feel sure he would have said. But what he misses, over and over in his actual work, is the *personalism* itself. Jan Olof Bengtsson has analyzed Dugin's "Fourth Political Theory" in some detail, but has not, in my opinion, leaned heavily enough on the problem with it, which is the incoherent ontology. Bengtsson says:

Again, the fourth theory has been conceived by Dugin as an unfinished, ongoing, and collaborative project. But already as it has thus far emerged, in his own work, as suggested points of departure, a correctly posed question, it captures, in broad outline, much of the essence of the human condition as it relates to world politics at our present point in time. And it indicates, equally broadly, a possible way out of the predicament that this condition in reality is, the predicament which the "first" political theory, liberalism, as inextricably bound to globalized, financial, monopoly capitalism in its present stage of development, has put us all in.²⁴

I think this is right, and it is a concise version of what I have explained above. Bengtsson says that paleo-conservatism (most fully set out by Paul Gottfried)²⁵ has all the elements Dugin really needs and wants, and without the problematic baggage that cannot be separated cleanly from fascism and communism, while still resisting Enlightenment (lower) romanticism and capitalism, insofar as they need to be reined in. The trouble here is that Bengtsson seems to allow that Dugin's ideas could be reformed into some sort of acceptable theory, and indeed Dugin has enough "right" that this position is tempting. But it cannot be done. The connection between Dugin and his "unacceptable political statements," as Bengtsson calls them, and his influence on the current Russian regime is not incidental, not something that can be set aside, as Bengtsson does, with the remark that it has "marginalized him in academia." I think we do have a bit more of the Rasputin problem here than Bengtsson

24) See Bengtsson's blog: Bengtsson, "Spirituality, Arts & Humanities."

25) See Gottfried and Fleming, *The Conservative Movement*, among many other writings.

allows, even with religious pluralism admitted. I do not mean Dugin is crazy, I mean that his sanity is incorrigibly misguided. I do not think he can mature into a responsible philosopher.

Bengtsson criticizes Dugin for relying on a structuralist and reductionist anthropology, which is impersonalist, although Bengtsson does not point out the impersonalism in any explicit way. The genuine problem comes from the fact that Dugin retreats, when pressed, to saying that human nature is *Dasein*. The apocalypticism, inherited from Spengler and traceable through Evola and even Fukuyama (albeit in contrast to the more typical right-wing apocalypticism), the eschatology as the destining of *Dasein*, is a problem that cannot be solved by reforming Dugin. This again is in keeping with the Voegelin-style critique articulated by James Heiser (cited earlier). Dugin says in an interview:

You have opportunely mentioned the multiplicity of Daseins – Western and Eastern (in reality the nomenclature is much subtler). The liberals' version of the present-day West with American hegemony and left-liberal culture as "a dogmatic culture" is the most extreme form of inauthentic existence. So the West today lives on the other side of its own Dasein, in the most concentrated point of inauthenticity, in the full oblivion of its identity. Eurasia and Russia awakening will awaken real Western Dasein from sleep and the loss of Self. With Eastern Dasein, or better Eastern Daseins, the situation is quite different. They are also seriously damaged by Modernity and have sometimes turned into simulacra, but they are much more alive than Western Dasein, which is dying.²⁶

This is clearly a non-standard reading of *Dasein*, and quite a departure from anything Heidegger says or means, but that in itself is not necessarily a fault, since philosophers appropriate and change other philosophers' key ideas all the time. The question is the result. For Dugin, adding it all together, it means something like irreducibly (maybe entirely) subjective but social self-awareness. Building on this idea of *Dasein*, he asserts:

The world around us becomes what it is by the fundamental action of presencing accomplished by the mind. When the mind sleeps, reality lacks a sense of present existence. It is fully immersed in a continuous dream. The world is created by time, and time, in its turn, is the manifestation of self-aware subjectivity [i.e., *Dasein*], and *intrasubjectivity*.²⁷

From this he concludes:

The future is social because it is a historical feature and not immanent to an object's nature. The object has no future. The Earth, animals, stones, machines – all have no future. Only that which can take part in the human social context can take part in the future, and then only indirectly. Without self-referential consciousness, there can be no time. Time is that which is inside us, and what makes us who we are. Time is man's ultimate identity.²⁸

26) See the interview in Dugin, *The Rise of the Fourth Political Theory*. This discussion of Heidegger is important because Dugin's long works on Heidegger are not currently available in English, but they have been summarized by Millerman in his book *Beginning with Heidegger*.

27) Dugin, *The Fourth Political Theory*, 159.

28) *Ibid.*

Perhaps I do not even have to point out that this is an incoherent ontology, not to mention a perfectly terrible interpretation of Heidegger, if that is what it is meant to be. Simply put, Earth, animals, stones, and machines do not take part in human social context. Therefore, they are outside of time. Time creates the world by dint of the presencing of mind. Therefore, Earth, animals, stones and machines are also outside of the world, having no presence and no future. Therefore, the mind, whose ultimate identity is time, can have no relation, social or otherwise, to Earth, animals, stones and machines, or to any other “objects.” It follows that we are not aware of those four objects listed, or of any others, nor can we be, and apparently we are only indirectly aware of others, other *Daseins*. The reason this is fatalism rather than solipsism or nihilism is due to the irreducible presence of history in the ontology. Add history to this toxic ontological brew, and you have fatalism, social *Dasein(s)*’ being-toward-death. But only in the West, apparently, so some *Dasein* is being-toward death, due to its inauthenticity, which other *Dasein* can wake up if they invades Ukraine, annexe Georgia and whatever else catches its semi-sleepy eye.

Dugin is a fatalist of an incoherent sort, then. This fatalism is not the Fourth Political Theory, it is a prophecy about the end of all politics, and that Fourth Theory is a prescription about how to realize a social eschaton. It is a vow to go down fighting the neo-liberal foe. This fatalism cannot be reconciled to the Modern, and will certainly never overcome Modernity. It theorizes the Armageddon-like clash of tradition, its final battle, with Modernity, and knows it cannot win. *Dasein(s)* is being toward death. Death is what *Dasein(s)* anticipates. Dugin would like to associate his fatalistic battle with Modernity with Traditionalist philosophy, to lend a crust of respectability to this, well, it is nonsense, is it not it? But the Traditionalists have no truck with Dugin.²⁹

Person and Death

Person(s) has no such deathwish. Person is being-toward-freedom. Personalists read Schelling rather differently than Heidegger did. It might serve as a corrective to Dugin if he were to reconsider Schelling’s 1809 essay on freedom. When he speaks of this topic, he uses Heidegger’s language about letting being be the beings they are, *Gelassenheit*. Person is unapologetically and unequivocally active. Person acts. Even waiting is acting. Person is community and individual; person is plural and in solidarity with others. The history of Person is not the history of West or East, authentic or inauthentic, and it is not an *interpretation* of action, it is the *past of action* in light of its openness to the future. Person makes nations as surely as it brings them to ruin, East and West. Person makes technology as surely as it uses or misuses it. Person never sleeps in the ontological sense that Dugin asserts for his Western *Dasein*, indeed Person never rests, and never yields. Even in physical sleep Person acts, and its dreams are more than mere illusions. What Dugin *wanted* to describe was not *Dasein*, it was Person.

But person can err, can degrade itself even if it cannot truly be degraded by another. Dugin wanted the ominous feel, the apocalyptic gravity, the *ressentiment*, the hate and rage, and most of all he wanted to complain about the blow to his ego that came with the defeat of the Soviet Union. That is a misuse of intelligence. Soviet communism had degraded Person to mere matter, which is worse than being a consumer. If *Dasein* looks better to him, it is a short-term improvement at the cost of a long-term disaster. When a human being or a village needs a soul, one does not peddle it a second-hand idea, one points to the soul it has not seen in itself.

The *real* Fourth Political Theory is and always has been personalism, and interpreting *Dasein* as “person,” which some have done, is a disservice to Person unless the idea is seriously adjusted upward from Heidegger’s being-toward-death and finitude to being toward-freedom and possibilities. These resources are in Heidegger’s

29) It would be hard to imagine a more complete rebuttal of Dugin’s pretensions to be a Traditionalist than Upton’s massive work, *Dugin against Dugin*. This is over five-hundred pages of closely argued critique.

writings, but they are unused by Dugin. Reading *Dasein* as person changes the ontology in ways that remove it both from traditionalism (the Guenon sort, that Dugin admires in Evola's radicalized form), and from all ideas of fate and destiny. The fatalist conjectures are replaced with an ideal of freedom which, alone, can secure the ontology against that of individualist, consumerist capitalism. Beneath classical liberalism and its neo-version, always, there is also a determinism and crypto-materialism, along with an atomism of some form. So Dugin's critique succeeds only on grounds that would apply to communism as well. Fascism and fascist *Dasein* also cannot make sufficient room for Person as being-toward freedom.

Person is relational and processual, all the way down. I do not think Dugin understands that. Personalism is the only position that can compete with the forces Dugin (and Bengtsson) rightly criticize. We do not need Heidegger for this, and indeed, he is a false friend if he is a friend at all.

It is difficult to estimate the prospects for personalism ever to prevail as the principal basis of human society. I choose the word "society" after much reflection. I do not say as the "politics" or "political order" of the world. Personalism is post-political, in that sense – except that it was so from its beginnings. So if Dugin wants to theorize a post-political order, as he claims, he needs to start with Kant, not with the hegemony of liberalism. That is why Personalism can conserve what liberalism got right without violence – the sacred worth and dignity of individuals as well as communities. This makes personalism diametrically opposed to Dugin's theory at the most basic and most important level. Personalism, as a philosophy, is a *cluster* of possibilities for thinking through any situation, past, present or future. It hangs together just as a star cluster does – from any perspective in the universe, the ideas that surround "person" are the same, and similarly proximate. They include a list you know well – dignity, empathy, respect, non-violence, care, community, and most of all freedom.

Dugin does not believe we are free; a position he takes from every source he values. He thinks "freedom" is merely license and licentiousness. And without community and restraint, it is, so he is right. But fate and being-toward-death is not what restrains personalists, love does. That idea is also missing from Dugin's theory, and what a telling omission that is. Personalists build their ideas about relation from the difficult idea of love, and their ideas about freedom from what love requires. It requires the primacy of the other person, the recognition that my access to myself is the gift of the other persons to me. When one places Person at the center, the cluster coheres into an ontology of value that Dugin could never grasp. He is trying to make history and intellect do the work that only love can do, which is to exist in, through, and as the *ordo amoris*. That is our personalist ontology, and *Dasein's* projects look very puny beside it. That is our personalist anthropology. Structuralism and other forms of reductionism, in their poverty, cannot compare the riches of Person.

What Dugin has assembled is not a rich cluster of real possibilities, but merely a *constellation* of dissociated ideas, a patchwork of ideas that do not in fact fit together. Constellations only appear as patterns from particular perspectives – the stars are not really proximate at all. So it is with Dugin's ideas, a bit from here, a bit from there, and together, they form an intellectual version of Frankenstein's monster. It may live, and grow in power, but it comes from the world of dead ideas. Dugin should banish himself and take his monster with him. Bengtsson identifies the many fault-lines, incoherencies and even a few contradictions, but he does not draw the conclusion: this theory cannot work, ever. And therein lies the difference between reforming Dugin, and rejecting his view entirely. We Personalists already had, in our clear possession, everything he has right *without* his theory. And the only way forward he offers is death. Let us choose otherwise.

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