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The Morphology of Right Populism in the US and in the EU

Abstract: Right populism in the United States and in the European Union is one of the leading trends in their political reality. That is why we need to structurize our understanding of this phenomenon by listing its main indicators and by explaining its causal background. What seems to belong to the leading determinants of the phenomenon is: the hostility toward immigration, the perception of multinational companies as a threat to local labor markets, a postulate to reduce bureaucracy, anti-elitism, another understanding of international politics combined with a new opening in the relations with Russia.

Various right populist movements result from several determinants such as a significant increase of immigration in Europe, the growth of national debt, expanding bureaucracy, growing importance of international corporations, a flood of terrorist attacks or negative demographic tendencies.

The ideology of right populism can be referred to two different traditions: to individualist libertarianism (which partially determines the ideology of the Tea Party and some other American movements) and to *alt-right*, collectivist, tribal traditionalism, which is more common in the Old Continent.

Key words: US, United States, EU, Union, Europe, right, populism, alt-right, Brexit

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to contribute to the understanding of a widespread but vaguely defined phenomenon usually described as right-wing populism within the Western democracies, at the dawn of the third millennium. What has to be admitted is the significant impact of right-wing populist ideologies on the political reality in the EU and on the other side of the Atlantic, which results from mental transformations in Europe and in the US. There is a necessity for a structural description of the doctrinal base (in other words, for a comprehensive conceptual summary of the phenomenon based on a synthetic overview) on the one hand, and for a possible social justification of the new tendencies on the other.

The topic has already been discussed in several publications, including the leading monographs: Betz & Immerfal (1998), Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser (2012) and Fielitz & Laloire (2016). The authors usually concentrate on the analysis of particular cases of right-wing populism. However, in a smaller number of studies one can find some causal and structural generalizations, such as in the paper of Arbatova et al. (2016) concerning right- and left-wing populism in EU states.

There are several theoretical problems that may appear while considering a synthetic and causal study of the question. Although the need for such an attempt is not questioned, the theoretical framework is an arguable matter, since it can either be withdrawn from the structure of the doctrines, or rely on the social and economic context of the states in question. Moreover, the conclusions may take either the shape of an inductive synthesis, a generalization based on observed cases or a form of deductive speculation. There are good reasons for each of the approaches. The necessity to return to political reality is beyond doubt, and that is the reason for presenting some exemplary cases of right-wing populism as an obvious point of reference. On the other hand, however, it also makes sense to create a conceptual structure of right-wing populism both as a generalization of ideas and as a set of possible ideological options that might be used by any populists as devices of political manipulation.

Right-wing populism is by no means a sudden or a new phenomenon. The shocks caused by the new right have been observed since the late 1970s. Surprisingly, one could detect them on both sides of the iron curtain. In the USSR, a leftist totalitarian empire, the late years of the Brezhnev era were marked by the appearance of Pamyat – the first new conservative nationalist organization, which evolved from a historical association Vityaz, promoted by the Soviet Society for the Protection of Historical and Cultural Monuments (cf. Brudny, 2000, pp. 204ff.).

The Western world (the one that stems from Catholicism and Protestantism), seemed not to have convincing reasons for rightist populism: technological development transformed the United States and the uniting Europe into unquestionably well-prospering and attractive partners. The world economic system was designed according to American and European expectations. The “wonder years” of counterculture left the memories of wars behind. After the end of the cold war the integrative processes went on, making NATO and the EU grow bigger and extending the area of Western influence and relative stability. However, the following years witnessed the emergence of new tendencies on both sides of the Atlantic.

A bird's eye view on right-wing populism in the US

In the United States, the new rightist positions (after the McCarthyism of the 1950s) were represented most strikingly by groups and thinkers representing the trend of **paleoconservatism**. Paleocons such as Pat Buchanan, Russell Kirk, Tom Tancredo and Paul Gottfried were for many years considered to be the main protectors of the values promoted by traditional white America: family, limited government, Jeffersonian federalism, religious identity and civil society (based on individual initiative and independence). Paleoconservatism never had a single, vertically organized party, which in a way corresponds with their anti-centralism. Their political views were represented by such movements as the American Party of the United States, the Constitution Party, America's Party (previously America's Independent Party), the America Freedom Party (that emerged from the American Third Position Party), the Christian Liberty Party and the Independent American Party. None of them ever played an important part in real politics.

A phenomenon of much bigger importance is the Tea Party, a conservative movement associated much more often with the Republican Party than with the Democrats. Its ideology oscillates around the reduction of taxes and state deficit. TP activists strongly opposed *Obamacare* (*The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act*), which was clearly responsible for the enormous growth of America's national debt. According to Bowman & Marsico (2014), at least 10% of the American population adhere to the ideas of the Tea Party, which means that we are dealing with a real power.

Halloran (2010) suggests that the Tea Party rightist "populism" is a result of the failure in solving the country's economic and social problems during the Democratic period in the White House. However, a look into TP slogans and the ideologies of paleoconservative parties allows one to say that in fact we are coming up against a predominant **libertarian** turn in the rightist regions of the American political stage. It is obvious that the purest representation of this doctrine is to be found in the manifesto of the Libertarian Party, which is not a completely unimportant phenomenon, especially if we consider the fact that the Libertarian candidate for US presidency in 2016 received 3.28% in the popular vote, which placed him right behind Clinton (48.18%) and Trump (46.09%).

However, libertarian ideas are widely represented in the manifestos of the other right-wing American parties and movements, including the

highly influential Tea Party as well. Most of the 15 TP's "Non-negotiable Core Beliefs" refer directly to libertarian values:

4. Special interests must be eliminated.
5. Gun ownership is sacred.
6. Government must be downsized.
7. The national budget must be balanced.
8. Deficit spending must end.
9. Bailout and stimulus plans are illegal.
10. Reducing personal income taxes is a must.
11. Reducing business income taxes is mandatory. [...]
13. Intrusive government must be stopped" (Webteaparty, 2017).

However, some of the Tea Party's core beliefs belong to another stream of the political right, not necessarily compatible with liberal values:

1. Illegal aliens are here illegally.
2. Pro-domestic employment is indispensable.
3. A strong military is essential.
- [...]
12. Political offices must be available to average citizens.
- [...]
14. English as our core language is required.
15. Traditional family values are encouraged" (Webteaparty, 2017).

The other face of contemporary right-wing populist ideology was described by Gottfried (2008) as the **alternative right (alt-right)**, which embraces such ideas as white supremacy (or even white nationalism, represented most visibly by Richard Spencer), islamophobia, antisemitism, homophobia and antifeminism (directed not against women but against extreme feminism). The media platform for the trend is provided by the *Altright.com* website and some partners such as *Arktos*, *Radix Journal* or *Red Ice TV*. Shapiro (2016) with no hesitation accuses *Breitbart News* of embracing the white supremacist *Alt-Right* as well. Apart from Spencer (accompanied by his colleagues such as Daniel Friberg, Jason Jorjani, Henrik Palmgren, William Regnery, Hunter Wallace and Tor Westman) Weigel (2016) mentions Peter Brimelow and Jared Taylor as the other main representatives of the movement.

The difference of the two spirits, which are equally labeled as "rightist" or even "right-wing populist" are concisely described by Tucker (2016), who points out important differences between libertarianism and some dominating trends in the alt-right phenomenon. First of all, a libertarian emphasizes the fact that "libertarianism speaks of individual choice, alt-

right theory draws attention to collectives on the move.” In other words, the alt-rights continue the tradition of rabid collectivist visionaries, including nationalists, fascists or elitists, such as Hegel, Carlyle, Gentile or Schmitt. Secondly, libertarian thinking stems from a belief in the possible harmony among people, whereas alt-right realism is rooted in the idea of unavoidable conflict. Thirdly, “the libertarian believes that the best and most wonderful social outcomes are not those planned, structured, and anticipated, but rather the opposite” while in the alt-right conception society “is built by the will of great thinkers and great leaders with unconstrained visions of what can be. What we see out there operating in society is a result of someone’s intentional and conscious planning from the top down. If we cannot find the source, or if the source is somehow hiding, we imagine that it must be some shadowy group out there that is manipulating outcomes – and hence the alt-right’s obsession with conspiracy theory. The course of history is designed by someone, so ‘we’ might as well engage in the great struggle to seize the controls – and hence the alt-right obsession with politics as a contact sport.” Fourthly, a libertarian supports free trade and migration of people, whereas for the alternative rightists the internal market should be protected and free migration causes a threat to national identity. Last but not least, one should note the libertarian admiration of progress and, contrary to that, the alt-right fear of the loss of culture, identity and mission.

Even if one does not accept Tucker’s synthesis entirely, it is clear that alt-right is alternative to traditional right-wing individualism thanks to a kind of a “tribal” or “mobilization” instinct, and alternative to the left counter-movements because of preaching a war against such things as the destruction of national culture by immigration, moral degradation, decomposition of families or traditional patriotism, etc. The American right-turn is in a way paradoxical, with its cult of limited government and individual initiative explained in terms of tribal or religious imperatives.

Selected cases of right-wing populism in Europe

The American reaction against deep-rooted liberalism was accompanied by analogous phenomena in the Old Continent. The beginnings were obviously different than in the US with its McCarthy’s witch hunt: Europe was permeated with the feeling of post-war security guaranteed by American military forces. For half a century after WW2, Western Europe

grew as a uniting continent characterized by relative well being and political stability, with only temporary turbulences such as the events of 1968 in France. If there was a real populist alternative, it typically appeared on the left side of the political stage.

The situation began to change after the first traumatic experience with mass immigration. The first steps were made in Austria, which should probably be studied as a separate case, because its main right-wing populist party – the **Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ)** was founded as early as in 1956. Such early beginnings can probably be explained by the resentment caused by the Soviet occupation, which was much less efficient in denazification proceedings than the Western partners.

The FPÖ's ideology focuses on the *Heimat*, the homeland, which ought to be protected both in an economic and cultural sense. That is why the party has always been highly sensitive to the immigration question: an inflow of newcomers is associated with the demolition of the welfare state and of the Teutonic character of the nation. As far as the national question is concerned, the FPÖ originally resorted to a sort of Pan-Germanism: in the party's manifesto the Austrian nation is described as predominantly German with "integrated minorities" (see: Parteiprogram, 2017) However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the party became euro-skeptical and turned to Austrian nationalism. It is no surprise that the party's ideology is generally anti-Islamic, pointing out the problem of the growing share of Muslims in a traditionally German-speaking and Christian population.

The manifesto contains a limited input of libertarian ideas, saying that: "Freedom is our most valued asset. Since the civil revolution in 1848 we have dedicated ourselves to the struggle for freedom, and to defend it wherever necessary if what we have achieved comes under threat." However, the collectivist content is much stronger, referring to such imperatives as national identity, traditional family, necessity for proper public health care, protection of law and security.

In the area of international relations, the FPÖ's vision of Europe boils down to "an association of free peoples and autonomous nations." What can open Austria to the world is only its sovereignty and freedom. The party's manifesto also "supports the interests of the German and Ladin linguistic minorities in Southern Tyrol and the interests of all German native speakers from the territories of the former Habsburg monarchy" (Parteiprogram, 2017). The FPÖ signed an agreement with the Kremlin's United Russia party, which probably resulted from the fact that the present

party leader, Heinz-Christian Strache, sought support among tough, conservative politicians, whereas the Russian political elite sought another opportunity to weaken European unity. Coincidentally, the FPÖ's support for the German-speaking minorities in the territory of the former empire is almost a carbon copy of the "Russian World" (Russkiy Mir, a community of all people related to Russian culture)

The FPÖ is by no means a minor political entity in Austria. The results it gained in the elections to the National Council varied over the decades, reaching 26.9% in 1999, when the party's leadership was in the hands of Jörg Haider, the governor of Carinthia. Haider was one of the most controversial Austrian politicians in the post-war period because of his pro-Nazi sympathies (he was the son of early NSDAP members). In 1999, the FPÖ achieved 27.5% in the elections to the European Parliament. After Haider's death, and massive criticism in the media, results dropped drastically in the following elections at all levels. However, since that disastrous downfall the party's position has been steadily improving. According to a Research Affairs poll in December 2017, the FPÖ was expected to achieve 35%, which is the highest level of popularity for the party in its long history (see: *Austria, December 2016 Research Affairs poll*).

The second position belongs to France, where Jean-Marie Le Pen founded the **National Front (Front National)** in 1972, handing down leadership to his daughter Marine only in 2011. The FN's manifesto, which has had several incarnations in recent decades, invariably aims at such things as:

- the withdrawal of France from the EU, especially from the eurozone and Schengen;
- drastic limitations put on immigration, and deportations of illegal immigrants as well as of new arrivals who break the law;
- the protection of French industrial and agricultural production, as well as of services (the last element provoked the irrational "Polish plumber threat");
- a tough approach to crime;
- dialog with Russia and withdrawal from sanctions.

All these topics were consistently exploited in Marine Le Pen's presidential campaign (cf. Les 144 engagements présidentiels, 2017). However, her father criticized the selection of the imperatives of the campaign, suggesting that the European topic should have yielded to more important issues such as immigration and the internal destruction of the country in the spheres of economy and national identity (cf. Rose, 2017).

The popularity of Front National and its leaders varied over the decades. In elections to the National Assembly, the best result to date was achieved in 1997 (14.9%), whereas in the presidential elections Jean-Marie le Pen managed to get to the 2nd round in 2002 with only 17.8% support. Marine Le Pen was much more successful, gaining 21.3% in the first round of the elections in April/May, 2017 only to lose in the end, receiving a third of the votes in her struggle against Emmanuel Macron, who in the first round received 24.01% and became the unquestioned winner in the second. What seems especially interesting is the fact that not only did the FN have powerful representation on regional councils, but managed to receive 24.9% of the votes in the elections to the European Parliament in 2014 (see: *Résultats des élections européennes*, 2014).

In the Netherlands, right-wing populism found a strong representation in the **Party of Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV)** which has been guided since the moment of its foundation in 2008 by Geert Wilders. The party manifesto contains some typical elements of right-wing collectivist populism, such as the necessity to secure health care and an effective pension policy for native Dutch citizens, limitation of immigration, help for the Afrikaners, withdrawal from the EU, national solidarity and the necessity of supporting the biblical tradition as the cultural mainstream in the country (this option can be generally considered Judeo-Christian since the PVV has a few Jewish supporters, or activists even, such as Gidi Markuszower). The first, and most important point in the party's manifesto, however, lies in the belief that the supposed Islamic threat can be neutralized (see: *Concept Verkiezingsprogramma PVV 2017–2021*, 2017, p. 1). The anti-Islamic line in Wilder's views is probably expressed most clearly in his famous documentary *Fitna*, which brought him world fame.

The election results of the PVV have not been bad so far. The party gained 15.45% in 2010, 10.08% in 2012 and 13.1% in 2017. The dynamics seem similar to that of the Front National in France, where – after a temporary decline – popularity began to grow again (see: *Uitslag van de verkiezing van de leden van de Tweede Kamer van 15 maart 2017*, p. 9).

A specific case of European populism is right-wing separatism, represented in an interesting way in Italy by the **Northern League (Lega Nord per l'Indipendenza della Padania)**, which was founded as an alliance of several regional movements in 1989, and as a party in 1991 by Umberto Bossi, the previous leader of Lega Lombarda. The LN's ideology is much more libertarian than those of the previously mentioned move-

ments; it includes such imperatives as the promotion of small businesses, limited government, political and fiscal federalism, low taxation, reduction of pan-Italian solidarity (cf. Jori, 2009, pp. 77ff.). On the other hand, Lega Nord concentrated its efforts on the preservation of the Northern traditions and on micro-identities. That is why LN's doctrinal orientation was quite vague. As correctly emphasized by Ignazi (2008, pp. 87ff.), its adherents represented a wide range of trends stretching from communism to Christian democracy. Its populism boils down to anti-immigrant, anti-establishment and anti-monopolistic positions.

LN is neither Euro-skeptical nor Euro-enthusiastic, rejecting a bureaucratic macro-state, but proposing the idea of Europe as a continent of autonomous regions instead. In the international sphere the Northern League seeks supporters in various places. As in the case of the Freedom Party of Austria, the present leader of Lega Nord, Matteo Salvini, signed an agreement with United Russia. The Kremlin's intentions were visibly analogical, whereas LN explicitly supported Crimea's right for regional self-determination (cf. Seddon, 2017).

A similar case of a separatist party is the **Vlaams Belang** (previously Vlaams Blok) in Belgium. VB is a representation of frustrated Flemish nationalists which was officially founded in 2004 but in fact goes back to the tradition of the People's Union of the late 1970s. The ideology of the VB, expressed in the party's manifesto (*Programma*, 2017) declares the European character of Flanders, the necessity to withdraw from Belgium (which is supposed to become a paradise for people seeking asylum) and a strong rejection of immigration, especially from Muslim countries. The popularity of the party (at least if one considers the number of seats taken in the federal Chamber of Representatives) has been dropping since 2003 (2003, p. 18, 2007, p. 17, 2010, p. 12, 2014, p. 3), which does not fit the pan-European scheme. However, this can be explained by the fact that the Flemish separatist electorate concentrates much more on another nationalist party, the **New Flemish Alliance (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie, N-VA)** founded in 2001 by Geert Burgeois, and led later by Bart de Wever. The manifesto of this national/regional conservative party is both consistent and moderate and creates a more realistic perspective of a "civilized" secession. That is why the N-VA steals Flemish votes, winning more and more seats in the lower house of parliament (2003: 1, 2007: 5, 2010:27, 2014: 33). The ideological line of the party is an attempt to combine Flemish regionalism with modern EU standards, which resembles the direction taken by Lega Nord.

Another example of a right-wing-populist party oriented toward the defense of the interests of only one ethnic group in a multiethnic state is the **National People's Front (Εθνικό Λαϊκό Μέτωπο, ELAM)** in Cyprus. ELAM was founded in 2008; its ideology is clearly explained in a number of publications and interviews given by its leaders, including its chairman, Christos Christou. According to these sources, ELAM is a strictly nationalistic, ethnically Greek-oriented party, which resorts in its ideology both to radical or traditionalistic European philosophers, including Nietzsche or Herder, and, obviously, to Greek nationalistic thought, e.g. to Perikles Giannopoulos. According to its leaders, there is no need to avoid “tribal” argumentation, which is able to explain the glory or misery of particular cultures. ELAM wants to halt Islamic, especially Turkish immigration into the European circle. The same bias refers to the fading Turkish plans to join or to deepen its integration in the EU (see: Thesis, 2017). The party's popularity, although still insignificant, shows positive signs of growing.

What seems interesting is the fact that on the Greek ethnic mainland another nationalistic party – **The Independent Greeks (Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες, ANEL)**, which obtained 10 parliamentary seats in the 2015 election, renewed its coalition with SYRIZA (a coalition of radical lefts). ANEL, with Panos Kammenos at its head represents more the economic orientation of rightist populism, demanding war reparations from Germany and reduction of foreign debt. For ANEL, Greece was trapped by the financial institutions and treated by the IMF and the EU as a guinea pig. That is why the paradoxical anti-liberal and anti-globalist coalition with SYRIZA became reality in 2015. Nordsieck (2015) is probably right in describing ANEL as a “national conservative”/“social conservative” party. Between 2012 and 2015, despite its share in the governing coalition the importance of Independent Greeks was decreasing.

In Denmark, anti-immigrant rightist positions are presented by the **Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti, DF)**. It was founded in 1995 as an emanation of the Progress Party. The DF rejects the possibility of multiculturalism in Denmark, and is especially sensitive to the Muslim question. Although it is not typically euro-skeptical, the DF does not accept the perspective of joining the eurozone and is quite careful about the possible accession of new EU members, consistently rejecting the idea of Turkey's membership. The DF's attitude to some foreign policy matters seems slightly divergent, since the party does not support the recognition of Kosovo, and wishes to renew diplomatic relations with the Republic of China in Taiwan at the same time (see: Nores Danmark, 2017).

In Central Europe, right-wing populist tendencies are manifested both in the libertarian version and in the collectivist ideology. Libertarian thinking predominated in the manifestos of such Polish parties as **The Real Politics Union (Unia Polityki Realnej)**, founded in 1990, **The Congress of the New Right (Kongres Nowej Prawicy, 2010)** and **Liberty (Wolność, 2015)**, formerly: **KORWiN**. The libertarian tradition in Poland owes a lot to Mirosław Dzielski (1941–1989), a moderate academic theoretician. The new forms of Polish libertarianism, associated mainly with MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke, present a more aggressive position, which includes such elements as the total rejection of the EU, or the restitution of capital punishment (see: *Dumna, bogata Polska. Program Partii KORWiN*, 2017).

Alt-right populism is present in the manifestos of some Polish parties and movements, including the national-conservative Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*) (which is concerned about such ideas as faithfulness to traditional values, the rebirth of patriotism among the younger generation, a strong national economy and reluctance to any inflow of Muslim refugees), but far more in the relatively blurry ideology of **Kukiz'15**, which was founded just before the parliamentary elections in the fall of 2015 by Paweł Kukiz, a popular rock singer. The party's strategy aims at the achievement of such imperatives as an independent "national" economy, national control over the country's future, low and "just" taxes, the limitation of the influence of international corporations. However, Kukiz'15 does not suggest any form of withdrawal from the EU, emphasizing only the necessity of criticism about overregulation, and of a realistic attitude to Polish foreign policy (see: *Strategia zmiany*, 2015).

A much more striking example of right-wing populism is the Hungarian **Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarorszáért Mozgalom)**, a nationalistic party officially founded in 2002 (at the same time as the Right-Wing Youth Association) by Gergely Pongrácz, a veteran of the 1956 revolution. Jobbik's vision of Europe is not Euro-skeptical, but focused on the idea of a community of free and sovereign nations. On top of that, Jobbik is highly sensitive to the situation of compatriots in neighboring countries, demanding the application of European norms to the minorities in Slovakia, Romania and Serbia. The party manifesto also focuses on such problems as special measures against corruption, providing equal opportunities for Hungarian firms in competition with international companies, abandoning the EU talks on TTIP, and giving preferences to

family farms instead of promoting large estates owned by oligarchs (see: *Policies*, 2017).

The popularity of the party shows an upward trend: it gained only 2.2% of the popular vote in 2002, but 16.67% in 2010 and 20.22% in 2014. However, according to Századvég's poll in February 2017, Jobbik's popularity was at a level of 19% whereas the right-conservative Fidesz conducted by Viktor Orbán expected 49% (see: *Party Preferences in Hungary among the Total Population*, 2017).

In Germany, the most influential EU member, rightist populism has been represented since 1964 by the nationalistic and xenophobic **National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD)**, whose manifesto focuses on making Germany an ethnically German country again. The party is oriented toward a strong, far more militarized state. As in the case of nearly all rightist populists, the NPD demands that the economy be subordinated to national interests rather than to the rules of globalization. The policies ought to focus on traditional families, so Germany should become a welfare state with regional and economic microsystems. Non-citizens should be excluded from social programs, in accordance with the main imperative, which is Germany for the Germans, within a Europe defined as a community of nations ("Das Europa der Völker") (see: *Arbeit. Familie. Vaterland. Parteiprogram*, 2017, pp. 5, 6–8, 13).

The NPD, however, which is perceived as a Nazi threat in a country with a totalitarian past, is not necessarily a convenient option for the circles which are afraid of denationalization on the one hand and of being accused of renazification, on the other. The nationalists have never won a seat in the Bundestag; in 2014 they managed to send one deputy to the European Parliament. What seems to be much more promising is the **Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland, AfD)**, which was founded in February 2013 by Alexander Gauland and Berndt Lucke as Electoral Alternative 2013. The AfD is much less nationalistic, accepting the project of the EU but without a common currency. The party's manifesto does not accept the vision of Europe as a federal macro-state, but as a community of sovereign countries.

Like the NPD, the AfD is rather conservative in the social sphere, opposing non-traditional family policies that would accept homosexual marriages or an unfriendly attitude to "full-time mothers." The main topic of the AfD's interest, however, is the problem of immigration, especially from Muslim countries. The AfD rejects double citizenship, mass inflow

of refugees from abroad, unjustified asylum, reducing the meaning of integration to proper command of German, and so on.

The ideas on foreign policy in the AfD manifesto would lead to weakening the ties inside NATO, which is perceived only as a defensive alliance. The AfD stands for better relations with Russia and rejects the idea of a European army (*Programm*, 2017).

The AfD, regardless of its short history, enjoyed greater popularity than any other populist movement in Germany. Under the leadership of Frauke Petry and Jörg Meuthen the party managed to achieve 4.7% in the popular vote to the Federal Assembly (the Bundestag) missing the 5% barrier by a hair's breadth. In 2014, the AfD won 7 seats in the European Parliament and by May 2017 turned out to be quite successful in several regional elections. The best result was achieved in Saxony-Anhalt, winning 25 seats out of 87 (see: Cantow, Fehndrich, Zicht, 2016).

The unquestionable success of the AfD can be explained by its relative moderateness compared to some cases of European right-wing radicalism, such as the NPD or **Pegida (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, Eng. Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West)**. Pegida, which was founded in 2014 by Lutz Bachmann in Dresden, enjoys some popularity not only in Germany but in several other countries as well, including Poland, where Muslim immigrants are practically non-existent. Pegida describes itself as a moderate rightist movement, concerned about the preservation of national European cultures and averting radicalism. That is why it suggests an immigration policy strictly combined with demographic objectives. In terms of economy, Pegida is oriented toward independent state policies, which ought to replace the dictatorship of global agreements. It is also radically pro-Russian and stands for the abolition of sanctions (*Programm*, 2017, Pegida).

Possibly the most successful right-wing-populist movement in the EU (not because of its presence in the governmental structures but rather due to the achievement of the main idea) is the **United Kingdom Independence Party**. It managed to win 24 out of 73 seats in the British share of the EP in the elections of 2016, but only one seat (despite 12.6% in overall vote) in the election to the House of Commons in 2014. The election of 2016 turned out to be only a prelude to the Brexit referendum (the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum) held on June 23, 2016. UKIP was founded in 1993 by Alan Sked, leader of the Anti-Federalist League.

There is no controversy about the populist character of the UKIP. Abedi & Lundberg (2007) describe such phenomena as AEP (Anti-Establishment Parties). The paradoxical course of their actions places them within the scheme of Pareto's theory of the circulation of elites: having achieved their goals, the counter-elites become a new generation of elites, which deprives them of their previous mission. UKIP does not have a coherent manifesto and its political line can be deduced from its *5 Pledges*: "cut immigration, a more secure Britain, NHS before foreign aid, protecting British culture, modern & fair democracy," interviews, speeches and, probably most convincing, from the manifestos prepared for the main regions of the UK. Their main concern is hardly a surprise: "Britain's policy of open borders has caused house prices to skyrocket, social services to become strained and left parents struggling to find school places for their children" (see: *UKIP London Manifesto*, 2016).

The above list of right-wing populist organizations and movements is by no means complete, but hopefully partly representative. Right-wing populism is certainly not restricted to the area of the US, or of the European Union. Such phenomena as the **Swiss People's Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP, Partida populara Svizra, PPS)** led by Albert Rösti or the **Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (Liberalno-Demokraticeskaya Partiya Rossii)** founded and led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy fall under the label in a similar way.

Common Ideological Structure of New Right-wing Populism

A synthetic view of the leading right-wing-populist movements within the Western world helps to draw a modest list of common imperatives:

1. Opening the country's borders to migration poses a serious threat to social stability, especially to cultural identity, health care, internal security and the labor market.
2. States are encountering a flood of international economic pressures; the sovereignty of states is questioned by international corporations, which deprive nations of their possessions. People lose jobs and production is transferred to tax havens or to countries with cheap labor.
3. EU bureaucracy (as well as the federal US administration) is an expensive, artificial and parasitic creation that imposes regulations on states and citizens, caring for the interests of Big Finance instead of

the benefit of nations. We need a more limited but efficient government to meet the expectations of our times.

4. There is an urgent need to return American and European politics back to the people, who ought to assert their needs and distance themselves from denationalized and selfish elites.
5. There is no need to keep the liberal positions in foreign policy. Sanctions against Russia are questionable, we need a new opening in the relations with a strong and conservative partner, which was successful in fighting Islamic extremism.

Rational Grounds of Right-wing Populism

Trying to establish whether the right-wing populist specter which is haunting Europe and the United States has any rational grounds, at least six issues can be mentioned:

1. **The growing number of immigrants.** According to Migration Watch UK (2017), a significant growth of the immigration rate in Britain has been observed for decades, with the greatest jump after 2012. The migration rate was actually negative between 1975 and 1982, but after that period there was continual growth. In 2015, the number of immigrants exceeded 300,000. In September 2016, the net migration index was -56,000 for British citizens, +165,000 for incomers from other EU member states and +164,000 for immigrants from non-European countries. In many other European countries, including Germany, France, Austria, the Netherlands and Hungary, the trends are not very different, which is a result of the inflow of real or fake refugees after the Arab Spring.
2. **The increase of national debt,** which is discussed in almost all western countries but most vigorously in the US. According to the US Debt Clock, by spring 2017 the USA's debt reached \$19.9 trillion. The most dynamic growth of the debt took place after 2008, and the high dynamics have been continued ever since. Also, the US budget deficit is growing reaching \$176 billion in March 2017 (see: *Monthly Budget Review for April*, 2017).
3. **Expanding bureaucracy.** Criticism of expanding bureaucracy is becoming more and more common both in the US and in Europe. The general conclusion is that the Parkinson Law is entirely confirmed, especially in the case of the Brussels administration. As British Influ-

ence (2015, p. 5) analysts point out: “The EU budget is wasted on EU bureaucracy and administration” paying more than 55,000 civil servants.

4. The growing **impact of globalization**, which causes several new phenomena in world business such as offshoring and outsourcing. There is no doubt that these tendencies cause social dumping, a phenomenon which has already been studied in reliable research (cf. Bernaciak et al., 2015), and foster migrant labor (cf. Drahokoupil, 2015, p. 20).
5. Increasing crime rate and a **flood of terrorist attacks**. The recent years saw an outbreak of highly dangerous phenomena. In 2016 alone, Europeans were provided with good arguments for resentment, because of such terrorist attacks as the explosion in Brussels airport in March, the Nice truck attack in July, or the truck raid on the Berlin Christmas market in December. Almost all terrorist attacks were associated with Islamic fundamentalism.
6. Last but not least, the **negative demographic tendencies, which** in the states of the West cause more and more acute consequences: the necessity of immigration and decreasing productivity. These fatal syndromes refer to nearly all European nations including the leading economies. As Stratfor analysts point out, “In the long term, Germany’s demographic outlook will challenge its trade surplus and position as creditor” since Germany will “not have a trade surplus by around 2030 due to decreased exports (resulting from lower productivity) and growing imports by retirees” (Stratfor, 2012). Another problem is the growing percentage of Muslims in European societies. Although it is generally difficult to estimate, according to academic studies, we can generally say that the percentage has grown now to about 6% from 1950 when it was less than 2% (see: Kettani, 2010, p. 154).

Conclusions

The presented overview of right-wing populist movements in the US and in the European Union, as well as the abstraction of right-wing populist imperatives and of the facts that lie behind social attitudes, confirms the dual character of contemporary rightist populism. On the one hand, it expresses the libertarian principle of individual freedom and limited government. This model of rightist populism prevails in the United States, which has been confirmed by the results of the elections to the House of

Representatives, to the Senate and, above all, in the recent presidential election.

However, the libertarian tendency is contaminated in the US by right-alt collectivist ideas with the predominating cultural component. This point of view is more typical of the European stage, where social security and ethnic purity became much more important than the idea of unlimited freedom on the one hand and limited government on the other. The reason for this divergence may boil down to the differences in historical experience and in the range of the Islamic threat.

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Morfologia prawicowego populizmu w USA i Unii Europejskiej

Streszczenie

Prawicowy populizm w Stanach Zjednoczonych i Unii Europejskiej jest jednym z wiodących trendów ich politycznej rzeczywistości. Stąd istnieje konieczność ustrukturyzowania wiedzy na temat tego zjawiska poprzez wyszczególnienie jego głównych wskaźników i wyjaśnienie ich przyczyn. Do głównych jego determinant należą wrogość wobec imigracji, postrzeganie wielonarodowych firm jako zagrożenie dla lokalnych rynków pracy, postulat redukcji biurokracji, antyelitaryzm, odmienne rozumienie polityki międzynarodowej połączone z nowym otwarciem w stosunkach z Rosją.

Różnorakie ruchy populistyczne wynikają z kilku czynników, takich jak znaczny wzrost imigracji w Europie, narastanie długu publicznego, wszechogarniająca biurokracja, poważne znaczenie międzynarodowych korporacji, powódź ataków terrorystycznych lub negatywne tendencje demograficzne.

Ideologię właściwego populizmu można odnieść do dwóch różnych tradycji: do indywidualistycznego libertarianizmu (który częściowo determinuje ideologię Tea Party i niektórych innych ruchów amerykańskich) oraz do prawicowego, kolektywistycznego, plemiennego tradycjonalizmu, bardziej powszechnego na Starym Kontynencie.

Słowa kluczowe: USA, Stany Zjednoczone, Unia, Europa, prawica, populizm, alt-right, Brexit