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2017 | 20 | 1 | 35-51

Article title

Are Central Banks In CEE Countries Concerned About The Burden Of Public Debt?

Content

Title variants

Czy banki centralne w krajach Europy Środkowej reagują na dług publiczny?

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
The aim of this study is to analyze the monetary policy rules in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, with public debt as an additional explanatory variable. We estimate linear rules by the GMM estimation and non-linear rules, using the Markov-switching model. Our findings suggest that in the Czech Republic and Poland the monetary authorities respond to growing public debt by lowering interest rates, while in Hungary the opposite may be observed. Moreover, we distinguish between passive and active monetary policy regimes and find that the degree of interest rate smoothing is lower and the response of the central banks to inflation and/or output gap is stronger in an active regime. In the passive regime, the output gap seems to be statistically insignificant.
PL
Celem badania jest analiza reguł polityki pieniężnej w Czechach, Polsce i na Węgrzech, z długiem jako dodatkową zmienną objaśniającą. Estymowana jest liniowa reguła przy użyciu Uogólnionej Metody Momentów oraz reguła nieliniowa przy użyciu modelu przełącznikowego Markova. Wyniki badania sugerują, że w Czechach i Polsce władze monetarne reagowały na rosnący dług obniżaniem stóp procentowych, podczas gdy na Węgrzech reakcja była odwrotna. Ponadto, wyróżniamy pasywny i aktywny reżim polityki pieniężnej, przy czym reżim aktywny charakteryzuje się niższym stopniem wygładzania stóp procentowych i silniejszą reakcją banku centralnego na inflację i/lub lukę produktową. W reżimie pasywnym luka produktowa okazuje się być statystycznie nieistotna.

Year

Volume

20

Issue

1

Pages

35-51

Physical description

Dates

published
2017-03-09

Contributors

  • Warsaw University, Faculty of Economic Sciences

References

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Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_1515_cer-2017-0003
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