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2014 | 12 | 4 | 301-317

Article title

Tenses, Dates and Times

Content

Title variants

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
This paper presents a theory of utterance content that is neutral with respect to some of the key issues in the debate about the proper semantics of tense. Elaborating on some ideas from Korta & Perry (2011), we defend a proposal according to which utterances of both temporally specific and temporally unspecific sentences have a systematic variety of contents, from utterance-bound to incremental or referential. This analysis will shed some light on the contribution of tense to what is said by an utterance.

Keywords

Year

Volume

12

Issue

4

Pages

301-317

Physical description

Dates

published
2014-12-30

Contributors

author
  • University of the Basque Country
author
  • University of Seville

References

  • Bar-Hillel, Yehoshua. (1954), “Indexical expressions”. Mind, 63, pp. 359-379.
  • Castañeda, Hector Neri (1968), “On the logic of attributions of self-knowledge to others”. Journal of Philosophy 65 (15), pp. 439-456. DOI: 10.2307/2024296
  • Frege, Gottlob (1918), “Der Gedanke. Eine Logische Untersuchung”. In Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I (1918–1919), pp. 58–77. (English translation) (1956), “The Thought: a logical inquiry”. Mind 65 (259), pp. 289-311.
  • Higginbotham, James (2003), “Tensed Second Thoughts: Comments on Richard". In Aleksander Jokic and Quentin Smith (eds.), Time, Tense, and Reference. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003. pp. 191-197.
  • Kamp, Hans (1971), “Formal properties of ‘now’”. Theoria 37, pp. 227-274.
  • Kaplan, David (1989), “Demonstratives”. In J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes on Kaplan. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 481- 614.
  • Korta, Kepa & John Perry (2006), “Varieties of Minimalist Semantics”. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research LXXIII, No. 2, pp. 451-459. DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2006.tb00628.x
  • Korta, Kepa & John Perry (2007), “How to Say Things with Words”. In Savas L. Tsohatzidis (ed), John Searle’s Philosophy of Language: Force, Meaning, and Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 169-189.
  • Korta, Kepa & John Perry (2011), Critical Pragmatics. An Inquiry into Reference and Communication. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Korta, Kepa & John Perry (2013), “Highlights of Critical Pragmatics: reference and the contents of the utterance”. Intercultural Pragmatics 10 (1), pp. 161-182. DOI: 10.1515/ip-2013-0006
  • McTaggart, John M.E (1908), “The unreality of time”. Mind 17, pp. 457-474.
  • Mellor, D. Hugh (1981), Real Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Oaklander, Nathan (1991), “A defense of the new tenseless theory of time”. Philosophical Quarterly 41, pp. 26-38.
  • Perry, John (1979), “The problem of the essential indexical”. Nôus 13, pp. 3-11.
  • Perry, John (2001), Reference and Reflexivity. Stanford: CSLI Publications. Expanded and revised 2nd edition, (2012).
  • Perry, John (2013), “Temporal Indexicals”. In H. Dyke and A. Bardon (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Time, Oxford: John Wiley and Sons, pp. 486-506.
  • Prior, Arthur N. (1967), Past, Present and Future. Oxford: Claredon Press.
  • Prior, Arthur N. (1968), “Now”. Noûs 2 (2), pp.101-119.
  • Recanati, François (2007), Perspectival Thought. A Plea for (Moderate) Relativism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  • Reichenbach, Hans (1947), Elements of Symbolic Logic. New York: Macmillan Company.
  • Richard, Mark (2003), “Objects of relief”. In A. Jokic and Q. Smith (eds.), Time, Tense and Reference. Cambridge, Mas.: MIT Press/Bradford Books, pp. 157-189.
  • Russell, Bertrand (1938), Principles of Mathematics. New York: W. W. Norton.

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_1515_rela-2015-0002
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