



## COMMON DEFENCE OF EU COUNTRIES: REALITY OR FANTASY?

WSPÓLNA OBRONA PAŃSTW UNII EUROPEJSKIEJ –  
RZECZYWISTOŚĆ CZY MRZONKA?

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### — ABSTRACT —

Limited energy resources, EU member countries' budget capabilities impaired by the financial and debt crisis, Brexit, or the migration crisis that is causing serious consequences, are but a few serious challenges that the Union is going to face within the short-term perspective. One ought not forget about the increasingly powerful and meaningful threats to the Project Europe: rampant terrorism, increasing military activity of Russia (including its actions in eastern Ukraine, Crimea, or on the Sea of Azov), as well as the ambivalent (to say the least) attitude of the current President of the USA towards NATO. Even these few challenges and threats ought to cause for an increase in the decisive and, later on, organizational effort for the purpose of transforming the EU into an entity that shall be able to counteract and react to them. The intention of the author of this article is to provide an attempt

### — ABSTRAKT —

Ograniczone zasoby energetyczne, nadszarpnięte kryzysem finansowym i zadłużeniowym możliwości budżetowe państw członkowskich Unii Europejskiej, Brexit, wywołujący poważne konsekwencje kryzys migracyjny – to tylko kilka pospiesznie wskazanych poważnych wyzwań stojących przed Unią w najbliższym czasie. Nie należy zapominać także o rosnących w siłę i znaczenie zagrożeniach dla bezpieczeństwa projektu Europa: panoszącym się terroryzmie, rosnącej aktywności wojskowej Rosji (w tym o jej poczynaniach we wschodniej Ukrainie, na Krymie czy Morzu Azowskim), a także o co najmniej ambiwalentnym stosunku urzędującego prezydenta USA wobec NATO. Już tylko tych kilka wyzwań i zagrożeń skutkować powinno wzmocnieniem wysiłku decyzyjnego, a potem organizacyjnego na rzecz przekształcenia UE w podmiot zdolny do przeciwdziałania im

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to answer the question whether the indicated process is actually taking place.

i reagowania na nie. W zamierzeniu autora niniejszy artykuł ma być próbą udzielenia odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy wskazany proces rzeczywiście zachodzi.

**Keywords:** Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); PESCO; common defence; security strategy; defence industry

**Słowa kluczowe:** wspólna polityka bezpieczeństwa i obrony; PESCO; wspólna obrona; strategia bezpieczeństwa; przemysł obronny

Other countries perceive the European Union (EU) as one of the leaders in global economy and trade. This occurs in spite of the crises in the Union – migration, financial, debt crisis, etc. – or in spite of huge dynamics of economic growth in the Asian countries. Still, depending on the entity performing calculations and on the aspects included in them, the EU is considered the second, third, or fourth economy in the world. One should add that this very economy is still highly developed, competitive, and counting over 515 million wealthy consumers, and no country in the world may afford to ignore such factors.

Even though factors such as strengthening economic bonds, elevating economic statistics (including trade and innovation) are incredibly important, they compose the foundation of the European Project and allow for its dynamic development, yet they constitute merely one of the aspects of what needs to be currently understood under the term “Europe”. For this is far more than that. In the course of noticeable progress towards integration of European countries under one roof, many matters were included, such as agriculture, societies, environment, energy, and finally politics and defence. It turned out that it was possible to develop many of them by way of consensus, yet for many years there were many deficiencies in the political and, above all, defence matters. An opportunity to change such a state of affairs was at the moment of adopting (2007) and implementing (2009) the Treaty of Lisbon, “in which the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy was further emphasized” (Cheda, 2018, p. 1), and then a new security policy (2016), as well as “a reconfiguration of the international order – especially in terms of EU safety environment – taking place for over a decade” (Zięba, 2017, p. 45). Has this opportunity actually been used? Did the significance of defence initiatives increase during that time? Is it possible to observe any dynamics of the processes aiming to create the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)? Or perhaps particular interests of individual member countries are still more important, which prevents substantial

reinforcement of the EU's military capabilities? Is it still the case that in the EU there is more dispute rather than action in terms of defence? The hereby text shall attempt at shedding some light on these doubts.

#### ATTITUDE OF THE USA TOWARDS THE ESDP/CSDP

Ending war activities in 1945, capturing Middle and Eastern Europe by the CCCP, and transforming the countries from these regions into "satellites" by the Soviets convinced the Europeans that their own safety "hangs in an uncomfortable balance between dependence on and autonomy from the United States" (Howorth, 2017, pp. 13, 24–25). However, first mentions about the need of establishing European defence capabilities – which were not very specific at that time – brought about severe alert in the USA. Washington's concern was caused mainly by the fact that EU initiatives could lead to doubling the existing NATO structures, especially bearing in mind that many countries were fulfilling their duties towards the Treaty to an insufficient degree. However, the effect of the fall of the CCCP was that many European societies and consequently many country leaders – not perceiving tangible military threat – eagerly limited the expenditure for defence (reduction of army size, financial cuts for modernization and training, limiting research, etc.) and cynically utilized the "protective umbrella" spread over Europe on the USA's tax payers' expense. During that period, Great Britain was considered the American voice in Europe and it was London that mostly blocked the development of the ESDP (Rees, 2017, p. 562).

It is thus hardly surprising that due to Art. 42 Sec. 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the Union respects the right of EU and NATO member countries altogether to maintain individual security and defence policy and respects their obligations towards common defence as part of the Treaty. A similar statement can be found also in the European Global Strategy (EGS, 2016, p. 20). Paradoxically, in Art. 220 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), NATO was not included as an international organization key to the Union (as opposed to the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the OECD), the only mention concerns "proper relations" with other organizations. Nonetheless, NATO is regularly present in the EU's actions concerning the security and defence policy. During a summit in Washington in April 1999, the *Berlin Plus* agreement was signed, which granted the Union access to the NATO's resources, capabilities, and planning data for the purpose of performing crisis manage-

ment without the participation of the USA (each time a separate agreement is required). On the 8<sup>th</sup> of July 2016 in Warsaw a common declaration on the EU's cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was adopted. According to the established agreements, the cooperation is to concern, among others, developing the capabilities to counteract hybrid threats, extending coordination regarding cyber-safety, developing coherent and complementary defence capabilities, or cooperation of military industries (more: Koziej, 2017, p. 11). In recent time (the 10<sup>th</sup> of July 2018), on the other hand, both organizations signed a Common Declaration, in which they optimistically welcomed (which shall be discussed later on) the EU's establishing of PESCO and first steps towards establishing the European Defence Fund, considered key (also for the Treaty) for developing European defence capabilities (Muti, 2018, p. 4). However, it seems that in the situation in which the EU intends to further develop the CSDP, one ought to "divide the roles between both organizations in the area of defence more clearly and utilizing system tools, so that they are more complementary and thus would force cooperation, and so that they would not be the same, with similar tasks, thus generating competition" (Koziej, 2018, p. 5).

## THE TREATY OF LISBON – KEY REGULATIONS

The legal framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy was established in the Treaty of Lisbon. However, it would not be false to assume, even before getting acquainted with that framework, that during negotiation and implementation processes they must have remained general and abstract to a significant degree. Such that these statements would be acceptable by all member countries. The creators of the framework succeeded in this attempt and thus the Treaty of Lisbon was pushed through.

Even in the Preamble to the TEU it was indicated that EU country leaders are "resolved to implement a common foreign and security policy including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, which might lead to a common defence in accordance with the provisions of Article 42, thereby reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world" (TEU, Preamble). In the spirit of political solidarity, loyalty, and respect, also the records of certain articles of the Treaty were maintained, especially Art. 24, Art. 26, Art. 36, Art. 43–46, and Protocols 10 (concerning Permanent Structured Cooperation PESCO) and 11. A key matter

in the Treaty is the condition from Art. 42 Sec. 1–2, which indicates that “The Common Security and Defence Policy shall be an integral part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security (Kącka, 2011) in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States”, as well as that “the Common Security and Defence Policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy”. Confirmation of these regulations can also be found in Art. 2 Sec. 4 of the TFEU.

Such consensual and abstract take on the norms may cause an impression of purposelessness in the reader. What sense does it make to introduce such general, indeterminate records into agreements constituting the EU? Upon their further investigation one may advance a thesis about strong characterization of these records with none other than Union values (Samadashvili, 2016, p. 23; Altafin, Haász, & Podstawa, 2017, p. 123) or excessive focus on institutionalization<sup>1</sup> rather than on creating actual military capabilities (Leonard & Röttgen, 2018). Nonetheless, at the point of practical realization of the CSDP’s premises, their implementation (which shall be discussed later on), such a measure allows to maintain significant flexibility of adopted initiatives. Certainly — according to one of the fundamental rules of law — *nullum crimen sine lege*.

## EUROPEAN GLOBAL STRATEGY

The first strategic document concerning the Union’s foreign and security policy was adopted on 12–13<sup>th</sup> December 2003. It was *A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy ESS* (European Council, 2003). In this relatively short document (consisting of only 14 pages) EU leaders stated the objectives of the organization in terms of foreign and security policy, as well as the means for

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<sup>1</sup> One might mention here at least the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), European Union Military Committee, and Political and Security Committee. Interestingly, the EUMS is not responsible for operational command during EU military missions – usually the EU transfers the command to the so called framework state (France, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, Greece) and after ending the operations, the command is dissolved. Such a solution is disadvantageous, as it does not generate the so called institutional memory and hinders making conclusions for the future.

their realization. The document also indicated key threats to the safety of the continent, i.e., terrorism, distributing weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, fallen states, and organized crime. Therefore, it would not be surprising to state that the presented catalog, due to the dynamics of events in the EU itself, as well as in its direct neighborhood, soon turned out to be insufficient, and the majority of the adopted methods of operation soon ceased to be adequate to the international situation.

Thus, there soon appeared voices of the necessity for its update or even creating a new complex strategy of EU's operation in the international environment. Unfortunately, it was contrary to the document itself, as it was adopted as late as 28<sup>th</sup> June 2016 (EGS, 2016). And yet again, this is a "typical" European Union document, very general, not specific, avoiding any categorical and straightforward statements – it even lacks an enumerative catalog of threats, which were mentioned in the ESS. To state it briefly, it defines and indicates the interests of the EU and its citizens; explains rules and values for its external actions; presents priorities of international policy activities; and finally characterizes methods and means for achieving the adopted premises. The most important matter about this document is the fact that the new Strategy made way for actuating the processes creating the Union's defence policy (Samadashvili, 2016, p. 34). According to Ryszard Zięba, "it rightly connects the internal and external aspects of safety and assumes that internal safety depends on peace outside the Union's borders. Therefore in order to provide the Union's internal safety it anticipates external activities on a broader scale" (Zięba, 2017, p. 50). The question, whether its records will result in concrete and measurable activities, remains open to a certain extent, as it depends solely on the will of member countries. And past experiences tell us that it is not necessarily bound to happen, as currently in many Union member countries governments are taken over by populists with Eurosceptic attitude.

What might be perceived as obvious, in order to be able to fulfill premises adopted in the Strategy (in addition, in the assumed manner) – and at the same time be a credible partner on the international arena – member countries, and therefore the EU itself, need to have sufficient, adequate, flexible, ready, and mobile military capabilities at their disposal. Replenishing the shortages, a reform consisting on moving away from territorial defence forces towards expeditionary forces – all this costs money (and lots of it) and requires time

(Zięba, 2017, pp. 39–40)<sup>2</sup>. Moreover, a mental change is required in these terms, with regard to the approach to the role of the Union as the global guardian of order (Domachowska, Gawron-Tabor & Piechowiak-Lamparska, 2018, pp. 201–202; Polcikiewicz, 2018, p. 108; Schade, 2018, p. 84). Moderate and discreet optimism of the experts in terms of realizing the Strategy, and thus waking up the CSDP, results from the fact that it was followed by important decisions. In June 2017, during an EU summit: a) it was decided that a cell for military planning (Military Planning and Conduct Capability, MPCC) shall be established; b) the European Defence Fund was initiated (budgeted from the Union's common arming programs); c) the procedure actuating regular structural cooperation (PESCO) was initiated. Thus the strategy is implemented on both grounds: economic and, by way of an agreement with NATO, also international (Koziej, 2018, p. 2; Kuźniar, 2018, p. 65).

## FINANCIAL DEFENCE EXPENDITURE

The will to play a key role in the global security environment costs real and very serious money. It is best seen looking at the USA's defence budget, the amount of which is unachievable for other countries. It is enough to mention that in 2017, it equaled to 686BN \$ – only for the sake of comparison one ought to point out that the budget of all European NATO members, including Great Britain, was almost 250BN \$. Therefore the difference is visible in all aspects – number of soldiers, their mobility, training, equipment, or even funds for technology research and development (NATO Secretary General, 2018, p. 108). Other statistics are even more crushing for Europe – e.g., the USA generates around 51% GDP of all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and yet it spends 72% of the total of their budget for defence. Moreover, if we take a look at the expenditure for defence as a percentage of GDP, the USA are an undisputed leader (they spend 3.57%) yet again. The highest rated European country in this comparison is Greece (2.36%), followed by Great Britain (2.12%), Estonia (2.08%), and Poland (1.99%). The rest of the Treaty's members do not fulfill the obligation of spending at least 2% of GDP on their defence (NATO Secretary General, 2018,

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<sup>2</sup> Also the autonomic Eurocorps was established or the EU Battlegroup was initiated, yet according to the experts, these do not fulfill their expected role.

pp. 33, 109). Similar data, albeit differing by fractions of a percent, has been delivered in the annual report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Among the information in the report we also read that Russia spends 4.3% for that purpose, and China – 1.9% (SIPRI, 2018). The European Defence Agency does not indicate at all what percentage of GDP is spent and which Union countries spend it on defence. We also get to know from the report that in 2016, only 4 EU member countries exceeded or reached the 2% threshold, although their names were not published (EDA, 2018b, p. 6).

### EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY

The proof for the will to advance the CSDP, as well as the advantage of the institutional attitude in its creation from the time before the Treaty of Lisbon, is the European Defence Agency. It is an entity the purpose of which is “(a) to contribute to identifying the Member States’ military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States; (b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods; (c) propose multilateral projects to fulfil the objectives in terms of military capabilities, ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes; (d) support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs; (e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure” (TEU, Art. 45). In other words, it concerns establishing an open market of armament in the Union and effective usage of financial assets in terms of the armament research as well as its purchase (Duda, 2017, pp. 3–5; Rogala-Lewicki, 2017, pp. 155–156). So much for theory, but how does it all look in practice?

Firstly, the EDA actively engaged in the process of creating and actuating of PESCO (which shall be discussed later on). Secondly, it undertook a series of preparatory activities (administrative, financial) for the purpose of actuating another key EU defence initiative, i.e., the European Defence Fund (EDF). Recently, the agency also engaged in preparing the revision of the Capability



Development Plan (CDP)<sup>3</sup> or performing the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD). Nonetheless, thirdly, its most important task is coordinating and managing the “97 ad hoc Research & Technology and Capability Projects, 14 Research & Technology and Capability Programmes, 3 Joint Procurement Arrangements and more than 190 other activities related to capability development, research and technology and the defence industry” (EDA, 2018a, p. 3). Thus one may assume that certain actions do take place, but bearing in mind the existing defence needs of the member countries and the EU itself, it does not relatively amount to much. To a large extent these are rather small, not very costly projects, that do not generate arguments between countries and other entities that participate in them. These also do not change the image of moderate capabilities of European armies in a substantial and positive way.

## PESCO

Permanent Structured Cooperation, the possibility of which was provisioned for in Protocol 10 of the Treaty of Lisbon, is starting to take real form for the first time since 2017. And this is in spite of the skepticism of certain Union member countries, especially the ones that feel threatened by recent activity of the Russian Federation, and the ones that are members of NATO<sup>4</sup>. Apart from the European Defence Fund, the annual review on defence (CARD) and creating within the European Union Military Staff (EUMS) a cell that on a strategic level is responsible for operational planning and leading military missions (MPCC), PESCO is an initiative that is most certainly to be considered key in terms of strengthening the CSDP and European military capabilities. In brief, its purpose is leading common “development programs and projects in terms of defence technologies, harmonization of military forces technical modernization plans, common purchases of armament, strengthening the interoperability of armies,

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<sup>3</sup> In the EU we currently have 11 CDP priorities (EDA, 2018c, pp. 6–18).

<sup>4</sup> The adopted and implemented shape of PESCO caused caution in assessments, because the countries, including Poland, were afraid of: its focus on developing expeditionary military capabilities (and not territorial defence), competition from biggest EU countries’ armament concerns, diagnosing threats to security only on the southern EU border (excluding the so called Eastern Wall; Gotkowska, 2018, p. 11; Terlikowski, 2018a, pp. 1–2). What is more, the following countries do not participate in PESCO: Great Britain (which is leaving the EU), Denmark (maintains a clause excluding from the participation in the CSDP), and Malta (due to lack of armed forces).

and creating international tactical units (e.g., EU's strike groups)" (Terlikowski, 2017a, p. 1). The nature of PESCO is by no means to establish a common army, transform the Union into a military alliance, or create a group of a few countries that would perform deep military integrations within their own circle (Gotkowska, 2018, p. 6). Basically, such inclusive<sup>5</sup> attitude is aimed at encouraging the participating countries to more substantial engagement in the CSDP and fulfilling the accepted obligations towards the Union, and indirectly towards NATO. This way the CSDP would be beneficial as well.

It may be assumed that at the beginning of 2019, the initiative is bringing slight positive effects. In the first turn, the adopted common included 17 Polish positions (Poland submitted access to 6 and fulfills the role of an observer in 2), in the second turn, 17 more projects were added to the existing list (Poland submitted access to 1 and has observer status in 9 more; Lesiecki, 2018, p. 1). Also, there exists a list of several dozen projects pending access to the basic list. Nonetheless, EU countries still act with significant caution in terms of submitting ideas for common projects, which is evident judging by the fact that the binding list is not extended by projects that are key for "supplementing major shortcomings in European military capabilities, indicated within the context of both, territorial defence and crisis management missions". Among others, it concerns projects such as common development of a new type of a fighter aircraft, tank or transport airplane (Terlikowski, 2018b, p. 1). In addition, the very activation of PESCO projects does not mean that they shall be completed successfully, therefore the comments of President Juncker, High Representative Mogherini, and also President Macron and Chancellor Merkel, who in many places and in many words called the EU countries to full engagement in PESCO and other EU defence initiatives, should come as no surprise (Rees, 2017, p. 563).

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<sup>5</sup> Holding on to the very essence of the TEU in its Lisbon version, PESCO was to be utilized for creating a strong "defence core" of the Union – a small group of countries that were the strongest in military terms, willing to quickly deepen the integration as far as security is concerned. Such an interpretation of the Treaty's regulations caused concern of other countries, this time regarding the creation of a new dimension of multi-speed Europe. For this reason, in order to avoid misunderstandings, ultimately the inclusive approach was opted for (Terlikowski, 2017b; Rogala-Lewicki, 2017, p. 158).

## EUROPEAN DEFENCE FUND

In June 2017, the European Commission announced the creation of the European Defence Fund, a financial instrument the purpose of which is to co-finance research and development of military technologies, thus contributing to increasing EU countries' military capabilities. The EDF is the main component of the European Defence Action Plan from 2016, which is focused on the support for the European defence industry. The Fund itself was constructed basing on two complementary constituents – the so called windows: 1) the research window (Research & Technology), and 2) the capabilities window (Research & Development). The first pillar shall include research in terms of innovative defence technologies: “It shall function on the basis of Union grants for projects proposed by international consortia consisting of research institutes, enterprises, foundations, etc., analogically to EU civil framework programs concerning research and innovation (e.g., Horizon 2020)” (Terlikowski, 2017b). The second pillar shall undertake research and implementation works, i.e., tweaking new technologies by building prototypes or implementing them into existing military equipment. In this case the majority of financial funds shall originate from member countries' budgets, concerns, non-public sources, with certain support (max. 20 %) on the part of the EU (Koziej, 2017, p. 10).

For preparatory purposes, in order to fully activate the EDF in 2021, it has been decided that the first pillar shall for the time being be called Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR), coordinated by the European Defence Agency, and shall include years 2017–2019, and the budget shall be 90 million EUR. The second pillar – European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) – shall include years 2019–2020, and its budget shall be 500 million EUR. The EDF shall attain full action capability only after 2021, also the budgets for both pillars shall be increased to the level of accordingly: 4.1BN EUR and 8.9BN EUR. In effect, “the co-financing from the EDF shall generate new investments in defence, with total value of around 50BN EUR (in the budget seven-year period – 2021–2027), which amounts to around 10% of current EU countries' expenditure” (Jaźwiecki, 2018).

It ought to be emphasized that research and development of new military technologies in Europe should include analogical actions undertaken by NATO for the purpose of avoiding doubling of ideas and expenses (Szymański, 2018). At this moment one ought to note that the European Commission aims at reinforcing the effectiveness of executing the so called Military Directive No. 2009/81

by EU countries, which the EC wants to use in order to force them to observe to the rules of competition while making purchases of armament and military equipment (Rogala-Lewicki, 2017, p. 160). Such a task is very important also because “the institution estimates that lack of cooperation of defence industries within the Union annually causes a loss of 25 to 100BN EUR, among others, due to failure to utilize the effect of scale of the Union market and lack of common standards. And lack of these interferes with the fight against duplicating equipment or making common orders for weapons and military equipment even by the allies from NATO” (Jaźwiecki, 2018). The EDF and the directive are supposed to change that. And yet again, a question arises whether the protectionist approach to national armament industries shall not prevail after all...

#### POLAND VS. EU'S DEFENCE INITIATIVES

For Union partners Poland, its attitude towards European defence initiatives, its role, and contribution towards the CSDP, remain a mystery (Muti, 2018, p. 1). Leaders of integrating Europe would like to have confidence in terms of evaluating the attitude of Warsaw towards deepening of the defence integration, yet this attitude depends *stricte* from political factors, i.e., which party wields power in Poland at the moment. During the years of the PO–PSL (Civic Platform–Polish People's Party) coalition Poland was perceived as the driving power of European integration and as an enthusiast and leader in terms of building and strengthening the CSDP, yet since 2015 and acquiring power by the PiS (Law and Justice) party, the situation became quite the opposite (Kuźniar, 2018, p. 66). One might add that the situation is far from optimal, be it for the remaining member countries that do not have a way of knowing what to expect from Warsaw, as well as for building the position of Poland in the EU. The close neighborhood with Russia, the geopolitical location of Poland, its social, economic and military potential, are factors indicating that Warsaw ought to be seriously interested in raising EU's military capabilities. Yet, which is very surprising, Poland prefers to discuss military matters with USA rather than with Union institutions or leaders of European countries, and treats Washington (disregarding the growing unpredictability of its foreign policy) as the sole guarantor of its safety. The same applies for armament concerns – in the eyes of Polish politicians the American ones seem to be of more value rather than the products of the European competition (Zaborowski, 2018, p. 13).

Even though Polish defence expenditure statistics might seem favorable, especially in comparison to other countries of interest, one ought not be fooled by their deceiving charm. Since 2015, the program of modernization of Polish armed forces slowed down significantly, which is best proved at least by canceling the tender for multi-task helicopters for armed forces (including offset), withdrawing from the purchase of Australian frigates, sluggish talks of purchasing artillery equipment, submarines, or a contract for modernization of armored forces, etc. According to press releases, military storage facilities are starting to lack soldier uniforms and old helmets are sand-blasted in order to remove rust... Also, certain accounting tricks are used in order to overvalue real defence expenses – e.g., purchase of airplanes for VIPs was financed by the Ministry of National Defence and they are piloted by officers of the Polish Armed Forces and stationed in a military base, so such expenses were included in the statistics for defence.

Firstly, one ought to return to the path of modernization of the Polish army. This matter is key and constitutes an absolute priority. What is more, the modernization ought to be based on substantial criteria and a long-term strategy, i.e., actual needs of Polish armed forces, adjusting the purchased equipment to systems utilized so far, the ability to maintain them financially, etc. Secondly, although it might sound a bit utopian, one should dismiss the political approach in terms of modernizing the army and military purchases. It is not acceptable that defence matters are dependent on the interests of political parties or their electorate, both in terms of choosing a specific supplier and the country of their origin. Consequently, one also ought to thoroughly restructure the Polish arms industry<sup>6</sup>. As soon as it happens (hopefully rather quickly), more constructive attitude towards EU defence projects and programs ought to be adopted (Zaborowski, 2018, p. 15). These are to no extent a threat to the security of the state. To the contrary, they are a chance for the Polish army as well as the Polish arms industry. Developing common military capabilities, cost reduction, larger integrity of systems, and interoperability are among the obvious benefits resulting from such an activity standpoint. Thanks to that, the Union, understood as an entity consisting of 28 (27) countries, would be able to accept bigger responsibility for its own safety (Muti, 2018, p. 2) and Poland would “gain more influence on

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<sup>6</sup> As indicated by Adam Duda, “this task is made even more difficult by the fact that in recent decades the competitive environment has undergone a process of transformation and consolidation, the result of which was establishing such European giants as Airbus, Leonardo, MBDA, Thales, etc., which [...] deepened the gap in technological advancement between Polish and European companies from the defence sector” (Duda, 2017, p. 6).

strengthening NATO's and UE's political coherence" (Lorenz & Terlikowski, 2018, p. 2). Participation in the aforementioned undertakings should be considered *raison d'état*, as the very partnership with the USA or membership in NATO without serious participation in the CSDP might not be sufficient (Koziej, 2017, p. 13).

## FINAL NOTES

Until today, the project under the name "European Union" has definitely undergone a long and difficult road. What seems obvious, certain matters concerning the member countries (such as the common market) were less controversial from initiatives concerning, e.g., safety and defence. In the beginning no one even assumed common activities in this regard – the Europeans were deceived by the illusion that after the fall of the bipolar order, peace (at least in this part of the world) shall prevail forever and that it will be something natural, a matter-of-course so to speak, and no endeavors shall have to be made in order to maintain it (Kuzniar, 2018, p. 56). And as soon as real political activities were initiated, many a time did national interests temporarily halt or even block decisive and creative processes. Therefore, common European output in this regard is hardly surprising, especially in comparison to the economic, social, cultural, etc., output of the Union. This contrast between the economic position of the EU in the world and the lack of real foreign and security policy was starting to become an "increasingly obvious handicap" (Samadashvili, 2016, p. 17).

Nowadays, there is almost no doubt that "without effective security and defence policy the Union shall not be able to implement its plans of being a leading actor on the global international arena" (Zięba, 2017, p. 45). Even though such awareness is existent, moving on to real, rational practical actions, especially while various populists and Eurosceptics are taking over the governments in member countries, the whole European construct seems to be faltering. Faltering really hard. The notions of sovereignty or national subjectivity are again becoming fashionable and attractive to the societies, which is obviously contrary to the idea of community, which the Union, as well as its specific activities, desperately needs. Thus the noticeable stagnation, or even crisis in the integrative processes, since the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon.

In the face of successive, even more serious challenges and threats to the European security, every once in a while this stagnation has been discontinued

by events forcing certain activities, be it declarative or other. More terrorist attacks on EU countries, the tense situation in North Africa and the Middle East generating increased migration to Europe, the armed conflict in direct neighborhood (eastern Ukraine, Crimea, the Sea of Azov), and Brexit<sup>7</sup>, to name just a few, reminded the European leaders that everything is possible in modern international relations. The complexity, instability, and unpredictability are unfortunately key features of the current security environment. And, as indicated by Zdzisław Polcikiewicz: “It also awoke Europeans to the fact that security does not last forever by itself, that it is a state one must actively pursue at all times and by all means” (Polcikiewicz, 2018, p. 98). Therefore, the situation comes full circle.

The initiatives briefly presented hereby, especially PESCO and EDF, the change of attitude of EU and member countries’ leaders towards making Europe more independent in terms of security and defence, various threats in the EU’s direct neighborhood, or the increasing unpredictability of the attitude of the USA towards NATO and Europe, may become a stimulus to break the impasse and blandness of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the EU. It is important also to Poland, as the conceivable success in this matter shall mean establishing another (following the partnership with the USA and membership in NATO) pillar of the country’s safety. Therefore Poland ought to make haste in order to join them and actively participate in them. Thus it is not about creating a supranational European army or about federalization, but about emphasis on broad and deep cooperation of countries in terms of defence, cooperation of national defence industries, and common defence in the future. So far the road to this objective seems to be immensely long and very bumpy.

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<sup>7</sup> Quite frequent are the statements that Great Britain’s leaving of the EU would somehow make the development of the CSDP easier, because one of the countries that treats building European military capabilities as competition and not supplementation to NATO, shall be gone (Rees, 2017, p. 569; Howorth, 2017, p. 25; Kuźniar, 2018, p. 64).

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