War in Ukraine and Enduring Relevance of the Clausewitzian Theory

• Authors: Damian Winczewski

Title variants

PL

Wojna w Ukrainie i nieustająca aktualność teorii Clausewitza

Abstracts

PL

W artykule omówiono wybrane teoretyczne i praktyczne problemy trwającej od 2014 r. wojny rosyjsko-ukraińskiej z perspektywy politycznej teorii wojny Carla von Clausewitza. Stwierdzono, po pierwsze, że definiowanie pierwszej fazy konfliktu jako „wojny hybrydowej” jest na gruncie teoretycznym zabiegiem zbędnym, który zaciemnia metodologicznie ważną różnicę między wojną a pokojem. Po drugie, pomimo innowacji technologicznych, koncepcje „mgły wojny” i „tarcia” pozostają aktualne. Po trzecie, obecna faza konfliktu pokazuje, że spontaniczne i oddolne zaangażowanie obywateli w wojnę było zjawiskiem przejściowym, które uległo podporządkowaniu centralnym strukturom dowodzenia. Ukazano również, że z perspektywy teorii Clausewitza strategiczna porażka Rosji w pierwszej części drugiej fazy konfliktu jest całkowicie zrozumiała.

EN

The article discusses selected theoretical and practical problems of the ongoing Russian Ukrainian war since 2014 from the perspective of Carl von Clausewitz’s political theory of war. It argues, first, that defining the first phase of the conflict as “hybrid war” on theoretical grounds is an unnecessary exercise that obscures the methodologically important difference between war and peace. Second, despite technological innovations, the concepts of “fog of war” and “friction” remain relevant. Third, the current phase of the conflict shows that the spontaneous and grassroots involvement of citizens in the war was a transitional phenomenon that became subordinated to central command structures. It also shows that from the perspective of Clausewitz’s theory, Russia’s strategic failure in the first part of the second phase of the conflict is completely understandable.

Keywords

EN

Clausewitz; strategy; war in Ukraine; political theory of war; hybrid war

PL

Clausewitz; strategia; wojna w Ukrainie; polityczna teoria wojny; wojna hybrydowa

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek
• Journal: Athenaeum. Polskie Studia Politologiczne
• Year: 2023
• Volume: 80
• Pages: 239-252

Dates

published

2023

Contributors

author

Damian Winczewski

• University of Maria-Curie Skłodowska in Lublin

• https://orcid.org/0000000308094817

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Identifiers

DOI

10.15804/athena.2023.80.14

Biblioteka Nauki

25806054