

## II. SPRAWY MIĘDZYNARODOWE

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### **THE PLACE OF NATO IN RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY IN THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY – OVERVIEW OF THE MATTER**

In number of Russian analysis the NATO is treated as a relic of the Cold War world's division and as a tool of U.S. policy to protect their global dominance. Russia's position towards NATO can be perceived as ambivalent. On one hand, Russia stresses her willingness to collaborate with NATO and the European Union (almost every member of the EU participates also in the Alliance). It also emphasizes the importance of relations with the United States. However, on the other hand, Moscow recognizes NATO as an organisation destabilizing the world order and the balance of power.

In Russian meaning NATO is an organization that creates a serious threat for her interests. First of all, Moscow emphasizes NATO's expansiveness, its military character and desire to reinforce the influence of this organization. Russia's approach towards NATO is so critical because the Alliance is regarded as a tool in Washington's hand, which wants to diminish the importance of Russia in global politics. It explains the peculiar dichotomy of Russia's view on the Pact and its members. On one hand, NATO invariably is described as a threat for Russian interests, but on the other hand, Russia underlines her willingness to develop relations with Western Europe – primarily with Germany, France and Italy which all are members of the Pact. Russia also differentiates between members of the Alliance; she differentiates allies of the

United States (mainly new member states) from these countries which might be used in a rivalry with the United States (i.e. Western Europe).

Since the beginning of the process of enlargement of NATO with the former communist states, Moscow began to see NATO as the main threat to her interests and security. Despite numerous controversies and cooling of relations between Russia and the West, in the end Russian side underlined that signing *NATO-Russia Founding Act* was a big success of Russian diplomacy. Although it didn't stop NATO expansion, it contained notation of respect for Russian interests in the security field. Another serious tension in relations between Russia and NATO emerged with the Kosovo crisis in 1999<sup>1</sup>.

### **NATO and Russia's position towards this organization – a declarative dimension**

Events in the former Yugoslavia in 1999 caused the need to define new priorities of the Russian Federation's security policy. As a reaction to the new situation, the National Security Concept<sup>2</sup> was adopted on 10<sup>th</sup> January 2000. In this document an important role in ensuring the safety of the state was assigned to nuclear deterrent policy. In the National Security Concept it was written both about using nuclear weapons as a response to nuclear attack, but also as a response to aggression with using conventional weapons in situations of extreme danger to national security. At the same time, Russia was ready to reduce their nuclear capabilities under agreements with other countries possessing these weapons<sup>3</sup>.

Since the early 90s the Russian Federation has sought to achieve the greatest impact on formation of security system in Europe. The Russian Federation government has postulated inter alia to strengthen the role of the OSCE (the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe). NATO's actions,

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<sup>1</sup> Н. Загладин, „Новый мировой беспорядок” и внешняя политика России, „Мировая Экономика и Международные Отношения” 2000, № 01, p. 18–19.

<sup>2</sup> Е. Хрусталеv, В. Цымбал, *Военная безопасность России: замыслы и реалии*, „Мировая Экономика и Международные Отношения” 2001, № 01, p. 40.

<sup>3</sup> *Концепция национальной безопасности Российской Федерации*, Утверждена Указом Президента Российской Федерации № 24 от 10.01.2000 года, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, Chapter IV, <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befe34209743256c630042d1aa/a54f9caa5e68075e432569fb004872a6?OpenDocument> [access: 3.03.2008].

according to Russian concept, should be subordinate to the mandate of the OSCE. At first Russia called to NATO for its disband, then tried to get a guarantee from the Alliance to stop their expansion to the East. The Russians also gave ideas for the transformation of NATO from security to political organization.

Assessing the role of NATO, Russia emphasized the importance of cooperation with NATO to maintain security and stability on the continent and openness for mutual constructive action. Indispensable basis for this was the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co-operation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed on 27<sup>th</sup> May 1997. As a forum for consultations between NATO and Russia, the Permanent Joint Council (PJC) was established<sup>4</sup>. This cooperation tightened after rapprochement between Russia and NATO's relations after 11<sup>th</sup> September 2001.

The PJC was replaced by the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) established during the meeting between the leaders of the Alliance and the Russian Federation on 28<sup>th</sup> May 2002 at Practica di Mare Air Force Base near Rome<sup>5</sup>. This agreement (known as the Rome Declaration) was inscribed in the process of developing by NATO new initiatives relating to the changing circumstances of the Euro-Atlantic security. The mechanism of functioning of the NRC is based on the rule of partnership between all its members. The Council is a forum for consultation and co-operation as well as for taking up joint decisions and joint actions. Decisions are made by consensus. The states participating in the Council are jointly responsible for implementing the decisions made together. The Council engages in the following areas: fighting against terrorism, crisis management, prevention of proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, arms control and confidence-building measures, missile defence, sea rescue, defence reform, military cooperation and defence reform, civil planning and new threats and challenges. Annual cooperation programmes are realized according to a work plan. Members of NATO-Russia Council meet twice a year at the level of Foreign Ministers and Defence Ministers and at the level of Heads of State and Government upon previous agreement. At ambassadorial

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<sup>4</sup> *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation*, Paris, 27 May 1997, NATO online library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxtxt/fndact-a.htm> [access: 17.01.2009].

<sup>5</sup> *Declaration by Hades of State and Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation*, NATO online library, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxtxt/b020528e.htm> [access: 17.01.2009].

level meetings are held once a month or more often. Council meetings are chaired by the Secretary General of NATO. There is possibility to create additional committees or working groups. Within the frame of the Council the representatives of the armed forces meet once a month and the Heads of Head Quarters meet not less than twice a year. Meetings of military experts are also possible. The Council does not deal with matters such as: admission of new members to NATO, defence planning, strategic concept, troops deployment and taking military action by the Alliance<sup>6</sup>. Cooperation between Russia and Alliance has been suspended in response to Russia's military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, which the Allies condemn in the strongest terms. Political and military channels of communication remain open<sup>7</sup>.

Despite the arrangements of co-operation mentioned before and receiving by the Russian Federation the instruments to influence the NATO and security system in Europe, the negative Russian attitude towards the Alliance generally has not changed. However, after 2001 the spirit of confrontation gave up to some extent (at least declaratively) to co-operation and integration of Russia with the Western security structures. Nevertheless, in general it concerned the matters that did not antagonize Russia and NATO, such as: problems with combating terrorism, non-proliferation of weapon of mass destruction, peace-keeping and the new challenges and threats. What is interesting, even after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine (the inspiration of which Moscow accused the West) this co-operation was still active<sup>8</sup>. Another revolution in Ukraine and Russian intervention in this country in 2014 have changed this situation.

In the NATO-Russia relations under presidencies of Putin and Medvedev some reorientations were observed but without changing the fundamental attitude towards the Pact. Despite the adoption of a pragmatic attitude towards the Alliance and resuming a dialogue with it, Putin invariably recognized it as a menace to the national interests of Russia. As Marek Czajkowski writes, NATO was constant and most important threat to Russian security. In security terms *sensu stricte* NATO was not of a great importance for Russia and this was one of the greatest paradoxes of Russian policy. The Russians (politicians,

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<sup>6</sup> *Polska w NATO*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of Poland, <http://www.msz.gov.pl/Polska,w,NATO,1695.html> [access: 17.01.2009].

<sup>7</sup> More about collaboration between NATO-Russia on the official Web-Site of the Alliance: [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_50091.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm) [access: 11.11.2017].

<sup>8</sup> K. Kraj, *Rosja w walce z terroryzmem*, Kraków 2009, p. 171, 174–175.

military men and others) realized that NATO could not attack Russia – it is a defensive structure and the public opinion of the member states also will not agree upon it. Russia's position resulted from a specific paradigm of international relations, as Mikhail Heller said, the imperial policy of Russia conducted for centuries had essentially defensive nature. Therefore, anything that did not give up to expansion was seen as a threat, even if it was not<sup>9</sup>.

In the most important Russian foreign policy documents issued by Putin and Medvedev, the West and NATO were still seen as the main source of threat to Russia's position. Both the *Foreign Policy Concept* of 2008, 2013 and 2016 and the *National Security Strategy 2020*, stressed that Russia had restored its international importance and aimed to achieve its national interests. Russia's goal was to achieve the status of global power<sup>10</sup>. Similar statements could be heard during Putin's presidency in 2007 and 2008<sup>11</sup>. In Conception of Russia's foreign policy from 2016 the status of the West was confirmed. In this document it is said that one of the main reasons of crisis between Russia and the West were the processes of enlargement of the NATO and EU which were "manifested in the geopolitical expansion"<sup>12</sup>.

The documents above identified the main threats for Russia's international position in a similar way. Despite Russian assurance of willingness to co-operate with NATO, these documents emphasize that NATO's enlargement to the east and plans of building a missile defence system are a menace to Moscow. Also the issue of Russian right to possess regions of priority interests<sup>13</sup> is dis-

<sup>9</sup> M. Czajkowski, *Rosja w Europie. Polityka bezpieczeństwa europejskiego Federacji Rosyjskiej*, Kraków 2003, p. 147–148.

<sup>10</sup> *Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации*. Утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации Д.А. Медведевым 12 июля 2008 г., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation 2008, <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c-630042d1aa/d48737161a0bc944c32574870048d8f7?OpenDocument> [access: 10.09.2010].

<sup>11</sup> M. de Haas, *Medvedev's Security Policy: A Provisional Assessment*, „Russian Analytical Digest”, 18.06.2009, № 62, p. 2, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=101960> [access: 20.11.2010].

<sup>12</sup> *Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации* (утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В. Путиным 30 ноября 2016 г.), [http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/official\\_documents/-/asset\\_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/2542248](http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptlCk6BZ29/content/id/2542248) [access: 23.07.2017].

<sup>13</sup> *Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации*. From 2008, 2013, 2016; *Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации до 2020 года*, The President of Russia, 13.05.2009, [http://news.kremlin.ru/ref\\_notes/424](http://news.kremlin.ru/ref_notes/424) [access: 20.11.2010].

cussed. Similar catalogue of threats was seen in *Russian Federation Military Doctrine*, from 2010. The document in the part concerning collective defence talked about the European Union and NATO<sup>14</sup>. The mention about EU and NATO in the sphere of collective security could be treated as an evidence that the RF military contingents want to participate in operations of these organizations. However, they were both excluded from the list of military-political co-operators, which might signify that these actors do not belong to the category of favoured military partners as some scientists think<sup>15</sup>. The *Russian Federation Military Doctrine*, from 2015, stressed that the NATO is one of the main threat for European order and stability<sup>16</sup>.

### **NATO's expansion to the East vs. Russia's position**

An event that particularly decided on critical Russian attitude towards NATO was first of all expansion of the Alliance to the East. NATO included new member-states from post-communist Europe. This step was interpreted by Moscow as a break of the agreement that was allegedly made between Russia and the West after the collapse of the Iron Curtain<sup>17</sup>. O. Shloma of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus presents three basic interpretations of NATO's enlargement to the East, which are found in Eastern Europe. Firstly, it is related to the conviction of a moral debt of West to the Eastern Europe. To repay this debt, the West should help the countries from Central and Eastern Europe in adaptation of fundamental principles and democratic values. This will help countries from the region to return to the western democratic community. Secondly, NATO's eastward expansion was motivated by the intentions to add

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<sup>14</sup> *Военная доктрина Российской Федерации*, Утверждена Указом Президента Российской Федерации 5 февраля 2010 года, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation 2010, <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/2a959a74cd7ed01f432569fb004872a3?OpenDocumen> [access: 20.11.2010].

<sup>15</sup> M. de Haas, *Russia's New Military Doctrine: A Compromise Document*, „Russian Analytical Digest”, 4.05.2010, № 78, p. 4, <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=116019> [access: 20.11.2010].

<sup>16</sup> *Военная доктрина Российской Федерации (в редакции от 2015 г.)*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation 3.03.2015, [http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign\\_policy/official\\_documents/-/asset\\_publisher/CptICkV6BZ29/content/id/976907](http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkV6BZ29/content/id/976907) [access: 13.03.2017].

<sup>17</sup> М. Майоров, *О нравственности и национальных интересах*, „Международная Жизнь” 2007, № 1–2, p. 9.

the countries of Central and Eastern Europe to the Alliance zone of influence to offset the possibility of Russian expansion and restoration of Russia's dominant position in the region. The third approach is related to the NATO's aspirations to be an effective security organization representing the interests of member states as a „core” of the Euro-Atlantic security system<sup>18</sup>. Within the Kremlin's circles of power the second interpretation is especially taken into account.

In fact, the extension of NATO did not threaten the Russian sense of security but rather its fragile international identity. According to the analysts of the Council of Foreign and Defence Policy headed by Sergey Karaganov, the NATO's expansion neither threatened Russian interests nor it was a danger to Moscow. However, it could lead to Russia's isolation in the international politics and interfere with the economic and political processes of integration in Europe<sup>19</sup>. To compensate Russian the loss, the West proposed a mechanism which would specify the NATO-Russia relations which was the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. However, the war in Kosovo in 1999 exposed the weakness of Russia in the international arena. It showed the fiction of agreements between Russia and the West, which were symbolic to a great extend. It happened shortly after the new countries from Central and Eastern Europe had joined the Pact<sup>20</sup>. Therefore, Russian reaction to the NATO's intervention in former Yugoslavia and to bombing Serbia in 1999 was so violent<sup>21</sup>.

According to Russia, the intensity of its co-operation with NATO first of all depended on not applying force nor threat to use it by the Alliance as well as non placing nuclear weapon nor means to carry it on territories of the new member states<sup>22</sup>. For this reason the plans of installation of missile defence in Poland and Czech Republic and western involvement in the Orange Revo-

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<sup>18</sup> О.С. Шлома, *Западные интерпретации расширения НАТО на восток*, [в:] *Десять лет внешней политики России*, ред. А.В. Торкунов, Москва 2003, р. 324–325.

<sup>19</sup> А.С. Линч, *Реализм российской внешней политики*, „Pro et Contra” 2001, № 04, р. 150–152.

<sup>20</sup> Ibidem, р. 153.

<sup>21</sup> М. Майоров, *op.cit.*, р. 9.

<sup>22</sup> *Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации*, Утвержена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В. Путиным 28 июня 2000 г., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, Chapter IV, Accessible in the Internet: <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e-9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/fd86620b371b0cf7432569fb004872a7?OpenDocument> [access: 3.03.2008].

lution in Ukraine and earlier in Georgia faced Russian hostile reactions. The Russian standpoint on these problems was expressed by Vladimir Putin during the NATO-Russia Council meeting at the NATO's summit in Bucharest. He said in rough words that approaching Russian borders by the Alliance is a serious danger to Russian interests. He also stated that the Russian Federation would take adequate steps if NATO adopts the Membership Action Plan (MAP) for Ukraine and Georgia and Moscow would use the casus of Kosovo to consider the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia<sup>23</sup>. The same arguments we heard in 2014, after Russian annexation of Crimea when Vladimir Putin talked about the new Ukrainian government that it is "disciplining" "by the foreign sponsors of these so-called politicians"<sup>24</sup>.

In some areas of NATO's activity Russia perceived a serious threat to its security and interests. Such areas included: first of all the trends to strengthen and develop the NATO's structures and its expansion to the East as well as elevation (to a strategic level) of a doctrine of using power to solve problems beyond the territory of NATO's member states and without sanction of the Security Council of the Organization of United Nations. Russia recognized this new way of NATO's functioning as a substantial threat to the strategic global order<sup>25</sup>. As it was stressed in the National Security Concept of the RF, broad and constructive co-operation between Russia and NATO would be possible only if it is built on the basis of proper respect of the partners and unconditional fulfilment of accepted mutual obligations<sup>26</sup>.

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<sup>23</sup> О. Алленова, Е. Геда, В. Новиков, *Блок НАТО разошелся на блокпакеты*, „Коммерсантъ”, 7.04.2008, № 57, <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocsID=877224> [access: 11.01.2009].

<sup>24</sup> Обращение Президента Российской Федерации, 18 марта 2014 года, <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603> [access: 13.11.2017].

<sup>25</sup> *Концепция национальной безопасности Российской Федерации*, Утверждена Указом Президента Российской Федерации № 24 от 10.01.2000 года, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, Chapter III, <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/a54f9caa5e68075e432569fb004872a6?OpenDocument> [access: 3.03.2008].

<sup>26</sup> *Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации*, Утвержена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В. Путиным 28 июня 2000 г., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, Rozdzial IV, <http://www.mid.ru/ns-osndoc.nsf/0e9272befa34209743256c630042d1aa/fd86620b371b0cf7432569fb004872a7?OpenDocument> [access: 3.03.2008].



### Russian proposals for the new European security architecture and the role of NATO in it

Both Putin and Medvedev presented similar proposals for a new European order which should determine the status of NATO in proposed security system. These proposals redefined basic assumptions and goals of the security policy that the Russian Federation had presented since the 90s.

In Putin's projects we can read the following presumptions about European security and NATO's place in it: the multilevel concert of powers should play the fundamental role in determining the shape of governance of security in Europe (especially important for Russia was the fact that economic and energy factors should play the core role in this structure<sup>27</sup>). The UN principles should be the basis of international legal regulations. In fact, in Russian conceptions the decision centre should be the UN's Security Council where Russia had the power of veto. The security level should be supported by regional organizations – in Europe it should be the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). According to the Russians, for Europe the OSCE should be something like the UN. The third part of the structure of the new Russian-European security plan was the new NATO-Russia co-operation. Russia had a negative attitude towards the Alliance but due to the Russian pragmatism she wanted to co-operate with it. Moscow also wanted to transform the Alliance into an organization of collective security<sup>28</sup>.

The proposals of a similar security architecture can be read from the plans presented several times by president Dimitry Medvedev. The basic document containing these proposals is known as Medvedev's plan – that is The Project of the European Security Treaty<sup>29</sup>. In that document and on the basis of Russian politicians utterances we can presume that Russia seeks to create

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<sup>27</sup> More about the importance of the power industry for the Russian foreign policy in: R. Kłaczyński, *Gaz ziemny – kluczowy instrument w realizacji strategicznych interesów Federacji Rosyjskiej na arenie międzynarodowej*, [in:] *Studia Europejskie z zakresu prawa, polityki, gospodarki*, ed. R. Kłaczyński, Kielce 2011, p. 56–71.

<sup>28</sup> M. Czajkowski, *op.cit.*, p. 156–157.

<sup>29</sup> *Проект Договора о европейской безопасности* [online], The President of Russia, 29.11.2009, <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/6152> [access: 20.11.2010].

specific concert of powers and to increase her influence in Europe, like during the presidency of Putin. When it comes to security issues in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russia first of all wants to monopolize these issues. In that region Russia is the leader of the *Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and according to the Medvedev's plan this organization should manage the problems of security on CIS territory*<sup>30</sup>. Russia, being the undisputed leader in the CSTO and in the CIS, in practice, proposed to give her dominion over the region. Such proposals were not new. Since the early 90s the Russian Federation treated revitalization of influence in the post-Soviet zone as strengthening its position in relations with the West and as an activity that should give Moscow a prominent place in the multi-polar world<sup>31</sup>. CSTO also allowed Russia to preserve her presence in strategic locations such as Central Asia and Caucasus and to maintain a bridgehead in Europe (e.g. Belarus). Russia, aware of the inadequacy of her potential, counted on interaction within a broader security system. It would significantly rise Russia's efficiency, especially due to the fact that Moscow could operate within the Russia-Europe-USA triangle<sup>32</sup>.

Russian proposals of the new European security architecture were presented at the NATO summit in Bucharest where the Alliance did not give a MAP to Ukraine and Georgia. However, these countries received assurance that in the future they would be members of NATO, too. Therefore, Russia decided to prevent the enlargement of NATO. The Russian-Georgian conflict was the evidence of that. This war showed how important the post-Soviet zone is to Russia. It also showed that Moscow would defend this region at all costs. Russia wanted to strengthen her position in this territory by receiving a mandate of the international community to have the security issues resolved by the CSTO.

The Russian proposal was addressed primarily to Germany and France. Russia also presented these countries with an interesting offer of development a bilateral trade and investment. It seemed this way Moscow referred to the idea of a "concert of powers". First stage of that plan was to convene a summit of the

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<sup>30</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>31</sup> S. Bieleń, M. Raś (eds.), *Polityka zagraniczna Rosji*, Warszawa 2008, p. 21.

<sup>32</sup> Т. Гомар, *НАТО и «русский вопрос»*. Как изменить ментальность холодной войны, "Россия в Глобальной Политике" 2010, № 2, p. 24–26, <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/NATO-i-russkii-vopros-14851> [access: 20.11.2010].

OSCE with the participation of all European security organizations, including the NATO, the European Union, the Organization of Collective Security Treaty and the Commonwealth of Independent States<sup>33</sup>.

According to the “Kommersant” reports of October 2010, Russia modified their proposals and started to demand that NATO reduce its military presence in the new member states of the Alliance. This was the condition on which Russia would sign a co-operation agreement with NATO. Moscow demanded that the Alliance prohibits placing “significant armed forces” on the territory of the new member states from Central-Eastern Europe<sup>34</sup>. It shows that Russia could try to build some kind of buffer zones in Europe and might not treat all members of the Alliance equally. The proposals addressed by Moscow show a constant trend of forcing the policy of international order based on consultation with major powers in the global arena<sup>35</sup>.

The essence of Medvedev’s plan was the request of indivisibility of security for all (point nr 3 of the plan). It has substantial implications for Russia’s perception of NATO. The adoption of this subjective criterion would lead to negotiation with Russia by the European countries such activities as: NATO’s enlargement, the Alliance’s infrastructure deployment and installation of the missile defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic. The project of the agreement proposed by Medvedev included a commitment to respect the sense of security of all parties of this agreement. Any changes which alter the existing balance of power or undermine the sense of security of the pact signatories would have to be discussed. Any decisions would have to be reached only by consensus<sup>36</sup>. It seems that Russia’s short-term goal could have been to block NATO’s expansion and to start a debate on new European security architecture. The long-term Russian goals could have been the following issues: weakening the U.S. position in Europe and thus loosening the transatlantic

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<sup>33</sup> A. Krzymowski, *Plan Miedwiediewa – nowa architektura bezpieczeństwa?*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe” 2009, № 2, p. 24.

<sup>34</sup> J. Prus-Wojciechowska, *Moskwa chce mniej NATO w Europie Środkowej*, „Rzeczpospolita”, 28.10.2010.

<sup>35</sup> More: M. Leonard, N. Popescu, *Rachunek sił w stosunkach Unia Europejska – Rosja*, Londyn–Warszawa 2008, p. 22–27.

<sup>36</sup> *Проект Договора о европейской безопасности* [online], The President of Russia, 29.11.2009, rozdz. 2–6, <http://www.kremlin.ru/news/6152> [access: 20.11.2010].

relationship, NATO's marginalization and giving Moscow the veto power in matters of European and transatlantic security<sup>37</sup>.

### SUMMARY

In 2006 Dmitry Trenin stated that Russia left the West and began to work on creation of her own sphere of influence. The area of Russian activity in particular was the post-Soviet zone where Moscow wanted to rebuild their dominant position. Sergey Karaganow added: "Moscow has realized that she neither wants to nor she can afford to integrate with the West on the conditions proposed by the West – the type of integration without the right of veto"<sup>38</sup>. Alexander Dugin, an Euro-Asian ideologist claimed: "We proved that we did not give a damn about NATO and we were not afraid of it. We have the nuclear weapon and we are ready to use it. Russia crossed the line from which she can not withdraw anymore. This is a course for the revival of Russian sovereignty and the position of regional power – in practice, not just in words"<sup>39</sup>. The above quotations reflect the Russian attitude to the NATO and show the role of this organization for Russia. Undoubtedly, the Alliance is perceived by Russia as a threat and a rival. The reasons of such perception are primarily the Alliance's claims to play the role of a "guardian" of global peace, attempts to interfere in the area recognized by Russia as her sphere of influence, strengthening the position of NATO in Eastern Europe and project of development new defence technologies such as missile defence. Since the 90s Russia consistently has been trying to undermine the importance of NATO and to put it into the frame of international structures of security governance. In 2010 minister Sergey Lavrov argued that NATO is a relic of a bygone era and should be subjugated to the principles of the UN Security Council<sup>40</sup>.

**Keywords:** NATO, Poland, Russia, security

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<sup>37</sup> A. Krzymowski, op.cit., p. 28–29.

<sup>38</sup> A. Grabowska, *Stosunki Unia Europejska – Rosja i ich implikacje dla ładu międzynarodowego*, „Stosunki Międzynarodowe” 2009, № 1–2, p. 95–97.

<sup>39</sup> S. Popowski, *Z kolan na głowę*, „Nowa Europa Wschodnia” 2008, № 2, p. 26.

<sup>40</sup> *Статья Министра иностранных дел России С.В. Лаврова „В одной лодке”, „Итоги”, 15 ноября 2010 года*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation, 15.11.2010, [http://www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/2fee282eb6df40e643256999005e6e8c/cadb0dc3ec77b9b9c32577d-c004d637d?OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/2fee282eb6df40e643256999005e6e8c/cadb0dc3ec77b9b9c32577d-c004d637d?OpenDocument) [access: 19.05.2011].