

PARISIAN “KULTURA” AND THE QUESTION OF UNITED EUROPE

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Let us not concern ourselves with speculations whether Jerzy Giedroyc, when he founded the Literary Institute in 1947 and soon afterwards published the first issue of “Kultura”, already suspected that his two creations (especially the magazine) would play such an important role in shaping political ideas of Polish exiles and become his true magnum opus. The fact remains that in spite of its distance from the centers of Polish immigration, the government in exile, and the large Polish immigrant community, the new monthly, while still looking for new contributors and readers, and remaining in opposition to Mieczysław Grydzewski’s “Wiadomości” - which sought to cultivate pre-war traditions - quickly achieved the unquestionable status of a platform for free speech, a forum for the bold exchange of views (these often being unpopular and going against the drift of Polish public opinion in the West), and a leading channel of communication with the homeland. Even though the subtitle (Sketches. Short Stories. Reports) hinted at the editorial staff’s interest in literature, “Kultura” from day one tackled difficult geopolitical and political problems arising from the situation in post-war Europe. Its publications were characterized by topicality and realistic assessments, which can be clearly seen while studying consecutive annual sets, for example with regard to the process of European unification.

Throughout over half a century of the magazine’s existence (as it is well known, the final issue came out in October 2000), this topic kept returning regularly, in accordance with the historical timeline. The terminology used: “uniting Europe”, “unification”, “integration”, is not only a sign of the times, but also shows that the process described is of a multilateral, heterogeneous nature, constantly evolving in

response to philosophical and intellectual debates. “Kultura” contains a wide selection of programmatic articles tracing the roots of integration to theories describing the crisis of Western civilization or culture. A separate category is made up of publications documenting historical facts and events taking place during the unification process. Sociological, economic and political microanalyses look at the reflection of ideas in particular actions and the specificity of regional aspects of unification. It is also well worth noticing the discussions of such questions as federalism and neutrality, world government, the state of Polish-German relations and, more broadly, the position of divided Germany in Europe. Articles about Polish aspirations to join the EU are given rich background in the form of debates on the role of Poland in the East (whether it should be a bulwark, a keystone or a clutch) and on the ULB theory (i.e. the good-neighbourly relations with independent Ukraine, Lithuania and Belarus)¹. It is worth pointing out that the question of united Europe was often present in the pages of “Kultura” in various columns and series. It was addressed by regular contributors (Juliusz Mieroszewski, Waclaw A. Zbyszewski, Bohdan Osadczuk, Leopold Unger), and guest writers, including scientists and politicians (Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Richard Pipes). In the final decade of the last century, as efforts aimed at EU expansion intensified, “Kultura” attained the status of a national opinion poll (new contributors, “Poland In The 21st Century” poll). Materials for discussion and polemical articles were published.

It can be claimed that faith in Europe and the values of its spiritual heritage were the guiding light for founders of “Kultura” ever since its inception. This opinion is confirmed by two manifestos elaborating on the statements by Paul Valéry and Benetto Croce, published in the opening pages of the first issue, as well as by the magazine’s advocacy of theories of Raymond Aron (see e.g. “Wielka Schizma” [Great Schizm], K. 1949/15); James Burnham (“Walka o świat” [Struggle for the World], K. 1949/9, K. 1950/1 through 5) and Theodor Oberlaender (*Cele Europy* [Aims of Europe], K. 1951/2-3). Their significance stemmed from the fact that they presented the causes of “struggle between two civilizations”, the breakdown of traditional hierarchies and ties between societies, and traced the historical roots of present-day

¹ The ULB concept is the most enduring and vital achievement of Juliusz Mieroszewski, a close associate of J. Giedroyc, who in the years 1950-1976 was responsible for formulating the policy of “Kultura”. His writings are discussed in numerous dissertations and articles, e.g. K. Pomian *Redaktor i Publicysta – o polityce “Kultury”* (*The Editor and The Publicist – On the Policy of “Kultura”*) (in:) *Kultura i jej krąg. (Culture and its Circle)*. Wyd. UMCS, Lublin 1994, J. Giedroyc: *O listach Juliusza Mieroszewskiego – specjalnie dla “Polityki”. Polak zachodni. (On the Letters of Juliusz Mieroszewski – exclusively for “Polityka”. Western Pole.)*, “Polityka” 1999 no. 47 (2220), Z. Byrski: *Myśli o publicystyce Juliusza Mieroszewskiego (Reflections on the Writings of Juliusz Mieroszewski)*, “Kultura” 1976 no. 9/348.

conflicts (the idea of community, dating to the times of Alexander the Great and the Roman Empire). According to J. Burnham, the sharpest metaphor used in describing this state of affairs was the Iron Curtain. The Yalta agreement divided Europe into zones of influence controlled by culturally adverse superpowers whose rivalry was restrained by mutual respect for the status quo, necessitated by the desire to prevent a new war, which, however, cost the countries in the Soviet zone their independence. As early as in late Forties and early Fifties, in the articles penned by, among others, Zbigniew Florczak, Jan Ulatowski, Melchior Wańkiewicz and Juliusz Mieroszewski, "Kultura" called for the creation of a regional community or federation of nations of Central Eastern Europe in order to counterbalance the existing situation. Free Poland's answer to the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community came in the form of a "Democratic Manifesto" by Father Innocenty M. Bocheński, published in the Parisian monthly. Bocheński wrote of the need to confront communism with the European democratic tradition and the necessity of political integration of the East and the West. Among other programmatic articles, the most clear-cut vision of the future united continent is presented in, e.g. Ł. Małecki's, *Rzecz idzie o Europę* [*It Is About Europe*] (K. 1951/4)²; J. Mieroszewski's, *ABC polityki "Kultury"* [*ABC of the Policy of "Kultura"*] (K. 1966/4) and *Ani z Rosją, ani z Niemcami* [*Not With Russia, Not With Germany*] (K. 1967/9). These writings are an attempt at showing to what extent the crisis of values, as well as local and global disruptions of political and economic balance fuelled initiatives aimed at uniting Europe.

Contributors to "Kultura", as well as all the prominent historians and political scientists invited to present their opinions on the prospects of eliminating divisions in Europe, were at the same time witnesses and chroniclers of this process. They participated in conferences, observed the impact of adopted resolutions, experienced the gradual change in designation of the terms "divided" and "united Europe". Articles devoted to the genesis and activities of the European Coal and Steel Community, European Economic Community and the European Union in the political-legal, socio-economic and cultural areas form the largest body of commentaries and analyses. Obviously, the formula of the present synthesis, focusing on a particular problem, precludes the inclusion of detailed references to most of these writings. The basic difficulty facing the researcher lies in the selection of these opinions which, in retrospect, seem most significant and universal, and which, while of historical value, still retain their validity. It is also crucial to present them in a chronological order,

² A telling excerpt follows: "If Europe wants to live, it must be united anew and the Iron Curtain will have to go, as it is a line separating two halves of one body which cannot be separated at will".

so as to show the evolution of views presented by the succeeding generations of writers.

The idea of the United States of Europe presented in 1946 by Winston Churchill provided the impetus for change in European countries' strategy on three levels of foreign policy: regarding relations with the USA, with each other and with the Soviet Union and its satellites. Western Europe expected its American ally to provide far-reaching help in fighting communism (even the Marshall Plan was interpreted in these terms). The February 1949 Conference of European Movement in Brussels revealed the lack of agreement on the fundamental question: what the European community should be, which countries it should consist of, how the supranational declarations were to be put into effect. It lay bare the major areas of conflict: whether or not countries from behind the Iron Curtain were to be included, what to do about the divided Germany and its armaments. „Kultura” published articles on these matters by such authors as Edward Raczyński (report from Brussels, K. 1949/18), Alfred Fabre-Luce (*Jak mogłaby powstać Europa* [*How Europe Could Be Created*], K. 1949/24); Juliusz Mieroszewski (*Finał klasycznej Europy* [*The End of Classical Europe*], K. 1950/6).

Subsequent events, such as the establishment of ECSC in 1951, intensive discussions surrounding the proposed European Defence and Political Community and the founding of the Western European Union (1954), preceded by the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (1949), distinctly showed that unification plans were closely connected with the organization of defense systems, and were to be limited to Western Europe only. This fact was pointed out by Aleksander Kawałkowski (*Kapitulacja czy wyzwolenie* [*Capitulation or Liberation*], K. 1951/6) who wrote that in the first half of the Fifties the focus should be on giving the North Atlantic Treaty substance by, among other things, speeding up the process of integration initiated by the Schuman Plan, and the inclusion of Germany in federal Europe. Some writers also warned of the dangers of regionalization of Europe and the folly of underestimating strong economic links within the Soviet bloc – Jan Wszelaki, Jerzy Prądyński, S. L. Sharp, Stanisław Zarzewski.

Despite the fact that on January 1st, 1958 the Treaties of Rome came into effect, European public opinion was skeptical about the chances of unifying the continent. Juliusz Mieroszewski (*Wielki cień* [*Large Shadow*], K. 1958/3) named two obstacles to the unification process: the superpowers' reluctance to disturb the status quo and the unresolved so-called German question. This term encompasses not only the division of Germany, the ratification of Paris Agreements and the new Ostpolitik replacing the “Habsburg bulwark”, but also the neighbours' mistrust of Germany and the fear of the potential political threat it posed. These matters were discussed by Mieroszewski (*Na linii Szczecin-Triest* [*From Szczecin to Trieste*], K. 1962/4; *Nad grobem Ostpolitik* [*On the Grave of Ostpolitik*], K. 1962/12), and other writers, such as Stefan

W. Kozłowski, Jerzy Prączyński, Eugeniusz Hinterhoff, Feliks Grass³. The reasons for the cooling of Franco-British relations and the ways of counterbalancing the German contribution to European community were also analyzed by Aleksander Kawalkowski (*U progu V Republiki* [*On the Threshold of the Fifth Republic*], K. 1959/3).

First opinions on the effectiveness of the European Economic Community appear in "Kultura" as soon as in the early Sixties, e.g. *Europa* by A. Kawalkowski (K. 1962/1-2); *Wspólny Rynek: efemeryda czy punkt zwrotny* [*Common Market: Ephemera or Turning Point*] by W.A. Zbyszewski (K. 1964/4). Their conclusion is that the slow, but steady integration serves to transform a multinational, multilingual area, politically fragmented over the centuries, into one powerful whole, a union of Europe. The experience of the Vietnam war and the détente policy of U.S. President Richard Nixon showed – according to J. Mioszowski – that EEC was founded in reaction to Soviet hegemonic policy and American economic supremacy; it is, therefore, a product of Cold War, which fact must raise concerns about the impending crises in Europe. "The Londoner" wrote: "EEC is an economic giant and a political-military midget", incapable of moving beyond the "European illness that is nationalism, and its outdated ambitions", and suffers from "overabundance of a sense of history and paralysis of a sense of reality" (*Lekcja wietnamska dla Europy* [*The Vietnam Lesson for Europe*], K. 1973/7). Different views were formulated by Leopold Unger, e.g. in his biographical essay on Jean Monnet (*A jednak się kręci* [*And still it moves*], K. 1979/5) and in the article *Ziewanie Europy* [*The Yawning of Europe*] (K. 1982/5). Therein he writes that a great political vision, like that of a union of free democratic nations, brings hope of overcoming nationalistic and "tradesman's" barriers. The unification of Europe is a way of protecting sovereignty and democracy in the globalized world, and EEC is an "oasis of welfare and peace".

The signing of the Single European Act which came into effect on July 1st, 1987, marked the end of a certain stage on the road to united Europe, a stage which was probably the most difficult. As we could see, contributors to "Kultura" expressed their opinions on the most important ideological matters, instead of focusing on practical solutions to problems arising during transformations of the European community. Rare opinions on the idea of Mitteleuropa as a neutral area or a Central European federation can be considered part of the realm of philosophy and political science. The Treaty of European Union, in effect since November 1st, 1993, not only opened

³ F. Grass's *Remarks on Eastern Europe* (K. 1958/10) retain their validity in that respect to this day: "European Union is the right place for a strong, united Eastern European region; only together with the Western democracies will it provide counterbalance for Germany and create conditions for peaceful cooperation, both within and without. (...) Linked through the European Union with the Atlantic system, Eastern Europe will complete the chain of cooperation between the East and the West."

broad new perspectives, but gave rise to completely new challenges as well. In his article entitled *W poszukiwaniu nowego miejsca Polski w świecie* [*In Search of a New Place for Poland in the World*] (K. 1990/10) Krzysztof Gawlikowski averred that the lack of a generally accepted formula for unification slowed this process down. Debates on the form, scope, and obligations of candidate countries were and still are being held in Western European countries which, after all, have first-hand experience of integration. Some contemporary problems were reflected in writings published in “Kultura”, e.g. the concept of “concentric circles”, monetary union, ways of dealing with the industrial “heritage” of Comecon, the role of independent Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus (Stanisław Polaczek, *Znaczenie Maastricht dla polskiej gospodarki* [*The Consequences Of Maastricht For Polish Economy*], K. 1992/12; Janusz Mondry, *Do jakiej Europy zmierzamy* [*What Europe Are We Heading For*], K. 1997/12⁴; Karol Modzelewski *Pożytek z utraty złudzeń* [*Advantages of Disillusionment*], K. 1994/3). As far as the latest commentaries are concerned, it is worth mentioning the analyses of Andrzej Koraszewski (*Uwagi o perspektywach integracji z Unią Europejską* [*Remarks on the Perspectives of Integration with the European Union*], K. 1997/10) and Krzysztof Czyżewski (*Powrót Europy Środkowej* [*The Return of Central Europe*], K. 1997/10), which focus on EU’s agricultural policy, including changes in the vocational structure of the rural population. They also show that Central European markets are currently seen in the context of short-term interests of countries comprising the “Fifteen”, without due regard to the long-term strategy of EU. A speech given by President Aleksander Kwaśniewski “Europa na progu XXI wieku” [*Europe On the Threshold of the 21st Century*] (K. 1999/12) is worthy of attention as a synthesizing review of the history of unification plans, threats to the process of integration and regional initiatives.

Alongside historical accounts which documented the genesis of the idea of European community and the process of its implementation, “Kultura” also contained reflections on cultural differences between the East and the West as the original cause of present-day geopolitical conflicts, particularly in articles by J. Mieroszewski and

⁴ J. Mondry in his review of John Laughland’s book *Splamione źródło: niedemokratyczne korzenie idei europejskiej* [*Tainted Origins: Undemocratic Roots of the European Idea*] reminds the readers that most disagreements among member countries as to the future shape of Europe revolve around the attributes of sovereignty (currency, armed forces, foreign policy). The line of division runs between advocates of a strong, superpowerful and centralized European Union and opponents of federalist ideas. Both attitudes are representative of two geopolitical concepts, reflecting two European standpoints: German–French – strong, independent Europe, playing a pivotal role in the world, and British – expanding, but loosely linked community of Union countries, firmly anchored in the alliance with the United States.

W. A. Zbyszewski. These discussions are concerned with, among other things, voluntary unification of “European homelands”, the primacy of local interests over a universal vision, “Europeanization” of communism prior to integration (a federation of countries with different political systems, but a common culture, is possible). Iron Curtain was not the only line of division and the main determinant in deciding the position of a country in the European order became – in a political sense – the attitude towards Russia and the US. Within this context Zbigniew Brzeziński’s conclusions seemed particularly moving (*Przyszłość Jalty* [*The Future of Yalta*], K. 1985/1-2): political reality is such that America cannot eliminate the division of Europe, but it stimulates peaceful evolution towards pluralism in the East and “From among all the Europeans, those from the East, deprived of the illusion of American liberation, display the strongest yearning for united Europe which would free them from the Soviet yoke. This yearning explains the unceasing popularity of de Gaulle (...) and the feelings towards the Pope whose vision of spiritual unity of Europe has a self-evident significance”.

Attitude towards Russia, Soviet-bloc countries and the divided Germany had a decisive influence on the dynamics of the processes of unification. Settling the disputes over political borders in Europe which failed to reflect fully historical, geographical and cultural divisions, became a priority for the advocates of reconciliation and the early pro-unification organizations. In the course of supranational debates, new areas of nationalist, economic and social conflict were constantly being discovered. Some of them were local in character, but disagreements between neighbours effectively hindered attempts at reaching more fundamental goals. Euroskeptics could nearly always provide examples of overzealous officials “producing” artificial regulations which embarrassed the Community. These problems kept appearing along with the changes in understanding of the essence of integration and found their reflection in “Kultura”, starting from the mid-Sixties. The controversies described above were anticipated by earlier speculations on the world government, federal union of Europe, and the neutralization of the Central-Eastern zone. Analyses by Zbigniew Jordan, James Burnham, Robert Redfield, Aleksander Kawalkowski show how the development of the idea of world government paralleled the rise in Cold War tensions⁵. However, these writers noted that a voluntary association of countries under such a government – an act tantamount to partial renunciation of the privileges of sovereignty – was unlikely. As a result, greater importance was attached to local initiatives, or regional federations. In the words of A. Kawalkowski

⁵ J. Burnham in his writings went so far as to postulate the necessity of establishing world government as soon as possible in order to maintain exclusive control over atomic weapons (*Walka o świat* [*Struggle For the World*], K.1950/1).

(*Kapitulacja czy wyzwolenie* [*Capitulation or Liberation*], K. 1951/6): “integration of Europe requires that its constituent areas be organized on a federal basis. Western Europe could be just the kernel of a future entity”. This idea was most fully elaborated by Juliusz Mieroszewski⁶ who, speaking for the entire editorial staff, presented proposals for certain “campaigns” aimed at hastening the implementation of federative plans, e.g. a joint declaration of representatives of political nations of Europe on ways of solving territorial disputes, and the creation of an international European brigade. According to J. Mieroszewski, the main threat to federalist ideas came from “anachronistic historical views” of the nations concerned – a good example here would be the question of sovereignty over the so-called Regained Territories. “The Londoner”, himself an advocate of federalism, pointed out that the only bleak alternative to federation lay in subservience to Russia or the future united Germany. Hubert Ripka formulated a proposal for a regional federative union of Poland and Czechoslovakia (K. 1952/12). A variation on federative strategy, inspired by the spirit of *détente*, came in the form of a concept of creating a security zone by neutralizing Central Eastern Europe. Again, this matter was discussed by J. Mieroszewski and H. Ripka.

Contributors to “Kultura” gave serious consideration to the so-called German question. In the Fifties their focus was on the pacification of concerns raised by German unification and rearmament, as well as on the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border, and the conviction that Europe did not end with Germany. These matters were discussed not only by “The Berliner” (initially, Jerzy Prądzyński was the magazine’s German correspondent), but also, quite extensively, by J. Mieroszewski⁷. He expresses the opinion that the unification of Germany is a necessary condition for European stability, while German neutrality is the best guarantee of peace. He claims that the Second World War lay bare the fallacy inherent in the assumption that the fate of Eastern Europe is inextricably bound with the state of German-Russian relations. He also stresses the need for a comprehensive agreement between Poland and Germany.

⁶ The leading contributor to “Kultura” focused on this subject matter in such articles and writings as: *O międzynarodową brygadę europejską* [*On the Need For an International European Brigade*] (K. 1951/11); *Europy nie da się przesunąć* [*Europe Cannot Be Moved Elsewhere*] (K. 1952/2-3); *O reformę “zakonu polskości”* [*On the Need For Reform of the “Polish order”*] (K. 1952/4); *Kontynent na emeryturze* [*Retired Continent*] (K. 1952/9); *Federacja ośmiu* [*Federation of the Eight*] (K. 1954/4); *List z wyspy* [*Letter From An Island*] (K. 1951/12).

⁷ See, e.g. *Niemcy* [*Germans*] (K. 1954/4); *Niemieckie zbrojenia a polskie interesy* [*German Rearmament and Polish Interests*] (K. 1954/12); *Metamorfozy polsko-niemieckie* [*Polish-German Metamorphoses*] (K. 1955/10); *Materiały do refleksji* [*Materials For Reflection*] (K. 1956/3); *Dla kogo zbroimy Niemców* [*Who Do We Arm the Germans For?*] (K. 1958/5); *Niemiecki cul de sac* [*German Cul-de-sac*] (K. 1957/10).

The dilemmas of divided Europe soon attracted the attention of J. Mieroszewski. It can be seen in the breadth of his interest in this area and his perceptive observations on the unification processes, such as, for example, his thought-provoking study *Dramat Europy* [*The European Tragedy*] (K. 1963/3) which describes with great precision the interdependence of Western Europe and the proposed Atlantic Union within the context of French policy. The “Europe of homelands” concept elaborated by Gen. Charles de Gaulle found its ardent advocate in “Kultura”’s Aleksander Kawałkowski (*Francja 1961* [*France 1961*] K. 1961/6-7; *Europa* K. 1962/1-2; *Alternatywa* [*The Alternative*] K. 1962/9; *Potwierdzona alternatywa* [*The Alternative Confirmed*] K. 1963/3; *Bitwa o Europę* [*Battle for Europe*] K. 1963/9; *Wola i środki* [*The Will and the Means*] K. 1963/6). Kawałkowski saw the advantage of French over American plans in their more dynamic strategy aiming at tearing down the Iron Curtain and undermining the status quo. His arguments, however, were questioned by “the Londoner” who rejected the possibility of the revision of post-Yalta order, as the position of the most unsatisfied states, i.e. Germany and France, was still too weak in comparison with that of the competing superpowers. J. Mieroszewski’s opinions were echoed by Z. Brzeziński who wrote on the prospects of unification, for example: “can the rift dividing Europe be removed without creating the impression that someone is surrendering to someone else?” (*Droga do przyszłej Europy* [*Road to Future Europe*], K. 1965/4).

In the Seventies, articles focusing on general problems gave way to short reflections and reports on selected specific matters connected with, for example, negotiations with Great Britain concerning its accession to the EEC, agricultural overproduction, the failed referendum on Norway’s integration with the EC, or the functioning of the European Parliament (L. Unger, *Trzecia schizma* [*The Third Schism*], K. 1979/9). Writings published in the Eighties included opinions by representatives of Eastern Europe, such as Boris Lewiński, Jiri Lederer, Wasyl Wytwiński, Jurij Szewelow, who in principle discarded the notion of the return of Eastern Europeans to the Community⁸. In the new political situation German matters came to the fore once again (Bohdan Osadczuk, Kamila Chylińska, Kurt Biedenkopf, Jan Szuldrzyński, Jan Józef Lipski). Partly due to the birth of “Solidarity” the vision of Central and Eastern Europe as a buffer between Russia and Germany, and, more broadly, the West, became valid once again. The policy of “differentiation”, i.e. making Western economic aid dependent on the internal liberalization of Soviet-bloc

⁸ For example in the article *Polska i Europa* [*Poland and Europe*] (K. 1981/11) Jiri Lederer wrote “from a historical and cultural standpoint we, Czechs, do not belong either to Eastern or Central Europe. We are simply part of Europe”.

states needed to be replaced by a long-term, far-sighted strategy towards Russia⁹. The process of building a new Europe gave rise to many new problems, such as the absorption of united Germany, strengthening of democracy in the countries of Central Eastern Europe, their prospective membership in the organizations within the Community, and collective security. In the course of later debates a more specific formula for a future Union emerged, calling for full rights for its new members (e.g. Janusz Mondry, Laszlo Lendyel, Tomas Venclova, Henry Kissinger, Tadeusz Kossobudzki). Leopold Unger summed up the prospects of a quick and broad integration after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and evaluated the association agreements between Wyszehrad countries and EEC, as well as the “Partnership for Peace” program organized by NATO (*Polska w Europie: bez złudzeń i bez zmarszczek* [Poland in Europe: No Illusions, No Wrinkles], K. 1994/9; *Strachy nie na Lachy* [No Fear?], K. 1995/1-2).

During the process of unification Europe had to overcome numerous difficulties, such as national phobias and historical grievances deeply rooted in communities on both sides of the former lines of division. Germans worried about the possible economic downturn and the loss of their privileged status. Ukrainians, Lithuanians and Byelorussians deeply – and not without a good cause – felt the threat of being faced with a new European border on the rivers Bug and San. Swedes agreed it was feasible to open negotiations with all candidates at once, but asked that their conclusion be dependent on the progress of economic and political reforms. Spain and Portugal fought for permanent, non-reduced EU subsidies. The spectre of unemployment haunted Europe “inundated” with cheap workforce from the East. These problems were reflected in numerous commentaries and reports published in “Kultura”. These were penned by, among others, Bohdan Osadczyk, Stefan Abner, Karol Baumgarten, Mirosław Matyja. It is worth quoting some of the titles which symbolically conjure up the spirit of this debate – *Z nordyckiej perspektywy* [From a Nordic Perspective] (K. 1997/5); *Dylemat Unii: bezrobocie kontra rozszerzenie* [The Union’s Dilemma: Unemployment versus Expansion] (K. 1999/1-2); *Równowaga strachu* [The Balance of Fear] (K. 1998/3).

A separate, large group of articles is made up of discussions of the place of Poland in united Europe. To begin with, it is necessary to remind the reader that “Kultura” from the very beginning stood fast by its opinion that the Eastern part of pre-war Poland was irrevocably lost and Vilnius and Lvov would never return to Poland.¹⁰

⁹ Cf. the interviews conducted by Robert Kostrzewa with Eugen Rostow, *Pax sovietica, pax americana* (K. 1988/1-2), and Richard Pipes *Między polityką powstrzymywania a détente* [From Containment to Détente] (K. 1988/5).

¹⁰ Józef Łobodowski’s famous statements on these questions became part of the canon of Polish political thought in exile: *Przeciw upiorom przeszłości* [Against the Specters of the Past] (K. 1952/2-3); Father Józef Majewski’s letter (K. 1952/11); *Nota Redakcji: Nieporo-*

These unpopular assumptions constituted the cornerstone of the painstakingly developed policy towards the ULB area. Moreover, it was proposed that the program for Poland be based on, first, giving substance to the oft-repeated slogan calling it a bridge between East and West, and second, the need to avoid blind fascination with the West. Juliusz Mieroszewski raised this question on numerous occasions (*W matni koegzystencji* [Trapped In Coexistence] K. 1959/11; *Most na Rubikonie* [Bridge Over Rubicon] K. 1963/7-8; *Polska Ostpolitik* [Polish Ostpolitik] K. 1973/8; *Polska Westpolitik* [Polish Westpolitik] K. 1973/9; *Rosyjski kompleks Polski i obszar ULB* [Poland's Russia Complex and the ULB Area] K. 1974/9). The primary aim of "The Londoner's" writings was to make Poles realize that relations with their Eastern neighbours were hundredfold more important than remote alliances in the West, and that an agreement with Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus and the future non-imperialist Russia was a crucial prerequisite for regaining and strengthening Polish independence. Mieroszewski claimed that due to its geopolitical position, Poland's policy towards the West was dependent on its Eastern program; in other words "we will count for as much in the West as we are worth in the East". However, it is only in the Nineties that Polish endeavours aimed at specifying its position and role in the new political reality were truly intensified. One of the dimensions of this reality was constituted by the unification processes in Europe whose institutions were striving to withstand the historical and social pressure from newly appearing post-Communist states. Two articles by Krzysztof Gawlikowski *Europejska wspólnota kulturowa a nacjonalizmy* [European Cultural Community and Nationalistic Tendencies] (K. 1990/4) and *W poszukiwaniu nowego miejsca Polski w świecie* [In Search of a New Place for Poland in the World] (K. 1990/10) try to show that internal cohesion of Eastern Europe and its readiness to submit to a uniform adaptation procedure are necessary conditions for joining the EU. In Gawlikowski's opinion, Polish interests would be secured by the wholehearted embrace of the pro-Western trend, association with European Community and NATO, strong ties with states of the region and the support of processes of disintegration taking place in Russia. The fall of Communism presented Poland with an unprecedented chance of developing good neighbourly relations with united Germany and the ULB area. This matter was also discussed by Jerzy Giedroyc (in an interview with Krzysztof Pomian, K. 1992/1-2), Dymytro Pawlyczko, Leonid Krawczuk, Aldona Chojecka, Bohdan Osadczyk and Tadeusz Kosobudzki. Contributors to "Kultura" warned against raising unrealistic social hopes for a quick upturn in economy resulting from EU membership, e.g. Karol Modzelewski (*Przejsć suchą stopą. O naszym miejscu w Europie* [To Walk Across Dry-Shod. On Our Place

zumienie czy tani patriotyzm [Note from the Editor: Misunderstanding or Cheap Patriotism] (K. 1953/1).

in Europe], K. 1991/5; Stanisław Polaczek (*Znaczenie Maastricht dla polskiej gospodarki* [The Consequences Of Maastricht For Polish Economy], K. 1992/12; Jędrzej Krakowski (*Polska wobec Zachodu – partner czy klient?* [Poland In Relation To The West – Partner or Customer?], K. 1995/10). These views are worth confronting with excerpts from the “Poland In The XXI Century” questionnaire, filled out by, inter alia, Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz, Ewa Łętowska, Jan Olszewski, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, Lech Wałęsa¹¹. Arguments presented in contemporary articles by Andrzej Koraszewski, Stefan Abner, Robert Kaczmarek, Karol Baumgarten, Jacek Safuta and Andrzej Wyczański can be considered an interesting comparative material in that area. The authors analyze, among other things, social costs of adaptation to the European market and EU standards (unemployment, pauperization).

In the pre-accession period it was crucial to give shape to an independent foreign policy based on a clear recognition of the primacy of its Eastern dimension. It was in this context that Bohdan Osadczuk wrote that Poland is constantly faced by a dilemma stemming from the need to oscillate between the East and the West (*O Ukrainie i Krymie... w Berlinie* [On Ukraine and Crimea... In Berlin], K. 1995/5), while Janusz Trybusiewicz described Polish political thought as dominated by the fear of Russia and the desire to form closest possible ties with Western Europe (*Dwa trójkąty i jedna obsesja* [Two Triangles And One Obsession], K. 1996/12). Without any risk of oversimplification, it can be assumed that the framework of contemporary Polish foreign policy took shape under the influence of endlessly repeated appeals by “Kultura”, calling for the elimination of completely irrational phobias about Russians, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Byelorussians and the inferiority complex towards the powerful Germany (and the West). Jerzy Giedroyc’s patient, oft-repeated exhortations in which he stressed the need for finding a balanced position for Poland amid its neighbours, and giving due reflection to the role it could play in Europe, came to fruition recently, in the political declarations of the presidents of the Third Republic.

The question of European unification was one of many discussed in the pages of the Parisian monthly within the context of its interest in current international affairs. The authors of “Kultura”’s political program wanted not only to participate consciously in contemporary events, publish commentaries and discussions, but also to undertake successful attempts at shaping public opinion and thus change reality.

Articles devoted generally to the idea of integration appeared mostly in the regular columns of the magazine, such as “Archiwum polityczne” [Political Archives], “Sąsiedzi” [Neighbours], “Widziane z Brukseli” [Seen From Brussels], as well as in

¹¹ In the summary of the poll results the editors of “Kultura” stressed the lack of attempts at assessing the historical, political and economic costs of integration and the risks stemming from total military confidence in NATO.

chronicles (e.g. Ukrainian and German), reviews of foreign press (e.g. Russian), letters (e.g. "List z Wyspy" [Letter From An Island] by J. Mieroszewski). The final three of the aforementioned forms, due to their informative-cognitive function, played a crucial role in bringing cultures closer together, overcoming nationalism and building a climate of good neighbourly relations. Analyzing writings published in "Kultura" it is possible to distinguish four primary thematic blocks connected with the past and present of the European Community. These are: the earliest programmatic articles derived from the first definitions of post-Yalta order in Europe, then – sketches on the formulation and implementation of ideas, interpretations of federalist concepts and proposals for the neutralization of Central Eastern Europe, reports on global and local problems with the realization of unification plans – here one need only mention the historic studies on the so-called German question (a "halved" Germany in a "halved" Europe, united Germany in a united Europe¹²) – and finally, reflections on Poland's place in the integrated Europe. References to the most obvious examples of these writings are given above. A comprehensive lecture on this subject is contained in the book entitled "Zjednoczona Europa w publicystyce paryskiej »Kultury«"¹³ [United Europe in Parisian »Kultura«]. It ends with a quote: "Many problems more or less successfully tackled by society, and in particular the political class, were long ago presented and discussed in »Kultura«. Their depiction and the conclusions drawn are at times more astute than contemporary analyses"¹⁴. Grażyna Pomian's reflection corresponds with conclusions formulated on the basis of research into writings on the process of integration published in "Kultura".

¹² Cf. J. Mieroszewski: *Niemiecki cul-de-sac* [German Cul-de-sac], *Kultura* 1957 no. 10/120, pp. 37–47

¹³ I. Hofman: *Zjednoczona Europa w publicystyce paryskiej "Kultury"*, Wyd. Morpol, Lublin 2001.

¹⁴ G. Pomian: *Wizja Polski na łamach "Kultury" 1947–1976* [The Vision of Poland In The Pages Of "Kultura"], Tow. Opieki nad Archiwum Instytutu Literackiego w Paryżu, Wyd. UMCS, Lublin 1999, pp. 14–15.