TURKEY:
SOCIAL ENGINEERING SECULAR PROJECT

by Paweł Sus

Every morning a nearly identical school ceremony takes places in all cities and villages in Turkey. Children line up and the voices of teachers rise above the excited chatter. When silence is imposed, the ritual, though not religions, begins. "I am a Turk! I am honest! I am industrious!" – the children shout in proud unison, whatever part their ancestors may have played in Turkey's jumbled mosaic of ethnic groups, religious and migrations. The slogans are various, but the message is the same for the young would-be citizens of modern Turkey. "O Great Atatürk, I vow that I will march unhesitatingly along the road you opened, towards the goal you showed!"[1]

1. INTRODUCTION

Turkey is a country that lies on two continents. It is often regarded as a bridge between Europe and Asia, or between East and West. This in fact implies that its inhabitants participate in two separate and somewhat con-

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[1] Quoted after: Nicole and Hugh Pope, *Turkey Unveiled: Atatürk and after* (London: John Murray 1997), pp. 7–8.

flicting sets of political values. On the one hand, those are the values of western liberal democracy. As a country in which periodic elections are held and there is a competition between political parties, Turkey is a democracy at least in the procedural or formal sense.[2] On the other hand, there are oriental values related to the authoritarian political culture that goes back to the Ottoman Empire[3] and to political Islam, that are often regarded as incompatible with democracy. The influence of these values on the Turkish political system has made some scholars to argue that a fully-fledged liberal democracy is impossible in this country. Furthermore, the existence of these different sets of values had often in the past led to a political confrontation. For decades there has been a struggle in Turkey between the secular center, represented by the Kemalist establishment, and the peripheral political religious movements.

Mustafa Kemal, founder of the Republic of Turkey, established in 1923 and the country's first president, who soon later had become known as Atatürk, consciously embraced the western ideal of national secular state. Atatürk's political doctrine, Kemalism, had become an ideology of the Republic.[4] He believed that only by a strict secularization and control of religion, and by removing it from the public sphere, a new secular national identity can be formed and Turks, until then divided into various ethic and religious groups, can be unified into a nation. Yet, his idea of Turkey as a modern and secular state had almost immediately clashed with politicized religious sentiments of conservative Islamic sects. My argument is that in order to win the ideological war against them and to build its secular political culture, the new state employed an instrument of "social engeenir-

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[2] The idea of procedural democracy is related to a competition of parties in an electoral system, and is defined by such characteristics as competitiveness between parties and regular, free and fair elections.

[3] Turkish political culture is not a pure continuation of the Ottoman Empire authoritarian culture, it's a product of the Ottomans past and should be understood from that perspective.

[4] The Kemalist ideology is represented by "Six Arrows"-which is a party symbol till today. Each arrow referring to a constitutive principle: *Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Reformism, Statism and Secularism.*

ing" or "social engineering."[5]. The successful national-state building and the transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic of Turkey was not merely based on the strength of national military forces, always ready to intervene on behalf of the secular state, but also, or even primarily so, because of a successful implementation of a social engeeniring device.

2. STATE AND THE SOCIAL ENGINEERING PROJECT

As Adam Podgórecki have noted "the idea of unitary, nation state is inherently related to the birth of European modernity in the eighteenth century". However, social engeeniring, that are methods for engineering social human action, were not developed before the beginning of the twentieth century.[6] We may agree that social engineering means a set of recommended procedures for bringing about conscious social changes in order to achieve specific goals.[7] In the case of the Turkish Republic, these goals were forming a new national identity and nation-building. More specifically, by social engineering we can understand a process involving the creation and alteration of social attitudes and political orientations. The engine of this process (*steering system*) can be a small group of people persons who are at the top of society and represent a political elite.[8] The steering system in the Turkish case, I believe, consisted of the Republican Peoples Party (CHP) officials and military generals during the mono-party system for a period of 27 years. From 1923 until the 1950's, during a transition to a multi-party system,[9] CHP party officials tried to exclude Islam from the sphere of politics. The main aim of this process was to create a new Turkish national identity that was based on the secular state ideology.

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[5] See: A. Podgorecki, J. Alexander and R. Shields, eds., *Social Engineering* (Ottawa: Carleton University Press 1996), p. 4.

[6] Ibidem, p. 24.

[7] Ibidem, p. 82.

[8] M.K. Mlicki, *Socjotechnika: Zagadnienia etyczne i prakseologiczne*, (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo im. Ossolińskich, 1986), pp. 11–33.

[9] For more about transitional election see: B. Akgün, *Aspects of Party System Development in Turkey,* "Turkish Studies", Vol. 2, No. 1 (Spring 2001), p.73.

The concept of a steering system can be used to analyze the center-periphery model that is presented in works of Şerif Mardin and other scholars.[10] Mardin claims that Ottoman politics was a struggle between the state establishment and various groups in the periphery. The same center-periphery model can be applied to the early republican period. The bureaucratic, secular elite—public officials, high military officers, and intellectuals – can be identified with the center; whereas the opponents of Turkey's secularization and modernization, mainly peasantry, farmers and artisans, with the periphery. The Turkish politics in this period was characterized by constant clashes between the secular elite and Islamic periphery. The secular elite, in control of the system, was responsible for the direct interaction with society, using the formal structure of the state, and also for non-formal relations with the different groups of society. It was operating by using all the forms of propaganda, manipulation and hidden influence, excluding psychological or physical coercion. The main aim of the steering system is the creation and maintaining of a set of political values among the members of society, the objects of the process, which are recognized as supportive orat least – neutral towards the existing political regime and social order[11]. In the Turkish case the steering system should be defined as the group of political elites that are on the top of state institution and are connected to the modern republican secular values.

The elitist component is one of the most important factors that shaped the Ottoman-Turkish political development through the ages. For example Roderic H. Davison observes that "there always has been an elite in one form or another [in Ottoman and Turkish society]. It has been the ruling element and the moving element throughout Turkish history. Without the ruling group, Turkish history is inexplicable"[12]. And without the consolidated circle of state elite's Turkish polity can not survive in the turbulent and flexible reality. Transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Repub-

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[10] Ş. Mardin, *Historical Determination of Stratification: Social Class Consciousness in Turkey*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Ankara University Press, Ankara 1967 and Ş. Mardin, Center-Periphery Relations: A key to Turkish Politics?, E.D. Akarli with G. Ben Dor (eds.), *Political Participation in Turkey*, (Istanbul: Bagazici University Press 1975).

[11] M.K. Mlicki, *Socjotechnika…,* op.cit., pp. 11–33.

[12] R.H. Davison, *Turkey*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J, Prentice Hall: Spectrum Books 1968), pp.8–9.

lic is one of the most significant changes that have ever occurred in the modern Middle East Region in the 20th century.

The political plan of Atatürk could not be put into effect without the drastic and purposeful modification in the new Turkish polity where society was still religious and conservative in many different dimensions of every day life. In this article I am using the terminology that is taken from the science of social engineering. All the reforms that have been used by the state-kemalist-elite to build a modern nation are the apparatus of changes of social attitudes and orientations. Indeed, society can be an object [target] of manipulation, but as we will see later the long term influence of the state over society can weaken the direct secularization process and change the trajectory of orientation from the secular to the more religious and anti-western Muslim nationalism. The rise of conservative forces [Political Islam] in Turkey and the electoral victory of the conservative Democrat Party after the transition to the multi-party system can be regarded in this perspective[13].

3. SOCIAL ENGEENIRING PARADIGM AND THE NATIONAL BUILDING PROCESS

Indeed, all changes that occurred in Turkish politics after the Ottoman Empire collapse were due to the policy of breaking the links with the old reality in order to consolidate the new national modern state – a secular,

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[13] In the case of electoral success of the Democratic Party we can compare center of the state and periphery with the conception of "counter-elite" that was presented in the works of V. Pareto (1935) and G. Mosca (1938). They make a general observation that in every society there is a ruling minor group who actually govern. These elites are composed of those who occupy the posts of political command and those who directly influence political decisions. If there is no circulations of elites the counter-elite can come into being. The theory of circulation of elite postulate that over time elite undergoes changes in its membership by recruitment of new members from the lower strata of society, or less frequently, by incorporation of new social groups or complete replacement by a ''counter-elite''. In the Turkish case we can analyzed it as the rivalry of secular elites and Islamic movements and pro-Islamic political parties. And *exdefinitione* between these circulations of the elites can not be done because of the two conceptions of the secularization and role of the religion in the public sphere in Turkey.

republican polity. Consolidation of the modern Turkish political system can not be achieved without the long term project that was prepared on the social engeeniring paradigm. According to A. Podgórecki there are six stages of planning of a social action: 1) Problem recognition, 2) Problem identification, 3) Global evaluation, 4) Theory base, 5) Design, 6) Action, 7) Evaluation.[14] First pattern I regarded as lack of national identity and indispensability for the national building process and should be connected with values, such as Islamic-religious attitudes and orientations, influence of Islam to the political life and institutional function of Islamic legacy power during the Ottoman Empire. Problem recognition as the paradigm of efficient social action consists of an examination of the social problem[15]. The question whether the state should have investigated lack of national identity by a social engineering action in the case of transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic gave us many evidence for the needs of this process. The second paradigm of the efficient social action should be based on describing the situation and clarifing the existing social structure, regarding past and present circumstances. In the case of westernizations it should be mentioned that germs of it started during the Tanzimat reforms (reorganization of the state) and Young Turks political activity[16]. Problem identification most involved hierarchical order of social priorities and ideological values that are basis for efficient social action.[17] The methodological stage of the third paradigm global evaluation compromise an evolution of the situation that was the subject of the diagnosis, answer to the question whether applying the acknowledged values dictates efforts to change it, in this case, Western-Euro-Atlantic values versus Asiatic--Middle-Eastern Islamic Values,[18] are not so similar in the case of political culture and social structure, but social engineering process of secularization can not be done over night. Changing the mentality, religious orientations

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[14] A. Podgórecki, J. Alexander and R. Shields, (eds.) *Social Engineering…*, op.cit, 1996 p. 50.

[15] Ibidem, p. 51.

[16] For more see, E. Özdalga, *The Veiling Issue, Official Secularism and Popular Islam in Modern Turkey*, (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1998), pp. 5–15.

[17] A. Podgórecki, J. Alexander and R. Shields, (eds.) *Social Engineering…*, op.cit., p. 51.

[18] Ibidem, pp. 51–52.

and attitudes toward social system using the sociotechnics methods can harm and cure the society and sometimes can not achieve successful end.

Also it should be mention that the historical process of nation building that had occured in Europe in the 19th and early 20th century and state secularization strategy – especially French modelcan be connected to the Turkish politics. Turkey established many institutions like in France. Turkish republic became highly centralized country with strong national identity and a assertive[19] version of secular policy. As Ahmet T. Kuru observed: „Assertive secularism has been the dominant ideology in Turkey since the foundation of the Republic. The Kemalists, who have embraced Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's principles nonnegotiable dogmas, have been the main supporters of this ideology. They have included the CHP, military generals, majority of the high court members, and major media outlets".[20]

The fourth and fifth subentries are linked together because of relations of the theory and practical dimensions of social engineering. I understand the basis of theory as a strict secularization (assertive) strategy and excluding Islamic religion from the public sphere; Design and implementation of Kemalism as state ideology. This altion was based on a series changes in the political system and real action on the macro and micro level of state indoctrination. Evaluation is the stage for re-definition of the problem and verification of the strategy can be regarded on the terms of guardian military-type coup in 1960 and in 1980, and moderate type army intervention in 1971 and in 1997 and e-memo coup during the July 2007 election and state prosecutor charges to Turkey's highest court to shutdown the ruling AK Party for allegedly undermining secularism.

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[19] According to the view of Ahmet T. Kuru there are two types of secularism; "passive and assertive". The first one allows for public visibility of religion and it requires that the state play a "passive" role in avoiding the establishment of any religion. The second one, excludes religion from the public sphere and for concerning our case, the state plays an assertive role as an agent of a social engineering project that confines religion to the private domain. For more see: Ahmet T. Kuru, Changing *Perspectives on Islamism and Secularism in Turkey: The Gülen Movement and the AK Party*, paper submitted in the international conference proceedings; *Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement*, (London-UK, 25–27 October 2007), pp. 140–150.

[20] Ibidem, pp. 140–150.

Early years of the Turkish Republic was a period when ruling elites constructed a nation – this process was based on secularization and westernization to create a homogenous national state. In the 1920s republican elites aimed to secularize and westernize most aspects of social, cultural and political life. These modernization processes required a new space for religion-state interaction in administrative and social spheres. As Sencer Ayata noted, Islam had positive and negative aspects for "*the father of all Turks*" and new ruling elites in the Turkish Republic. According to him, secular elites were aware of the importance of Islamic religion in Turkish society and also that religious faith was crucial for the consolidation of the nation and mobilization of the population, for example it could contribute to moral and social welfare. Nevertheless, republican elites also considered Islam as a conservative force and a source of traditional influence – its dogmas, superstitions and strength of public will could be turned against the project of modernization. Moreover, they believed that Islam was responsible for Turkish backwardness and had features which had been obstacles to the achievement of the modern national building process[21]. Social engineering was the core aspect of the secularization program and its aim was to eliminate the significant role of Islamic religion over politics.

Feroz Ahmad defines the main aim of the secularization process "The aim in adopting secularism was to create a modern, rational, state with institutions and laws which would facilitate the developments of capitalism in Turkey".[22] According to him, Atatürk had believed that in the modern Turkish state the *"civic religion"* should provide moral values for all citizens. Also Ş. Mardin focus on the idea that Islamic religion should be relegated to the role of a personal sphere of life and the new modern state would be based on responsibilities of the citizenship as the key issue. This can be regarded as the need to create institutions, which would encourage the growth of the „*civic religion*" and promote the individual responsibilities on which the civic religion would be based on.[23] The social engineering process

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[21] S. Ayata, *Patronage, Party, and the State: The Politization of Islam in Turkey,* "Middle East Journal", vol. 50, (Winter 1996), pp. 40–42.

[22] F. Ahmad, *Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey*, "Middle Eastern Studies", vol. 27, (Winter 1991), p. 3.

[23] Ş. Mardin, *Religion and Politics in Modern Turkey*, [in:] J. Piscatori (ed.) *Islam in the Political Process*, (New York: Cambridge University Press 1983), p. 142.

of secularization gained impetus with a series of legal and institutional changes implemented by the governmental elites in the founding process of the Turkish secular republic. In the early years of the republic (from 1922 to 1924), the new regime abolished the Sultanate, the Caliphate, the highest office of the religious authority in the Ottoman Empire, Islamic laws, schools and courts and the Ministry of *Shari'a* and pious foundation. In 1925, Islamic sects and orders were banned. Social engineering had also a strong input on the socialization process; firstly Kemalist elites unified the educational system under the Ministry of Public Instruction and secondly the religious [sects and organizations] were taken under control by the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DRA).[24] Moreover between 1925 and 1930 the legal system was changed and the Swiss civil code and the Italian penal code were adopted. The new legal system was complemented by reforms such as the banning of traditional and religious customs, the incorporation of metric system of the measurement, the Gregoria were given. Furthermore, in 1928 the second article of 1924 Constitution, which declares Islam as the religion of the state was canceled and the principle of secularism was added into the Constitution in 1937[25]. Moreover, as Robert Spencer pointed out and Metin Heper noted, socialization was carried out through mass media, schools, People's Houses (1932–1954), flag saluting, national anthem singing, state parades and non-religious holidays on national anniversaries.[26] All these reforms can be understood as a process of "shock changes" in the society that was based on Ottoman-Islamic traditions. The changes in legal and social structure were part of long term action towards modified orientations

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[24] Many scholars have interpreted establishment of the DRA as one of the aims of the ruling elite to control religion (Islam) instead of directly separating religion and politics. For more see: B. Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey,* (Ledien: E.J. Brill 1981). It could be also understood as a long term political project to form a public agency to present the "right" interpretation of Islam against heterodox beliefs and practices.

[25] Ü. Sakallıoğlu-Cizre, *Parameters and Strategies of Islam State Interaction in Republican Turkey,* "International Journal of Middle East Studies", vol. 28, No. 2, (May 1996), p. 233–234.

[26] M. Heper, *Islam, Polity and Society in Turkey: A Middle Eastern Perspective,* "The Middle East Journal", Vol. 35, No. 3, (Summer 1981), pp. 355–356.

and attitudes in Turkish society[27] and as we will see latter it could not prevent the raise of Political Islam. Policies for secularization have intensified during the mono-party period (1923–1950). As this social engineering process has been strict, the gap between the state and the society has expanded.

F. Ahmad hasdescribed these relations as follows – "they (Kemalists) tried to remove Islam from political discourse, though not always successfully. Turkish society as yet undifferentiated in the single party regime, tended to use Islamic discourse to challenge the legitimacy of the state. The state responded by limiting the space in which this discourse took place by extending secular laws and becoming more and more militant against Islam".[28] The republican leadership under Atatürk sought to remove the historical legacy of all traditional institutions in general as well as power and control of religion on political affairs in particular. While the secularist reformers set as their aim "reaching the level of contemporary civilizations", they also marginalized the role of religion by prohibiting its existence in the political sphere.[29] The relation between state and religion and the nature of religious education became central issues in the Turkish political competition. First real opposition party[30] that has separated from the Republican People's Party, mainly the Democrat Party[31], brought together a cluster of peripheral interests ranging from small town citizens, merchants, small landowners, an urban merchants class and religious group, as well as big

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[27] All of this social engeeniring can be analyzed as the *„social modeling"*. By modeling I understand a process of learning behavior by watching another individual performing it-in this case it can be understood by the state socialization and indoctrination in the educational institutions such as primary schools, high schools and universities, etc. It should be noted this point that all Turkish students pass an examon the history of the Turkish revolution.

[28] F. Ahmad, *Politics and Islam in Modern Turkey…*, op.cit, p. 3.

[29] Ibidem, p. 3.

[30] It should be noted that the first opposition party was the Progressive Republican Party but the Atatürk shut down the PRP, assesing that it is lethal to Turkey's still nascent secularization. Second opposition party was the Free Party that was established during the 1930s, but was also dissolved by the father of all Turks.

[31] See also, A. Kardan and S. Tuzun, *Political Polarization and Voter Behavior in Turkey*, (Istanbul: Veri Arastirma, 1998).

land owners.[32] Several members of RPP followed the suit and joined DP. In the first competitive election in 1950 the DP gat the majority of votes. One of the reason of this significant victory was the anti-secular agenda.[33] The DP after that removed the ban on Arabic call to prayer, supported the mosque building and reintroduced religious secondary education. The DP policies thus allied it with peripheries who sought to reassert the role of Islam in Turkish society and opposed to the autocratic imposition of secularizing reforms of the republican center of the state. Also, DP relegitimized Islam and traditional rural values[34]. Erik Zürcher argues that the 1950 election is a more important division in Turkish political history then the more commonly recognized official demise of the Ottoman Empire and declaration of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Until 1950, he maintains, Turkey's sociopolitical power structure remained the same as it had been during the Young Turk period. The 1950 election ushered in a new political era. The elections were indeed unprecedented, and had a profound impact on the political system. Leslie and Noralou Roos call it a "greening election", typical for developing countries, in which rural interests take control of the political system. Sabri Sayari points out that prior to 1950, that Turkish parties tended to be "official", meaning they were an instrument of the regime designed to enhance political control rather than represent the electorate.[35] The governmental success of the DP that represent the peripheries over the center couldn't be in power longer. On 27 of May 1960, a military coup was carried out in Turkey by the junior army officer under the leadership of the General Cemal Gürsel.[36] According to Ergun Özbudun, who labels May 27

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[32] I. Sunar and B. Toprak, *Islam in Politics: The Case of Turkey,* "Government and Opposition", Vol. 18, No. 4, (Autumn 1983), p. 429.

[33] In this case DP is analyzed as populist political party, that during the electoral campaign used an emotional argument of the pro-religious importance in the public sphere.

[34] E.D. Akarli and G. Ben-Dor, *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Backgrounds and Present Problems*, (Bebek-Istanbul: Bağici Press, 1975), p. 29.

[35] F. Tachau, *Turkish Political Parties and Elections: Half a Century of Multiparty Democracy*, "Turkish Studies", vol. 1, No. (Spring 2000), p. 132.

[36] W. Hale, *Turkish politics and the Military*, (London–New York: Routledge 1994), p. 112.

a "reform coup" with a "somewhat vague social neo-Kemalism".[37] The main agenda of the coup was to destroy the DP. Kemal Karpat recognized that "the military in power displayed from the beginning to end of their rule an almost paranoid hatred of the DP and partisan preference for the RPP".[38] All the DP deputies and a number of state officials, police officers and businessmen were arrested and accused of corruption and violation of the 1924 Constitution, but they were trialedd under a new law regulations. On September 29, 1960, the DP was closed down by Junta because they failed to hold the national congress every four years. It was a legal farce when first the Junta arrested all the DP deputies and imprisoned them, effectively shutting down the party.[39] The court delivered its verdict on September 15, 1961, fifteen were sentenced to death, thirty-one were sentenced to life imprisonment, and the rest received minor imprisonment charges. In the final stage, Prime Minister Adnan Menders, Foreign Minister Fastin Rüştü Zorlu and the imprisoned them Minister Hasan Polatkan were trailed and hanged. The other twelve received the death penalty. In the following years they were granted amnesty and released from the prison. Former President Celal Bayar also received an amnesty because of his old age. The Military Junta legalized itself as the legal institution called the National Union Committee (NUC) the day after the coup so that it could govern the state. On December 1961, the NUC established the Constitutional Assembly which, consisted of the RPP deputies and a group of leftists liberal intellectuals, called also "leftist authoritarian intellectuals".[40] On 9 of July the Constitution was approved throug a national referendum, in which 81 percent of the registered voters participated and resulted in a 61.7 percent yes vote. In 1961, there was an election under the control of the NUC. The Turkish military was legally assigned the task of preserving Turkey's secular constitution. As it has been written into Turkish laws in 1961, article 35 of the Internal Service Law of the military says that the "Turkish Armed Forces is responsible for guarding and defending the Turkish republic as defined by the

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[37] R. Paul, *The Military in Turkish Politics 1960–1973*, (Saint Louis, USA 1974), p. 62.

[38] K. Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society,* (Leiden–Boston: Brill publishers, 2004), p. 117.

[39] W. Hale, *Turkish politics and the Military*…, op.cit., p. 127.

[40] K. Karpat, *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society*…, op.cit. p. 119.

constitution". The military has thrice intervened to the regime on this legal obligation. In 1960 and 1980, it carried out intervention, preventing what it considered, constitutional abuse by a majoritarian government in 1960, and ending near civil war in 1980 between leftist and rightist and nationalist militias and terror groups. In 1971, military coup by memorandum intervened into the politics and demanded resignation of the government of Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel unable to prevent rising domestic violence.[41] The February 1997 process that can be regarded as the black mail strategy that forced the government of Necmettin Erbakan to resign from the prime ministerial office look place. Also the republican and secular center was in clash with AKP during the presidential election that occurred when members of the party were trying to elect one of the leaders of the party (Abdullah Gül) to this office. At this point it should be mentioned that all former officials that hold this position were connected with the Turkish military forces. E-memo memorandum, that was published on the web site of the military forces should be analyzed as an indirect intervention to the Turkish politics. As we will see the secular steering system is still active and it can be another mille stone to build a fully-fledge democratic system. Long term strategy of the AKP is to reduce influence of army to the politics and introduce constitutional amendments in orderto democratize political system and achieve the Copenhagen criteria.[42] Civilian control under the military forces is one of the most important levels of democratic system, as we can observe in the Turkish case the struggle between army and periphery is still influencing the equality of political system. All those military interventions to the regime and establishment of the institutional frameworks as National Security Council and different position of military officials in the state structure and institutions such as Constitutional Court (AKP dissolution case)[43] can be regarded as agents of secular groups.

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[41] R. Paul, *Turkish politics and the military…*, op.cit. p. 62.

[42] See also: Ihsan D. Daği, *The Justice and Development Party: Identity, Politics and Human Rights Discourse in the Search for Security and Legitimacy* [in], M.H. Yavuz, (ed.), *The Emergence of a New Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti*, (The University of Utah Press, Utah 2006).

[43] For more details, *Summary of the Indictment Against the Ruling AK Party*, archives of Todayszaman newspaper: www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=138111.

4. CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that Turkish Republic is still in transition towards a fully-fledged democratic political system, based on the vision of the Copenhagen criteria. On the one hand the struggle between secular center and Islamic peripheries can affect this transition and stages of the evolution of the civil-military relations, party system structure or even socio-cultural relations in the society. On the other hand political culture and social structure is totally different from the ones in Euro-Atlantic block, Turkey is a country of transcontinental passage, and a bridge between Europe and Asia, and Euro-Asiatic circle affects politics and dimensions of the political system. A social engineering aspect of Kemalism ideology and transition from the Ottoman Empire to the Turkish Republic was the first step in transformation processes of the society and consolidation of the polity. But as we can see from the reality of Turkish political life the old paradigm of the center-periphery cleavage still is relevant for understanding the clash between secular elites and conservative forces of the neo-Islamic Justice and Development Party (AKP). When Ş. Mardin presented his model he called it: Key to Turkish politics – as we can observe – still it exists. Author, in the terms of social engineering, describes Kemalism ideology as the strict state indoctrination process that is a part of society consolidation techniques in a state of ethnical-cultural differences. Turkey should be regarded as a polity on the way to the democracy as in the states of the European Union, but as we noted from lessons of political history of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, cultural and ethnical differences in a state can be a hard background for the state unification and social engineering process of the strict secularization. The raise of the Islamic conservative agenda in Turkey can be regarded in this perspective. Since the center of the state is using a strict secularization policy the periphery is trying to save traditional values to limit the penetration of the state secular elites. As we can noted from the Turkish case, the process of westernization and modernization can not be achieved easily when Islamic religion is a part of social mentality, as it is in most of the Middle-East societies. There is no doubt that Turkish state is a country of transcontinental passage were political culture is a mixture of Euro-Asiatic values and orientations. This is one of the reasons that Turkey is still in transition to the political system that is based on the mod-

ern understand of human right and idea of liberal democratic agenda as in the Euro-Atlantic polities. But students of political science should keep in mind, that Eurocentric understanding of current world is "not the only one way" of real political systems analysis in our global reality.