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2022 | 3 (51) | 7-17

Article title

The Russian Federation Dominance in the International Security Environment

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Abstracts

EN
This article presents the research results, which set out to explain the mechanisms leading to the achievement of dominance by the Russian Federation in the international security environment. In the research process, the systemic approach was applied. Analysis and criticism of the literature, non-participatory observation and case study elements were used to solve the research problems. As a result, it was determined that the theoretical basis for the Russian Federation's achievement of international dominance is the concept of new generation war. The model of the strategic influence of the Russian Federation is directed at the shaping of the security environment and includes the synchronisation of kinetic and non-kinetic measures, indirect and direct effects, the blurring of the boundaries between war and peace and the application of pressure and aggression. The Russian Federation achieves strategic dominance through asymmetry, chaos, reflexive control, and strategic deterrence. Armed forces provide a key role in asserting dominance, focused on conducting offensive activities and inflicting losses with conventional and nuclear weapons.

Year

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Pages

7-17

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Dates

published
2022

Contributors

  • Jan Kochanowski University

References

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Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

Biblioteka Nauki
2154729

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-doi-10_15804_ppsy202237
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