Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox

• Authors: Tomasz Jarmużek , Krzysztof Krawczyk , Rafał Palczewski

Title variants

EN

Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

Poznawalność jako modalność de re: pewne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha W artykule staramy się znaleźć nowe, intuicyjne rozwiązanie paradoksu Fitcha. Twierdzimy, że tradycyjne wyrażenie zasady poznawalności (p → ◊Kp) opiera się na błędnym rozumieniu poznawalności jako modalności de dicto. Zamiast tego proponujemy rozumieć poznawalność jako modalność de re. W artykule przedstawiamy minimalną logikę poznawalności, w której zasada poznawalności jest ważna, ale paradoks Fitcha już nie obowiązuje. Logikę charakteryzujemy semantycznie, a także poprzez podejście aksjomatyczne i tabelaryczne.

EN

In the paper, we try to find a new, intuitive solution to the Fitch paradox. We claim that traditional expression of Knowability Principle (p → ◊Kp) is based on erroneous understanding of knowability as de dicto modality. Instead, we propose to understand knowability as de re modality. In the paper we present the minimal logic of knowability in which Knowability Principle is valid, but Fitch Paradox does not hold anymore. We characterize the logic semantically as well as by an axiomatic and tableaux procedure approach.

Keywords

PL

antyrealizm; modalność de dicto; modalność de re; logika epistemiczna; paradoks Fitcha; logika poznawalności; zasada poznawalności; logika modalna; metody tablicowe; antyrealizm; modalność de dicto; modalność de re; logika epistemiczna; paradoks Fitcha; logika poznawalności; zasada poznawalności; logika modalna; metody tablicowe

EN

anti-realism; de dicto modality; de re modality; epistemic logic; Fitch Paradox; knowability logic; knowability principle; modal logic; tableaux methods

• Publisher: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
• Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
• Year: 2020
• Volume: 68
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 291-313

Dates

published

2021-01-04

Contributors

author

Tomasz Jarmużek

• Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Poland

• https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3456-3859

author

Krzysztof Krawczyk

• Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Poland

• https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4367-4796

author

Rafał Palczewski

• Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences, Poland

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Identifiers

DOI

10.18290/rf20684-14