Putnam’s Natural Realism and Its Problems

• Authors: Tadeusz Szubka

Title variants

PL

Problemy realizmu naturalnego Putnama

Abstracts

PL

Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) miał skłonność do zmieniania swoich poglądów filozoficznych oraz do ich ciągłej modyfikacji. Ostatni okres rozwoju jego filozofii jest znany jako faza realizmu naturalnego lub zdroworozsądkowego. Realizm ten został najpełniej przedstawiony w Wykładach Deweyowskich z 1994 r. Artykuł dotyczy trzech aspektów stanowiska w nich wyłożonego, a następnie ulepszanego i uzupełnianego. Wskazane są trzy trudności tego stanowiska. Po pierwsze, Putnam twierdzi, że we współczesnym sporze o realizm mamy z jednej strony do czynienia ze zwolennikami ekstrawaganckiego realizmu metafizycznego, z drugiej zaś z entuzjastami rozmaitych wersji nieodpowiedzialnego antyrealizmu. Niestety Putnamowski zarys tej debaty jest zbyt uproszczony, ponieważ jest wiele postaci realizmu metafizycznego, natomiast scalanie w jedną całość różnych odmian antyrealizmu prowadzi na manowce. Po drugie, naiwny realizm bezpośredni Putnama trudno pogodzić z zaproponowanym przez niego transakcjonalizmem w teorii percepcji. Po trzecie, przez jakiś czas Putnam był pod wpływem Wittgensteinowskiego kwietyzmu, który zniekształcał charakter wysuwanych przez niego koncepcji filozoficznych.

EN

Hilary Putnam (1926–2016) was prone to change his mind on variety of philosophical issues and almost constantly to modify his views. The last period of the development of his philosophy is known as the phase of commonsense or natural realism, eloquently presented in his 1994 Dewey Lectures. This paper is focused on three facets of his position and tries to identify three difficulties it encounters. Firstly, Putnam claims that in the contemporary realism debate we have, on the one hand, proponents of extravagant metaphysical realism, and, on the other hand, advocates of various versions of irresponsible antirealism. Unfortunately, the delineation of the debate is too coarse-grained, since there are many forms of metaphysical realism, and lumping together various antirealisms is confusing and unhelpful. Secondly, Putnam’s naïve direct realism in the philosophy of perception seems incompatible with his transactional account of perception. Thirdly, for some time Putnam was under a spell of Wittgensteinian quietism that distorted the true character of his philosophical ideas.

Keywords

EN

Hilary Putnam; Michael Dummett; metaphysical realism; antirealism; natural or commonsense realism; naïve direct realism; disjunctivism; philosophical quietism; truth

PL

Hilary Putnam; Michael Dummett; realizm metafizyczny; antyrealizm; realizm naturalny lub zdroworozsądkowy; naiwny realizm bezpośredni; alternatywizm; kwietyzm filozoficzny; prawda

• Publisher: Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II. Towarzystwo Naukowe KUL
• Journal: Roczniki Filozoficzne
• Year: 2024
• Volume: 72
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 43-60

Dates

published

2024

Contributors

author

Tadeusz Szubka

• University of Szczecin

• https://orcid.org/0000000285602785

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.18290/rf24721.3

Biblioteka Nauki

31233200