Filozoficzny realizm między naturą a zdrowym rozsądkiem, część I

• Authors: Mario De Caro

Title variants

EN

Philosophical realism between nature and common sense. Part I

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

W ciągu ostatnich trzech dekad liczba filozofów na całym świecie, którzy określali siebie jako realiści zarówno w tradycji kontynentalnej, jak i analitycznej, stale rosła. W pierwszej części tego artykułu zostaną przedstawione zagadnienia z zakresu współczesnej dyskusji nad realizmem i antyrealizmem. Następnie omówiona zostanie rodzina poglądów, którą można by nazwać “zdroworozsądkowym realizmem”, biorąc pod uwagę jej postawę wobec nauki.

EN

Over the last three decades, the number of philosophers who would define themselves as realists has been steadily growing all over the world, both in the continental and in the analytic tradition. In the first part of the article, the terms of the contemporary discussion on realism and antirealism will be introduced. Then a specific family of views, which could be called „common sense realism”, will be presented and discussed, also considering its attitude towards science.

Keywords

PL

realizm; antyrealizm; zdrowy realizm; realizm; antyrealizm; zdrowy realizm

EN

realism; antirealism; commonsense realism

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie
• Journal: Studia Ecologiae et Bioethicae
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 91-98

Dates

published

2017-12-31

Contributors

author

Mario De Caro

References

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Identifiers

DOI

10.21697/seb.2017.15.4.09