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Euroscepticism in the Visegrád Group

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Abstract

Motivation: Euroscepticism is an phenomenon which is becoming increasingly important. EU countries ought to enhance cooperation in the face of major challenges. Despite challenges facing the European Union too little attention has been devote exploration Euroscepticism with particular reference to the V4 countries.

Aim: The main objective of this study was to examine citizen's Euroscepticism in the countries of the Visegrád Group. Accordingly, in the theoretical section were introduced definition of Euroscepticism, its classification and present differences in delineating of the phenomenon. Instigate an attempt to indicate the sources of Euroscepticism in the V4 countries and its characterize. The theoretical part was the basis for the empirical part in which was performed analysis results of Eurobarometer Public Opinion Researches.

Materials and methods: Quantitative (basic statistical analysis and ALSICAL algorithm) methods were used in this investigation. The research data was drawn from Eurobarometer opinion polls commissioned by the European Commission.

Results: The study indicated a varied level of Euroscepticism among the citizens of the Visegrad Group countries and the source of the whole phenomenon is strongly rooted in the sphere of migration. The Czechs are the most anti-European society from the V4 group. Research on Euroscepticism must also be carried out at the level of the societies of individual states, and not only of political parties.

Keywords: *Visegrád Group; V4; Euroscepticism; Visegrád Group Euroscepticism; V4 Euroscepticism*

JEL: *A13; F53; P16*

1. Introduction

In the perspective of the development of the European Union one can observe intensification of anti-European attitudes, actions and beliefs. Both the EU's integration processes and current activities are delayed due to the engagement of many political groups opposed to European Union as an organization or those who rejects how the EU works. Eurosceptic actions are not based only on an-

ti-EU communication, but in some countries their manifestations are noticeable in specific political decisions e.g. disregard of EU laws and regulations, corruption of EU funds or minorities' discrimination.

Relatively little attention has been addressed to this issue. Many papers about Euroscepticism were created, but only few of them elaborates on sources, reasons and leads to determine more precisely in which areas Eurosceptic attitudes can be observed. Few re-

searchers have addressed the question of distinction between Euroscepticism in people's political choices and their actual opinions and beliefs on specific matters. One of the main issues in what we know about Euroscepticism is a lack of awareness as to whether it is only result of media or political manipulation or real problem based on conscious choices and shaped worldview. Consequently, little efforts to answer this questions, can lead to flawed solutions or motivate to conduct research in inappropriate direction.

This paper is divided into five sections, including the introduction. [Section 2](#) looks at definitions and systematizing of Euroscepticism in literature. Also, in this part we made an attempt to point out sources of Euroscepticism in V4 group countries and their features. [Section 3](#) is related to the materials and methods used for this study. In [Section 4](#) we carry out analysis data based on Eurobarometer Public Opinion Researches. [Section 5](#) offers a brief summary of results.

2. Literature review

European Union as one of the most advanced institutional structures in the world is changing through successive processes of integration. Except for research on specific activities of the European Union and the implications of the creation of the community, scientists attach increasing importance to Euroscepticism. In the literature there are many examples of definitions and classifications of this phenomenon.

The term Euroscepticism has become overused, not only among the media, but even academics ([Bertoncini & Koenig, 2014](#)). In the articles researchers appeal to [Kopecký's and Mudde's \(2002\)](#) or [Taggart's and Szczerbiak's \(2001; 2004\)](#) academic contributions. The differences in perceiving Euroscepticism between aforementioned persons demonstrate how broad the concept is and enable wider field for interpretation. It seems worth mentioning that the term Euroscepticism is adapted to the specific political background of particular countries, which is determined

by experiences with European integration or political tradition ([Harmsen & Spiering, 2004](#)).

There is still considerable ambiguity with regard to one universal definition of the Euroscepticism ([Riedel & Zuba, 2015](#), pp. 26–48). However, the existing knowledge suffices to analyze this category in the relation to the Visegrád Group countries.

2.1. Definitions and classifications of Euroscepticism

In the literature we can find various definitions of Euroscepticism. One of the first proposed by [Taggart \(1998, pp. 363–368\)](#) described Euroscepticism as an idea of conditional or outright opposition to the process of European Integration. Afterwards [Taggart and Szczerbiak \(2004\)](#) extended the term and its classification. They distinguished two types of the Euroscepticism — hard and soft. The first type assumes utter rejection of European political project, opposition to integration also on economic issues and non-acceptance for joining or remaining in the EU. “Soft Euroscepticism involves contingent or qualified opposition to European Integration” ([Taggart & Szczerbiak, 2004](#)). Soft version may take the political or national-interest form.

[Taggart and Szczerbiak \(2001; 2004\)](#) remarks on political Euroscepticism seem to be well-founded. Authors emphasize that depending on the country, there are different determinants and motives shaping this type of the phenomenon. Recently, during the negotiations on the new EU budget for 2021–2027 a group of countries, called in the media “group of misers”, appeared. Austria, Sweden, the Netherlands and Denmark were opposing such high funds for countries in difficult economic situation e.g. Greece or Italy ([Money, 2020](#)). On the other hand, Poland and Hungary were against the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, which gives European Commission the right to suspension of payment of EU funds. Based on [Taggart and Szczerbiak \(2001; 2004\)](#) definition, it can be concluded that in both situations there were attitudes of soft Euroscepticism. [Kopecký](#)

and Mudde (2002, pp. 297–326) agree that many of tags, which define attitudes towards the EU and its actions initiate the discussion, not close it.

Taggart and Szczepiński (2001; 2004) approach did not escape criticism. First of all, soft Euroscepticism is a broad definition, which may embrace different policy positions. Secondly, they offered questionable criteria for the classification of soft and hard Euroscepticism. Furthermore, Taggart and Szczepiński (2001; 2004) typology was created in time in which EU had a different form than today (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, pp. 297–326).

Following the criticism, Kopecký and Mudde (2002, pp. 297–326) systematized several terms to clarify the interpretation of the Euroscepticism. The concept of support for political regimes according to David Easton in which indicate division into “diffuse” and “specific” support for European integration forms the basis of this Euroscepticism theory. The aforementioned concept allowed to create two dimensions. In the first, the authors divide the group into Europhiles — supporters of European integration and Europhobes who are against any integration.

Combination of these two dimensions results in the classification of four groups. Euroenthusiasts — group combining the positions of Europhiles and EU-optimists. They believe in European integration within EU structures and institutions. The positions of Europhiles and EU-pessimists are represented by Eurosceptics who generally support the idea of integration, but are pessimistic about its implementation in the European Union. A part of them prefers to limit European integration only to economic element — liberal integrated market economy (Ganea, 2019, pp. 31–39). EU-pessimist who are also Europhobes the authors call Eurorejects. This group is both against European integration and against the EU. Finally, Europragmatics who combine the attitudes of Europhobes and EU-optimists (Kopecký & Mudde, 2002, pp. 297–326).

One of the proposed Euroscepticism classifications by Chris Flood is based on the ex-

tension of the Kopecký and Mudde (2002) classifications. It includes European opponents, revisionists, minimalists, gradualists, reformists and maximalists (Kozbial, 2020, pp. 261–276). However, this division is not so often quoted in the literature.

A fairly simple concept is also presented by Zuba (2006), who separates Euro-enthusiasts (supporters of integration) and Eurosceptics (opponents of integration) with a group of Eurorealists who adopt an ambivalent attitude.

2.2. Sources and characteristic of Euroscepticism in V4

This particular area of sources of Euroscepticism is of interest to some scientists, whose aim is to explain the causes of the phenomenon. Analyzes conducted by McLaren (2002, pp. 233–251) led her to distinguish three factors of Euroscepticism — economic, cultural and institutional. Based on historical facts, scholars also associate this phenomenon with political populism, which could have been observed during the accession negotiations for several countries (Stach, 2011, pp. 223–237). McLaren (2002) argues that distrust to the national institutions goes hand in hand with distrust to the EU institutions. This observation is true, but not in all cases. The crisis has been also indicated as the starting point for Euroscepticism. It may include areas of economy, democracy, immigration or European project concept in general (Pleśniarska, 2017, pp. 29–43). Many citizens of Member States might have mistakenly related instability in these fields with functioning of the European Union. Referring to the subject, it is important to mention Góralczyk's (2019, pp. 61–90) article, in which he emphasized inhomogeneity of types of Euroscepticism in V4 political parties. The attitude of political groups from the Visegrád Group countries towards the EU is varied, but the stance on the migration crisis is something that unites entities from all four countries.

Undoubtedly, the reference point to the topic depends to a large extent on the researcher's field of science. In conclusion, econ-

omists, historians and sociologists will point to other reasons for the emergence and development of Euroscepticism.

Stach (2011, pp. 223–237), expanding Koźbiał's (2020) theses, points out that at the beginning of the formation of Eurosceptic movements there usually is a charismatic political leader. However, the whole process begins with the phenomenon of populism. The European Union is a great target for populists to attack. Interpreting this institution as an enemy helped to engage some of the electorate in Slovakia and Hungary. Nevertheless, Victor Orbán's Fidesz party was classified as pro-EU (Stach, 2011, pp. 223–237). This is evidenced by the long-term affiliation of Fidesz to the European People's Party. However, this does not change the fact that over time the government of Orbán has become the Eurosceptic leader of the EU, with which it has been in a strong conflict for several years.

As Lasoń (2011, pp. 178–201) mentioned there is no equality between Euroscepticism and populism. Euroscepticism serves only as a tool that influenced certain groups in Poland before its accession to the Union. Farmers were threatened with lower incomes or the purchase of Polish land, and the slogan "Yesterday Moscow, tomorrow Brussels" could be heard at anti-EU demonstrations (Lasoń, 2011, pp. 178–201). This proves that arousing Eurosceptic sentiments in the countries of the Visegrád group is often not done at the level of factual arguments, but only slogans intended to cause anxiety.

Economic issues play a significant role among the sources of Euroscepticism in the V4 countries. Grodzki (2016, pp. 375–392) points to the free market economy or the liberalization of public life in general as the foundations of transformation in post-communist countries, including the V4 countries. It is impossible to ignore the fact that a part of society in each of the countries that passed from the socialist system to capitalism was harmed both economically and socially. The Polish transformation also has its other side characterized by high unemployment, impoverishment of the countryside, and increasing social

inequalities (Zagóra-Jonszta, 2017, pp. 208–219). According to Długosz (2019, pp. 95–121), people with a positive attitude towards the European Union are, in most cases, winners of the transformation, and those whose material status has deteriorated as a result of opening to the West, also blamed the EU for this state of affairs. The role of politicians was also not without significance, as they confirmed the dissatisfied part of the people that the European community was responsible for their poor economic situation. This is related to populism resulting from globalization, as indicated by Rodrik (2018, pp. 12–33). He gives an example of the loss of income of certain groups by reducing trade barriers. In his opinion, in this field, it is effortless for populist politicians to pinpoint blame in the form of specific countries or institutions. It can be presumed that this is also relevant in the case of Euroscepticism.

As it has already been mentioned, the migration crisis of 2015 united the governments of the V4 group. There was agreement here on the opposition to illegal migration and on supranational decision-making on this issue. Differences emerged in the ways in which the whole situation was resolved. In the end, the rhetoric opposed to the policy of the European Union allowed to strengthen Orbán's power (Góralczyk, 2019, pp. 61–90) and win the parliamentary elections by Law and Justice in Poland in 2015. At that time, political declarations on defending sovereignty, preserving one's culture and security dominated the message of the opponents of the EU's migration policy. It is worth noting the fact given by Góralczyk (2019, pp. 61–90) that in 2018 80% of Hungarian citizens were against accepting migrants, which was also used by Victor Orbán, fighting for re-election. The scale of such views meant that it was also possible to reach the supporters of the European community with anti-EU rhetoric. It should not be forgotten that nowadays, when accessing data and information, advanced communication techniques can be used, thanks to which it is possible to influence the views of people with completely different world views.

The mass media also, to some extent, shape people's views on topics such as that mentioned in the previous paragraph. [Leśniczak](#) (2019, pp. 115–131) examined 5 journals and how they wrote about the migration crisis in 2015. The Polish political and media scene is highly polarized, and some right-wing newspapers also featured arguments very similar to those used by Law and Justice in the election campaign. In the *W Sieci* and *Do Rzeczy* weeklies, migrants were presented as a threat to the security of the European Union and were also described as religious barbarians who wanted comfortable life ([Leśniczak](#), 2019, pp. 115–131). [De Vreese](#) (2007) has contributed significantly to the research on the impact on Euroscepticism by mass media. He proved that the media can both fuel and reduce Euroscepticism and that individual human characteristics and the amount of information we receive affect, as he put it, “the level of cynicism towards European integration” ([de Vreese](#), 2007, pp. 271–286). This example shows how wide the field of research into the sources of Euroscepticism is.

The common defense policy of the EU cannot be included among the sources of Euroscepticism in the V4 countries. Despite the difference of opinion, in which only the SMER — a left-wing party that is also characterized by national populism is in favor of the European armed forces, and the SPD — the far-right, Eurosceptic party from the Czech Republic, Law and Justice or Fidesz are looking for other solutions to strengthen defense capabilities, e.g. in NATO, the topic of defense does not connect the countries of the region against EU policy ([Góralczyk](#), 2019, pp. 61–90). The case does not seem to arouse great emotions in the public opinion and therefore it is not a good topic to stimulate anti-EU attitudes.

In the area of compliance with the rule of law, Poland and Hungary clearly stand out from the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The conflict between the governments of Poland and Hungary and the authorities of the European Union has been going on for several years now, and its source is the erosion

of faith in democracy and the effectiveness of international cooperation ([Glied & Zamęcki](#), 2020, pp. 647–673). The literature describing this issue emphasizes the difference between the strength and bluntness of criticism of EU actions by the most important politicians in Poland and Hungary. Fidesz, by changing the Hungarian constitution and thanks to the ineffectiveness of the national opposition, questions the EU's actions much more bluntly than Polish political leaders [Mateusz Morawiecki](#) and [Jarosław Kaczyński](#). However, in both cases, populism and reference to the role of the nation state dominate ([Csehi & Zgut](#), 2020, pp. 1–16). Contrary to the message of the Polish and Hungarian authorities, the European Union does not question the facts of changes in the area of the judiciary or the media market, but the manner of changes and their consequences in the form of reducing the independence of courts and judges or limiting media pluralism and freedom of speech. The dispute also concerns the systemic issues of the Union. The Brussels is convinced that its actions and demands towards Poland and Hungary are justified and have a strong legal basis. [Kranz](#) (2021) describes the current problem regarding the Reconstruction Fund, in which the “money for the rule of law” mechanism is to operate. The Polish government, however, undermines the legality of such a solution and uses it to show the European Union as an institution striving for federalization and claiming the right to decide on an increasing number of areas of human life. In general, the ruling parties in the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have a vision of a community centered more around a free-trade zone with strongly marked roles of nation states. However, the ANO party from the Czech Republic has no ideological leaning, as in the case of Fidesz and Law and Justice ([Góralczyk](#), 2019, pp. 61–90). The most pro-European and not using anti-EU narrative is the Slovak political class, which, according to [Góralczyk](#) (2019, pp. 61–90), is closer to pro-European Polish parties such as the Civic Platform. [Mangada Real de Asúa](#) (2021) emphasizes

that the actions of the Polish and Hungarian governments in breaking the rule of law are part of a larger narrative that focuses on sovereignty and is the opposite of European, liberal values.

Insufficient attention in research on the sources of Euroscepticism is devoted to climate and energy policy. This may be due to the fact that relatively recently this topic has become one of the most important issues in EU policy. Victor Orban calls EU climate policy a “utopian fantasy” (Reuters, 2020). Poland, where energy mix is dominated by coal, has by far the biggest problem with the energy transformation. The future of energy policy may become more complicated in the coming years and the role of negotiations in this field may significantly increase (Zapletalová & Komínková, 2020, pp. 1–9). It cannot be ruled out that, as was the case with the migration crisis, the climate goals of the union and the energy policy of national states, e.g. Poland, may become a starting point for spreading Euroscepticism, and the European Union and its activities may be used as an explanation for the rising electricity prices to citizens. Undoubtedly, this topic will attract greater research interest in the near future.

Gehring (2019) points out that historical differences and approach to international organizations are often overlooked sources of aversion and conflicts. This is related to that mentioned by Condruz-Băcescu (2014, pp. 52–59) claim that there is, in the EU, a revival of negative passions and claims on the horizon, mostly based on aspects of identity and ethno-national issues. This, in effect, may be the basis of a conflict between countries and the EU, but also one of undetectable roots of Euroscepticism. Moreover, historical processes are often not measurable, which makes empirical analysis difficult.

Summing up, it is difficult to attribute the source of Euroscepticism in the countries of the V4 group to one single factor. The migration crisis, defense, foreign and energy policy as well as legal and institutional issues divide or connect the anti-EU attitude

of the V4 countries to a different extent. It seems that Poland and Hungary are the countries most strongly undermining the present form and policy of the EU. Slovakia appears to be the most pro-EU country. However, all considerations are mainly based on political parties. This does not necessarily have to be reflected in the views of the citizens of the V4 countries. This issue will be examined in Section 4.

3. Materials and methods

The main objective of this study was to examine citizen’s Euroscepticism in the countries of the Visegrád Group. Empirical analysis involved comparison of answers to selected questions related to areas in which Euroscepticism phenomenon exists e.g. immigration, trust in EU institutions or common foreign policy. In the research we used basic statistical analysis and ALSCAL algorithm. Data used in the analysis are Eurobarometer Public Opinion Researches commissioned by European Commission and were collected from official Internet data bases of the European Union. Data covered the period from 2016 to 2020 based on 9 Eurobarometer surveys. This choice was justified by the topicality of the data and the availability of answers to the same questions for all studies.

Before presenting the results, it should be clarified how the data was selected. From the database of questions asked during the Eurobarometer Standard survey, the ones that would accurately show the attitude of citizens to the integration of the EU, the Union as an institution or the values that are the basis of its functioning were selected. The questions and possible answers were assigned thematic categories for drawing conclusions more easily (Table 1). The collected data concerned the percentage of positive responses. Depending on the question asked, a positive answer was to agree with a statement or to opt for deeper integration. It was assumed that a lower percentage of positive responses is tantamount to a higher level of Euroscepticism. On the one hand, this simplification must

be considered as a limitation in the study. On the other hand, the use of this data source ensures reliability and representativeness.

4. Results

As [Chart 1](#) clearly shows, in recent years the V4 countries have less support for the common migration policy than in the entire EU. What is even more interesting, the next two questions — number 8 and number 9, for which the percentage of positive answers practically never in the years 2016–2020 was at the level of the EU average, also related to migration. Citizens of the Visegrád group countries expressed less willingness to help refugees than statistical Europeans and less often believed that immigrants contribute a lot to their country. With such a statement in the 2020 Eurobarometer almost every fifth Czech, Hungarian or Slovak agreed. However, as many as 56% of Poles agreed that immigrants bring a lot to their country. However, there is one area where V4 group citizens look more Euro-enthusiastic than Europeans in general — trust in EU institutions. In the last two analyzed studies, 3 out of 4 countries of the V4 group were above the EU average.

The unmistakable aspect is undoubtedly the stability of views. [Table 2](#) presents the values of the coefficient of variation of positive responses in 2016–2020 for each country. It is clear that the greatest fluctuations concern question 7, i.e. the EU's common migration policy. The value of the coefficient of variation for each of the V4 countries was over 20%, and for Poland it was almost 30%. Consistency of views can be seen on the issue of the EU's common foreign and defense policy (questions 2 and 3), where the variability does not exceed 6%. Slovaks are also not sure of their identity, understood as a sense of being European — the value in question 6 is 28.72%.

Conducting a common policy at the EU level in the countries of the Visegrád group is perceived in a different way ([Chart 2](#)). The greatest consensus is in the field of defense policy. Over 70% of the citizens of each country support this idea. In the case

of the remaining spheres, support is the weakest in the Czech society. The Czechs are particularly reluctant to the common economic policy and the common currency — it is supported by only 21% of Czechs, but also only by 33% of Poles. The Slovaks are the complete opposite, who support over 80% of the common economic policy. Slovakia is also the only country from the V4 group that belongs to the Monetary Union. The view of a common migration policy for the Union definitely separates the citizens of the V4 countries from the average support among all EU countries. This confirms the thesis often mentioned in the literature that migration issues are a significant source of Euroscepticism in the countries of the Visegrád Group. Similar support for the integration of foreign and energy policy can be noticed for Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. Therefore, taking into account all 5 fields of policy that would be conducted jointly at the EU level, Czech citizens are by far the most opposed to it.

Over the years, the willingness to integrate in terms of decision-making has increased in each of the V4 countries. The percentage of respondents who tend to agree or totally agree with statement: “More decisions should be taken at EU level” in 2016–2020 increased the most among Hungarian and Polish citizens ([Chart 3](#)). Perhaps this is due to the dissatisfaction of some residents of these countries with the lack of a more decisive response from EU bodies to the actions of national governments in the area of the judiciary and the rule of law. In 2020, 60% of Hungarians and 61% of Poles wanted to make more decisions at the EU level. It was respectively 11 and 10 percentage points more than 4 years earlier, and also more than the EU average. Less than half of Slovak citizens (45%) agree with the above-mentioned statement, and the lowest percentage of the population in the V4 countries supporting this idea again concerns Czechs (38%).

EU institutions are often used by politicians to undermine the functioning of the community. It is important to look at the extent to which citizens trust these entities. Both the Parliament and the European

Commission have the same or higher degree of trust among Hungarians, Poles and Slovaks than the EU average (Table 3). However, out of the three countries, Hungarians trust these institutions the most, as declared by 58% of respondents. Once again, the Czechs turn out to be the most Eurosceptic. Less than 40% trust the Commission, Parliament and the ECB. This is in each case less than the EU average.

Poles feel Europeans the most in terms of identity of all V4 countries — 83% of respondents from this country feel at least to some extent European. Slovaks and Hungarians are very much in agreement with Poles on this issue, which is confirmed by a similar percentage of positive responses (82% and 80%). Only the Czechs declare the feeling of being EU citizens in only 60% and are the only ones below the EU average, which is 70% (Chart 4).

Looking for similarities in the current attitudes of the citizens of the V4 Group countries, it can be seen that it occurs most strongly between Slovakia and Hungary (Chart 5). Using the ALSCAL algorithm, the values of positive answers to 12 questions were reduced to a two-dimensional space. Chart 5 also shows that from all the V4 countries it is an average Pole that is most similar to the average EU citizen. The Czechs have little in common with the citizens of Poland, but also with Hungary and Slovakia in their views and attitudes towards the EU. This proves that the citizens of the Visegrád Group should not be treated as a uniform whole, as there are significant differences between them.

5. Conclusion

The main aim of the study was to investigate the phenomenon of Euroscepticism in the countries of the Visegrád Group. Conclusions from the analysis of selected questions from Eurobarometer surveys indicate two key issues. First of all, issues related to migration, such as the common migration policy, attitude to immigrants or the willingness to help refugees quite strongly bind the V4 societies together and are a pronounced source

of Euroscepticism. Secondly, the Czechs turn out to be the most Eurosceptic society out of all four countries. Significantly less often they express the will of a common EU policy in particular areas, they have less confidence in the EU institutions, but also, in most cases, they are not positive about taking more decisions at the community level.

The states of the Visegrád group cannot be treated as one in all fields. Referring to specific political, social and economic aspects increases the reliability of the assessment of real similarities and differences. The survey also showed the stability of the views of the citizens of the V4 countries on the conduct of the common defence policy of the European Union. There is a need for further research on the issue in the areas of reluctance to European integration. It is worth bearing in mind that current occurrences, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, may change the opinion of citizens of V4 countries. There is no doubt that observing the attitudes and views of citizens should be of key importance not only for scientists, but also for decision-makers who want to effectively identify the sources of Euroscepticism. Discussing this phenomenon at the level of selected issues increases the quality of the conclusions and counterbalances the debate, a large part of which focuses on political parties rather than on citizens and real problems.

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Appendix

Table 1.
Questions selected from Standard Eurobarometer survey

Question number	The content of the question	Possible answers	Thematic group
1	What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A European economic and monetary union with one single currency, the euro	against — don't know — for	economy policy
2	What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A common foreign policy of the 28 Member States of the EU	against — don't know — for	foreign policy
3	What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A common defence and security policy among EU Member States	against — don't know — for	defence policy
4	What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A common energy policy among EU Member States	against — don't know — for	energy policy
5	Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following statements. More decisions should be taken at EU level	totally disagree — tend to disagree — don't know — tend to agree — totally agree	decision making
6	For each of the following statements, please tell me to what extent it corresponds or not to your own opinion. You feel you are a citizen of the EU	no, definitely not — no, not really — don't know — yes, to some extent — yes, definitely	identity
7	What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it. A common European policy on migration	against — don't know — for	migration policy
8	To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? Immigrants contribute a lot to (OUR COUNTRY)	totally disagree — tend to disagree — don't know — tend to agree — totally agree	migration
9	To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements? (OUR COUNTRY) should help refugees	totally disagree — tend to disagree — don't know — tend to agree — totally agree	migration
10	And please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust these European institutions. The European Parliament	tend not to trust — don't know — tend to trust	EU institutions
11	And please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust these European institutions. The European Commission	tend not to trust — don't know — tend to trust	EU institutions
12	And please tell me if you tend to trust or tend not to trust these European institutions. The European Central Bank	tend not to trust — don't know — tend to trust	EU institutions

Source: Own preparation based on [European Commission](#) (2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b, 2020).

Table 2.
Coefficient of variation of positive answers 2016–2020 (in %)

Question number	CZ	HU	PL	SK
1	9.25	3.09	2.73	6.31
2	5.63	3.11	2.76	4.31
3	2.45	5.35	5.88	4.18
4	3.19	10.18	7.52	8.58
5	5.39	3.11	4.24	8.29
6	6.67	10.27	19.96	28.72
7	23.86	20.20	28.87	23.72
8	15.07	7.77	7.62	11.61
9	10.21	8.97	12.36	12.97
10	9.32	10.72	7.77	7.62
11	11.61	10.21	5.85	8.97
12	12.36	12.97	9.32	7.10

Source: Own preparation based on [European Commission](#) (2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b, 2020).

Table 3.
Trust in the EU institutions in V4 countries

EU institution	CZ	HU	PL	SK	EU
The European Parliament	39	58	52	48	48
The European Commission	34	58	53	49	45
The European Central Bank	39	52	45	50	42

Source: Own preparation based on [European Commission](#) (2020).

Chart 1.
Positive responses in the V4 countries compared to the EU

question number:	12	3	4	2	2	3	3	3	3	3
	11	3	3	2	3	3	3	3	3	3
	10	2	3	2	2	1	2	2	3	3
	9	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	6	2	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
	5	1	1	0	0	1	1	2	2	2
	4	1	0	1	1	1	1	2	1	0
	3	3	2	2	2	4	1	3	4	2
	2	2	3	2	2	3	2	3	3	1
	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
		2016/ 85.2	2016/ 86.2	2017/ 87.3	2017/ 88.3	2018/ 89.1	2018/ 90.3	2019/ 91.5	2019/ 92.3	2020/ 93.1
		year/Eurobarometer edition								


Notes:



Number of V4 countries with % of positive answers equal to or above the EU average.


Source: Own preparation based on [European Commission](#) (2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b, 2020).

Chart 2.
Positive attitude to the common EU policy making in V4 countries



Source: Own preparation based on [European Commission](#) (2020).

Chart 3.
V4 countries attitude to decision making at EU level (in %)




Notes:

% of respondents, who tend to agree or totally agree with statement: "More decisions should be taken at EU level."

Source: Own preparation based on [European Commission](#) (2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2018a, 2018b, 2019a, 2019b, 2020).

Chart 4.
European identity in V4 countries (in %)




Notes:

% of respondents, who feel to some extent or definitely citizens of the EU.

Source: Own preparation based on [European Commission](#) (2020).

Chart 5.
Euclidean distance model



Source: Own preparation based on [European Commission \(2020\)](#) and calculations using SPSS.

