Akt przekonania w ujęciu Jana Łukasiewicza a idiogeniczna teoria sądu

• Authors: Adam Olech

Title variants

EN

Act of Belief in Jan Łukasiewicz’s View and the Idiogenic Theory of Judgement

Abstracts

EN

The aim of this article is to provide a comparative analysis of (i) the act of belief in Jan Łukasiewicz’s conception and (ii) the act of judging in the view of idiogenic theory of judgment. According to Łukasiewicz, the act of belief is not a propositional entity, which reproduces (correctly or not) the states of affairs to which it is intentional directed. Consequently, the act of belief is not a carrier of truth but rather a feeling of reality of something to what it is directed. If one analyses Łukasiewicz’s remarks about beliefs, he would agree that the act of belief is the same as the act of judging understood within the idiogenic theory of judgment. In turn, in phenomenological terms: Łukasiewicz’s belief and idiogenic act of judging could be defined as “thetical moment” or “moment of capturing the reality” (R. Ingarden) or Setzungsmoment (E. Husserl).

Keywords

PL

akt przekonania; akt sądzenia; F. Brentano; idiogeniczna teoria sądu; E. Husserl; R. Ingarden; J. Łukasiewicz; tetyczność; K. Twardowski

• Publisher: Polska Akademia Nauk
• Journal: Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
• Year: 2023
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 149-165

Dates

published

2023

Contributors

author

Adam Olech

• Uniwersytet Jana Długosza w Częstochowie, Katedra Filozofii

Identifiers

DOI

10.24425/pfns.2023.146787

Biblioteka Nauki

55789463