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Józef Tischner on Upbringing and Hope

Abstract: The present article examines Józef Tischner's idea of upbringing (*wychowanie*) in establishing the new awareness of solidarity among the Polish workers and people through an awakening to conscience. The present moment served as a revolutionary alternative to socialism. I look at Tischner's critique of Marxism and the central issue surrounding base and superstructure. Then I turn to his recovery of the Polish tradition of ethical ideals, especially in the person of Maximilian Kolbe and John Paul II. The text provides a detailed analysis of the chapter on upbringing in *The Spirit of Solidarity*. Tischner's notion that upbringing is a personal bond established in trust to live in hope for improvement in mind and heart is placed in the context of the solidarity as a social bond establishing an ethical community transcending the political quest for power and the need to find an enemy. The text analyzes the various counterfeit forms of education in order to deepen our awareness of the meaning of authentic upbringing. Salient points of his teaching are discussed in conclusion.

Keywords: Tischner, Pope John Paul II, solidarity, education, hope, Marx and Marxism, theses on Feuerbach, Maximilian Kolbe, conscience

Józef Tischner is known and revered in the United States as a key figure in Solidarity movement and as a friend and collaborator of Pope John Paul II.¹ In the years between martial law and the round table discussions, two of Tischner's works, written at the birth and outset of Solidarity, were translated into English. *The Spirit of Solidarity* was published in 1984 with a forward by the

¹ Pope John Paul II mentions Tischner as an important member of his intellectual circle in *Rise, Let Us Be on Our Way* translated by Walter Ziemba (New York: Warner Books, 2004) and in the editorial note to his last book, *Memory and Identity: Conversations at the Dawn of a Millennium* (New York: Rizzoli, 2005), he says that he returns to themes of his conversations with Tischner and Michalski, xi.

former U.S. National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzeziński and an afterward by Lech Wałęsa.² This volume received a wide distribution and gave American readers a true flavor of the solidarity movement. Brzeziński hailed Tischner as “a truly major figure in the Polish spiritual rebirth,” and as “the major philosopher of the Solidarity movement.”³ Wałęsa noted that the grim reality of the delegalization of Solidarity did not diminish the aspirations of the Polish people and Tischner’s book gives expression to “things that still flow through the minds, and even more the hearts, of my compatriots.”⁴ Three years later, his book *Polski kształt dialogu* was translated and published as *Marxism and Christianity: The Quarrel and the Dialogue in Poland*.⁵ This volume contains a remarkable set of essays by Tischner on the various phases and of the encounter between Marxism and Catholicism; he says that it was more quarrel than dialogue. It also gives very valuable summary analyses of the key thinkers and themes over the years of the quarrel. These two books alone grant to Fr. Tischner an important place in the annals of the Polish resistance to Soviet occupation and oppression of Poland, his impact and influence was also important after Poland regained its freedom in 1989 until his death in 2000. Most significantly, his comprehensive philosophical work was not readily available in English during this time. After his death, the Tischner Institute⁶ undertook the project to make his philosophical writings available in a series of three editions of *Thinking in Values*, as publications in *The Tischner Institute Journal of Philosophy*.⁷ And more recently, the Ignatianum University Press has published a volume on Józef Tischner as part of their excellent project on The Polish Christian Philosophy in the 20th Century.⁸ This volume includes a set of essays introducing the life and work of Tischner as well as translations of some of the key writings by Tischner. We can hope that more English speak-

² Józef Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1984). Translation of *Etyka Solidarności*, 1982. Translated by Marek B. Zaleski and Benjamin Fiore, S.J. It includes his sermons of May 3, 1981, at Wawel, and those from the first congress of delegates and the first congress of Solidarity.

³ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, viii–ix.

⁴ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 106.

⁵ Józef Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity: The Quarrel and the Dialogue in Poland* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987). Józef Tischner, *Polski kształt dialogu* (Paris: Editions spotkania, 1981). Translated by Marek B. Zaleski and Benjamin Fiore, S.J.

⁶ The Józef Tischner Institute was founded by his pupils and friends for the purpose of preserving and spreading knowledge about his work. See www.tichner.org.pl. I wish to thank Zbigniew Stawrowski, Director, for providing me with many resources and for meeting with faculty and students from my University.

⁷ *Thinking in Values: The Tischner Institute Journal of Philosophy*, no. 1 (Solidarity) (2007); *Thinking in Values: The Tischner Institute Journal of Philosophy*, no. 2 (Agathology) (2008); *Thinking in Values: The Tischner Institute Journal of Philosophy*, no. 3 (Dialogue and Encounter) (2011).

⁸ Jarosław Jagiełło, ed. *Józef Tischner* (Kraków: Ignatianum University Press, 2020).

ing scholars will now reconsider the work of this influential Polish philosopher and activist.

It is not our intention to assess Tischner's philosophy as a whole, but rather to examine his work on notion of solidarity, and to focus specifically upon one aspect of it, namely, how an idea of education, or "upbringing" (*wychowanie*) grew out of the experience of solidarity. In fact, as Dobrosław Kot has pointed out, Tischner treated his book on solidarity as "sui generis reports from the center of events, and not as an independent, complete theory."⁹ He admits that "solidarity" is not a concept or an ethical system but an "idea that illuminates the current events."¹⁰ Therefore, Kot suggests that the book is not about solidarity as such but about the "things which thanks to solidarity were brought to light."¹¹ The value of the book lies in the phenomenon of human action that Tischner observed and experienced at the critical time of solidarity's first emergence. Thus, he begins with the "fact" of "real solidarity of people," which he then describes and begins to offer some thoughtful reflections, analyses, and comparisons. When he describes the phenomenon as a willingness to "carry the burden of another" or an awareness of the "bonds" that people have to each other, he uses a scripture citation to make the point (Gal. 6:2). Solidarity is a call. He also observes that solidarity is not imposed from without but born from within, like virtue. And that solidarity does not need an enemy because it is turned towards all, and it is against no one. And notably he turns most emphatically to talk about solidarity in terms of conscience. "The ethics of solidarity intends to be the ethics of conscience,"¹² he famously declared. But again, there is not here a philosophical analysis of conscience, but we can refer to the deepest part of the person, where one encounters the voice of God, and stands reliably or consistently for others.¹³ Thus, in response to the pain of others, more often victimized by an oppressive system of government, the awakening of conscience brought forward a new social movement. In the midst of a "crisis of truth, excessive suspicion, exploitation and bad organization," the Polish people chose neither passivity nor direct confrontation, but a "third path, the path of solidarity."¹⁴

In this social-political context, Tischner, in *The Spirit of Solidarity* wrote a chapter entitled "Upbringing." Tischner wrote elsewhere: "I do not deal with

⁹ Dobrosław Kot, "Solidarity without Solidarity," in *Thinking in Values: The Tischner Institute Journal of Philosophy*, no. 1 (Solidarity) (2007): 98.

¹⁰ Kot, "Solidarity without Solidarity," 98–99; he makes reference to Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 5–6.

¹¹ Kot, "Solidarity without Solidarity," 99.

¹² Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 6–7.

¹³ Kot, "Solidarity without Solidarity," 100–102, quoted in Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 6–9.

¹⁴ Kot, "Solidarity without Solidarity," 103.

the philosophy of education directly, but I touch it only insofar as this philosophy is related to man.”¹⁵ Solidarity helps to illuminate an important part of any society, namely, education or upbringing.¹⁶ This in turn will help us understand his philosophy of the person as tied to others by bonds of social trust.¹⁷ There is an informality to the idea of upbringing that emphasizes the personal bond between mentor and the pupil, not unlike that between the parent and the child. It does not rely on formal positions of teacher and student, but readily emerges as a way of forming and influencing one another through social bonds built on trust. These bonds, established through an awakening of conscience, constituted the revolution that began to heal the sickness of work and social order. Tischner will suggest that, against the backdrop of a proper understanding of upbringing as awakening, we may say that the “ethics of solidarity” is the “ethics of awakening.”¹⁸ The ethics of solidarity “wants to be an ethics of conscience.”¹⁹ The solidarity movement was a revolution of conscience because solidarity was a movement of awakening, brought to pass through upbringing. Upbringing is the pivot for the change in consciousness and the action that characterizes the revolution of conscience.

The very attempt to thematize “upbringing” and view it in the light of solidarity is rooted in Tischner’s account of Christianity’s “quarrel and dialogue” with Marxism in Poland.²⁰ According to Marxist thought, it is through labor and the changing conditions of labor that human beings are created and formed. What human beings are “coincides with their production, both what they pro-

¹⁵ Józef Tischner, *Krótki przewodnik po życiu: nieznanne teksty* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2017), 72. “Droga Sokratesa i perć Sabaly. Uwagi o filozofii wychowania,” *Znak*, no. 11 (1996); and Józef Tischner and Jacek Żakowski, *Tischner czyta Katechizm* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2009), 109–112.

¹⁶ Józef Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 66–75. On the topic of upbringing, see also Józef Tischner, *Krótki przewodnik po życiu: nieznanne teksty* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2017), 71–82. Also see, Józef Tischner and Wojciech Bonowicz, *Alfabet Tischnera* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2012), 293–298.

¹⁷ See Zbigniew Stawrowski, “Solidarity Means a Bond,” *Thinking in Values: The Tischner Institute Journal of Philosophy*, no. 1 (Solidarity) (2007), 159–171.

¹⁸ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 49; and awakening is what the pupil owes his teacher or mentor. Charles Taylor, in his sympathetic but critical analysis of Tischner’s account of solidarity, pinpoints the moment of “awakening” of common citizenship as the most relevant aspect of the solidarity movement for the west. “It is indispensable for the community to come alive again and to actualize itself. This is the main message of Fr. Tischner.” Charles Taylor, “Several Reflections on the Theme of Solidarity,” *Thinking in Values: The Tischner Institute Journal of Philosophy*, no. 1 (Solidarity) (2007): 73, 75.

¹⁹ Tischner, “The Ethics of Solidarity,” trans. A. Fraś, in *Thinking in Values: The Tischner Institute Journal of Philosophy*, no. 1 (Solidarity) (2007), 39.

²⁰ Józef Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity: The Quarrel and the Dialogue in Poland* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987).

duce and how they produce,” Marx stated in his book *The German Ideology*.²¹ There is no need for another sphere of life called “upbringing” or “education,” insofar as morality, religion, and metaphysics are simply ideology, and exist only as “reflexes and echoes of real life processes.”²² In sum, “life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness is determined by life [labor].”²³ An education not based on work, productivity, and class struggle forms a “false consciousness” and is counterproductive to the authentic liberation of human beings. Thus, to take seriously a philosophy of education, called by Tischner “upbringing,” even in an indirect way, is a sign of his rejection of Marxist theory and a challenge to its practice. Of course, Marx himself recognized the difficulties of his position that external social and economic circumstances, such as productive capacities and class division, are the sole determination of consciousness. He raises a critical question in his brief “Theses on Feuerbach.” He posed the following question: “Who will educate the educator?”²⁴ As an initial answer, Marx responds that the “coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing activity.”²⁵ His cryptic remark begs many questions such as what is the character of this revolutionizing activity and who will bring it about and under what conditions? Tischner discusses precisely the third thesis on Feuerbach in his *Marxism and Christianity*.²⁶ According to Tischner, this third thesis “concisely but unequivocally points to the decisive role of human beings in shaping the base.” Accordingly, the human being is not merely a product of the base, but “its particular creator,”²⁷ and indeed human beings are elevated as “the fundamental production forces above other forces.”

Perhaps the great achievement of Solidarity was to provide such a transformative activity that brought about a change in social life and deepened an awareness of responsibility. Charles Taylor describes Solidarity as “the engine

²¹ This constitutes a part of the so-called first premises of materialist method, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology*, edited with an introduction by Christopher C. Arthur (New York: International Publishers, 1970), 42.

²² Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, 47.

²³ Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, 47.

²⁴ Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach, III,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, ed. Robert Tucker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), 108. Also found in Christopher Arthur’s edition of *The German Ideology*, 121–122.

²⁵ Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach, III,” in *The Marx-Engels Reader*, 108.

²⁶ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 59ff. For an excellent analysis of the third thesis, see Nicholas Lobkowitz, *Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1967), 409–426.

²⁷ Tischner emphasizes the role of creativity as a feature of the human person in “Thinking and Creativity,” in *The Philosophy of Person: Solidarity and Cultural Creativity*, ed. Józef Tischner, Józef M. Życiński, and George F. McLean (Washington, D.C.: Paideia Press, 1994).

of social healing.”²⁸ Solidarity found a fresh and seemingly innovative alternative to the broken and sick socialist experiment in Poland. Solidarity was an experience that would itself “educate the educator.” At its heart is the experience of an awakening and formation of conscience derived in part from the Polish tradition, the Church, and mutual friendship. This is the task of “upbringing.” Tischner’s report on upbringing from his experience of solidarity is a valuable document to understand how this change came about. In order to analyze this chapter of *The Spirit of Solidarity*, we shall first look at Tischner’s critique of Marxism; second, we examine the importance of the Polish tradition as an alternative or rival to the Marxist position and other philosophies of Western Europe;²⁹ third, we shall do a paragraph-by-paragraph analysis of the chapter on upbringing. And in the conclusion, we identify three salient points about upbringing: upbringing belongs in an extra-political sphere, upbringing highlights personal interiority and freedom; upbringing ultimately derives from hope and the experience of the Abrahamic response to the divine promise.

Tischner’s Critique of Marxism

In his study on *Marxism and Christianity*, Tischner deftly analyzes aspects of the Marxist account of labor to show its inability to account for the crisis of work in Poland so evident to all in the 1970s. He began the work in 1976 and completed it in 1980. He acknowledges the difficulty of examining fairly all sides of the “quarrel” between Christianity and Marxism in Poland because more often than not the meeting was a confrontation and an ongoing struggle. The whole nation was involved in the confrontational “dialogue” because everyone faced a decision, the choice between Marxism and Christianity. Thus, Tischner considers the genre of his book to be more akin to “witness,” or the honest reflection of someone close to the history; he offers his “honest testimony” but in them he provides a very substantial analysis. The efforts by the Marxist government in Poland to actively construct socialism in Poland and to provide a steady indoctrination of the Marxist ideas made it inevitable that the Marxist dogmas would “seep into one’s soul.”³⁰ The notions of class warfare, higher ideals as a mere superstructure derived from the base of economic

²⁸ Taylor, “Several Reflections on the Theme of Solidarity,” 72.

²⁹ Alasdair MacIntyre speaks about rival and competing traditions in *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry: Encyclopedia, Genealogy, and Tradition*, Gifford Lectures of 1998 (South Bend: Notre Dame Press, 1990).

³⁰ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, xvii.

productivity and relations, and the international dimension of the struggle for socialism drenched the life of the country like a wet fog. Dialectical materialism was the official teaching in all venues and it claimed to provide an all embracing explanation for economics, history, and culture. The regime relentlessly attacked all the varieties of Polish thinkers who might provide an alternative to Marxism. The thousand-year tradition of Christianity in Poland provided a strong counter-current to this ideological inundation. The Polish church was a “factor in the awakening the people from slumber.”³¹ The two figures of Stefan Wyszyński and Karol Wojtyła symbolized for the people the journey of the nation under communism and enhanced the moral and intellectual authority of the Church. It was an unequal struggle, Tischner argues, because the nation “chose according to values” and they saw themselves as a nation in the work of these two men. Fr. Tischner is clearly building upon their vision of work society.³²

Presenting Marxism as a “philosophy of labor,” Tischner explains the conceptual link between their understanding of labor and the all-pervasive notion of dialectic. At all stages of the process of production Marxists identify fundamental points of opposition and antagonism, culminating of course in the defining aspect of class warfare. Labor must utilize raw materials from an unyielding earth and bring into play human relationships in division of labor and class distinctions in exchange. As production unfolds, “the world around human beings changes. The human beings themselves also change. This change goes so far and reaches so deeply that we may say that labor directly creates the human being.”³³ The dialectical method reduces history to the antagonism of classes designated as the exploited and the exploiters.³⁴ Tischner explores the concept of exploitation as alienation by tracing the concept through Hegel and Marx to the fantastic claim by Stalin that in the USSR, there are no longer “exploiters and exploited.” Such claims caused considerable embarrassment to the Polish communists in light of the evident failures of decades long efforts to refashion the economy and to reorder and reeducate the citizens of Poland. There was no socialism with a human face, but quite the opposite—alienated workers, widespread poverty, deeply oppressive structures. Some Marxists even proposed a rethinking of the

³¹ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, xviii.

³² See Stefan Wyszyński, *Duch pracy ludzkiej* (1946); translated as *Working you Way into Heaven* (New Hampshire: Sophia Press, 1995); see also Stefan Wyszyński, *The Deeds of Faith* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966); Karol Wojtyła, *Dobrze Was rozumiem, nie obca mi praca: Kardynał Karol Wojtyła – Ojciec Święty Jan Paweł II w Piekarach Śląskich* (Katowice Diocese, 2020). John Paul II, *On Human Work “Laborem exercens”* (Vatican, 1981), https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens.html.

³³ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 64.

³⁴ Marx and Engles, *The German Ideology*, 52–57; Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto* (New York, Penguin, 1964), *passim*.

notion of alienation so to include socialist society, particularly by Adam Schaff.³⁵ The issue of alienation pitted the old guard, dogmatic Marxists, against those who championed the “younger Marx” as a humanist. Yet the experiment of socialist economy in Poland led many to search for another way to understand the sickness and exploitation of Polish labor at the heart of the Soviet system, especially through the resources of Christian Philosophy.³⁶

Tischner explains that the basic affliction of the socialist human being is “moral” in nature, and not strictly economic. On one key page of *Marxism and Christianity*, he summarizes the multiple points made throughout his *The Spirit of Solidarity*:

Exploitation drives human beings into a state of moral conflict with themselves. [...] It is the feeling that their otherwise sincere goodwill is time after time misused for aims that have nothing to do with this goodwill and which often are even contradictory to it. [...] this new form is a direct manipulation of human beings themselves, their attitude towards others, and towards themselves. Socialized human beings discover they are below the level of human life due to an inability to exercise their proper rights and to execute the duties entrusted to them. Their right to truth is canceled, their feelings of personal dignity are taken lightly, their personal freedom suffers limitations. [...] They suffer from an excess of needless, empty tasks, and from a constant lack of time. They live in a world of the propagandistic lie.³⁷

Marxists were simply unable to deploy ethical concepts to analyze this moral existential situation. A similar point was frequently made by Alasdair MacIntyre. The criminal policies and deeds of the Stalinist regime such as mass murder and deportation, along with the imprisonment and execution of many leaders led many Marxists in the West to attempt a critical analysis. MacIntyre discussed the attempts at the moral assessment of Stalinism in “Notes from the Moral Wilderness.”³⁸ One had to appeal to a non-Marxist morality such as utili-

³⁵ See Helena Czosnyka, *The Polish Challenge: Foundations for Dialogue in the Works of Adam Schaff and Józef Tischner* (Atlanta: Scholar's Press, 1995); and Józef Tischner, “The Dispute over Alienation,” in *Marxism and Christianity*, 40–51.

³⁶ See *A Companion to Polish Christian Philosophy of the 20th and 21st Centuries*, ed. Piotr S. Mazur, Piotr Duchliński, and Paweł Skrzydlewski (Kraków: Ignatianum University Press, 2020).

³⁷ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 50.

³⁸ Alasdair MacIntyre, “Notes from the Moral Wilderness,” in *The MacIntyre Reader*, ed. Kelvin Knight (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 34. MacIntyre’s intellectual journey was fueled by his struggle to find an adequate critique of modern liberal society without succumbing to the contradictions and excess of Marxism. For an anthology of his writing on Marxism, see *Alasdair MacIntyre’s Engagement with Marxism*, ed. Paul Blackledge and Neil Davidson (Leiden: Brill, 2005). Also, Alasdair MacIntyre, *Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and Philosophy* (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press,

tarianism or Kantian categorical imperative, as espoused by modern liberalism, in order to judge the ethical errors of Marxism. But this seems to be arbitrary or inconsistent with the Marxist critique of western liberalism. Similarly, Tischner did not wish to make an arbitrary appeal to a moral system, such as Thomism, but rather to develop a form of personalism built from the experience of Polish life and readily applicable to the immediate but profound challenges.³⁹

The central problem with Marxism according to Tischner is its failure to account for the moral agency of the human being, indeed to account for the interiority of the person at all. Tischner quotes Włodzimierz Szewczuk's statement concerning the "ingenious discovery of Marx," namely: "Human beings begin creating themselves by remaking the nature of which they are part [...]. The social conditions of life create human beings and their personalities, they shape their value systems and modes of valuation, their life styles. They shape the entire interior of the individual."⁴⁰ It is clear that this approach to human development has no need for an "upbringing" or education outside of the forces of production and the ensemble of social relations in labor. And if human beings are in some way "raw material" and it is productive labor that humanizes or dehumanizes the person, who can gain such power over work and thus over human beings? Tischner rightly notes that "we are at the heart of socialism."

1978). Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984).

³⁹ Tischner's dispute with Thomism ranged beyond this choice of rhetorical style. Józef Tischner, "Schyłek chrześcijaństwa tomistycznego," *Znak*, nr 1 (1970). Helpful comments are made by Miłosz Hołda, "Discussions and Polemics," in Jagiełło, *Józef Tischner*, 115–118. Tischner claimed that Thomism "does not allow for positive research into the world and Christianity and getting really in this area new results" (Tischner, "Schyłek chrześcijaństwa tomistycznego," in Józef Tischner, *Myslenie według wartości* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 1993), 215–238; see page 236 for his comment on Maritain and Gilson). He seems to dismiss the accomplishments of Maritain and Gilson: "Recent analyzes by Maritain and Gilson do not, unfortunately, go beyond the conventions of Thomist Christianity." Tischner, "Schyłek," Footnote 11, p. 246. Tischner was probably not aware of Maritain's *On the Church of Christ: The Person of the Church and Her Personnel* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1973) written near the time of his essay: "I have always thought that the so-called 'Scholastic' mode of exposition, manner and style have had their day, because they have become an obstacle to the life and to the progress of this great doctrine in human history. What it needs is no longer a doctoral and magistral approach, inscribing in marble a majestic *sed contra* and peremptory responses to numbered objections; it is a free approach, inquiring, humble and proud at one and the same time; it is to advance under the standard of St. Joan of Arc" (p. 231). The standard of Joan requires "extraordinary liberty, extraordinary simplicity, extraordinary courage, and, above all, total gift-of-oneself to give heroically assistance to the pity which is in the kingdom of the earth." From his early book *Antimoderne* (Paris: Éditions de la Revue des jeunes, 1922) to his *The Peasant of the Garonne: An Old Layman Questions Himself about the Present Time* (New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1968), Maritain called for a renewal of Thomism and a reinvigoration of its central insights and truths. The truth is above time and not subject to decay.

⁴⁰ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 55.

We encounter the problem of how to understand its deterministic consequences of the theory of base and superstructure.⁴¹

According to the classic Marxist teaching, reality is constituted by the “base” of “the whole material intercourse of individuals within a definite stage of the development of productive forces.”⁴² Materials, technology, relations of production give rise to various classes and beyond that ranges an “ideology” by which class relations are embodied in art, religion, culture—all a “superstructure” or deception covering the fundamental facts of the productive engines of social-economic life. The problem is not just the reductionism of the moral and cultural to the social-economic, but “the determination of human beings, their psyche, views, moral and conceptual stance, through the historical social conditions in which they live.”⁴³ Tischner believes that this premise of Marxism makes it inevitable that the process of socialization must become “a violent assault against the human spirit.”⁴⁴ Such an assault “met the response of protest of individuals and society” in Poland. Solidarity was a search for the truth about the human person and for the authenticity of work, as response of protest to the oppression, disorder, and misery inflicted upon the Polish people by a Marxist regime.

As noted above, Marx himself had come to the essential question about the problem of historical determinism and the need to explain the factor of upbringing and education. He failed to develop the insight, but that did prevent neo-Marxists from searching for a humanistic Marx and a “Marxism with a human face” derived from the writings of the young Marx and especially the “Theses on Feuerbach.” The third thesis on Feuerbach seemed to indicate a way out of the deterministic and reductionistic social theory. The third thesis reads as follows:

The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of other circumstances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is men who change circumstances and that it is essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity and self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionizing practice.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 55. See also Shlomo Avineri, *The Social & Political Thought of Karl Marx* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1968) and David McClellan, *Karl Marx* (New York: Penguin, 1975), Joseph Cropsey, “Karl Marx,” in *History of Political Philosophy*, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), 755–781.

⁴² Marx, *The German Ideology*, 63.

⁴³ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 62.

⁴⁴ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 63.

⁴⁵ Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, 121.

“Who will educate the educator” does indeed open up a new vista for Marxism, but it remained the “road not taken,” according to MacIntyre. And Tischner gathers the testimony of Poland to its failed promise. Tischner approvingly cites this third thesis because it “unequivocally points to the decisive role of human beings in shaping the base.”⁴⁶ With the admission that “the educator must be educated” the question of upbringing comes back into view. An experience of human upbringing indicates that ideological indoctrination and official declarations about the grandeur of socialist work are a counterfeit form of education. This will be explained in the essay on upbringing in *The Spirit of Solidarity*. Marx had briefly suggested a solution within his notion of revolutionary practice that would change circumstances as it changes human nature—a prognostication that in the future, there will be a moment or threshold of the coinciding of practice and formation. And before we know it, the development of one is the development of all, and one could hunt in the morning and fish in the afternoon. For many good reasons, Tischner would declare that the “opposition between base and superstructure is nonsense.”⁴⁷

According to MacIntyre, Marx was attempting to give expression to the idea of a kind of practice “such that those engaged in it transform themselves and educate themselves through their own self-transformative activity.”⁴⁸ But this type of ethical activity was best expressed by Aristotle: human beings discover in the ends of any practice the goods common to all who engage in it and standard of excellence for the practice. Participation in a way of life effects a “transformation in the desires that led them to the activity.”⁴⁹ This is typically achieved in a smaller community with a social base of friendship and reciprocity such as a polis or a commune. MacIntyre points out that Marx was aware of the uprising of the Silesian weavers in 1844, but he neglected to understand the social base for their resistance.⁵⁰ It is through an ethical community that one discovers a coincidence of “changing circumstances and the human activity of self-changing.”⁵¹ But Marx looks forward to a large scale, universal revolutionary activity with the quality of the smaller personal scale of an ethical community, all the while dismissing authentic ethical communities as past forms of life to be left behind. The notion that the lag between productive forces and social relations will then call forth the transformative revolutionary activity

⁴⁶ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 59.

⁴⁷ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 60.

⁴⁸ MacIntyre, “The Road Not Taken,” 231.

⁴⁹ MacIntyre, “The Road Not Taken,” 226.

⁵⁰ MacIntyre, “The Road Not Taken,” 232. See Herman Beck, “State and Society in Pre-March Prussia: The Weavers’ Uprising, the Bureaucracy, and the Association for the Welfare of Workers,” *Central European History*, vol. 25, no. 3 (1992): 303–331. MacIntyre and Tischner both reference Edward Thompson’s account of weavers in Lancashire and Yorkshire at the end of the 18th century in his *Making of the English Working Class* (London: Penguin, 1968).

⁵¹ MacIntyre, “The Road Not Taken,” 232.

remains too mechanical and comes to be imposed from without, as in Poland. The true springs of creativity and authentic action are found in the interiority of the person, from intellect, will, and heart. The human person must be considered as a foundation for ethical community. How to form the core of the person for living in the communion of family, the community of work and for the common good of the nation becomes the paramount task. His critique of the Marxist dialectical materialism with its clumsy conceptual apparatus of base and super-structure and its unreal claims for the revolutionary practice of the international proletariat opens the way for a reclaiming of an authentic education that Tischner thematizes as “upbringing.”

In the movement of Solidarity, Tischner experienced the awakening of conscience accompanied by a transformed life among many people during the period of solidarity prior to martial law. The change came from within and was not imposed; through the change came an establishing or activating of a bond with others and for others; trust and dependability came to characterize those who changed or converted to the new attitude. He attributed the change to “upbringing” and the eruption of hope through the influence of mentors and leaders. One such leader was Pope John Paul II who brought hope to Poland through his years as Cardinal Archbishop of Kraków, but more directly through his election to the papacy and his first visit to Poland in 1979. Tischner refers to John Paul II multiple times in *The Spirit of Solidarity*.⁵² Solidarity, as a revolution of conscience, as the growth of a forest of consciences, came to be by the responsibility, initiative, and personal witness of so many Polish citizens who recovered their identity and inner resolve.⁵³ A decade after the publication of *Marxism and Christianity*, Tischner reflected upon the influence of John Paul II: “He is one of the very few people in the West to recognize fully the extent of the devastation resulting from Communism, not only in economics and politics, but primarily within man himself. He knows it is not enough to pull down the external structures of Communism; the totalitarian menace must be overcome in each human being.”⁵⁴ John Paul II reminded the Polish people of their heritage and tradition. Tischner also refers to the Polish tradition of heroes in *The Spirit of Solidarity* and *Marxism and Christianity*. In order to account for the awakening of conscience and the spread of solidarity, and for a new consideration of upbringing, Tischner explained how the Marxist heroes were so contrary to the Polish tradition, and how the Polish heroes, such as Maximilian Kolbe provide a model for solidarity.

⁵² Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 4, 89, 90, 99, 102, 119, 120.

⁵³ See John P. Hittinger, “Revolution of Conscience in *Centesimus Annus*,” *Philosophy and Canon Law*, vol. 3 (2017): 49–67.

⁵⁴ Józef Tischner, “A View from the Ruins,” in *A New Worldly Order: John Paul II and Human Freedom*, ed. George Weigel (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1992), 166.

Tischner and the Polish Tradition

In describing his own philosophy, Tischner admits that it “bears the distinct impression of the conditions under which I have been living and working.”⁵⁵ Coming of age in post-world war II Poland, under the rigors of communist rule, Tischner had to respond to the challenge by learning how to frame the questions to pursue. One must always be asking “what should I be learning”⁵⁶ and taking an active role in one’s own education. His life tracked the various phases of post-war Poland—from the time of Stalinism to the attempted reforms under Gomułka and into the time of Solidarity and then free Poland.⁵⁷ The year that Tischner was ordained a priest, 1955, the primate of Poland Cardinal Wyszyński was under house arrest and he mentions seeing Gomułka addressing the crowds with a sense of hope. As Fr. Tischner served the Polish people through his pastoral duties, he found in them a “severe crisis of hope.” This discovery of the lack of hope, as the basic feature of life in Poland, laid upon him the task of being an educator or mentor and gave him a sense of special responsibility.⁵⁸ When he came to reflect on his life later, he mused, “when I look at my job as a priest and philosopher, I find that over those several dozen years I mainly worked on human hope.”⁵⁹ The work upon human hope is crucial from the early schooling to adulthood, because through hope we can establish some meaning for life and work.

Tischner therefore speaks from within the Polish experience to address himself to the crisis of hope. Tischner studied the contemporary philosophers like Scheler and Levinas, but he said that the attempt to bring that philosophy into the realm of the crisis of the day, the lack of hope, required turning more specifically to the resources of the Polish tradition. Pawliszyn explains the importance of the Polish experience under communism for Tischner’s focus upon the issue of hope:

Arguably as never before, man has come to face the system which illegitimately wanted to claim all the areas of life bar none. The experience of the

⁵⁵ Józef Tischner, “The Philosophy That I Pursue,” found in Jagiełło, *Józef Tischner*, 145. See also in the same volume, Pawliszyn, “Biography,” 11–20

⁵⁶ Mirosław Pawliszyn, “Introductory Presentation of Józef Tischner’s Philosophy,” in Jagiełło, *Józef Tischner*, 34.

⁵⁷ Tischner explains these phases of communist rule in Poland in *Marxism and Christianity*, 3–12.

⁵⁸ Tischner, “The Philosophy That I Pursue,” 146; see also Pawliszyn, “Introductory Presentation,” 34–35.

⁵⁹ Tischner and Żakowski, *Tischner czyta Katechizm*, 111. I developed a translation for the Polish texts with the help of Piotr Przybylski, Małgorzata Bujak, and Grzegorz Hołub. See Jarosław Jagiełło, “From Axiology to Agathology,” in Jagiełło, *Józef Tischner*, 53.

war and then communism is not a mere occurrence, something that happened at some point in history. It is a mechanism aimed at annihilating man as such, not only in his corporeal, but all spiritual dimension.⁶⁰

Tischner himself said that “on our soil, philosophy is born out of pain. The quality of philosophy is determined by the quality of human pain that philosophy wants to express and remedy.”⁶¹ That pain, of course, is primarily a pain of a mental sort, a moral misery, leading to the temptation to despair about fulfilling one’s dignity: “To the weariness of work, to the boredom and exhaustion, to the threat of hunger is added a dead weight, a pain of the soul, a heartache.”⁶² It is a crisis of hope spawned in part by the very deterministic philosophy of the regime combined with its coercive force to extract compliance and silence. But the very imposition and demands of the system deepen the lack of hope with a sense of guilt. The Polish philosopher, indeed, each Polish citizen, had to come to terms with the Marxist practice imposed upon them. One comes to recognize that no one can remain inertly innocent because “the crisis of hope is not only about hope being taken away from man,” but also about the many ways to become complicit in the evil; one could also annihilate oneself by “becoming a player in the game.”⁶³ But hope can spring up through the drama of personal encounter: when the longing for good and a recognition of its vulnerability, a person can choose to act for value of the person. Tischner writes that hope “enables man to overcome obstacles in the present and face the future.” Hope arises when one can say “no” to a threat and see that a “change in the links between the world and the values that become realized in the world.”⁶⁴ A person discovers their own freedom and their own value as an agent to confront the tragic aspect of the life of the one whom I encounter.⁶⁵ Professor Jagiełło explains Tischner’s main point about hope as a “conviction expressed in thought, word and action that values still stand a chance of becoming realized, that they will not be annihilated or betrayed.”⁶⁶ Such a conviction stands upon a truth about “man, God, and the world.” This is not a neutral observation or a mere registration of facts, but an awareness of good and evil—hope involves an “agathological horizon” in which the person is aware of good and evil and the pos-

⁶⁰ Pawliszyn, “Introductory Presentation,” 35.

⁶¹ Tischner, “The Philosophy That I Pursue,” 148.

⁶² Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 29; see Taylor, “Several Reflections on the Theme of Solidarity,” 72.

⁶³ Pawliszyn, “Introductory Presentation of Józef Tischner’s Philosophy,” 35

⁶⁴ Jagiełło, “From Axiology to Agathology,” in Jagiełło, *Józef Tischner*, 55; and the entry for “Hope,” in Glossary, in Jagiełło, *Tischner*, 137–138.

⁶⁵ Various passages on hope are found in the glossary of *Józef Tischner*, 137–138. See extensive discussion by Jarosław Jagiełło, in “From Axiology to Agathology,” in Jagiełło, *Józef Tischner*, 53–65.

⁶⁶ Jagiełło, “From Axiology to Agathology,” in Jagiełło, *Józef Tischner*, 54.

sibility of “victory and failure, redemption and damnation.”⁶⁷ It is through this reciprocal discovery and affirmation of the value of the other and a joint refusal to accept the threats to human dignity that solidarity was born. Solidarity is the movement that became the great pedagogy of hope for the Polish people. Tischner emphasizes that this hope did not stem from a new theory or a new philosophy, but through the tradition and the experience of the Polish people. Tischner was in quest of the Polish philosophy to elaborate on the tradition and experience that was not fully articulate for the challenge of the day.

In one of the chapters of *Marxism and Christianity: The Quarrel and Dialogue in Poland*, Tischner discusses the Polish shape of dialogue (the phrase originally incorporated into the Polish title of the book *Polski kształt dialogu*). The best approach to a comparison of Marxism with Polish Christian philosophy is not to discuss the theoretical or historical deficiencies of dialectical materialism, but rather to reflect upon human hope. For, indeed, “a human is a being who needs some hope in order to live.”⁶⁸ The witness to hope becomes the centerpiece of his account of upbringing, as it was the central testimony of John Paul II.⁶⁹ Proceeding from the basis of human experience, and particularly from the Polish tradition with its 1,000 years of Christian culture, we must understand the variety of hopes that can be formed by the human person. The human person can direct their hope towards God, or to another human being, or to the world of objects, things and matter. Each form of hope contains both a promise and a somewhat hidden assumption about human suffering. What is the greatest misery for a human being and what promise do we have for overcoming such misery? Marxism clearly rejects the supernatural, indeed “radically negates it.” Marxists accuse the Christians of utopianism, peddling an “opium of the people” for an improvement of their lot beyond this life. The hope directed

⁶⁷ Jagiełło, “Agathological Horizon,” in Glossary, in Jagiełło, *Józef Tischner*, 131.

⁶⁸ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 69.

⁶⁹ Pope Benedict XVI noted well during his homily for the beatification of John Paul II: “When Karol Wojtyła ascended to the throne of Peter, he brought with him a deep understanding of the difference between Marxism and Christianity, based on their respective visions of man. This was his message: man is the way of the Church, and Christ is the way of man. With this message, which is the great legacy of the Second Vatican Council and of its ‘helmsman,’ the Servant of God Pope Paul VI, John Paul II led the People of God across the threshold of the Third Millennium, which thanks to Christ he was able to call ‘the threshold of hope.’ Throughout the long journey of preparation for the great Jubilee he directed Christianity once again to the future, the future of God, which transcends history while nonetheless directly affecting it. He rightly reclaimed for Christianity that impulse of hope which had in some sense faltered before Marxism and the ideology of progress. He restored to Christianity its true face as a religion of hope, to be lived in history in an ‘Advent’ spirit, in a personal and communitarian existence directed to Christ, the fullness of humanity and the fulfillment of all our longings for justice and peace” Benedict XVI’s Homily for Beatifying John Paul II, https://www.vatican.va/content/benedict-xvi/en/homilies/2011/documents/hf_ben-xvi_hom_20110501_beatificazione-gpii.html.

to other people, however, must be realized through the more fundamental hope to “conquer the world of social relations, productive forces, and material elements.” With the elimination of private property, they hope to achieve the end of antagonism between people and classes, as well as war and poverty. But in such an account, there is drastic surgery on human hopes. The limit of hope is the earth; Tischner coins the phrase “terraistic” hope, because there is no other heaven for human beings but the earth. By rational force and efficiency, we will become more at home on this earth. Tischner notes that the great totalitarian ideologies of the twentieth century also drew from the experience of hope by transferring it to earthly life: “They promised heaven on earth, or they even said that the hope had already been fulfilled—a paradise on earth already there is, you are already happy, and if you do not feel it, it means you’re stupid.”⁷⁰ From Christianity we learn to emphasize the “primacy of interpersonal hope over the hope of conquering the forces and elements of nature.”⁷¹ Indeed, he says that which “betrays not the human being became the characteristic teaching in a socialist context.”⁷² The defense of human conscience, and the right to hope in a religious dimension, concord in the nation, reconciliation, and unity in the family give a concreteness to the concern for the human person. The fight for hope was a fight for the human being.

Polish “patriotism” was the nut that could not be cracked by the Marxists. They put forward certain patriotic associations approved by the party and they excoriated nationalism in the name of internationalism. But they missed a peculiar trait of Polish national heroism: “The feeling of internal human identity, a feeling of being oneself, a feeling of personal dignity.”⁷³ The socialist hero, to the contrary, was characterized by a “poverty of interior life.” Deeper spiritual bonds did not form through the socialist system of work, but mere “pretended loyalty.” Also, in contrast to the socialist account of the human being, the axis of the hero of Christianity is person to person (love of neighbor) and human God (love of God). The value of the human being is deeper than the value of their actual or potential work, or their association with the collectivity. The “individual existence of a person is a value in itself,”⁷⁴ and the measure of human dignity is “not work but sanctity.”

Tischner turns to the life and death of Maximilian Kolbe as the great exemplar of love who has a special significance for Poland. He provides a glimpse of a way out of the crisis of hope. Tischner developed a bold project—to develop a philosophy of the human person through an understanding of the deed of Kolbe as a Polish patriot and priest:

⁷⁰ Tischner and Żakowski, *Tischner czyta Katechizm*, 111.

⁷¹ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 71.

⁷² Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 71.

⁷³ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 64.

⁷⁴ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 73.

Father Kolbe is more than just a Franciscan friar who sacrificed his life for a fellow human being. He is a living incarnation of our Polish philosophy of man, which runs in our blood, and yet has never been fully described. [...] Kolbe discovered but he did not name it. He just did what he did. It lies in the realm of philosophy to understand and name. Here I can discern a chance and a challenging task.⁷⁵

Tischner mentions contemporary currents of philosophy—existentialism, structuralism, cybernetics, Heideggerian philosophy—but he says “the fact of Kolbe is absolutely beyond it all.”⁷⁶ It is not simply a matter of theology, but a human perspective in an inhuman world. His is a witness to love and courage. It is a love born of his faith, but the love and courage are found in many deeds in Polish history. It is a witness to a human scale of values and a proper measure for human society. It is not work that makes us free, but love that frees us to work for the good of the other. In Marxism and Christianity, Tischner offers this reflection:

Fr. Kolbe’s heroism is revealed through the fact that he valued the life of his neighbor more than his own. Thus, by his sacrifice, he definitely transcended the level of values around which the ethical efforts of the heroes of work in a period of socialization are concentrated. Father Kolbe’s deed shows just not the value of work, but the values which work should serve. It unveils the sphere of values that gives meaning to all of human life. It also demonstrates the true order of human hopes. Faith in God is not synonymous with turning one’s back on the temporal problem; it is in no way a kind of opium, but it is the way to the deepest involvement in the struggle for a better world.⁷⁷

Yet the great national and religious heroes of Polish history disappeared from the Marxist narratives about Poland. But the greatness of the Polish past brings encouragement and its prostrations—a warning. Tischner mentions St. Stanisław, Queen Jadwiga, King Jan Kazimierz, Paweł Włodkowic, and others. The purpose is to see the way that Poles were educated through their tradition—they learned to hope and to aspire for something heroic and to affirm their dignity as a people. There must be a right to truth, to search for truth and to live the truth. The pedagogy of the Church, he says, is a pedagogy of hope; and the history of revelation is a disclosure of the pedagogy of God through challenge and hope.⁷⁸ Tischner will explain in another writing that upbringing and education as constituted by a circle of the quest for truth and a discovery of freedom. (The Socratic dimension seeks through dialogue and questioning to

⁷⁵ Tischner, “The Philosophy That I Pursue,” 147–148.

⁷⁶ Tischner, “The Philosophy That I Pursue,” 147.

⁷⁷ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 73.

⁷⁸ Tischner and Żakowski, *Tischner czyta Katechizm*, 111.

give birth to the truth in the pupil.) The dimension of the folk hero Sabała is to always practice shooting, or as is in readiness to defend life and freedom.⁷⁹ Thinking in values must see the motif of freedom: “the greater a value, the greater freedom to acknowledge it.”⁸⁰ Freedom is itself a value that emerges in the pursuit of truth because we must be free to pursue the truth and we must freely embrace the truth discovered. In this way, Polish history and culture are important for our understanding of the meaning of upbringing in *The Spirit of Solidarity*. We now turn to that task.

Solidarity and Upbringing

Marx wistfully asked “who will educate the educator?” He proposed as an answer his confident expectation for the emergence out of historical forces the coincidence of the changing of circumstances and the changing of human activity through a revolutionary moment. After three decades of their socialist experiment, that moment had yet to arrive in Poland. Tischner proclaimed in his famous homily at the Solidarity Congress that “Polish work is sick.”⁸¹ As to why Polish work was sick, Tischner proposed no easy answers. But the facts he said are clear: “Work in Poland, instead of deepening reciprocity, instead of being a plane of humanity, became a plane of controversy, disagreement, and even betrayal.”⁸² Comparing the work of the nation to a great river, Tischner said that the “waters of the Vistula are dirty [...] even bloodstained.”⁸³ The Solidarity Congress was called to “work upon work” for the whole nation, to “cleanse the waters of the Vistula.”⁸⁴ The goal was to restore to work the reciprocity, communion, and peace. In a subsequent homily on “rooting” Tischner repeats a familiar claim—that the basic problem is neither economic nor political, but rather it is ethical—it is “a problem of conscience.”⁸⁵ The hope for a renewal

⁷⁹ The reference to Socrates and Sabała as the two aspects of upbringing is found in his *Krótki przewodnik po życiu*, 72–75. For the importance of Sabała in Polish culture, see Oscar Swann’s *Kaleidoscope of Poland: A Cultural Encyclopedia* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 224. “A singer of tales Jan Krzeptowski (1809–1894), known as ‘Sabała, was a self-proclaimed former mountain brigand and an unparalleled repository of tales, legends, and songs of the Polish Podhale (Highlands).”

⁸⁰ Tischner, “Thinking in Values,” in Jagiełło, *Józef Tischner*, 153.

⁸¹ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 96–100.

⁸² Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 98.

⁸³ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 98.

⁸⁴ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 98.

⁸⁵ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 102–103.

of the work and the nation, like a noble tree, must be planted in the soil of conscience. He cited numerous times the person of Pope John Paul II who put forward an ethical standard for work: “work has the characteristic of binding people, the power of building a communion.”⁸⁶ The Polish Pope was indeed a trustee of their “highest hopes for freedom” and their spiritual leader. The vision of Pope John Paul II became a part of the Polish conscience, and for Catholic and non-Catholic alike, his defense of freedom and human dignity awoke many to the call of solidarity and strengthened their hope and resolve.⁸⁷ In turn, Pope John Paul II cited Fr. Tischner’s texts as the best account of the truth of Solidarity.⁸⁸

In this context, we may better understand the brief account of upbringing in *The Spirit of Solidarity* and to appreciate its emphasis upon fidelity and betrayal of a bond. If Solidarity undertook the task “to work upon the work” of the Polish nation as a whole, so too did leaders like John Paul II have a special work—theirs was “to work upon human beings”: “an upbringing and an education are work with a person and upon a person—with the one who is in the process of maturing.”⁸⁹ Tischner introduces the notion of upbringing as a special kind of work. It is a work upon a human being. The relationship of the mentor and the pupil, he says, is akin to the parent/child relationship. We must reflect adequately upon this first principle of the work upon the person. Karol Wojtyła wrote in *Love and Responsibility*: “Education is a creative activity with persons as its only possible object—only a person can be educated, an animal can only be trained—and also one which uses entirely human material; all that is by nature present in the human being to be educated is material for the educators, material which their love must find and mold.”⁹⁰ Education flows from love. And the “great moral force of love lies precisely in this desire for the happiness, for the true good of another person.”⁹¹ Tischner focusses on the importance of hope in this relationship between father and son, mentor and pupil:

⁸⁶ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 102.

⁸⁷ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 89–90, 120.

⁸⁸ Prefatory Material, in *Thinking in Values*, no. 1 (Solidarity) (2007): np.

⁸⁹ “Ethics of Solidarity,” translation of *Etyka solidarności* by Anna Fraś, in *Thinking in Values*, no. 1 (Solidarity) (2007), 46. The previous translation by Zeleski and Fiore states “upbringing is a work with a human being and upon a human being.” In this case, I think it is preferable to use the term “person” in order to reflect the personalist flavor of Tischner’s thought, and also to appreciate the affinity with Karol Wojtyła. See below.

⁹⁰ Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, trans. Harry Willets (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1981), 56.

⁹¹ Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 138. This personalistic dimension of education also defines the core of culture itself: “Culture is the cultivation of the person, precisely in their inner life.” *Love and Responsibility*, 302. See John P. Hittinger, “John Paul II’s Core Teaching on Culture,” *Communio*, vol. 48 (Summer 2021): 247–279.

Fatherhood is not only passing on life, fatherhood means also passing on hope. Between father and child, there is a bond of the passing on of hope. The father is the trustee of the child's hope, he is the support and strength of this hope. We are children of those into whose hands we have entrusted our hopes. What does it mean to be a child then? It means to entrust one's hope to somebody. What does it mean to be a father? It means to become a bearer of someone else's help. Hope is the source of our life. Therefore, the one who brings hope to a person is the spiritual father of this person.⁹²

The work of the educator should be first of all as a “trustee” or “bearer” of hope for another. For as we have learned, hope is the central quality of human existence. The pupil comes to entrust their hope to someone. Thus, it is fitting for Fr. Tischner to look to Pope John Paul II, and other leaders in the Polish tradition, as the bearers of hope for Solidarity. Only those who have hope can teach and nurture because they teach precisely by shaping the hope of others.⁹³ Education is not simply work upon a human person, but a work at the deepest level of the person, namely, upon conscience, intellect and will—so it is a work upon the spirit. There is a priority of hope in the process of upbringing. First, we have noted that the crisis of our time is a crisis of hope. Tischner has said, for example, that the development of conscience must begin with a desire for conscience. But the desire for truth and goodness springs from hope. It is from hope and within hope that “an adequate sense of reality evolves”⁹⁴; and hope is prior to both faith and love. Faith builds itself and love comes after hope, according to Tischner. In his reflections on the Catechism, Tischner more specifically argues that it is in the realm of hope that work is always to be done; less so he says for love and faith because “everyone has to work alone over your own love,” and with faith, “there is nothing to work with, because it is God's grace, either it is given or it is not.”⁹⁵ But with hope, in various situations and turns of life, we must work on hope. If therefore, upbringing is a bond between two persons, one a bearer of hope for the other, fidelity is a key principle for the mentor. Betrayal is the deepest violation of the trust that should characterize the mentor and pupil. To tear the bonds of entrusted hope, puts someone under the threat of despair.

We must now consider how solidarity arose under the aegis of hope, a hope inspired by Polish leaders. When we return to the beginning of the book on soli-

⁹² Tischner, “Ethics of Solidarity,” trans. A. Fraś, 46; see also Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 66.

⁹³ Tischner, “Ethics of Solidarity,” trans. A. Fraś, 46; see also Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 66.

⁹⁴ Tischner, “Ethics of Solidarity,” trans. A. Fraś, 46; see also Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 66.

⁹⁵ Tischner and Żakowski, *Tischner czyta Katechizm*, 111.

darity, we first learn that to be in solidarity is to carry the burdens of another.⁹⁶ Tischner argues that no man is an island and we share many things that unite us: the landscape, kinship, work, and speech. But we are often unaware or forgetful of our common bonds. But “when solidarity is born, this awareness is awakened, then speech and word appear—and at that time what was hidden comes out into the open. Our bonds become visible. [...] Solidarity speaks, calls cries, makes sacrifices.”⁹⁷ The awakening of conscience responds to the calls and the cries of the pain and burden inflicted upon those who suffer from the oppression and harshness of the imposed system of socialism. The action comes from within, from the heart. It is born of goodwill and proceeds without violence or in a focus upon the enemy. That is why Tischner speaks about an ethical event, not an economic or political event. It pertains to the recognition and support for human dignity, the source of rights.⁹⁸ So he proclaims that solidarity is, first of all, a solidarity of consciences. The two key values of solidarity are human conscience and the natural bond of man with those who suffer. These two aspects of solidarity, conscience and the bond of community, stand together and constitute what I would call the moment of revolutionizing activity that brings together changing circumstances and the changing of the person. Tischner recapitulates his basic idea as such: “Solidarity is founded on conscience, and the stimulus for its growth is the cry for help from the man who has been hurt by another man. Solidarity establishes specific interpersonal bonds; a man binds himself to another man in order to protect the one who needs care.”⁹⁹

Stawrowski explains how the original experience of solidarity is too easily lost under the popularity of the movement, its eventual victory over the Soviet domination, and the subsequent embrace of the democratic process and its inevitable divisions and conflicts.¹⁰⁰ We must appreciate the ethical bond as something prior to the political movement and the eventual need to engage in partisan political maneuvers. Solidarity arose when it did, almost “miraculously” he argues, precisely because its political limitations were clearly established and there was no need to focus on the socialist system and rulers as the enemy to be destroyed. It originated with a certain purity of intention to simply care for

⁹⁶ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 2.

⁹⁷ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 38.

⁹⁸ Commenting on the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948) Pope John Paul II said: “All the subsequent international documents on human rights declare this truth anew, recognizing and affirming that human rights stem from the inherent dignity and worth of the human person.” See Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/messages/peace/documents/hf_jp-ii_mes_14121998_xxxii-world-day-for-peace.html. See “Human Person and Human Rights,” in *Compendium of the Social Doctrine of the Church Vatican City*, 2004, 49–70.

⁹⁹ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 41.

¹⁰⁰ Zbigniew Stawrowski, “Solidarity Means a Bond,” *Thinking in Values: The Tischner Institute Journal of Philosophy*, no. 1 (Solidarity) (2007), 159–171.

those in pain and under oppression, and to summon the courage to emerge from hiding, taking off the masks, and choosing to reject compromise and betrayal for the sake of the people in need. That was the original experience of solidarity and it included Catholics and non-Catholics alike:

At that time, both atheists and practicing Catholics converted, that is, completely changed their lives. There are many such atheists or agnostics among us who raised their heads back then and stopped fearing and having decided to live with dignity and without false compromises threw away their party IDs and other chains of slavery and falsehood.¹⁰¹

This also helps to explain the importance of upbringing. Anyone who stood forth and risked punishment or curtailment was a bearer of hope for others. Leaders like John Paul II and Jerzy Popiełuszko stood out as effective mentors, but they were in a sense educating the educators—for any of the participants gave hope to others by their choosing to act in accord with human dignity by standing forth to take risks and to work for the good of all. Stawrowski called this time of first solidarity an “experience of being ‘incredibly lifted up,’ the hearing of some call to surpass themselves.”¹⁰²

Solidarity, according to Tischner, was a creation not only of those who had conscience but also of those who have restored it in themselves.¹⁰³ He continues his account of upbringing with a look at the reciprocity between the mentor and the pupil. It is a common experience to be raised up by a mentor because many have traveled through some portion of their lives “not knowing what it was about, as though we were half asleep.”¹⁰⁴ The witness and the words of a mentor roused us from the slumber. Tischner asks, “What do we owe our mentor?” “Awakening,” Tischner says, is what we owe to the mentor. And yet much of the work lies in the future to be achieved by our own efforts. He often references Socrates as his model for the teacher and mentor. Socrates acts as a midwife, bringing truth to birth within the interlocuter. The mentor does not create the truth, but helps to bring about the understanding of the truth. The Socratic mode of learning demands transparency and effort on the part of the pupil. Not all who engaged with Socrates desired to learn or to really come to the truth: Thrasymachus desired power and Meno wished to appear wise as a sophist; in

¹⁰¹ Stawrowski identifies this period of time from August 1980 until martial law in December 1981. Stawrowski, a participant in the events of this period, describes the time as something like a time of conversions but towards an ethical community. See Stawrowski, “Solidarity Means a Bond,” 167.

¹⁰² Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 67.

¹⁰³ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 8.

¹⁰⁴ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 67.

Meno, it was the simple servant boy who embraced the truth as he saw it.¹⁰⁵ The mentor in the process of upbringing serves as a Socratic midwife—the one who gives birth to the truth in the learner. Truth, says Tischner, is not created by the mentor, nor is it under the mentor’s special power as an expert or a manager. Truth must be born in the soul of the learner. The process of upbringing is a “joint effort” of mentor and pupil, a bond based in hope, and spurred by reciprocity. The work of the mentor is thus “indispensable,” and he proclaims this work “precious” even “as precious as a human being.”¹⁰⁶ This startling claim we may construe to mean that the work of upbringing accomplishes the growth of the human being within, a reclaiming of dignity and freedom.¹⁰⁷ In other words, the dignity of the student who is truly “learning” is in some way commensurate with the dignity of the mentor who is authentically teaching. The pupil is freed from illusion and participates with the teacher in the truth that sets free. Tischner ends the first part of his account of upbringing by reiterating the notion that “the work of the mentor is to work on the hope of a person.”¹⁰⁸

The rest of the homily is devoted to identifying the forms of “counterfeit education” that are all too common and stupefying. By examining the counterfeits, Tischner will highlight the aspects of the bond and relationship involved in authentic upbringing. The three forms of counterfeit upbringing he discusses are: (i) infringing upon the freedom of the pupil or neglecting the pupil’s concrete vocation; (ii) betraying the fidelity to the common work and the common bond; and (iii) confusion about the fundamental tasks of education and confusion about the role of the institution in education. With the first counterfeit, the mentor meddles with the proper notion of hope. Hope must be borne of a personal conscience and personal aspiration. Each person has a special aspiration and must respond from within their conscience. Hope is nourished by many common features such as national, professional and religious traditions. We live as persons through hope as it nurtured by the common and personal aspects. The mentor should convey the common aspects of hope. The counterfeit goes beyond the common life to somehow take responsibility for the particular hope of the person. “He wants not only to awake from sleep, but lead the awakened by the hand by adjudicating something which the pupil must resolve on their

¹⁰⁵ Plato, *Meno*, 81–86, in *Plato: Collected Dialogues of Plato*, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 366–371. On learning, See Jacob Klein, *A Commentary on Plato’s Meno* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), 103–104. See also John Sallis, *Being and Logos: The Way of Platonic Dialogue* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 76–92.

¹⁰⁶ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 67.

¹⁰⁷ Jacob Klein makes a similar claim in his *Commentary on Plato’s Meno*: “But even though the teacher cannot ‘produce knowledge in the learner [...] cannot be the ‘cause’ of his learning, the importance of the teacher in the process of learning matches the importance of the learner’s inner constitution,” 106.

¹⁰⁸ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 67.

own. The counterfeit mentor intrudes upon the freedom of the person and turns the pupil to themselves or some group interest. The source of hope is not the mentor nor the group they may represent. But Tischner notes that no one can order or force someone to take a certain direction in life; each pupil must find his personal hope and make it his own. This phenomenon of the intrusion upon the freedom of the person is seen throughout the contemporary society through mass movements, religious cults, and political factions or revolutionary cells. “An education and an upbringing presupposes freedom.”¹⁰⁹

A variation of this counterfeit upbringing which ignores the personal nature of hope is the mentor who relies upon an abstract system and attempts to erect a house from the roof down. Ritual and conformity become the hallmark of such systems of education. Education betrays a “castigation” or contempt for the pupil for not embracing the system. Authentic education and the role of the mentor is not to preach nor to indoctrinate but to encourage hope and bring forth thinking.

The next form of counterfeit stems from betrayal. Betrayal means the loss of fidelity. Upbringing depends upon a bond between mentor and pupil, a bond through which hope for the future and the achievement of what is true and good. If one breaks the fidelity to the person and the shared hope, the pupil may be cast back into despair or slumber. Such betrayal may be concealed or open. The concealed betrayal is worse insofar as it builds an illusory hope and creates suspicions or creates an atmosphere of distrust contrary to hope. Tischner explains that true fidelity requires that the mentor and the pupil be in the “same boat.” The trustee of hope is with those with whom he inspires hope. They share the same existential situation, share a common risk, carry the burden of the witness to hope in spite of difficulties and challenges. Tischner eloquently states the situation as follows: “In the land of lies, his truthfulness must be greater than that of the pupil’s; in the land of injustice, his justice must be greater than the sense of justice of his pupils. In the land of hatred and suspicions, he must be more straightforward and open.”¹¹⁰ The mentor and pupil share a common lot and take a common risk. Faithfulness is based on this because the pupil, having entrusted his hope to the mentor, must know that he has a confidant or fearer of his hope. Otherwise, the pupil is cheated and the mentor becomes guilty of a double standard.

The third counterfeit of upbringing stems from confusion about the fundamental tasks of education and confusion about the role of the institution in education. It is possible for the mentor to lose sight of what is primary and what is secondary in the process; or, again, mistakes the common and the personal dimension of the hope. The mentor builds the roof first and forecloses the choices of the pupil—whether to believe in God, on the nature of justice.

¹⁰⁹ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 68.

¹¹⁰ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 69.

The more immediate matters for life are left to the side, such as fidelity to truth or cooperation within the family. Tischner accuses the counterfeit mentor blunting the pupil's "natural sense of reality" instead of sharpening and fulfilling the natural inclination for truth. Such confusion is not uncommon for an education serving the interests of academic bias, party politics or ideology.

The last counterfeit Tischner describes accompanies the confusions about priorities; it pertains to the diminishment of the person in the process of upbringing and overvaluing the institution itself. Sadly, it often happens that the responsibility of the mentor is taken from the person and assigned to the institution. This no doubt means that bureaucrats in various official capacities make decisions about education. And yet it is the institution that is said to educate, to be responsible and so on. People are but a supplement to the institution. Tischner rightly says that the claim that institutions and not people carry out the task of education posits a belief in magical action—that somehow membership in the institution and its processes will yield the fruit of trustful life. Tischner mocks the idea of reducing upbringing to institutional belonging as simply asking the student to wear a uniform and its designated color. It is not important who you are but only what you wear or how you conform. Tischner concludes the chapter on upbringing with a brief but well formulated summary of his position:

The ethics of solidarity becomes an ethics of awakening – an awakening to fatherhood along the principles of hope. One must get through the world of illusions to what is fundamental. The foundation here is faithfulness. The one who has once accepted hope entrusted to him, let him bear it throughout his life.¹¹¹

The chapter on upbringing turns out to be a very strong part of his presentation of solidarity. Upbringing in some way is the key to solidarity. Solidarity is a solidarity of conscience. But conscience must be awakened. Such is the task of "upbringing." It may also prove to be the most enduring legacy of solidarity as an experience, a question, and a challenge.

¹¹¹ Tischner, "Ethics of Solidarity," trans. A. Fraś, 49; see also Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 70–71.

Conclusion: The Legacy of *The Spirit of Solidarity*

We have examined Tischner's account of upbringing in the light of solidarity. His work *The Spirit of Solidarity* is descriptive, non-systematic, and suggestive. Upbringing does serve an important role in his overall account of solidarity by providing a kind of pivot for the social movement to gain its traction and emerge as a potent force for good through "an awakening," an awakening of conscience. From these considerations, I would like to draw out three salient points about Tischner's account of upbringing that display the living legacy of *The Spirit of Solidarity*.

First, by all accounts the heart of the initial solidarity experience was non-political and perhaps for that reason short lived.¹¹² As explained by Stawrowski, it was non-political because it emerged as an attitude toward the other, all others, and not with the attitude against the others as enemy. Perhaps this was a miracle of circumstances that placed political power off limits. The transformation of solidarity into a political entity seems to have had an air of inevitability. In 2003, Pope John Paul II counseled the members to seek to recover the dominant note of a union of workers for self-help and care. In his encyclical on *Social Concerns*, he warned about the ever present pull of the disordered actions and attitudes opposed to the "will of God and the good of neighbor,"¹¹³ namely, the "all-consuming desire for profit and the thirst for power, with the intention of imposing ones will on others."¹¹⁴ It is the tendency to seek these things at any price. He warned of the "absolutizing of human attitudes," and even of "real forms of idolatry: of money, ideology, class, technology."¹¹⁵ This is not to suggest that solidarity succumbed to the sin of idolatry in seeking political goals, but rather that the deeper meaning of the experience of solidarity transcends the political because it is at a deeper or deepest level of personal existence. In *Redeemer of Man*, John Paul II says that with any movement of true renewal "man's deepest sphere is involved—we mean the sphere of human hearts, con-

¹¹² Stawrowski, "Solidarity Means a Bond," 162–164; Kot, "Solidarity Without Solidarity," 98–99.

¹¹³ John Paul II, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (Solicitude for the Social Condition), 1988, §37.

¹¹⁴ John Paul II, *Sollicitudo Rei Socialis* (Solicitude for the Social Condition), 1988, §37, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis.html. See helpful summary analysis by Franco Biffi, *The "Social Gospel" of Pope John Paul II: A Guide to the Encyclicals on Human Work and the Authentic Development of Peoples* (Rome: Pontifical Lateran University, 1989), 91–92.

¹¹⁵ John Paul II, *Sollicitudo*, §37.

sciences and events.”¹¹⁶ The temptations of power and profit require on our part a continual conversion.¹¹⁷ Stawrowski argues that something can be saved from the ethical experience of “First Solidarity” if we can “de-politicize” important areas of life now under partisan pressure.¹¹⁸ This responsibility devolves upon communities in learning, arts and culture, intermediate groups, institutions designed to reign political competition or ordinary interactions in everyday life.¹¹⁹

Second, upbringing shows that solidarity emerges from a rediscovery of human interiority, especially the discovery or rebuilding of conscience. Upbringing must work with the freedom of the pupil—the counterfeit forms of education disdain the freedom of the pupil. Most of all, upbringing the teacher plays a secondary role, as it is the student who must exercise their own intellectual capacity to seek and grasp the truth. Tischner appeals to the Socratic idea of the teacher as “midwife.” When the voice of the teacher aroused us from our slumber, “the rest had to be done by ourselves.” The teacher “only helps, adding his efforts to the efforts of the disciple.”¹²⁰ In the classical view of education, the learner or pupil is the primary agent in the learning process. The teacher, and the institutions which the teacher represents, such as family, Church, or political society, are secondary. Jacques Maritain formulates the principle as such:

The mind’s natural activity on the part of the learner and the intellectual guidance on the part of the teacher are both dynamic factors in education, but the principle agent in education, the primary dynamic factor or propelling force, is the internal vital principle in the one to be educated; the educator or teacher is only the secondary—though a genuinely effective—dynamic factor and a ministerial agent.¹²¹

Maritain is reiterating Thomas Aquinas who suggested that the art of teaching is like medical art—the doctor heals and the mentor educates as an exterior principle, not as the principle agent, “but as helping the principle agent, which is the interior principle, by strengthening it and providing it with instruments

¹¹⁶ John Paul II, *Redeemer of Man*, §10. Vatican, 1979, https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_04031979_redemptor-hominis.html

¹¹⁷ Biffi offers a helpful summary of the full dimension of notion of conversion in §36 of this encyclical: “With the introduction of the theological concepts of sin and of grace, the theological reading considers the history and the present moment as a mysterious intertwisting of solidarity in good and bad fortune; this provides a profound understanding of the reality that presents itself to our eyes.”

¹¹⁸ Stawrowski, “Solidarity Means a Bond,” 170–171.

¹¹⁹ John Paul II, 2003 Message to Members of Polish Solidarnosc Union: “It seems to me that it was politicization of the trade union that led to its weakening” (11 November 2003).

¹²⁰ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 47.

¹²¹ Jacques Maritain, *Education at the Crossroads* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1943), 90. See also Klein, *Commentary on Plato’s Meno*, 97.

and assistance.”¹²² Simply put, education is the work of the student or pupil who must be engaged in the deeper stratum of personal existence, involving freedom and intellectual judgment. In *Meno* (86b), Socrates instructs the servant boy to arrive at the truth, to exhibit the fact that learning is recollection, namely, the student must look within for the truth. This means that insight is the critical point of learning; learning entails the “simple seeing” of a truth and an assent of the mind to evidence. Without insight, there is no learning. This assent of the mind must be from within as we see in the free assent given by the slave boy because of the evidence presented. It does not reduce to external factors. Meno answers simply from rote memory and in imitation the sophists would—he does not answer according to evidence and truth, but according to extraneous reasons, such as what flatters his vanity, what seems to hurt him, what might please or amuse or impress others. Meno appears to be handsome, rich, and free. But he is ugly, poor, and slavish. Ugly—because of his greed and ambition; poor—because of his incapacity to learn; slavish—because he can only repeat what others have said. He possesses no interiority or self at all.¹²³ It is the slave who rises to the occasion of learning and frees himself from within through assenting to the truth. Socrates declares that we are better and braver for the search for truth. Developing this classical notion and echoing Socrates in *Meno*, John Paul II considers the free embrace of truth to be the “very kernel of what we call education, and especially what we call self-education.”¹²⁴ He calls self-education because “an interior structure of this kind, where ‘the truth makes us free,’—cannot be built only ‘from outside’. Each individual must build this structure ‘from within’—build it with effort, perseverance and patience.”¹²⁵ In the same vein, Tischner says, “an education and an upbringing require freedom” and he similarly says that we must return to basics—to evidence of experience—to let truth be truth, justice be justice. The classical pattern of Socratic education suits his account very well. The distinctive feature of Tischner’s account of upbringing is his emphasis upon hope in the process of upbringing.¹²⁶

Third, upbringing is a bond of trust providing hope. The mentor is a trustee or confidant of hope. The most profound and lasting legacy of Tischner’s

¹²² “Principium exterius, scilicet ars, non operator sicut principale agens, sed sicut coadiuvans agens principale, quod est principium interius, confortando ipsum et ministrando ei instrumenta et auxilia, quibus utatur ad effectum producendum.” *Summa theologiae*, I, q. 117, art. 1. See also *Summa contra gentiles* II, 75 and *De Veritate*, q. 11, article 1.

¹²³ Klein, *Commentary on Plato’s Meno*, 184–189. See also Sallis, *Being and Logos*, 94–96.

¹²⁴ Pope John Paul II, “On Self-education and Related Threats.” In Letter to Youth *Dilecti amici* (March 31, 1985), https://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/apost_letters/1985/documents/hf_jp-ii_apl_31031985_dilecti-amici.html

¹²⁵ Pope John Paul II, “On Self-education and Related Threats.”

¹²⁶ Stawrowski, “Solidarity Means a Bond,” 177–178.

The Spirit of Solidarity is this notion of a pedagogy of hope. It is the question of hope that brings in the sharpest contrast the conflict between Christianity and Marxism.¹²⁷ He contrasts a super-natural hope with a this-worldly hope (“terraistic”). Do we primarily seek to rule over this earth, its natural forces, and the social forces of production? Then the “proper gauge of human beings is their work” within the horizon of socialized productive forces. Or do we first seek the kingdom—of truth, justice, and holiness? The measure of human dignity in this case is “sanctity, not work.”¹²⁸ The value of the human being is not based upon their work. Tischner’s Polish prototype, Maximillian Kolbe, shows us not “the value of work, but the value which work should serve.” His sacrifice demonstrates the true order of human hopes. Not only does this contradict Marxism, but also a dominant trend in the west so intoxicated with work with the exaltation of “innovation” with an ever hope to ever expand the scope and efficiency of work. But Kolbe reminds us of the priority of the person over things, ethics over technology, and spirit over matter.¹²⁹ In addition to this defense of human dignity in the way that protects the person from the reduction to work and productivity, the theme of upbringing and hope puts before us the deepest source of the cultural conflict between Christianity and Marxism. Tischner says that Marxism is a form of European neopaganism.¹³⁰ Paganism endows the earthly forces “with a sacral character, and sorcery was a means of ruling the earth” that exalts the earth and relies upon technology as the means of control. It places the value of the human in its earthly city. Marxism is an ideology that binds the people to the earth and controls their life. The “terraistic” hope issues in a form of “terroristic” plan to achieve its lust for power. Tischner deepens this insight in a later writing on the “Challenge of Totalitarianism.”¹³¹ The essential point to bring forth is the role of fate in the pagan view of the world, and its loss of hope. He discusses the unity of power and fate that allows the totalitarian regime to claim that its power cannot fail nor be supplanted power. It seeks to subjugate the whole man and its ideology justifies its unlimited actions in this pursuit. But it is the followers of Abraham, the man of faith, who can withstand

¹²⁷ “To understand correctly the process of socialization in the country with a thousand year Christian culture, one must start by grasping the sense of hope expressed by Marxism.” And “the fight for hope is the fight for the human being.” Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 69, 72.

¹²⁸ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 72–73. Cf. Stefan Wyszyński, *Duch pracy ludzkiej* (1946); translated as *Working You Way into Heaven* (New Hampshire: Sophia Press, 1995).

¹²⁹ I develop this theme in two essays: John P. Hittinger, “Ethos, Person and Spirit—Principles of Social and Cultural Renewal.” *Człowiek w Kulturze: Pismo Poświęcone Filozofii i Kulturze* 26 (2016): 161–72; John P. Hittinger, “The Springs of Religious Freedom: Conscience and the Search for Truth,” *Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* 29, no. 1/2 (2017): 4–24.

¹³⁰ Tischner, *Marxism and Christianity*, 81.

¹³¹ “The challenge of totalitarianism: Judaism and Christianity in Relation to Twentieth-Century Totalitarianism,” in a booklet published by The Józef Tischner Institute (2005), 29–54.

the claims of fate.¹³² “Faith is the only force which can master the temptation of totalitarianism.”¹³³ The pedagogy of hope is inherently religious.

A very similar argument was made by Rev. Donald J. Keefe, SJ, on the basis of the Biblical teaching of the priority of the gift. He formulated this argument in response to the Marxist versions of liberation theology in the West to generate human dignity and freedom from political action.¹³⁴ He says that the despair over the lack of human worth and dignity is a pagan perspective that has been “pushed back” over the centuries by Eucharistic worship. But the pagan despair is reclaiming society. He states his claim as follows: “The fulfillment for which we long is actual and real with the reality of the risen Christ, the reality of the Eucharist, by which our historical existence in Christ is sustained in Christ. This is a sustenance in truth, in freedom, in dignity, in justice; it is the single source of our legitimacy; it is the gift of a future which fulfills and does not nullify the present and past.”¹³⁵ Keefe claims that the centuries of Christian culture centered upon and inspired by eucharistic worship could push back pagan despair and degradation; the discovery and defense of human dignity and freedom came about in the West “not by theory, not by law, not by charismatic leadership, but by the continual and cumulative appropriation by the people in the pews of the reality which is given them in this worship.”¹³⁶ The consciousness of human dignity and personal freedom derived from this faith and sacrament brought about a slow transformation of culture and upbringing. Participation in such divine worship brings each member a conscientious responsibility in the kingdom of Christ. This would correspond to the injunction “to bear the burdens of the other” and to live in solidarity with the injured as did the good Samaritan. Keefe says that “it is an acceptance of personal responsibility for the future which bars as sinful, as a rejection of the good creation, every resubmergence of that individual into the anonymity of a faceless mass and a featureless, meaningless present.”¹³⁷ I cannot think of a better way to express the essence of hope. To be awakened and to be called forth from the anonymity of the faceless collective and to rise above the titillation and distraction of the meaningless present is indeed to benefit from a pedagogy of hope as described by the spirit of solidarity.

¹³² Tischner and Żakowski, *Tischner czyta Katechizm*, 106–112.

¹³³ Tischner, *The Challenge of Totalitarianism*, 52–53.

¹³⁴ “Liberation and the Catholic Church: The Illusion and the Reality,” *Center Journal* (Winter 1981): 45–63. For the theology behind this article, see Keefe, Donald J. S.J., *Covenantal Theology*. 2 vols. Vol. I, Method and System; Vol. II Metaphysics of Covenant (Novata, CA: Presidio Press, 1996). For an excellent analysis of Fr. K. Leefe on faith and reason, see Kevin A. McMahon, “Nature, Grace and the Eucharistic Foundation of *Fides et Ratio*,” *The Saint Anselm Journal* 7.1 (Fall 2009): 1–7.

¹³⁵ “Liberation and the Catholic Church: The Illusion and the Reality,” *Center Journal* (Winter 1981): 55.

¹³⁶ Keefe, “The Catholic Church and Liberation,” 55.

¹³⁷ Keefe, “The Catholic Church and Liberation,” 56.

Fr. Keefe's notion that the centuries of Eucharistic celebration pushed back the darkness of pagan despair rings true for the spirit of solidarity. Consider the ministry of Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko in the steel works in the summer of 1980. He wrote: the "memory of that workers' Mass at the Warsaw Steel Plant will stay with me until I die."¹³⁸ When he heard the "thunderous response 'Thanks be God,'" he said that he knew "a bond between us was born."¹³⁹ He and many other priests went into the coal mines and the shipyards to celebrate the Eucharist. The public celebrations of the Eucharist by Pope John Paul II during his return to Poland, notably in Warsaw's "Victory Square" galvanized the country. The strongest impulses for solidarity came from the liturgical dimension of the Church. "From the Sunday Mass, there flows a tide of charity destined to spread into the whole life of the faithful," wrote John Paul II in his apostolic letter *Dies Domini* on Keeping the Lord's Day Holy.¹⁴⁰ He develops this idea as follows: "The presence of the Risen Lord in the midst of the people becomes an undertaking of solidarity and a compelling force for inner renewal."¹⁴¹

By explaining upbringing in terms of hope, Fr. Tischner traces its source to Abraham and his response to the call or word of God. In *Marxism and Christianity*, he distinguishes the hope in transforming this world and supernatural hope. In *Tischner czyta Katechizm* [Tischner Reads the Catechism], he turns to the narratives of Abraham and Odysseus to distinguish the God of hope and the gods of memory. The covenant establishes a promise to Abraham who must set out for the unknown, the promised land. Hope is oriented towards the future. In the line of Abraham through Noah and Israel, culminating in Christ, we see God working on the hope of the people. "In making a promise, you become the bearer or trustee of hope."¹⁴² The promise is also an invitation to reflection on history of the covenant. The test of hope leads to moral growth, step by step. This promise of the future does not detract from care for this world. Tischner emphatically states that from the trust of hope, "the bond between people grows, a community is created, the community of the Church."¹⁴³ When we compare this text to the homilies in *The Spirit of Solidarity*, we clearly see that Tischner roots solidarity in the reality of Christ in the Church. The human bond of solidarity is open to non-believers of course; and we can philosophize on the meaning of hope in terms of the discovery of values to be realized in the world and the experience of oneself as a value.¹⁴⁴ But the primary experience is that one aspires to be among those "who are

¹³⁸ Grażyna Sikorska, *Jerzy Popiełuszko* (London: Catholic Truth Society, 2010), 20–21.

¹³⁹ Sikorska, *Jerzy Popiełuszko*, 21.

¹⁴⁰ John Paul II, *Dies Domini: On Keeping the Lord's Day Holy* (1998), §72–73.

¹⁴¹ John Paul II, *Dies Domini*, §73.

¹⁴² Tischner, *Tischner czyta Katechizm*, 108.

¹⁴³ Tischner, *Tischner czyta Katechizm*, 108.

¹⁴⁴ Tischner, *The Spirit of Solidarity*, 138.

deemed worthy to attain to the coming age and to the resurrection of the dead” (Lk 20:35).

One may ask how can the aspect of hope be integrated into his central account of upbringing as a circle with search for truth and the winning of freedom as its two points, in between which the mentor must stand? The search for truth necessarily generates a kind of hope, as we learn from Socrates in *Meno*. Because all of nature is akin, one hopes to discover more truth in the light of the whole. Indeed, Josef Pieper has a fascinating argument that wonder has the same structure as hope in so far as in wonder the mystery of the unknown beckons the learner to pursue the reasons for things and to see things as a whole.¹⁴⁵ Freedom also generates a hope—as a courage to maintain and defend the arduous good. But these activities, modeled by Socrates and Sabała, could not guarantee the promise and the hope for long struggle of historical existence of a people or even a life under oppression. We must add the point of Abrahamic hope and obedience. Perhaps we should superimpose a triangle over the circle of learning, pointing to the prophetic role of the Judaic-Christian witness. Tischner does in fact add another metaphor for upbringing to the Socratic midwife and the rifle readiness of Sabała. It is parable of the sower of the word.¹⁴⁶ He reflects upon the report in the Gospel of John that some Greeks wanted to approach Jesus in the temple. He turned them away and spoke about the grain of what must die in order to give life. Tischner then recounts the Socratic story given in *Meno* about the soul beholding the truth and goodness in a prior life which is then forgotten upon birth. The forgotten truth can be remembered with the proper questioning and thinking. Under the sway of the mystery of the good, the Greeks seek Jesus. But his time has not yet come, so he declines to see them, but rather tells his disciples that the seed must fall to the ground in order to bear fruit. He is aware of his impending death and resurrection. So too does Fr. Tischner declare that the word God when cast into the soul can spring forth as truth and goodness in the life of the hearer. With the power of God’s word, the sower can trust that the word spoken forth, in the heart of hearer, can bear fruit over one hundred-fold. He concludes his homily to educators to refrain from expecting to see the harvest or to be disappointed when success is not readily apparent. Trust the word, and keep sowing.

Although Fr. Tischner’s outspoken views on the role of the Church in Poland after 1989 were controversial,¹⁴⁷ he defended John Paul II against the critics who accused him of imposing Catholic morality upon the Polish people. He reminded them that he “directed his remarks to consciences, not political

¹⁴⁵ Josef Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture* (New York: New American Library, 1962).

¹⁴⁶ Tischner, *Krótki przewodnik po życiu*, 78–81. His homily, given in the spring of 1997 in the Church of Saints Peter and Paul, is based upon John 12:20–26. “Unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground and dies, it remains alone; but if it dies, it produces much grain.”

¹⁴⁷ Brian Porter-Szucs, *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity and Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 111, 194–195, 204, 256.

factions.”¹⁴⁸ And distinct from politics, in the sphere of culture, Tischner clearly saw the importance of Christianity for an upbringing inspired by hope. Mirosław Pawliszyn points out that Tischner had a religious upbringing that impressed upon him “an ethical and religious ideal.”¹⁴⁹ He came to view Christianity as a religion “indispensable to his mother country’s development.”¹⁵⁰ Tischner stated that Poland and Europe have vital Christian roots, for Christian culture is “a huge tree that has borne so many fruits that cutting it off will make a person a person of one dimension, a flat horizon.”¹⁵¹ It would be a horizon without true hope. The remarks by Pope John Paul II at Castel Gandolfo would strike a common chord with Tischner’s notion of upbringing: “A certain loss of Christian memories is accompanied by a sort of fear in facing the future: a widespread fragmentation of life goes hand in hand with the spread of individualism and a growing weakness in interpersonal solidarity—we are witnessing a loss of hope.”¹⁵² These remarks were given soon after his publication of *Ecclesia in Europa* (28 June 2003). He identified the most urgent need for both East and West as the “growing need for hope, a hope that will enable us to give meaning to life and history and to continue on our way together.”¹⁵³ Tischner often conferred with John Paul II at Castel Gandolfo, and, out of the conversations of 1993, John Paul II wrote his book *Memory and Identity*. In his concluding chapter entitled “The Vertical Dimension of European History,” John Paul II identifies the moment of Abraham’s response to the “God of promise” as the opening of a history based upon hope.¹⁵⁴ The vertical dimension awakens conscience in us to assume our responsibility before God to do good and avoid evil. Christian hope projects itself beyond the limit of time and yet Christian hope is manifest in human history. The essential vertical dimension of human existence with its hope inspired by the promise of God provides the ultimate dynamism and unity for upbringing.

In this light, we can bring together the various aspects of Tischner’s account of upbringing as presented in *The Spirit of Solidarity* and in related texts. Upbringing is a work or activity of a human person with and upon another human person, working especially in hope and trust. At a time of deep crisis in Poland, Fr. Tischner proved himself to be a great and influential teacher and articulated the principles of his vision of teaching. He combined three elements of upbringing—

¹⁴⁸ James Felak, *The Pope in Poland: The Pilgrimages of John Paul II, 1979–1991* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2020), 249–250.

¹⁴⁹ Pawliszyn, “Biography,” 15.

¹⁵⁰ Pawliszyn, “Biography,” 15.

¹⁵¹ Józef Tischner, *Alfabet Tischnera* (Kraków: Wydawnictwo Znak, 2012), 297.

¹⁵² Angelus, 13 July, 2003, quoted in George Weigel, *The End and the Beginning: Pope John Paul II—The Victory of Freedom, the Last Years, the Legacy* (New York: Doubleday, 2010), 336.

¹⁵³ *Ecclesia in Europa* §4. Weigel considers this document to be John Paul II’s “last gift to the world Church of his distinctive reading of the cultural, social, economic and political signs of the times in the developed world.” Weigel, *The End and the Beginning*, 337.

¹⁵⁴ John Paul II, *Memory and Identity*, 153–156.

ing, so vital to social and personal renewal: Socratic inquiry, Sabała's spiritedness or courage, and Abraham's obedience to the word of God.

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John P. Hittinger

Józef Tischner : sur l'éducation et l'espoir

Résumé

Le présent article examine la notion d'éducation de Józef Tischner dans le contexte de la formation d'une nouvelle conscientisation de solidarité parmi les Polonais, y compris les ouvriers polonais, par l'éveil des consciences. Le moment présent a servi d'alternative révolutionnaire au socialisme. Nous analysons la critique du marxisme faite par Tischner et la question centrale de la base et de la superstructure. Nous abordons ensuite la question de la récupération par Tischner de la tradition polonaise des idéaux éthiques, notamment en la personne de Maximilien Kolbe et de Jean-Paul II. Le texte propose une analyse détaillée du chapitre sur l'éducation dans l'ouvrage „Ethique de la solidarité”. Le point de vue de Tischner, proclamant que l'éducation est un lien personnel établi dans la confiance pour vivre dans l'espoir d'améliorer l'esprit et le cœur est placé dans le contexte de la solidarité en tant que lien social mettant en place une communauté éthique qui dépasse les visées du pouvoir politique et de la nécessité de trouver un ennemi. Le texte analyse les différentes formes d'éducation fausses afin d'approfondir notre connaissance du sens d'une éducation authentique. Les points saillants de l'enseignement de Tischner sont discutés en conclusion.

Mots-clés : Tischner, pape Jean-Paul II, solidarité, éducation, espoir, Marx et marxisme, thèses sur Feuerbach, Saint Maximilien Kolbe, conscience

John P. Hittinger

Józef Tischner sull'educazione e sulla speranza

Sommario

Il presente articolo esamina l'idea di educazione (*wychowanie*) di Józef Tischner nel contesto della formazione di una nuova consapevolezza della solidarietà tra i polacchi, compresi i lavoratori polacchi, attraverso il risveglio della coscienza. Il momento presente è servito come alternativa rivoluzionaria al socialismo. John Hittinger analizza la critica di Tischner al marxismo e la questione centrale che circonda la base e la sovrastruttura. Il ricercatore passa poi al recupero da parte di Tischner della tradizione polacca degli ideali etici, soprattutto nella persona di Massimiliano Kolbe e di Giovanni Paolo II. Il testo fornisce un'analisi dettagliata del capitolo sull'educazione ne *Lo spirito di solidarietà*. La sua idea secondo cui l'educazione è un legame personale stabilito nella fiducia per vivere nella speranza di migliorare la mente e il cuore è collocata nel contesto della solidarietà come legame sociale che stabilisce una comunità etica che trascende la ricerca politica del potere e la necessità di trovare un nemico. Il testo analizza le diverse forme contraffatte di educazione per approfondire la nostra consapevolezza dell'importanza di un'educazione autentica. I punti salienti del suo insegnamento sono discussi nel paragrafo conclusivo del testo.

Parole chiave: Tischner, Papa Giovanni Paolo II, solidarietà, educazione, speranza, Marx e il marxismo, tesi su Feuerbach, Massimiliano Kolbe, coscienza