

## НОВА ІСТОРИЯ

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### “TWINS IN SPITE OF THEMSELVES”: SPANISH AND OTTOMAN EMPIRES’ ISSUES OF DECLINE IN XVIII<sup>th</sup> CENTURY

*Spanish and Ottoman empires had more similarities that could be found at first glance. Both experienced the take-off as leading force in Europe and Asia respectively, being for a while the most fearful and powerful states during XVI, faced economic and political blunders in XVII century and slightly ended with stagnation in XVIII century (as conventional wisdom says). Using comparative method and cultural analysis, article tries to answer a question – how unique or regular was that issues which stroke Spain and Ottoman Empires, how deeply they were engaged in so called decline narrative, created in XIX century European historiography and is it possible to create common trend for empire’s stagnation using not only historical sociology method (sociology of revolution used by Jack Goldstone and Teda Skocpole) and world-system analysis provided by Immanuel Wallerstein, with emphasis on history of ideas or begriffsgeschichte by Reinhardt Kosseleck. Main results are going to provide a more correct view on the status of Spanish and Turkish Empires during the XVIII century. Despite that Ottomans and Spaniards had obvious differences in political distribution, economic capabilities, warfare tactics and external actions, almost simultaneous decline was based on clear and exact reasons: lack of industrialization (production with high surplus value), hush incorporation of Ottoman and Spanish Empires into World-Economy, lack of defending tariffs, ineffective fiscal system and policy, devastating and lasting wars, decreasing price for agricultural products, down warding Kondratieff cycle, rigid political and social units, which constrain strict political actions. These gaps made the Empire’s decline possible notwithstanding those problems which they had previously. Oppositely, major European states (England, France, Prussia) had made reversed actions, which took a long time, but made European “take-off” inevitable, assured their economical breakaway to further domination over the Ottomans and Spaniards as well.*

**Keywords:** Ottoman Empire, Spanish Empire, comparative studies, XVIII century social history, world-trends, global history.

**Introduction.** Due to modern comparative studies shift, it’s still popular topic in current historiography of Eastern studies to create long-range narrative and comparisons between different state formations, especially empires or states that seems to be empires (with no clear and undisputed definition), in order to create a global scheme of their life expectancy and modulate possible variations of explanation and their consequent scrutiny. It was boosted by and became a branch of global history, imperial history and entangled history studies, which has been in the focus of scientists from the beginning of XXI century [1, p. 2-3]. Such a peculiar paradigm was established by Marcel Detienne, who urged historians to compare the incomparable, and Walter Scheidel, who tried to “...distinguish common features from culturally specific or unique characteristics and developments, help us identify

variables that were critical to particular historical outcomes” [2, p. 223]. Closer to the point is Frederick Cooper, who insisted on the topic of “history that compares” [3, p. 1135]. We can also mention Kenneth Pommeranz with his “Great Divergence” which has shown that Europe and Asia (on the examples of the Qing Empire and Great Britain) had a lot in common other than diversity.

Such approach was apprehended also between in connection with another great muslim state – Mughal empire as one of the most vast and complex state [4; 5], Spain and Russian Empires [6] and especially Ottoman and Japanese Empires, which were one of the main examples of such a comparison as one who succeeded and other, who failed. A century ago, such a comparison was made by Leopold von Ranke between Ottomans and Spanish empires in the XVI century [7], who could be subsequently blamed for creating a “decline trend” in all historical works after him [8, p. 85]. These articles and books were appointed into a comparison of countries’ empowerment and rising of the economy and their role in international relations. But hitherto, crises are also very productive in empire studies (if we agree on the thesis that all empires fall sooner or later). Ottoman and Spanish Empires had a lot in common: both of them were a global superpower during XVI-XVII centuries, their economics were effective and prosperous, they were largely populated. Also, as Sever Ağin mentioned, they were similar in their “decline” and “irrationality” convention duality [9, p. 2; 10]. They had stopped in their political and military evolution almost simultaneously – Spain in 1659 (but this term could be easily prolonged to the War for Spanish succession 1701-1714). The Ottoman Empire faced the same destiny in 1683 (the same goes with higher term 1774). Research based on the quantitative data shows the midpoints of territorial growth and internal power 1520 for Ottomans and 1639 for Spaniards, and time of political breathlessness 1700 for Ottomans and 1808 for Spaniards [11, p. 21; 12]. In the end of XVII century they both reached the pinnacle of their accumulative development, XVIII century became the age of stagnancy, XIX century – the age of political backwardness and struggle for redemption, which has been demonstrated in claiming the king of Spain Ferdinand VII (1808-1833) as “Grand Turk” [13], unbelievable equivoque, that couldn’t be existed in previous centuries, when Spanish king was known as “The most Christian monarch” alongside with French king. Comparative history can take many different forms; but it’s nature is not about the laws of some events or objects, but in the robust processes [11, p. 6]. Such a paradigm will be undertaken in this scrutiny. Also I, like Cam Emrece, suggest that the ‘historical trajectory’ framework is a better analytical tool and empirical strategy. It is spatial, path-dependent, and comparative. The trajectory perspective is attentive to local dynamics, explores ‘locked-in effects’ in state–society and global–local relations, and provides new grounds for imperial comparisons [14, p. 290].

The **aim** of this article is to trace how similar or distinct Ottomans and Spaniards were in elements of crisis in their empires, focusing on the XVIII century, which laid a cornerstone of socio-economical situation in both empires. My thesis’s that

Ottomans and Spaniards faced not just the mythical decline and stagnation but caused by exact problems: **lack of industrialization (production with high surplus value), hush incorporation of Ottoman and Spanish Empires into World-Economy, lack of real and concise protectionism policy, ineffective fiscal system and policy, devastating and lasting wars, rigid political and social units, which constrain strict/centralized political actions.**

**Results.** Some important preliminary remarks must be noted. Numerous spears were broken and an uncountable amount of ink and paper wasted on identifying and structuring the reasons for degradation and subsequent “backwardness” of Spain and Ottoman Empires. Adequate positions will acknowledge that whatever the reasons were, they were too late to be caused by medieval social realities and too early to be caused by processes of westernization in Ottomans and “centralization” in Spain. The reasons of decline may be unifying factor, but they came to life on different political presumptions: during the whole XVIII century Spanish authorities (King and his court) tried to gain maximum size of control over whole state and every its aspect, moving from “absolutist” type of government of Felipe V straight to “Enlightened despotism” of Carlos III [15, p. 1], that may be encircled as “regalism” - how the Spanish crown only selectively incorporated “advanced ideas” of other European monarchies into its centralizing measures [16, p. 9], while the Ottomans by other reasons stood on that way only during the reign of Selim III (1789-1808), firstly unsuccessfully, and during the Tanzimat Era (1839-1876), creation the modern state variation.

Relations between Spanish and Ottomans were typical for the superpowers in the realities of Early Modern World and reached its height in the XVI century, which was volatile between strategic ambiguity, warfare and commerce [17, p. 305]. Hostility between Spain and the Ottomans persisted until the XVIII<sup>th</sup> century, when the two states began to move toward an accommodation and occasional collaboration [18, p. 258], which included the exchange of envoys and establishing a normal political circuit [19, p. 20-22]. These were constituted in signing Trade treaties and cooperation in containment of Russian fleet exercises in the Mediterranean [20, s. 74]. Briefly speaking, both sides felt their unstable position in the newly born international relations system, and went on unprecedented things like establishing diplomatic relations, despite being straight opposite, in existential ways (rush catholics and muslims, still powerful states).

The Millet system, that is often described as a source and reaction of retardation of Ottomans and their social organization is also very disputable, and according to Gilles Veinstein successfully emerged and constituted as a complete self-adjustable unit only in the XVIII century with the generalization of so called “impot de repartition” [21, p. 10].

The uneven and combined development of relations between the Ottomans and Europe therefore created further developmental unevenness by exacerbating the fragmented and divided character of European feudalism. Consequently,

“combination” itself felt unevenly, with its specific causal effects varying across different European states [22, p. 26].

Taking further steps from general view I try to indicate the essence of highlighted problems, they are general and pivotal for understanding the inner crisis of Spanish and Ottoman Empire`s, they can be subdivided as follows :

**1. Lack of industrialization (production with high surplus value)**

The Ottoman economy is an extremely difficult nut to crack due to lack of clear sources which will highlight economic structure and activity, but a useful trick is post-factum research or better say counterfactual. However, seeing the roots of these problems in a steady and sustained economic decline that lasted for over three centuries is not persuasive. First, the historical evidence presented in support of this view is far from conclusive, because it is based on selectively used sources and tentative interpretations. Secondly, recent research indicates that the Ottoman economy showed signs of significant dynamism and growth. For instance, we now realize that in the first half of the eighteenth century the Ottoman economy could well have been much more dynamic and robust than what the steady decline thesis would suggest [23, p. 4-5]. Ottoman industry in the XVIIIth century was not like the explosive industrial growth occurring in Western Europe during the Industrial Revolution. Ottoman industry sometimes expanded or shrunk and at other times it remained motionless. Nonetheless, patterns of Ottoman industrial development do not show trends, which are potential symptoms of modern economic growth [24, p. 29]. One of the features of this Ottoman industry in the XVIIIth century is that, the main concentration of the production was ordinary commodity products for non-luxury consumption such as cotton and woolen cloths, food, building materials, household items, earthen-and wooden-wares. Most of the high-quality products consumed by upper-income society were imports and according to provisionism; obtaining these goods from abroad was not considered as harmful in any way [24, p. 32].

If we acknowledge standard view on economic growth for pre-industrial economies (and for XVIII century all economies were pre-industrial) was from 0.1 to 0.5 regarded as highly successful and up to 1% per year growth (for the beginning of industrialization) we will have numerous usually contradictory data`s fro level of economic development of the Ottomans [25, p. 112]. As for the industrial (or rather handcrafted goods with high value) we can only assume that fro the 1815 and so on the rate of western domination increased each year, that only can lead us to thought that rather Ottomans mismanaged to organize production or western states were already on that level which was sky high for the ottoman economy [26, p. 65], keeping in mind, that for till 1760 European countries were slightly industrialized or bureaucratized enough to erect capitalism as a mode of production and whole economic system [27, p. 23].

While the Spanish economy only underwent extensive, as opposed to intensive, growth during the 16th century, even that was followed by a dramatic decline in the 17th century, before an XVIIIth century recovery. [28, p. 12].

The rate of growth of TFP in textiles was moderate up to the early 18th century, after which it experienced a slow acceleration, particularly during the second half of the XVIIIth century. [28, p. 19]. Land rent/wage ratios for Andalusia, Castile and Catalonia rose throughout the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries [29, p. 346]. Spain gained a privileged position in networks for the circulation of knowledge and goods. It encompassed the most fertile area in the confluence of Hebrew, Islamic, and Christian traditions of thought, as well as the circulation of products among diverse civilizations including those of North Africa [30, p. 288].

Only two regions: Catalonia and Basque region were as we may say industrialized, bringing up 17% of the working force in 1797 [31, p. 996]. Catalan industrialization is considered as an early follower of the British industrial revolution. Barcelona was the principal printed textile city in Europe during the late XVIIIth century. There was a process of social evolution/revolution that created the modern industrial world out of the agrarian society of medieval Europe [32, p. 78]. But in the case of Spain one extremely important feature should be underlined: its economy, production and trade were highly interlinked with colonial economies, which were main involuntary recipients of Spanish goods, and with Bourbon reforms and in future loss of Latin America markets, Spanish industry went down immediately, thus Basque iron and steel industry became uncompetitive with their rivals from 1770s, the same goes with Valencia silk industry but for the 1790s. These misfortunes may have struck Spaniards to mature their industry but in reverse, they began to shut down even non-profitable industries (who nevertheless worked at least 80% on the domestic market) or smuggle cheaper British cotton [33, p. 183].

Spanish life rate and wealth may be described by the aggregation fact that during XVIII average height was around 163-164 cm. and continuously fallen to 162 cm. in the beginning of XIX century, moreover height as well as life expectancy was lower in rural areas than in cities [34, p. 16-17]. During the XVIII stagnated with – 0,1% per annum average, and began to rise only in the XIX with 0,3% averagely [23, p. 2]. And the rate of inequality (disparity in income of 10% of wealthiest and 40% of poorest spaniards) was 17 times as for England and France, which were richer than Spain [35, p. 8]. The cumulative effect of trends of the XVIII century prolonged in the XIX, where comprehensively (wars, loss of colonies, ineffective industry and inadequate economic policy) Spanish economy performed even worse than in previous centuries [36, p. 16-19]. In the long run, however, Spain experienced a sustained decline. Notwithstanding her relative improvement during the sixteenth century, Spain fell behind during the seventeenth century and up to 1750, and not only to the new leading nations (Britain and the Netherlands) but to Western Europe altogether [37, p. 27]. As in earlier centuries, XIXth century Spain mainly exported food, raw materials and semi-finished goods and imported raw materials and manufactures. About 60% of Spanish trade involved Western Europe, Britain and France being the major trading partners [38, p. 8].

The Ottoman empire's economy stayed in global trends that began to shuffle in the 1760s [39, p. 177]. An infamous price revolution and its consequences for the Ottoman economy, stated by Ömer Lütfi Barkan had a lot been overestimated even if not fallible [40, p. 85]. The stagnation of commercial activities, mainly brought about by local unrest, reached its nadir during the last decades of the eighteenth century [41, p. 28].

As clearly Mehmet Genç mentioned: between the XVI and early XIX centuries the decisions on the state and economic matters were not solely based on a system of production and management of material wealth, but usually interconnected with political, religious, military, financial aims and operations, that was widespread whether the Ottomans or Spaniards did this [42, p. 175]. By the middle of the 18th century, Muslim merchants were forced to pay an ad valorem tax of 12% on their merchandise, but in time, non-Muslim merchants were virtually exempt from such taxation. First out of economic concern, later under constant military and diplomatic pressure Turkey was forced to grant capitulatory rights to England in 1583, Holland in 1613, Austria in 1718, and Russia in 1784. After the middle of the XVIIIth century capitulations became permanent rather than discretionary grants of the Ottoman State. Moreover, emerging capitalist powers, such as the United States, were given the same extraterritorial rights and privileges in the XIXth century. The economic and technical superiority of European capitalist states stopped the further expansion of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time the increased use of firearms forced the State to invest in expensive new military technologies and to develop a centralized army that had to be supported directly out of the State treasury [43, p. 43].

**Table 1. Economic growth in the Ottoman Empire** (based on [25, p. 115], average growth rate calculation and interpretation are mine)

years	1600	1700	1750	1820	%
Madisson	600	600	-	643	0,05
Van Zanden & Pamuk	-	597	648	682	0,1
Bolt & Van Zanden	600	700	-	740	0,03

## **2. Hush and profitless incorporation of Ottoman and Spanish Empires into World-Economy**

World-system analysis also requires a brief methodical explanation in a course of recent work: the basics of “WSA” indicates the place and role of country in depth of world organization and interaction based on mode of foreign trade – “Core” means country that exports high surplus value goods and imports raw materials, “semi-periphery” means country that imports manufacture goods from “Core” but exports the same goods to the “periphery”, which one exports only raw materials.

May also be interpreted as a struggle between major economic poles of that time – England, France, Austria. For example France had a beneficial position in trade within the Mediterranean and didn't want to share its advantages. In Ottoman case this statement being highly debatable and Virginia Reeves-Ellington stated, that Immanuel Wallerstein made serious contribution into highlighting socio-cultural aspects of Ottoman incorporation, but economic consequences, emphasized as disastrous was lately debunked by economic historians Reşat Kasaba and Mehmet Genç [44, p. 11]. But still, As the Ottoman Empire became more integrated into world commodity markets, increased specialization took the form not only of rising exports of wool, silk and opium, but also of consumer goods like wheat, figs, raisins, olive oil, tobacco and even barley. Any rise in the price of traded consumer goods would have put more upward pressure on the prices of local consumer goods and thus on the nominal wage, eroding competitiveness with foreign producers in import-competing sectors. This would have been manifested by rising food prices relative to other products, by falling profitability in manufacturing, and by a decline in industrial output [45, p. 19]. In the Spanish case the mainstream view is that an absence of technological change was produced by anti-growth institutions and ecological constraints. While the Spanish economy only underwent extensive, as opposed to intensive, growth during the 16th century, even that was followed by a dramatic decline in the XVIIth century, before an XVIIIth century recovery [28, p. 12]. The international political chaos of the end of the eighteenth century created new opportunities for Ottoman traders and shippers. Most of these were Greeks from the Aegean coast and islands. Their growing commercial interests led members of the Greek community to establish themselves in major trading centers outside the empire, such as Marseilles, Trieste and the recently founded Russian port city of Odessa on the Black Sea, thus creating an international network that further stimulated their business. The Ottoman state machinery did not profit from this economic upturn. Its lack of control over the provinces meant it lacked the power to improve its fiscal situation by taxing the new profits, while at the same time the export of foodstuffs endangered the provisioning of its cities [46, p. 13]. For example, towards the end of the eighteenth century, ottoman craft guilds, especially the ones involved in the textile production, faced the competition of various foreign goods such as British textiles. But as the city has been closed to the outsiders for religious reasons, e.g. its location to Mecca, the only threat to the city's stable economic life during the late seventeenth and eighteenth century came from the members of local janissary garrison [47, p. 10]. The problem of foreign adversaries doubled by homeland problem – unskilled workers that tried to penetrate local markets outside the guilds, and that created the “gedik” (right to work and produce a kind of goods and practicing craft wherever craftsman wants and make it hereditary) phenomenon, that in realities in poorly or non-industrialized region gave some place to maneuver [47, p. 14-15].

### **3. Destructive/ineffective protectionist policy**

Spanish colonial losses, diminishing of foreign trade with protected colonial markets due to war with England of 1796, ineffective economic policy, grabbing inappropriate liberal reforms and stepping in dubious ways of comparative advantage in agriculture ends Spanish XVIII century [48]. Nevertheless, depiction of the economic state and whole concept of Spanish economic rule with emphasis on institutional view and theories of unbalanced growth is oftenly been caricature and outdated and some protectionist politics was useful and adequate, that results in revenues of colonies and mainland Spain itself [49, p. 17-19].

Comically on the verge of tragic depiction of ottoman Iraq realities where in Mosul, local ulema and even craftsmen wrote about life in their city. Particularly fascinating is the poem in which a master textile artisan of the eighteenth century complained about having sunk so low that he was obliged to deal with “beyond-the-pale creatures such as women” [50, p. 8]. According to Adam Block, the system of free trade as practiced in the Ottoman Empire (more in the XIX century but its predecessors lived best life in the end of XVIII century) restricted every attempt at industrial expansion, impeded the development of its considerable resources, and created de facto foreign monopolies, thus contributing to the impoverishment of native enterprise [51, p. 20]. Export was not an objective of provisionist Ottoman economic policy, which aimed at satisfying domestic demand [52, p. 192]. I daresay that Ottomans made grave mistakes by mirroring European mercantilist/protectionist practise: encouraging import and decreasing import quotas, forbidding export and installing high export duties. Spaniards did the same till the XVIII century when they woke up and tried to intervene the situation but in vain, like in mathematical equation when you had made mistake at the beginning of your calculations, you collect mistakes on and on, it's not easy to return to the starting point and better to begin from the ground zero.

### **4. Devastating and lasting wars**

All major military conflicts in which Spaniards and Ottomans were involved basically caused defeats or at least economically and socially negative for each country. Nevertheless, In comparison with the states in its tier, the Ottoman Empire was able to provide its artillery and firearms domestically. In the eighteenth century, Russia, the Empire's major regional rival, improved its capability by acquiring flintlock firearms. Russia also built a navy of galleons rather than galleys. The Ottoman administrators realized this after several wars that ended with the Ottoman defeat against Russia (specifically after the loss of Crimea), and consequently set about reforming their industry and military. They once again became equals with Russia in military production levels [53, p. 179-201]. Throughout the eighteenth century, the Ottoman arms industry was able to catch up with the high quality of the earlier period. The military reforms and recruitment of foreign military and technical experts led to reversal of the downward trend and preserved the Empire's self-sufficiency until the early nineteenth century [54]. Due to decreasing military power



of ottomans, European states as France or England were itself less interested in empowering Russian and Austrian Empires and try to harken the possible negative outcome of any result of negotiations as for Peace treatise of Zistovy (1791) and Jassy (1792) [55, p. 297], or even thought about lending money to ottoman government [56, p. 28].

### **5. Rigid political and social units, which constrain strict political actions**

Throughout some researches (among them even Max Weber), who claimed that Ottoman policy was irrational and even mad-driven, there are some who claims not and indicates that Ottoman decisions in politics were dictated by Islam statements and reasons for defending the state and ensure its survival, in which they were successful and highlights, that no country, even empire couldn't exist for such a long time [57, p. 23-24]. Also a great conclusion has been made that institutions are the reflection of the society, which are created by it and institutions are only as good as the incentive they made [58, p. 14]. Ottomans and Spaniards did not do any serious incentive, which will highlight the future not the glorious past (that could be the result of collective psychotrauma of elites).

In the case of inventing and adopting new technologies as a part of a state-oriented mind The Ottomans started to relax the restrictions on the printing press in the XVIIIth century. New sources of legitimacy gained importance in the intervening centuries, and hence it mattered less that the printing press threatened the ability of religious authorities to produce loyalty. Its expected benefits to the ruler's revenue had also increased, so the Ottomans deregulated the technology when its expected benefits exceeded the cost [59, p. 34]. Before the Industrial Revolution and the European expansion of the nineteenth century, the Ottoman central bureaucracy engaged in a power struggle with the notables of the provinces for almost two centuries. Yet, the ayan (provincial notables) did not establish alternative institutions and mechanisms of capital accumulation.

Despite their interests in trade, agriculture, and manufacturing, tax farming remained the most lucrative enterprise for them. In the early part of the XIXth century, the center was able to re-assert its power over the provinces. The well-known reforms of the nineteenth century are best understood as attempts to maintain the privileged position of the center, as well as the territorial integrity of the empire. The central bureaucracy reserved most of its pragmatism and flexibility, first, for defense of the traditional order and, second, for its own survival. Many of the traditional institutions, such as state ownership of land, the urban guilds, subsidy of the army and urban economy, selective interventionism, and, most important, restrictions on private capital, remained intact until the nineteenth century.

Selective institutional change may have enabled the Ottomans to survive into the modern era, but it did not further capitalist economic development or new forms of economic organization. These significant imitations of Ottoman pragmatism and flexibility help to explain the disintegration of the empire despite the many timely and extensive institutional changes that took place during the nineteenth century

[56, p. 246-247]. In the 1730s Ottomans began to acknowledge Neo-Aristotelian legacy in its politics section, learning such strange words as “republic”, “parlament”. But these concepts told almost nothing even for the educated and politically privileged part and did not make some fruite results [60, p. 48-49]. Strict and occasionally bloody political struggle better helped to build the so-called “second Empire” (stressed by the prominent and at the same time controversial concept of Baki Tezcan).

**Conclusions.** Ottomans and Spaniards bringed out complex and ambiguous efforts to catch-up and match with their more impressive and successful rivals in the XVIII century: Spaniards with Britain and France, Ottomans with Russia and Austria. Obviously two states had a lot in common as well as in differ (and these circumstances may be more fundamental for the historical path of them). I emphasized criterias that, in my opinion, determined the future of both Spaniards and Ottomans. The two faced defeats in wars and lost territories, both of them had their finances in disarray, did not introduce industrialization, prolonged inadequate internal economic policies and didn't manage to rearrange politics and institutions towards new progressive global trends. This in the eighteenth century was not grave for them only led to continuous advantage of other core-states such as England and France, but in XIX century this gap became indeed so wide, that inadequacy and inappropriateness old paradigm of development was clear as for the Ottomans as for Spaniards and caused even more massive changes.

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**Чалий А. “Близнюки мимоволі”: Іспанська та Османська імперії та проблеми їх занепаду у XVIII ст.**

Проблеми порівняльної історії імперій за останні декілька років набули нового звучання в контексті вироблення синтезу не тільки успішних прикладів, імперій, які змогли зберегти свою міць і силу максимально довго, а так само й неуспішних. Іспанська й Османська імперії демонстрували всі аспекти цих порівнянь, практично співпадаючи хронологічно: одночасно піднялися над всіма державами Європи й Азії, ставши свого роду наддержавами у військово-політичному так і в економічному сенсах, й так само синхронно зійшли із геополітичної дистанції; будучи економічними потугами, практично одночасно й за однакових причин опинилися на другорядних позиціях (а на короткі моменти мало чим відрізнялись від колоній) в світовій економіці; демонструючи військову міць і вправність на полях битв, в другій половині XVII ст. стали зазнавати по факту ситуативних, але болючих невдач, хоч і суттєво мало чим відрізнялись від своїх суперників у Європі; наприкінці XVIII ст. обидві імперії зазнали тяжких поразок, ще більше поглибивши відставання (уявне чи реальне) і ставши гравцями другого ешелону, балансуючи на межі геополітичних інтересів великих гравців. Неодноразово наголошуючи на тому, що за змістом ці дві імперії мало чим відрізнялися в політичному, економічному та суспільному планах, належачи до пре-індустріальних суспільств, вони все ж



продемонстрували відмінний від «успішних» країн-імперій результат. Метою статті є дослідити які риси суспільно-політичного й економічного життя обох імперій в порівняльному аспекті були ідентичні або близькі за змістом, які риси визначили подальший розвиток імперій, коли відбулася дана біфуркація. Автор наголошує, що попри усталений погляд на дві основні причини, що нерідко фігурують в викривальних статтях щодо османів та іспанців – «східний» характер цивілізації в одних та «золотий чинник» для інших, причина невдач цих країн крилася не в абстрактних універсалиях а в досить конкретних причинах – в хибній методологічній основі для розвитку країни та деструктивних та запізнілих діях державного управління.

**Ключові слова:** Османська імперія, Іспанська імперія, компаративна історія, глобальна історія, XVIII століття.

**Appendix 1: “Too much related” – same problems same path and same results**

Criteria	Spanish Empire	Ottoman Empire
<b>Lack of industrialization (production with high surplus value)</b>	1797 – 11,5 millions in mainland Spain, 13% working in industry/secondary sector (1,5 million), first cotton-spinning machine in Barcelona (1737), 1765 – “Jenny” machine firstly introduced, 1791 – water frame, 1803 – Crompton machine [61, p. 383-384].	Ottoman industrialization was no match in design and process with European one, it rather appeared as a complex pattern with rising and falling, export was not encouraged but rather cutralide by prohibition quotas, imp[ort on the other hand was fostered and facilitated [62, p. 59-60].
<b>Hush and non-profitable incorporation of Ottoman and Spanish Empires into World-Economy</b>	Spanish protectionism policy interlinked with its foreign trade gave disastrous results combined with poor rate of manufacturing easily traced in examples of Latin America trade (where only Spanish ships and merchants could trade but within Latin America and ban for industry and intercontinental trade was ruined by debatable Bourbon reforms [63, p. 35].	Due to WSA research Ottomans were incorporated during 1750 to 1856, as Trade Treaty of 1838 and later 1844 marked the end of incorporation of ottoman economics into European trends (subjugated by primarily Great Britain and lesser by France) [64, p. 150-151, 68].

<b>Destructive/ineffective protectionist policy</b>	“Let London manufacture those fine fabrics of hers to her heart’s content; Holland her chambrays; Florence her cloth ... Milan her brocades, Italy and Flanders their linens ... so long as our capital can enjoy them; the only thing it proves is that all nations train journeymen for Madrid ... for all the world serves her and she serves nobody” Alfonso Nunez de Castro, written in 1675 and quoted in Vives gives a clear view of Spanish inadequacy in economic policy [66, p. 2]. Free trade of grain (1765), abolition of internal custom duties, free-trade with American colonies, protection of manufactories, loosening property inheritance laws (1798) = resulting weakening the state without proper economic status	Ottoman thought about protectionism never reached far than crucial issues (timber, wheat) and was based on intrinsic and rather delusional presumption: let foreign goods inside is better than making custom protections (thought to torn apart European production), which had been proven completely wrong and ruinous to ottoman manufacturing till 1844 [65, p. 82-84, 100]. Economically, the Ottoman Empire was a pre-capitalist state. The economic policies of the state, such as they were, were aimed at subsistence of the population, at provisioning the major population centers and at the collection of taxes in money and in kind. Not until the very end of the empire did the Ottoman government develop policies that could be described as mercantilist, actively protecting or stimulating certain sectors of the economy [46, p. 11]
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

<p><b>Ineffective fiscal system and policy</b></p>	<p>Despite lots of economic reforms, reactions and radical changes, tax depression still depressed the Mesta and the problem of pastoral protectionism [67, p. 251], inability to transform short-term national debt into long-termed, burdening/levying commodities with different qualities and prospects of economic growth.</p>	<p>Unable to check the growing power of the provincial notables, the Ottoman state was able to collect limited amounts of taxes during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Most of the tax revenues were retained by various intermediaries. As a result, state finances came under increasing pressure in the seventeenth century and again from the 1770s onwards, especially during periods of war [68]. Fiscally motivated debasements were used rather frequently during these periods. New instruments for public borrowing began to emerge during the eighteenth century in response to these fiscal pressures [56, p. 4-5]</p>
<p><b>Devastating and lasting wars</b></p>	<p>War of a Spanish succession (1701-1714) made the biggest contribution into Spanish poor demography despite its uncertainness , but till the end of 1787 historians has been given a number of 10 138 000 inhabitants of Spain itself according to the census [69, p. 21]</p>	<p>The last victorious war for the Ottomans appeared in 1711, when they recaptured the city of Azov. From that moment, all subsequent wars (1736-39, 1766-1769, 1774-1783) led only to defeat, loss of territories and therefore economic losses.</p>

<p><b>Rigid political and social units, which constrain strict political actions</b></p>	<p>Lack of counterbalancing institutions, which leads to concentrating all political power in the hands of monarchs and their inner circle, low quality of bureaucrats and absence of clear state-oriented strategy.</p>	
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**Appendix 2: From superpowers to dust (due to WSA route of Spanish and Ottoman Empires from Center to Periphery)**

**World-system of XVI century**

**World-system of XVIII century**



- O - Ottomans**
- Ch. - China**
- I - India**
- S - Spain**