A proposal for a systematic approach to moral philosophy

• Authors: Christopher Caruana

Abstracts

EN

This article gives a methodological overview of three standards against which it is possible to examine the worth of moral theories and to test their true contribution to ethics. These standards or benchmarks are requirements pertaining to metaethics, moral psychology and practical reason. The proposal is that it is only when a theory answers questions raised by these three areas of inquiry together that such a theory can be said to be a substantive theory of morality. While defending the importance of each area I also provide examples on the way to highlight such areas of relevance.

Keywords

EN

metaethics; moral psychology; practical reason; systematic philosophy

• Publisher: Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Chełmie
• Journal: Language. Culture. Politics. International Journal
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 1
• Pages: 181-202

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Christopher Caruana

• Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski Jana Pawła II w Lublinie

• https://orcid.org/000000023044760X

References

• Anscombe, (2005). Good and Bad in Human Action. In: M. Geach and L. Gormally (eds.). Human Life, Action, and Ethics: Essays by G.E.M. Anscombe. Imprint Academic.
• Anscombe, G. E. M., (1957, 1963 ed.). Intention. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
• Aristotle, (2009 ed.). Nicomachean Ethics. Transl. by W.D. Ross, Oxford University Press.
• Ayer, A. J. (1996ed). The Emotive Theory of Ethics. In: Moral Philosophy: Selected Readings , Second Edition, Harcourt-Brace Publications.
• Bostock, D. (2000). Aristotle's Ethics . New York: Oxford University Press.
• Byers, S. (2006). The meaning of voluntas in Augustine. In: Augustinian Studies, 37 (2), 17.
• Crisp, R. (2006). Reasons. In: Reasons and the Good, Oxford University Press.
• Cuneo, T. (2001). Are Moral Qualities Response-Dependent? In: Nous, 35 (4).
• Dancy, J. (1993). Internal and External Reasons. In: Moral Reasons Appendix I, Oxford University Press.
• Driver, J. (2018). Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe , https://plato. stanford.edu/entries/anscombe/, 19.06.2022.
• Frede, M. (2002). John of Damascus on Human Action, the Will and Human Freedom. In: Ierodiakonou, K. (ed.). Byzantine Philosophy and its Ancient Sources . Clarendon Press.
• Frey, J. (2017). G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action. In: Analytic Philosophy, 58/ 3, 202.
• Frey, J. (2019a). Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and the Good. In: Ergo, 6 (39).
• Frey, J. (2019b). Revisiting Modern Moral Philosophy. In: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement , 87.
• Geach, P. (1956). Good and Evil. In: Analysis, 17 (32).
• Hume, D. (2009 ed.). Treatise of Human Nature , II, Ed. by Wright, J. P. Cambridge University Press.
• Johnson, R., Smith, M. (eds.) (2015). Passions and Projections: Themes from the Philosophy of Simon Blackburn . Oxford University Press.
• Johnston, M. (1989). Dispositional Theories of Value. In: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 63.
• Johnston, M. (1998). Are Manifest Qualities Response-Dependent?. In: The Monist, 18.
• Kant, I. (2009 ed.). Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals , Transl. by H. J. Paton, H. Collins. New York, London, Toronto, Sydney, New Delhy, Auckland: Harperperennial Modernthought.
• Kenny, A. (1979). Aristotle's Theory of the Will . New Haven: Yale University Press.
• Korsgaard, C. (1996). Scepticism about Practical Reason. In: Creating the Kingdom of Ends, Cambridge University Press.
• Korsgaard, C. (2008). Acting for a Reason. In: The Constitution of Agency: Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology , Oxford University Press.
• MacIntyre, A. (2007). After Virtue. University of Notre Dame Press.
• MacIntyre, A. (2016). Ethics in the Conicts of Modernity: An Essay on Desire, Practical Reasoning and Narrative . Cambridge University Press.
• Mackie, J. L. (1977). Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong . Penguin Publications.
• McDowell, J. (1995). Might there be external reasons?. In: World, mind and ethics, Cambridge University Press.
• McDowell, J. (1998). Values and Secondary Qualities. In: Mind, Value and Reality, Cambridge Mass.
• McGinn, C. (1996). Another Look at Colour. In: The Journal of Philosophy, 93 (11).
• Millgram, E. (1996). William's argument against external reasons. In: Nous, 30 (2).
• O'Neill, O. (1990). Constructions of Reason . Cambridge University Press.
• Perkams, M. (2013). Aquinas on choice, will and voluntary action. In: T. Homan, J. Mller and M. Perkams (eds). Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics. Cambridge University Press.
• Pettit, P. & Smith, M. (2006). External reasons. In: McDowell and his critics, Edited by C. Macdonald and G. MacDonald. Oxford University Press, 142.
• Scanlon, T. M. (2000). What we owe to each other . Cambridge-Harvard University Press.
• Searle, J. (1995). The Construction of Social Reality . Free Press.
• Ward, N. (1963). The concept of will in Early Latin Philosophy. In: Journal of the History of Philosophy , 1 (17).
• Williams, B. (1981). Internal and External Reasons. In: Moral luck, Cambridge University Press.
• Williams, B. (1995). Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame. In: Making sense of humanity and other philosophical papers , Cambridge University Press.
• Williams, B. (1995).Replies. In: World, mind and ethics, Cambridge University Press.

Identifiers

DOI

10.54515/lcp.2022.1.181-202

Biblioteka Nauki

2137563