

Original article

Implementation of intelligence and diplomatic tasks by the Military Attaché Office of the legation of the Republic of Poland in Berlin in 1928-1932

Damian Zurawski

Institute of History and International Relations, University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn, Poland,
zurawskidamian90@gmail.com

INFORMATIONS

Article history:

Submitted: 18 December 2017

Accepted: 23 May 2018

Published: 31 December 2018

ABSTRACT

The article presents the origins and functioning of the Military Attaché Office in Berlin in the years 1928-1932 led by Lieutenant Colonel Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski, who carried out the intelligence activities under the guise of a military diplomat. Within the scope of his operational activities, Lieutenant Colonel Morawski established contacts with other military attachés and gathered and transmitted information on the country of residence in order to identify its military potential as well as internal and external political situation in the Weimar Republic.

In his work, Lieutenant Colonel Morawski did not conduct intelligence activity of a purely operational nature, however, he managed to obtain a wide range of contacts for intelligence work, in which he used the meetings with military attachés of foreign countries, people from various circles from German pacifists and the Union of Poles in Germany as well as the environments related to the armaments industry. From 1929 to 1932 he expanded his activity to include open sources, i.e. the official press and announcements of the Ministry of the Reichswehr that gave him knowledge about the dates of the next maneuvers and detailed information about their course, which he received in a wider range from Japanese or Spanish military attachés.

Moreover, he obtained information about the cooperation between Germany and the USSR, which was to serve to devalue contacts between the military attaché of Great Britain and the German military authorities. One of such information was obtained in 1931 from the military attaché of Sweden through the Finnish military attaché office. In spite of quite secretive action, in November 1931 he was accused of espionage and was expelled in March 1932. He also gave a lecture at the Center for Higher Military Studies in Warsaw (February 1932) where he presented the possible directions of attack of the German Army and the entire doctrine of combat activity of the Reichswehr.

KEYWORDS

military attaché, Berlin, Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski, intelligence, diplomacy, national security



Introduction

At the beginning of this article, it is worth mentioning that the network of Polish military-diplomatic posts was created during the period of fighting for the border. Nevertheless, by the end of 1920, the Second Polish Republic had twenty embassies and legations. Military attaché offices were formed along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MSZ) institutions [Wodejko n.d., p. 157]. It should also be emphasized that the military authorities also set up military missions that protected Polish soldiers abroad, as well as missions that carried out arms purchases during the Polish-Bolshevik War. The positions of military plenipotentiaries were also created. Seventeen attachments and two military missions were formed by 1920. In the same year, the Military Attaché Office in Tokyo was also established.

On April 3, 1922, twelve military attaché offices functioned. In the years 1927-1939, the organization of posts abroad was changed. Until 1939, the supervision of the military posts of foreign countries was delegated to the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces (SG WP). Military departments carried out two intelligence and diplomatic tasks related to the protection of military interests. They were to be an element of early warning against war threats on the part of neighboring countries [Czarnecka 2009, p. 42]. In 1934, the instruction sanctioning the privileges of military representatives of foreign states was also introduced [Kolakowski 2012, pp. 105-106].

An important problem was the issue of typing and training candidates for military attachés. As a rule, Navy officers were assigned naval attachés, while artillery, infantry and cavalry officers became Land Forces attachés. They often served as the Air Force attachés. It was similar in the case of officers who were called upon to fill the positions of assistants to military attachés and of non-commissioned officers performing office personnel's duties. The personnel underwent a number of trainings. Philological courses organized in order to teach the history, culture and language of the countries of residence were one of the elements of education. The other form was lectures on the military, intelligence and counterintelligence of countries of arrival. It should be stressed that some qualified military diplomacy officers having experience in the work as military representatives went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its agencies in the country after 1926 [Kedziora-Plachciak 2014, pp. 54-77].

The aim of the article is to present the intelligence and diplomatic activity of the military attaché in Berlin Lieutenant Colonel Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski in the years 1928-1932.

The problem of the organization and operation of the intelligence in Germany has been dealt with so far by two historians. Robert Majzner presented the analyzed issues in the monograph of *Poland Military Intelligence on the Policy of the Third Reich of 1933-1939*, which was published in 2006, and the monograph *Military Attaché Offices of the Second Republic of Poland 1919-1945. Structural and Organizational Aspects of Operation* issued twice, in 2011 and 2014. The works of Henryk Cwiek also play an important role: *Against Abwehr* issued in 2001 and *In the Secret Service of the Second Republic of Poland* published in 2009. The Alexander Wozny's study *German Preparations*

for the War with Poland in the Assessments of Polish Supreme Military Authorities in 1933-1939 also deserves attention. The aforementioned work, despite the fact that it goes beyond the scope of the article, was important for writing this article due to the recorded Lt. Col. Witold Dzerzhinsky-Morawski's lecture in the Center for Higher Military Studies in Warsaw delivered in February 1932.

1. The genesis and operational organizational conditions for the establishment and functioning of Military Attaché Offices in Berlin in the years 1919-1928

After the end of World War I, the feeling of failure resulting from the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles developed in Germany. The prohibition on the possession of foreign intelligence was included among the obligations imposed on the above-mentioned Germans in Versailles. However, Germany could have counterintelligence to fight against diversion and espionage activities, so instead of solving it, it was joined in the Reichswery structure with military counterintelligence, and therefore the Abwehr Office of Foreign Affairs was created, which was then part of the Ministry of War. The Abwehr local units in Krolewicz, Berlin, Wroclaw and Szczecin directed the military intelligence against Poland [Zebrowski 2014, pp. 213-243]. After the reduction of the Army, Grenzschutz was set up, whose task was to conduct border surveillance and shallow intelligence within its framework. Kriminal Polizei and Schutz Polizei executed counterintelligence tasks as part of civilian activities of services. It also carried out intelligence activities in Poland, including The National Association of Germans in Poland and the Office of Foreign Affairs [see Kopczyk 1970; Cwiek 2001; 2009]¹.

Too large number of posts, both at consulates and outside them, which needed a structure supervising their operations in Germany, spoke in favor of the establishment of the Military Attaché Office at the Polish Legation in Berlin as the residency of the intelligence. They did not have counterintelligence protection, which caused frequent denunciations and expulsions of residents of consular offices. Consulates were supposed to protect the Poles living in Germany as well as those coming for seasonal work [Skrzeczowski 2002, p. 221]. At that time, the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces worked at a minimum of effort, assets and means, however, simultaneously with methods that would give the best results of work and allow effective training of employees and agents for both diplomatic and non-diplomatic residences known as illegal residences.

In addition, they enabled the recruitment and conduct the Offensive Counterintelligence agency [Majzner 2006, p. 21; cf. Brzeski 2014].² Another task put before the Detachment West in 1921 was to prepare further studies on the functioning of the su-

¹ The author mainly refers to the German Eastern Marches Society, the German Youth Union in Poland, the Association of Silesian Germans and the Trust of the former Prussian government. In addition, a number of espionage scandals on Polish territory and sabotage actions with their participation are quoted by Henryk Cwiek.

² Offensive counterintelligence – attempts to take control and turn the enemy agent after identifying the opponent and recognizing his goals. Turned, or “double agents” are used to misinform or inspire an opponent.

preme state authorities of the Weimar Republic in inter-ministerial relations with the Ministry of Reichswehr.

The next task of the Detachment West was to study the *Stellenbesetzung*, that is the list of the German Army personnel positions dated October 21, 1921, comparing it with an earlier one dated October 1, 1920. Research on the internal situation of Germany and East Prussia was also to be performed. According to the monthly report for June 1922, the Department West completed extensive studies in the field of:

- the German infantry organization,
- the analysis of the German budget.

In August 1922, general outlines, containing details relevant to the Ministry of Military Affairs (MSWojsk.), of the structure of the German Army and German civil-military organizations were presented. Two reports on the German Army were also prepared, one for the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, the other was made available to the Military Attaché in Constantinople. Furthermore, the work on the monograph of East Prussia in the chapters on the economy and geography of the region was completed as part of the above-mentioned studies.³

As part of the above-mentioned tasks, the analysis also covered the question of appointment of a military diplomacy representative in Germany.⁴ In the light of the report of the Department West from October 1922, there were carried out a number of studies regarding the adaptation of the organization of intelligence in Germany in the event of the reorganization of Schutzpolizei, and at the same time operational and reconnaissance activities were undertaken to acquire new structures of the aforementioned formation. Further analytical works addressed the establishment of the artillery structure as well as putting the German regulations on order was completed and information about the secret General Staff was obtained.⁵

Already at the beginning of 1919, key decisions were taken to create residences organized in institutions of higher rank than consulates. The residency in a legation gave greater organizational opportunities in the field of the agent intelligence; in this hierarchical arrangement a military attaché was a resident. Whereas officers outside the residency became sub-residents and *de facto* it was them who built the agent intelligence. Repeatedly, assistants to military attachés created tasks and organized activities of the agent intelligence with the consent of the post. In addition, the military attaché office – type posts organized the offensive counterintelligence [Piasecki 2014, pp. 260-271]⁶, which shielded intelligence operations and conducted active counterintelligence cover of a legation. What is more important, however, is that it was the point of *transferring information by officers* without cover, due to the constant courier communica-

³ Central Military Archives (CAW) in Warsaw, Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, reference number I.303.322.12, *Essential files of the Department West*, card 70.

⁴ *Ibidem*, card 133.

⁵ *Ibidem*, card 154.

⁶ Offensive counterintelligence – combating espionage of a foreign state through the use of active measures involving, inter alia, inspiring and misinforming foreign intelligence. However, the active area of counterintelligence activities also includes recruitment and typing as well as development of the agency. In addition, the information struggle and all shielding activities of own intelligence operations outside the country are also active methods.

tion entitled to diplomatic immunity, which precluded the arrest of both a resident and couriers. A diplomatic resident never took part in the direct operation of sources, only officers or agents directing a given source [Misiuk 1998, pp. 34-35]. The information war on the East-West line conducted as part of the cooperation between Germany and the USSR is also an important determinant of the issue discussed in this article. Poland was the object of these attacks; the Division II, the Border Protection Corps Intelligence, the General Staff Intelligence and the Department IV as well as subsequent transformations of the Political Police carefully analyzed all such attempts [Zebrowski 2011, pp. 357-387].

Several issues contributed to the creation of the Berlin Attaché Office. First of all, they were strained relations with Germany and the second important thing was the fact that the British did not agree that Poland would delegate a representative to the Inter-Allied Control Commission in Berlin in 1921 since they were convinced that it would weaken Germany's negotiating position for the benefit of France [Majzner 2014, p. 319]. The military intelligence of France provided the Division II, based on the alliance of March 1921, with materials of low value and very high level of generality, which required intensified operational work from intelligence agents to supplement the obtained information. Although the relations between the intelligence agencies were correct, changes resulting from the Treaty of Locarno led to the problems in the intelligence cooperation between Poland and France. The ultimate effect of this was the suspension of the intelligence information exchange at the end of the 1920s. The Second Bureau of the General Staff of the French Army also passed worthless things. However, before the establishment of the discussed post, the function of the intelligence guide was performed by the Legation of the Republic of Poland in Berlin, which failed to fulfill its tasks in 1922-1927 since it did not meet the information needs of the Division II of General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. For this reason, the Polish Legate in Berlin received a warning from Minister Aleksander Skrzynski, who reminded Jerzy Madejski that the Legation was a residency therefore it was expected, according to its definition, to perform a diplomatic role and the function of an external intelligence and counterintelligence post [Kolakowski and Krzak 2015, p. 45].

In January 1927, the Legation was obliged by the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces to inform the Ministry of Military Affairs on the development of the German armaments industry. This, however, was the responsibility of the economic counselor at the Legation. Moreover, the Legate of the Republic of Poland in Berlin, Kazimierz Olszowski, had the task of monitoring Reichswehr operations in the military and military-economic spheres [Szymanowicz 2013, pp. 191-192].

One of the reasons for the high proportion of vacant positions at the post was the difference of opinion between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Military Affairs as to the diplomatic rank of the military attaché, the assistant and also a non-commissioned officer performing clerical duties. It was finally decided that the military attaché would be qualified as an official of the 5th diplomatic rank, the assistant – 8th and the non-commissioned officer – 10th. Another important issue was the salary, which was discussed in 1921-1922, to be finally established in 1923. Budget documents

from 1923-1928 did not provide for the liquidation of the post. Definitively, the finances were as follows: 93 050 marks for the attaché, the assistant received 62 100 marks and the non-commissioned officer 22 575 marks. The post had a representative fund of 20 250 marks for the Attaché Office. The second floor of the building of the Consulate General of the Republic of Poland in Berlin, which was renovated at the expense of the Ministry of Military Affairs, was established as the seat of the post

The difference in opinion between the Chiefs of the Polish Armed Forces and Marshal Jozef Pilsudski was another decisive factor on not filling the vacant positions from 1921. Colonel Lucjan Sikorski did not receive the support of the Marshal. However, Lieutenant Colonel Janusz Gasiorowski had mutual support, however, he did not take over the post since he had been directed to the training course for staff officers to the Higher War School. Filling the positions was possible due to the certain thaw in Polish-German relations. At that time, a decision was made to provide the establishment of positions for officers of Polish military diplomacy in the Delegation. According to the Order of the Ministry of Military Affairs of January 20, 1928, Major Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski took office as the Military Attaché of the Polish Legation in Berlin on May 22, 1928. His assistants were Captain Andrzej Chmielowski, who functioned in the Attaché until November 15, 1930 and then Captain Stefan Osika from 1931 [Majzner 2014, p. 320]. According to Lieutenant Colonel Ludwik Sadowski, the Attaché reported on the actions taken to the First Deputy Chief of the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, while formally he was subordinate to the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. As to the budget, the Attaché Office was subject to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs [Sadowski 2014, p. 36]. Prior to taking over the post Major Dzierzykraj-Morawski was instructed to behave with restraint and not to let anybody know that he was a new resident of the intelligence on Germany, placed in a diplomatic mission.

As far as military relations were concerned, he had to perform identical tasks as the other military attachés, that is, possess substantive knowledge in the field of war industry of the country of residence and raise the position of the Polish Armed Forces on the international arena. He also promoted the Polish armaments industry. He acted in the interest of Polish military transit through Germany, which was not easy because it was the time of the Polish-German Customs War of 1925-1934, which was the implication of a permanent economic conflict between the Second Polish Republic and Germany lasting from the beginning of the 1920s [Watt 2007, p. 184]. He also had to be familiar with military-commercial issues related to the purchase and development of armaments technology. Furthermore, he was to analyze internal social relations in Germany and advise the ambassador on defense matters, and he was entitled the right to wear a uniform [Kolakowski 2005, pp. 79-94].

A military attaché was not a political officer of the Legation, which resulted from his 5th rank being equivalent to 1st class Legation counselors. Military attachés were always appointed by mutual agreement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of the Military Affairs. Directly at the post they were subordinate to the Legate or Chief of the Mission, while as regards discipline to the Minister of Military Affairs or Chiefs of the

Polish Armed Forces. The supreme military authorities of the Second Polish Republic issued instructions for the military attaché operation. All political activities in the post were carried out by military attachés only with the consent of the Legate or the Chief of the Mission. It was in this regard that the military attaché could contact the authorities of the state of residence, only with the consent of the mission manager. While providing information related to the Polish Armed Forces could only take place after receiving a special instruction from the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. All other elements remained in accordance with the previous instruction [Kolakowski 2007, pp. 143-150].

What is more, the military attaché was obliged to keep lodgment of documents office and records of espionage in Germany [Majzner 2006, pp. 42-44]. At this point, it is also worth mentioning the significant fact from the point of operation of this institution. During the creation of attaché offices in 1919, intelligence residency assignments were imposed on them. The emphasis was placed on self-organization of own counterintelligence covers by the attaché offices. In each case, the attachés' assistants were responsible for the matters of own protection in the form of the counterintelligence cover. On the other hand, the military attaché was liable for the state secrets protection [Majzner 2014a, pp. 229-231]. The relations between the attaché and other diplomats and privileges they were entitled to were significant as well. In many cases, there were military and naval attachés, which meant two assistants assigned. Another substantial thing is a separate cipher of the military attaché office and own car [Losowski 2001, pp. 97-108].

The duties of the attaché also included monitoring of factories and military facilities, which made it possible for him to obtain information visually about the state of the armaments industry in a given country. He was also responsible for the affairs of officers residing abroad. He had to stamp passports of military-diplomatic couriers [Majzner 2006, pp. 25-61]. In addition to the abovementioned duties, the military attaché provided adequate living conditions to his subordinates, as indicated by the reply sent in June 1931 regarding the deputy attaché, who returned 128 zlotys to the Financial Department of the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces in Warsaw on June 15, 1931.⁷ At the same time, Lt. Col. Morawski reported in a similar document from June 11 on the sum of 500 zlotys returned to the Financial Department of the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.⁸

⁷ CAW, reference number 303.4.7861, card 118, The letter from the military attaché in Berlin, Lieutenant Colonel Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski, regarding the return of part of the funds from the sum of PLN 1,000 from June 30, 1931, transferred for the purchase of a suit by Cpt. Stefan Osika (date of issue illegible or worn out). Sent to the Chief of the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces Colonel Tadeusz Pelczynski.

⁸ *Ibidem*, card 62.

2. Implementation of intelligence and diplomatic tasks by the Military Attaché Office of the legation of the Polish Republic in Berlin headed by Lieutenant Colonel Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski (1928-1932)

The first task of the Military Attaché Office was to collect as much information as possible about the Reichswehr officer corps, and the attachés accredited in Germany. It was also necessary to make a study of maneuvers of the German Army from 1928 and to obtain information about the attitude of German officers to Poland. The tasks set to Lt. Col. Morawski in the Instruction of 1928 and 1932 for the officers of the Polish Attaché Office in Berlin envisaged all possible aspects of the violation of the Treaty of Versailles by Germany. They included the following catalog of things: inventions, development of weapons and ammunition, war gases and explosives. The Instruction provided for the analysis of mobilization plans, the organization of anti-aircraft defense, actual military expenditures, including the training of reserves and professional soldiers as well as the Police and military-civilian organizations, recognition of the German military doctrine, as well as German fortification systems [Wozny 2007, pp. 195-200]. Lt. Col. Morawski was instructed to observe the state of advancement of Germany's cooperation with other states, in particular with the Soviet Union, Lithuania and Italy.

The state of development of the German civil and military aviation, Germany's foreign policy towards the Soviets, Czechoslovakia, Italy and Western powers were in the area of operational interests of the Division II. The social and political situation of Germany was also in the sphere of intelligence activities [Wozny 2007, pp. 195-200]. What is important, Lt. Col. Witold Morawski had a total ban on conducting an operational-tactical and strategic intelligence of agent nature [Kolakowski and Krzak 2015, p. 40; Majzner 2003, pp. 169-185]. After arriving in Berlin, Lt. Col. Morawski was informed by the Ministry of the Reichswehr that he would not be invited to maneuvers of the German Army. The above resulted from protocol issues. The Germans did not have an accredited military attaché at their Legation in Warsaw. Lt. Col. Morawski was informed about that on the day of arrival at the post [Lossowski 1995, p. 43].

Nevertheless, he obtained information on maneuvers by studying the German military press and official information provided by the Reichswehr, which he analyzed during his stay in Berlin as well as through proper contacts with military attachés of other countries. He received information on the maneuvers of 1929 from the military attaché of Japan. In turn, he received information about military exercises from 1930 thanks to the head of the military mission of Spain, which he reported to the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces.⁹ As indicated in one of the reports, he exchanged

⁹ CAW, reference number 303.4.2212, The Report of the Military Attaché Lt. Col. Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski to the Chief of the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces Colonel Tadeusz Pelczynski of February 27, 1930 on the shape of the Reichswehr maneuvers from 1929-1930 and the method of obtaining information about them.

views with the Swedish military attaché about the maneuvers of 1929. The course of the conversation was presented in the report of January 18, 1930.¹⁰ Lt. Col. Morawski also maintained contacts with Romanian diplomats that he reported to the Division II in a letter dated on May 24, 1929, in which he communicated the content of the conversation with a certain informer from Romanian political circles known to him. The information concerned a certain group of opposition German and Romanian politicians who wanted at least to improve the Polish-German relations and to maximize the Polish-German rapprochement, and that General Hans von Seect, known in the 1920s for anti-Polish attitudes, wanted to win the Chief of the Romanian Staff for some Romanian-German actions in the military and commercial field.¹¹

Lt. Col. Morawski acquired information on aviation technologies that could be relevant to night air raids; the report included detailed information on aircraft lamps with a light intensity as large as if a million candles were lit and on the production of thin magnesia beams thanks to which they would shine.¹² At the same time, in 1930, he informed the Division II about the request to the Finnish military attaché to act as an intermediary in contact with the military representative of the Kingdom of Sweden. He had information about the Soviet maneuvers carried out in the USSR and then he asked the Turkish military attaché, who took part in the mentioned maneuvers, for the intermediation.¹³ On November 6, 1930, Lt. Col. Morawski informed the Division II about the conversation with one of the German editors who presented changes in the situation of Germany since the First World War. He told him of the growing threat to the Poles from the German side, which, as he put it, was the result of the increasing influence gained by the anti-democratic forces in Germany and the growing in strength anti-Polish circles. According to the interlocutor of Lt. Col. Morawski, it was the result of the Treaty of Versailles.¹⁴ He informed him about bad relations on the military line between Berlin and Prague and about very good British-German relations, which Morawski mentioned in the reports provided to the Division II and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He also notified the attempt to eliminate this by revealing regular cases of Soviet-German cooperation. However, the biggest task that Lieutenant Colonel Morawski faced was to determine the real structure of the Ministry of the Reichswehr

¹⁰ CAW, reference number I.303.4.2212, card 220, The Report of the Military Attaché Lt. Col. Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski to the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces of January 18, 1930 on the desire to bring together or improve Polish-German relations and attempts by General Hans von Seect to acquire Romanian generals for military-commercial projects.

¹¹ CAW, reference number I.303.4.2205, card 106-107, The Report of the Military Attaché Lt. Col. Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski to the Chief of the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces Colonel Tadeusz Pelczynski of May 24, 1929.

¹² CAW, reference number I.303.4.2205, card 157-158, The Report of the Military Attaché Lt. Col. Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski to the Chief of the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces Colonel Tadeusz Pelczynski of June 1, 1929.

¹³ *Vide*, CAW, reference number I.303.4.2212, card 220, The Report of the Military Attaché Lt. Col. Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski to the Chief of the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces Colonel Tadeusz Pelczynski of January 18, 1930 on the issue of consent to the intermediation of the Finnish attaché in contacts with representatives of the military diplomacy of Sweden and Turkey on Soviet maneuvers carried out in the USSR in 1929.

¹⁴ CAW, reference number I.303.4.2212, card 141, The Report of the Military Attaché Lt. Col. Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski to the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces of November 6, 1930 on the relationship of Germany towards Poland and the state of Germany's relations with other countries.

and to characterize his officers' cadre. As can be seen, from 1929, Lieutenant Colonel Morawski and his post was a complete informer of the intelligence headquarters. The information he provided led to the conclusion that Germany was not prone to a radical change in relations with Poland. Moreover, he expressed concern in the reports about the rise in German expenses for the army. His concern was also raised by the development of the military automotive sector in Germany, about which he informed the listeners as part of the lecture that he gave on 22 February 1932 at the Center for Higher Military Studies in Warsaw. He highly evaluated the mobilization system of Weimar Republic. During the lecture he stated that a plan of attack on Poland could possibly be under development. He also stressed the fact that the Germans would concern about the immediate end of the conflict using the motorized divisions and aviation. Poland would be attacked concentrically from East Prussia, Western Pomerania, the Lubusz Land and Lower Silesia, and the general target of the attack would be the area of Warsaw. Undoubtedly, this lecture was an excellent summary of his four-year work at the post.

As previously mentioned, the strained relations with Germany caused that the intelligence materials could not be obtained from the source [Lossowski 1995, pp. 42-43; Jaracz 2001, pp. 13-34]. During the lecture given at that time, Lieutenant Colonel Morawski described the combat capabilities of the German Army from 1932 as 300.000 soldiers organized in 21 infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions. However, as far as information obtained is concerned, the list of cases commissioned by the intelligence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the instructions was implemented [Wozny 2000, p. 17]. He informed the Polish authorities about the significant advancement of the modernization of the German Army, the development of motorized troops, radio-location systems, chemical forces, and the production of ammunition, which was the clear violation of the Treaty of Versailles. However, it should be noted that the data provided by the French intelligence to the Division II exaggerated the nature of the training of reserves in Germany or understated some data [Wozny 2000, p. 16]. Lieutenant Colonel Morawski used non-governmental circles in his information work. The survey method was the main form of work of the head of the Military Attaché Office in Berlin. He obtained information mainly from German industrialists, pro-Polish environments opposing the Stresemann's Cabinet, German supporters of disarmament and pacifists as well as contacts with German nationalists. In the intelligence work of Lieutenant Colonel Morawski the emphasis was put on contact and cooperation with the attachés of neighboring countries and those kindly disposed towards Poland. The interest in deepening mutual relations in the Balkans and in the Baltic Sea basin was emphasized in contact with neighboring posts.

Attempts were made to acquire the Britain military attaché for cooperation by revealing cases of cooperation between Germany and the USSR. The US and Japanese Military Attachés maintained good relations with Lt. Col. Morawski on the political, social and private basis due to the common views on the subject of the USSR. The military attaché of Italy was observed to determine what relations he had with Germany, which was a derivative of the alliance with France that had its interests in the Mediterranean countries. The Czechoslovakian attaché maintained relations with the Polish

post due to the common German military threat. The activities of the Soviet military attaché in Berlin were also under the constant observation [Majzner 2014, p. 321]. As mentioned, the information work of the Polish attaché was based on public sources, which supplemented the information obtained from surveys and observations. The reason for dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Morawski from his post was his request for resignation motivated by the inability to carry out the mission, which he stressed in February 1932. The indirect cause, however, was the accusation by the German newspapers of espionage, which caused that he left the post on March 31, 1932 [Kolakowski and Krzak 2015, p. 43].

It is not difficult to conclude why such suspicions appeared. If, despite the ban, Lt. Col. Morawski undertook actions resulting from the resident's rights, i.e. supervision of an illegal intelligence and offensive counterintelligence agents, which was indicated in the counterintelligence instructions for military attachés. It ordered the attaché to keep an active and passive cover of the post against infiltration, record cases of espionage in Germany and inform the headquarters about them as well as protect state secrets and ciphers in the post [Majzner 2013, pp. 159-170]. The negotiation by Lieutenant Colonel Morawski of the price of obtaining documents important from the point of view of the German threat of war, for which 7 million German marks were to be paid, may be an example confirming the thesis of his espionage activity.¹⁵ He also had to counteract anti-Polish propaganda [Peplonski 2004, pp. 247-263]. Another reason could be the reluctance of the Germans to the manager of the post, but not so important that it would be the cause of the expulsion. At that time, a decision was made to free up the position discussed in this text, and when the attaché was leaving his successor had been appointed. It should be pointed out that such a long term of office of Lieutenant Colonel Morawski resulted from his ability to analyze and reason.

The four-year stay of Lieutenant Colonel Morawski at the post resulted from his previously mentioned high qualifications, he was a qualified officer with the period worked at the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces [Majzner 2006, p. 74]. When emphasizing the fact of his operation in Berlin, his report, dated January 10, 1931, which indicated that the German Army could count from 300 to 400 thousand soldiers who would be well and modernly armed was of significant importance. In addition, motorized infantry divisions were to create the core of the Army. Germany put emphasis on instantaneous strikes. Already in the report, he refuted the military authorities' thesis that he exaggerated the situation, arguing that Germany was enforcing its strength from the conclusion of the Treaty of Versailles, and the German threat was growing. He also underlined the fact that the German Army consisted of two separate systems. The German doctrine assumed the creation of heavily fortified areas on the Polish border, which will be occupied by citizens-in-arms, that is, forces weaker in combat but with a high defensive advantage. He noticed the uniqueness of the German fortification system, which was based on natural water and terrain obstacles [Majzner 2008,

¹⁵ CAW, reference number I.303.4.7080, The Letter regarding the obtaining of war materials from the source for the sum of 7 million German marks sent to the Chief of the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces on April 20, 1931.

p. 492]. Architecturally, the arms depots were not large warehouses, but were located in small shelters scattered in the area and armed with heavy machine guns, which giving the appearance of passive defense were supposed to be a cover of the concentration of large impact assemblies [cf. Lach 2010, pp. 209-219].¹⁶ According to the author, the German doctrine sought the fastest possible general solution, which was to be proved by 75 and 37 mm artillery sub-units located in the regiment's structures. The formations were to operate strictly according to the commander's assumptions in the field, which he based not only on information, but also on conversations with the other attachés. Each type of weapon was to operate according to a strictly defined plan.

However, this happened after breaking the resistance of the enemy. The vanguard was assigned while concealing further directions of attack. However, they were to reveal only after the positions had been taken by the front guard, which also created the first communications network, only then the infantry, artillery and heavy machine gun units moved into battle. The infantry moved under cover fire to the starting positions. It was planned to use supporting weapons to occupy the initial dislocation points and mask the attack directions, for which smoke screens were to be used. They were to be used when attacking subsequent positions and mask assaults on the enemy flanks. The war doctrine of Germany was based on armored and motorized weapons as well as supporting weapons [Majzner 2008, pp. 492-494; Kozaczuk 2008, pp. 263-318]. A flexible organization of troops adapted to the specificity of the area occupied was used. The Supreme Command of the Polish Armed Forces was also warned not to disregard the quoted report. This doctrine could change. He informed that after unblocking the Rhineland, Germany felt an increasing need for armaments, as well as about the fact that more and more emphasis was put on the offensive doctrine and the Army enlargement. He also noticed that his views should be subjected to more thorough analysis [Majzner 2008, pp. 492-494].

Conclusions

At the beginning of the formation of Polish diplomacy there was no uniform opinion on the functioning of military diplomacy. In addition to the positions of military attachés, the posts were set up to purchase weapons and military diplomacy positions protecting Polish soldiers who were outside the country. The next ones were the missions operating to bring Polish soldiers from abroad to the country.

In April 1922, twelve military attaché offices were financed, which carried out tasks beyond the borders of the Second Polish Republic. The years 1927-1939 brought further reorganizations of military attaché offices abroad, and the Division II took over the supervision of military attaché offices of foreign states accredited in Warsaw to the At the same time, in 1934, the privileges of military attachés of foreign states were sanctioned.

¹⁶ Wiesław Lach draws attention to the fact that the fortification system in the German military doctrine was considered from 1919, while the second important thing was the detection of fortification systems in the region of Krosno on Oder and in the Masurian District in East Prussia by the international control in 1928, the first one covered the area of 40 km and the second 150 km. Both had the character of ring fortresses.

The method of typing and training officers candidates for the positions of military attachés helped to deepen and increase the competences of officers typed and appointed for these positions. These competences also became a contribution to building the elite not only of civilian diplomacy, but also the elite of the state administration of the Second Polish Republic after 1926.

The problems of appointing the military attaché office at the Berlin delegation of the Second Republic of Poland was related to the reluctance to its presence in international control bodies, such as the 1921 Control Commission mentioned above. However, the quality of materials conveyed by the French intelligence in 1921-1928 spoke in favor of the establishment of the attaché office. It was treated by the French as a necessary evil, especially after Locarno. Finally, the exchange of intelligence information was suspended by the Division II at the end of the 1920s due to the weakening military-diplomatic relations between Poland and France.

An ambivalent attitude of successive Legates of the Republic of Poland to intelligence work and informing military intelligence about the threat posed by Germany contributed to the creation of the attaché office. Legate Jerzy Madejski even received a reprimand from the Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for not responding to the intelligence's questions about the German threat. After this expulsion, the commercial adviser and Legate Olszowski carried out the tasks of the intelligence informer in the Legation.

At the same time, the operational situation in Germany after the Treaty of Versailles, which was unfavorable for the independence of Poland, also spoke for the establishment of the attaché office. In the years 1919-1928, and especially after 1922, the Second Polish Republic was the subject of information fights on the part of Germany and the USSR. In addition, intelligence and counterintelligence activities in Germany were carried out by the Army, police institutions and Grenzschutz. The Military Attaché Office was created after long discussions. Negotiations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Military Affairs were crowned the order of the Ministry of Military Affairs of January 20, 1928, which appointed Major Witold Dzierzykraj-Morawski as the military attaché of the Legation of the Republic of Poland in Berlin. He held the office entrusted to him until March 31, 1932.

During his activity in Berlin, he carried out a number of intelligence tasks, including informing about maneuvers of the German Army in 1928-1931, about which he obtained information not only from open sources such as posters or German newspapers. The second source of this activity was contacts with military attachés of other countries. Until the end of his term of office he conducted activities aimed at discrediting the USSR in the eyes of the British by revealing the cooperation of the Soviets with the Germans.

It should be emphasized that Lieutenant Colonel Morawski had to fulfill tasks in the difficult period of the Polish-German Customs War, as his tasks included the purchase of fuel and the security of Polish transit through Germany. He also was supposed to monitor the continuous progress of the German Army in the field of technology violat-

ing Treaty arrangements from Versailles. He was also to advise the Polish Legate on defense matters.

Like the other attachés, through his assistants, he supervised other intelligence centers placed both at consulates and outside them. He also supervised the intelligence activity outside the post. Furthermore, he protected the state secrets in the Legation and directed activities related to the counterintelligence cover of the Legation.

What is more, he had to make the characteristics of the Reichswehr officers and their attitude to Poland. He also conducted activities related to the recognition of social moods in Germany. He acquired the German military doctrine based on the analysis of knowledge obtained from the attachés of other states. The analyses made became the basis for the lecture given by Lieutenant Colonel Morawski in Warsaw to the supreme military authorities (February 1932).

The content of the lecture was the German doctrine and the state of the organization of the German Army at the beginning of 1932. Although the report was from January 10, 1931, the size of the German Army was estimated at about 300 000-400 000 soldiers deployed in 21 armored-mechanized infantry divisions and 5 cavalry divisions aimed at striking Poland from the Lubusz Land, Western Pomerania and Lower Silesia, and East Prussia, which corresponds to the attack made on Poland in September 1939.

The war doctrine assumed a flexible organization of military operations depending on the field situation and the division of the Army into two parts. The offensive army was to hit concentrically in accordance with the orders in the field. The second part was supposed to be a territorial army, embedded in natural obstacles scattered on the territory of the country, serving only to engage enemy units. The task of the defensive forces was to involve the enemy's forces. Obtaining this type of information was not a simple thing and it was made difficult by the protocol issues resulting from the non-placement of a military attaché of Germany in the Legation of the Weimar Republic in Warsaw. Nevertheless, Lt. Col. Morawski obtained information through personal contacts with military diplomats of countries positively disposed towards Poland and the analytical work with open sources. The second large group of informers of the military attaché of the Legation of the Polish Republic in Berlin included the political opposition, industrialists and journalists, after talks with whom Lt. Col. Morawski immediately informed the Polish military authorities about the growing threat to the security of interwar Poland.

One of the indirect causes of the resignation of Lieutenant Colonel Morawski from his position was the accusation of the aforementioned spying and the unwillingness of German agents to the Polish military diplomat for his actions and their effectiveness. However, the attitude of the British to Germany did not change in every case, deepening the British *epissement* policy, which, as we know, ultimately led to the outbreak of World War II.

In the name of the mythical balance of power on the continent, the United Kingdom was to be an arbitrator of the continental powers and in the name of historical phobias against France it favored Germany that alongside fascist Italy and the USSR was the

factor destabilizing Europe. Another thing is that during his actions Lt. Col. Morawski watched the activities of the USSR and Italy, which indicates that the attaché and military authorities had specific directions of action. It indicates that the selection of intelligence friendship in Berlin was accurate: anti-Soviet countries (Japan, the USA, Turkey, Spain), common threats (Czechoslovakia) and cooperation in the Baltic area (Sweden, Latvia, Estonia, Finland), as well as the Balkans (Yugoslavia and Romania). These directions of deepening diplomatic relations contributed to the effective work of Lt. Col. Witold Morawski in Germany.

According to the author, there is one conclusion as regards the Lt. Col. Morawski's resignation; four years in office in a country that was negatively oriented towards him had to bring him to such a decision. It should be noted that such a long term of Lieutenant Colonel Morawski's office was not a coincidence. The educated officer with internship at the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces trained in Prague and Bucharest in the years 1921-1926 in the positions of a military attaché's assistant. As for such a long term, it resulted from the competence of the officer, the will of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the leadership of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, as well as the great trust and contacts that Lieutenant Colonel Morawski still had from the time of the service in the Guard of the Emperor Wilhelm II during the First World War, which the military authorities and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs knew.

Moreover, Lt. Col. Morawski's attitude was not insignificant. Undoubtedly, he was the officer with a great sense of honor, as indicated by the circumstances of his resignation. At the same time, he was a person with high military and personal competences, who was able to make contacts to obtain specific information essential for the security of the state. Secondly, he was an excellent analyst who was able to extract the smallest details, caring about the content of the created documents and the implementation of entrusted tasks in a way characterized by the highest ethos.

Conflict of interests

The author declared no conflict of interests.

Author contributions

Author contributed to the interpretation of results and writing of the paper. Author read and approved the final manuscript.

Ethical statement

The research complies with all national and international ethical requirements.

ORCID

Damian Zurawski – The author declared that he has no ORCID ID's

References

Archives

Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie, Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego, sygn. I.303.322.12, *Akta zasadnicze Referatu Zachod*, karta 70.

Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie, Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego, sygn. I.303.4.7861, karta 118, Pismo Attaché wojskowego w Berlinie pplk. Witolda Dzierzykraj-Morawskiego w sprawie zwrotu części środków z sumy 1000 zł z dnia 30 czerwca 1931 roku, przekazanej na rzecz zakupu garnituru przez kpt. Stefana Osike (data wystawienia nieczytelna lub wytarta). Przesłane do szefa Oddziału II SG WP plk. dypl. Tadeusza Pelczynskiego.

Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie, Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego, sygn. I.303.4.2212, Raport Attaché Wojskowego pplk. Witolda Dzierzykraj-Morawskiego do szefa Oddziału II SG WP plk. dypl. Tadeusza Pelczynskiego z 27 lutego 1930 r. o kształcie manewrow Reichswery z lat 1929-1930 i metodzie pozyskania informacji o nich.

Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie, Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego, sygn. I.303.4.2212, karta 220, Raport Attaché Wojskowego pplk. Witolda Dzierzykraj-Morawskiego do Oddziału II SG WP z 18 stycznia 1930 r. o chęci zbliżenia lub poprawy w stosunkach Polsko-Niemieckich oraz próbach pozyskania przez gen. Hansa von Seecta rumuńskiej generalicji do projektów wojskowo-handlowych.

Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie, Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego, sygn. I.303.4.2205, karta 106-107, Raport Attaché Wojskowego pplk. Witolda Dzierzykraj-Morawskiego do szefa Oddziału II SG WP plk. dypl. Tadeusza Pelczynskiego z 24 maja 1929 r.

Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie, Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego, sygn. I.303.4.2205, karta 157-158, Raport Attaché Wojskowego pplk. Witolda Dzierzykraj-Morawskiego do szefa Oddziału II SG WP plk. dypl. Tadeusza Pelczynskiego z 1 czerwca 1929 r.

Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie, Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego, sygn. I.303.4.2212, karta 220, Raport Attaché Wojskowego pplk. Witolda Dzierzykraj-Morawskiego do szefa Oddziału II SG WP plk. dypl. Tadeusza Pelczynskiego z 18 stycznia 1930 r. w sprawie wydania zgody na pośrednictwo attache Finlandii do kontaktu z przedstawicielami dyplomacji wojskowych Szwecji i Turcji w sprawie manewrow sowieckich odbytych w ZSRR w 1929 r.

Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie, Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego, sygn. I.303.4.2212, karta 141, Raport Attaché Wojskowego pplk. Witolda Dzierzykraj-Morawskiego do Oddziału II SG WP z 6 listopada 1930 r. o stosunku Niemiec do Polski i stanie relacji Niemiec z innymi krajami.

Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe w Warszawie, Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego, sygn. I.303.4.7080, Pismo w sprawie uzyskania materiałów wojennych od źródła za sumę 7 mln marek niemieckich wysłane szefa Oddziału II SG WP 20 kwietnia 1931 r.

Printed sources

Brzeski, R. (2014). *Kontrwywiad obywatelski*, [online]. Posted by Maciej Konarski on 8 September 2014. Available at: <https://socjocybernetyka.wordpress.com/2014/09/08/dr-rafal-brzeski-kontrwywiad-obywatelski/> [Accessed: 7 February 2019].

Czarnecka, R. (2009). *Oddział II Sztabu Głównego (Generalnego) w latach 1921-1939. Zarys organizacyjny i przegląd zawartości inwentarza*, [online]. Available at: <https://www.zbfsop.pl/>

archiwum/index.php/archiwum/387-oddzia-ii-sztabu-gownego-generalnego-w-latach-1921-39.html [Accessed: 7 March 2019].

Cwiek, H. (2001). *Przeciw Abwerze*, Warszawa.

Cwiek, H. (2009). *W tajnej służbie II Rzeczypospolitej. Wywiad Polski wobec Niemiec w latach 1918-1939*. Czestochowa.

Jaracz, R. (2001). Działalność attache wojskowego Witolda Dzierżykrajca Morawskiego w okresie międzywojennym. *Mars*, no. 11.

Kedziora-Plachciak, J. (2014). *Od dyplomacji wojskowej do cywilnej. Personel attachatów wojskowych II RP – nabor i przygotowanie oraz funkcjonowanie w strukturach Ministerstwa Spraw Zagranicznych*. In: Kolakowski, P. and Peplonski, A. (eds.). *Za kulisami wywiadu i dyplomacji. Polski Wywiad wojskowy 1918-1945*. Kraków.

Kolakowski, P. (ed.). (2005). Instrukcja ogólna dla attache wojskowych z 10 listopada 1920 r. *Zeszyty Historyczne*, no. 151, pp. 79-94.

Kolakowski, P. (ed.). (2007). Instrukcja ogólna 24 sierpnia 1922 r. dla attache wojskowych przy przedstawicielstwach dyplomatycznych Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. *Zeszyty Historyczne*, no. 1, pp. 143-150.

Kolakowski, P. (ed.). (2012). Przywileje i uprawnienia obcych attache wojskowych państw. Instrukcja z 1934 roku. *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy*, no. 13 (64)/3 (241), pp. 105-116.

Kolakowski, P. and Krzak, A. (2015). *Sprawa majora Jerzego Sosnowskiego*. Warszawa.

Kopczyk, H. (1970). *Niemiecka działalność wywiadowcza na Pomorzu 1920-1933*. Gdansk.

Kozaczuk, W. (2008). *Wehrmacht*, Warszawa.

Lach, W. (2010). *Polska północna w systemie obronnym kraju w latach 1918-1926*. Olsztyn.

Lossowski, P. (ed.). (1995). *Historia dyplomacji polskiej (półowa X-XX w.)*. Vol. 4, 1918-1939. Warszawa.

Lossowski, P. (2001). *Dyplomacja polska 1918-1939*. Warszawa.

Majzner, R. (ed.). (2003). Attachat wojskowy przy Poselstwie/Ambasadzie RP w Berlinie w latach 1928-1939. Wytyczne organizacyjne. *Zeszyty Naukowe Państwowej Wyższej Szkoły Zawodowej we Włocławku. Rozprawy Humanistyczne*, no. 1, pp. 169-185.

Majzner, R. (2006). *Polski wywiad wojskowy wobec polityki III Rzeszy 1933-1939*. Torun.

Majzner, R. (ed.). (2006). Instrukcje ogólne dla attache wojskowych II Rzeczypospolitej. *Zeszyty Historyczne*, no. 157, pp. 25-61.

Majzner, R. (2008). *Wkład attachatów wojskowych w rozwój polskiej myśli wojskowej II Rzeczypospolitej w latach 1919-1939*. In: Lach, W., Gajownik, T. and Radziwillowicz, D. (eds.), *Polska myśl wojskowa na przestrzeni dziejów*. Olsztyn.

Majzner, R. (2013). *Zadania kontrwywiadowcze w zakresie obowiązków attache wojskowych w latach 1918-1939. Zarys problematyki*. In: Nawrocki, Z. (ed.), *Kontrwywiad II RP. (1914) 1918-1945 (1948)*. Vol. 1. Warszawa; Emow.

Majzner, R. (2014). *Attachaty wojskowe Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej 1919-1945. Strukturalno-organizacyjne aspekty funkcjonowania*. 2 ed. Czestochowa.

Majzner, R. (2014a). *Mankamenty osłony kontrwywiadowczej attachatów wojskowych II RP na przykładzie placówki moskiewskiej. Zarys problematyki*. In: Nawrocki, Z. (ed.), *Kontrwywiad II RP. (1914) 1918-1945 (1948)*. Vol. 2. Warszawa; Emow.

- Majzner, R. (2014b). *System łączności szyfrowej attachatów wojskowych w latach 1919-1939. Zarys problematyki*. In: Majzner, R. (ed.). *Sukcesy i porażki wywiadu polskiego 1918-1945*. Częstochowa.
- Misiuk, A. (1998). *Sluzby Specjalne II Rzeczypospolitej*. Warszawa.
- Peplonski, A. (2004). *Wywiad a dyplomacja w II Rzeczypospolitej*. Torun.
- Piasecki, B. (2014). Kontrwywiad ofensywny jako element systemu bezpieczeństwa państwa. *Przegląd Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego*, no. 10/14, pp. 260-271.
- Plachciak, G. (2006). *Zarys działalności informacyjno-wywiadowczej attachatu wojskowego w Paryżu w latach 1921-1939*. In: Kolakowski, P. and Peplonski, A. (eds.), *Polski Wywiad Wojskowy 1918-1945*. Torun.
- Plachciak, G. (2014). *Zarys działalności attachatów wojskowych II RP w państwach bałtyckich (Finlandia, Estonia, Lotwa) w latach 1919-1939*. In: Kolakowski, P. and Peplonski, A. (eds.), *Za kulisami wywiadu i dyplomacji. Polski wywiad wojskowy, 1918-1945*. Krakow.
- Sadowski, L. (2014). *Oddział II Sztabu Generalnego. Rezultaty pracy pokojowej i przygotowania do wojny*. Lodz.
- Skrzeczowski, H. (2002). *Współdziałanie Wojskowych służb informacyjnych z Policją państwową w II Rzeczypospolitej*. Torun.
- Szymaniuk, R., Wszendyrowny, A. and Jaskula, A. (eds.). (2014). *Polska dyplomacja wojskowa 1918-1945. Wybór dokumentów*. Vol. 1. Warszawa.
- Szymanowicz, A. (2013). *Na tajnym froncie polsko-niemieckim. Polski wywiad w Prusach Wschodnich 1918-1939*. Gdynia.
- Watt, R.M. (2007). *Gorzka chwala. Polska i jej los 1918-1939*. Warszawa.
- Wodejko, M. (n.d.). *Materiały do działalności attachatów wojskowych przy ambasadach II Rzeczypospolitej w zasobie Centralnego Archiwum Wojskowego*, [online]. Available at: <https://docplayer.pl/16229368-Materiały-do-działalności-attachatów-wojskowych-przy-ambasadach-ii-rzeczypospolitej-w-zasobie-centralnego-archiwum-wojskowego.html> [Accessed: 7 February 2019].
- Wozny, A. (2000). *Niemieckie przygotowania do wojny z Polską w ocenach naczelnych władz wojskowych II Rzeczypospolitej 1933-1939*. Warszawa.
- Wozny, A. (ed.). (2007). Instrukcje z 1928 i 1932 roku dla oficerów polskiego attachatu w Berlinie. *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy*, no. 2, pp. 195-201.
- Zebrowski, A. (2014). *Oddział II Sztabu Głównego Wojska Polskiego uczestnikiem wojny informacyjnej na kierunkach Niemcy i Rosja*. In: Kolakowski, P. and Peplonski, A. (eds.), *Wywiad wojskowy II Rzeczypospolitej*. Krakow, pp. 357-387.
- Zebrowski, A. (2014). *Sytuacja operacyjna w państwach graniczących z Polską znajdujących się w obszarze zainteresowania operacyjnego Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego WP (wybrane aspekty)*. In: Kolakowski, P. and Peplonski, A. (eds.), *Za kulisami wywiadu i dyplomacji. Polski wywiad wojskowy, 1918-1945*. Krakow, pp. 213-243.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Damian Zurawski – M.A. in History, PhD student in the science discipline History at the Institute of History and International Relations at the University of Warmia and Mazury in Olsztyn since October 2015. He defended his master's thesis in June 2014 under the supervision of Prof. Dr. hab. Andrzej Kopiczko. The title of the work: *Formation of Poland's borders in the years 1918-1923*. His research interests cover the area of security of the Second Polish Republic and the functioning of intelligence agencies and the protection of Polish borders in the interwar period. He is interested in contemporary national and international security of countries. He is also interested in music and film as well as in literature and journalism. So far, he has published reviews in the Scientific Journals of the Ostrołęka Scientific Society and a report on the event in *Notes from the Borderland*.

How to cite this paper

Zurawski, D. (2018). Implementation of intelligence and diplomatic tasks by the military attache office of the legation of the Republic of Poland in Berlin in 1928-1932. *Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces*, vol. 50, no. 4(190), pp. 82-100, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.0724>



This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>