

Original article

The evolution of the strategy of the Islamic State in the years 2014-2017

Miłosz Gac 

Department of Finance and Management, Department of Security Sciences,
Higher School of Banking in Gdańsk, Poland,
e-mail: mgac@wsb.gda.pl

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ABSTRACT

In the last three years, the Islamic State (ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) had to redefine its strategy as a result of air raids conducted by the antiterrorist coalition. The tactic is no longer concentrated on the territorial expansion and the creation of their own statehood, but on the attacks carried out by the so-called “lone wolves”, just like in the case of their rival Al-Qaeda. The idea of a solitary attack is accompanied by a new method used by the terrorists – crashing into people or places with the help of cars. Since the events in Nice in 2016, this phenomenon, known as “ramming”, has taken a death toll in Europe.

KEYWORDS

Islamic State, terrorism, “low cost”, “ramming”



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Introduction

The Islamic State (ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) is a contemporary terrorist organization which has taken over great areas of Syria and Iraq as a result of military activities, thus becoming the leader of global terrorism. After declaring the formation of a Caliphate in this region, ISIS started usurping the right to govern over all Muslims in the world. In the first year of its existence, ISIS followed the strategy of territorial expansion and creation of para-statal structures in the conquered lands. After the initial success, the power of the jihadists started to diminish. As a result of territorial losses in both Syria and Iraq, the leaders of ISIS have changed their methods of operation. The new strategy rejects the long processes of coordination and action-planning, replacing them with the ‘lone wolves’ recruitment, who act independently, do not have any connection with any of the groups and do not demonstrate their beliefs. Among this type of terrorists, the ‘low cost’ terrorism based on killing people with the use of cars seems to have the dominant role. It is simple, cheap and effective. In the last three years this method, known as ‘ramming’, has become immensely popular among the terrorists and was used in the attacks in Nice, London, Stockholm, Berlin and Barcelona.

1. The Strategy of the Islamic State in the Middle East

The origin of the Islamic State dates back to the Second Gulf War (also known as the Iraq War), when the international forces dominated by Americans, began the liberation of Iraqi citizens from Saddam Husain's reign. At that time, in the whole country, Al-Qaeda – a Sunni terrorist organisation, created a dependent group under the name of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, led by a Jordanian Abu Musab az-Zarkawi. After the death of Abu Musab az-Zarkawi in an American bombing raid on June 6, 2006, Abu Abd Allah ar-Rashid al-Baghdadi emerged as the leader of the organization and renamed it to the Islamic State of Iraq. In the conquered areas in the Al-Anbar province near the Syrian border, the jihadists became notorious for especially brutal methods aimed at the civilians. The organization was not popular among the locals, which resulted in the American and Iraqi armies defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and killing the current leader Abu Abd Allah ar-Rashid al-Baghdadi on April 19, 2010 [1, p. 56]. The crisis in the group was quickly averted by handing over the leadership to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who seized a fertile ground for establishing the base for international terrorism. The decision to withdraw the American army in December 2011, the events of the Arab Spring, the fall of the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the Shiite Prime Minister's Nuri al-Maliki repressive policy towards the Sunni community in Iraq, allowed the jihadists from the Islamic State of Iraq to increase their military – financial potential and the territorial range of their influence. The result was a spectacular expansion in parts of Syria and large areas in North-West Iraq.

Entering the conflict-driven Syria coincided with the announcement of the change of the organization's name to the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL). The sloppy reaction of the Western countries enabled ISIL to intensify their activities, which allowed the Islamists to take control over the Syrian city of Raqqa and a number of important sites in Iraq: Mosul, Tikrit and Haditha. The jihadists started to establish their reign over the conquered lands, and the announcement of reopening institutions in the controlled areas made on June 29, 2014 after a thousand years of absence was unprecedented. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi became the leader of the self-proclaimed state and declared himself the Caliph or, in other words, the ruler of all Muslims in the world.

The acquisition of parts of the territories of Syria and Iraq was an element of a planned strategy to create a religious state, based on Koran Sharia law [1, p. 57]. Realisation of the plan was initiated with the introduction of civil law code founded upon an ultraconservative interpretation of the Koran. The document called "The City Contract" contained radical provisions, among which there was the following religious credo: "All the Muslims shall be treated well, unless they ally themselves with oppressors and bandits; everybody who wants to leave the faith or convert, will meet with death" or "chapels and graves are forbidden and shall be destroyed, this law is aimed against the Shiites, who worship the graves of the dead, unlike the Sunni [2]. Till today, the Islamic State code of law emphasises the content known from Koran, like the *Al-Maida surah*: "whoever steals, he shall have his limbs amputated. Whoever threatens the other or blackmails, he shall meet a severe punishment, and the criminals death or crucifixion" [2].

The Islamic State, with the territory and law binding thereon, has become a model for creating and consolidating influence in a given area. Aspiring to become a state, it has managed to combine the three indispensable attributes of functioning of a country: administration,

finances and freedom fighters. The administration is based on a hierarchical structure which includes the Caliph on the top position, two of his subordinate deputies and the local leaders of lower ranks under them [1, p. 58]. During the peak moment of ISIS' existence, these functions were held by soldiers from Saddam Hussein's army, such as Abu Ali al-Anbari¹, responsible for the functioning of the Islamic State in Syria, and Abu Muslim al-Turkmani², to whom the ISIS structures in Iraq were appointed. The other elements of the Caliphate's governing system are: the administrative sector on the central, regional and local level, where the military activities are planned and where the actions of the city and provincial security leaders are strictly monitored. However, the "Sharia" (a religion council) is responsible for the functioning of the religious institutions and respecting the Sharia law. It shall be emphasized that for violation of the law the courts in the Caliphate would sentence the citizens to severe punishment, among which there are: beating, whipping with a rubber belt and electroshocking [3]. The second sphere is the social sector that aims to provide sufficient quality of social services, for example: humanitarian aid as well as services, maintenance and development of the basic, critical infrastructure – water and energy supply [1, p. 58].

The quick rise and significance of the Islamic State in the region was undoubtedly achieved due to its accumulated fortune. The riches enabled the jihadists to subsequently conquer the cities, while the main source of income were the resources in the occupied territories. As a result of the attack on Syria, 60% of the oilfields in the eastern part of the country have been taken over, which allowed to increase the foreign recruitment and buy the arms, and consequently attack Iraq. The loot in Iraq was even more spectacular, as seven oilfields and two refineries were taken. The boldest move, however, was taking over the bank in Mosul, where 420 million dollars were stolen [4].

Apart from financing from the sale of crude oil in the peak period of its power, the Islamic State obtained the money from a system of fees and taxes introduced in the controlled territories, which might have supplied an income of around 3 million dollars per day [1, p. 58]. The rest of the profit has come from crime, such as drug trafficking, trading human organs and selling pieces of art from the looted areas on the black market [1, p. 60].

With a large budget at their disposal, ISIS terrorists do not have any problems with recruiting the fighters, as they are well paid. According to 'The Washington Post', in 2014, with 425 million dollars in the bank account, the Islamic State was able to pay 600 dollars per month for a whole year to 60 thousand fighters [4]. The recruitment to the armed forces takes places not only in the Middle East, but also in Africa, Europe, Asia, USA and Australia [1, p. 58]. For recruiting purposes, the Islamic State propagandists use two methods – the formal and the ideological one. They are substantially avid with the Internet, using the latest programs, uploading modern videos and the statements of ISIS leaders that are immediately translated into several languages, from English, German, French or Dutch to Turkish, Russian

¹ Abu Ali al-Anbari, better known as Abdul Rahman Mustafa al-Kaduli, died on March 25, 2016 during an American operation. See: M.S. Schmidt, M. Mazzetti. *A Top ISIS Leader Is Killed in an Airstrike, the Pentagon Says*, [online]. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/26/world/middleeast/abd-al-rahman-mustafa-al-qaduli-isis-reported-killed-in-syria.html> [Accessed: 5 September 2017].

² Abu Muslim al-Turkmani died on August 18, 2015 in an American air bombing attack on western Iraq. See: R. Sanchez. *Islamic State's deputy leader killed in US airstrike, White House says*, [online]. Available at: <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/11817711/Islamic-States-deputy-leader-killed-in-US-airstrike-White-House-says.html> [Accessed: 5 September 2017].

and Indonesian [5, p. 22]. As a result of opening to the new media, the jihadists are gaining popularity all over the world, an example being the few minutes long video of a Jordanian soldier burnt alive viewed on YouTube by 150 million web browsers, among which nearly 120 million Arabs [5, p. 22].

The Internet is also used to propagate ISIS ideology, which is even stronger than their formal power. The Islamic State is primarily depreciating the Western world, promoting slogans like: ‘in the place where you live you have a hard, complicated life, maybe they despise you, maybe they repress you, you cannot stand out of the crowd, you do not get promoted, maybe you do not have money or maybe you are a woman – in short, you are doomed to what you do not like, you do not understand much and you do not know a lot’ [5, p. 22]. It is not hard to imagine that the vision of the Caliphate is pictured in a totally different way, as a Koran paradise on Earth, where, apart from the spiritual fulfilment, you get a couple hundred dollars a month, a gun and a woman.

Such arguments are extremely tempting for young Muslims. Therefore, among the supporters of the Islamic State there are representatives of practically every social group, from pupils and students to doctors and engineers [6, p. 198].

The recruited individuals go through an intensive training in the bases and training facilities in Syria and Iraq, and either become soldiers in the fight for the Caliphate or ‘lone wolves’, ready to carry out terrorist attacks in the West. Thus, it comes without saying that in comparison with the other terrorist organizations, the self-proclaimed Caliphate has created a regular army, numbered at 50,000 in the peak period [7]. The potential and the possibility for a well-organised military structure of ISIS were confirmed by the takeover of Mosul in 2014, then defended by thousands of Iraqi soldiers [6, p. 192]. The success would not have been possible without the exquisite equipment and weapons available to the fighters. While still developing, the tactical potential of ISIS was shaped by the loots in the Syrian and Iraqi campaigns. It’s worth emphasising that apart from rifles and grenade launchers, the terrorists have also accumulated road vehicles “Humvee, M1117”, armored vehicles “M-113”, “MT-LB”, “BMP-1”, tanks “T54/55/62/72” and advanced antitank and antiaircraft defense systems [8].

In conclusion, the creation and the activity of the Islamic State is an exceptional phenomenon in the history of terrorism. Never before has a terrorist organization taken control over a legally functioning state. A number of closely related determinants played the key role in the establishment of the self-proclaimed Caliphate. The most important ones were: local and international events, accumulation of the sufficient logistic potential and effective use of the military potential [6, p. 191]. The Islamic State was fully able to take advantage of the favourable situation. In the time of prosperity, the state supported the strategy based on attacks on close targets and consolidated its own background. Thus, the main objective was to gain effective control over the territory, which required military, and not strictly terrorist actions. An example of such was bringing the structures of Syria and Iraq to a fall and then introducing their own administration in those territories based on Sharia law.

It needs to be emphasised that in the years 2014-2015, the ISIS strategy was based on territorial expansion in the Middle East, which differentiated them from Al-Qaeda, concentrated on terrorist attacks on targets in the Western world.

2. The new modus operandi of the Islamic State

Eventually, the functioning of the Islamic State with the organization of a terror campaign in the conquered territories and the peak period consisting in seizing an area similar in size to approximately 2/3 of Poland, could not be underestimated any longer by the Western world [6, p. 191]. In September 2014 the President of the United States of America Barack Obama introduced a conception of fight with the Islamic State. The strategy concentrated on four areas: air attacks on the terrorist positions in Iraq and Syria, supporting the moderate opposition which fought ISIS and Bashar al-Asad regime in Syria, intensification of actions aimed at cutting off the financial resources and stopping the flow of fighters joining ISIS and providing humanitarian aid to the refugees [9]. The conception was confirmed by the NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016, where it was stated that the Northern Alliance will get involved in the fight with the terrorism of the Islamic State by providing military trainings for the army and antiterrorist units in Iraq [10, p. 3].

United States of America then adopted the strategy to fight the Islamic State and began a campaign of air bombing on the jihadist positions, first in Iraq, then in Syria. France joined the fight and supported the USA with their air forces stationed in United Arab Emirates and Jordan. Since 2014, Great Britain has also played a major role in the antiterrorist coalition, with their contingent located in Cyprus, Bahrain and Mina Salman, as well as with the naval base of Royal Navy vessels [11]. It is worth mentioning that Arabic countries and the Kurdish region also joined the fight against the Islamists.

In 2015, the joined armies of the antiterrorist coalition began to gradually force the Islamic State onto the defensive. The ISIS territory started shrinking, from 25 to 40% in Iraq and between 10 and 20% in Syria [6, p. 191]. Moreover, the allied Iraqi government and Kurdish Peshmerga offensive, supported by the Americans, reached the eastern banks of Tigris river. Therefore, the Islamic State lost a number of important cities, like Tal Abiad or Tikrit, as well as the biggest refinery of crude oil in the Iraqi Baiji [12]. The jihadists also experienced severe defeats in the Euphrates region where the Iraqi armies, supported by the USA, took over the cities of Al Hit and Fallujah [13].

The fact that the self-proclaimed Caliphate is coming to an end was indicated by the loss of the biggest ISIS-governed city – Mosul. The offensive to take over the capital city of the jihadists in Iraq started in the middle of October 2016 and lasted until July 9, 2017, when the Prime Minister of Iraq Hajdar al-Abadi announced its liberation. With the capitulation of Mosul, the Islamic State lost its last bastion in Iraq, the city of Tal Afar, where the top leaders of the Caliphate were born [14]. The greatest defeat for ISIS was the loss of Raqqa, the self-proclaimed capital city of terrorism and terrorists. The city had stayed in the hands of the Islamic State from January 2014 as a residence of the Caliphate leaders [15].

In comparison to 2014, the territory of the self-proclaimed state has shrunk by over 2/3. The process of losing the influence in the Middle East also meant the decline of money and fighters on the territories of Syria and Iraq. In 2014, there were 80,000 jihadists fighting for ISIS, while in 2017 this number dropped to 12,000-15,000 [16, p. 12].

The defeats mentioned above did not determine the defeat of the Islamic State. Diminishing of the influence in the Middle East did not by any means eradicate the idea of jihad among the local fighters. The fathers of the Islamic State, aware of no possibility of holding the whole territory, decided to change their strategy and concentrate on the fight with Western

countries on their territories, in the style of Al-Qaeda. The change in the approach stems out of the statement of the late ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, who encouraged the jihadists to carry out attacks in Europe in the following words: "If you cannot detonate a bomb or shoot, drive over them with a car. The smallest action, performed in their territory is more useful than what you can do with us" [17, p. 13]. The aforementioned propaganda brought a new strategy, in which the major role is played by the 'lone wolf' or 'sleeping' jihad fighter, utilising all the tools he has at hand to commit a crime³. The evolution of the operation methods is portrayed as 'low-cost' terrorism, because there is no need for the terrorist to create any network to obtain rifles, grenades or high-power explosives. The primary element of this strategy is the shock in the media, spreading fear in the minds of common citizens of the attacked countries, or even, the whole Western world [17, p. 13]. In the concepts of the Islamic State ideologists, fear is the priority because it brings particular consequences such as the rise in approval of anti-Islamic populists and the level of reluctance towards Muslims. This way the Islamists from the West are to feel that the indigenous societies of the countries they live in have an antagonistic attitude towards them. Such escalation of tensions is supposed to provoke the will to radicalize among the Islamists, and as a result, the will to join 'the holy war'. It needs to be emphasised that insecure, hung-up, fame-seeking, blinded with hate and fanaticism or simply psychologically unstable people are particularly prone to this kind of propaganda. They allow themselves to get easily involved in what seemingly is a consistent religious, ideological and political argumentation. This situation was quickly used by the terrorist identifying themselves with the Islamic State who were born in the Western world [18]. The fact that the attacks carried out by 'lone wolves' have doubled in Europe and the USA when compared with the years 2011-2014 proves the above claim [17, p. 13]. Apart from the creation of a new category of fighters, it is important to note that the attacks are performed in a different way than the earlier bombings. A car has become the new 'modus operandi' of the jihadists and the number one weapon. The decisive thing here, compared with the skills needed to create a bomb in home conditions, is the simplicity, economy and effectiveness of such a tool. After the analysis of the terrorist attacks that involved cars, performed or inspired by the Islamic State, we can say that the first attack took place on July 14, 2014, when a truck ran into a crowd on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice.

The attack was carried out late in the evening at a seaside boulevard where thousands of residents and tourists were watching the last moments of the fireworks, organized to celebrate the French national holiday [19]. The perpetrator turned out to be a 31-year-old Tunisian French, Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, who used a refrigerator truck rented a couple of days earlier for this spectacular attack. On July 14, late in the evening, driving around 90 km per hour, while zig-zagging, he ran over a crowd, killing 86 and injuring 430 people. To make things worse, the suicide terrorist did not have any problems with renting the largest and heaviest truck in the rental company. Moreover, Moahmed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel did not hold a license to drive such a heavy car. Therefore, the attack showed both the ineffectiveness of

³ The idea of a lone attack was introduced to the Islamic world by the Syrian Abu Musab as-Suri. Due to an initiative coming from the Arabian Peninsula's Al-Qaeda, the concept was spread by the English-language newspaper "Inspire", which was supposed to encourage mainly western supporters to take the jihad into their own hands. The newspaper became infamous for including practical instructions how to construct a bomb and not get caught. See: R. Stefanicki. *Samotne wilki – oznaka słabości dżihadystów*. Gazeta Wyborcza. 2017;70, p. 13.

the police, who was securing the celebration of the national holiday, and the vulnerability of France in its fight with terrorists and the Islamic extremism.

After a tactical analysis of the events in Nice, it is noticeable that the attack had all the features characteristic for the strategy of the Islamic State. The terrorist attack was not led by ISIS headquarters, but it was based on the radicalization and manipulation of a mentally unstable person, who had a need to show his strength and draw attention to himself. The perpetrator, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, ideally fit the profile, did not have any connection with other groups, worked alone, did not show his beliefs and, what is more, was a lonely man with symptoms of depression.

A similar strategy served as the basis for the attacks in London in 2017. The terrorist attack on March 22 was unusually bold, since it took place on the Westminster Bridge, adjacent to the Parliament. Again, just as in Nice, the attacker used a car to run over the pedestrians. After leaving the car armed with a knife, the aggressor reached for the officer guarding the building of the Parliament. Had it not been for the police officer, he would have entered the area of the Parliament. 4 people were killed and around 40 were injured in the attack [20]. Khalid Masood, a 52-year-old man with a criminal record, but without a connection with any of the terrorist groups, was responsible for this tragedy. To carry out such an operation, he probably did not even need to contact the ISIS headquarters. However, the Islamic State admitted to having performed the attack, and presented Khalid Masood as a fighter of this organization.

The next car attack in the United Kingdom took place in June 2017. It was similar to the one on Westminster Bridge. A commercial vehicle ran into a group of pedestrians on London Bridge. The perpetrator then used knives to attack the people passing by the Borough Market. 8 people were killed and around 48 injured during the attack [21]. The Islamic State admitted to having performed the attack, although the attackers did not take part in any trainings in the organization – they were just jihadists inspired by its ideology.

A typical 'low-cost', inspired by the propaganda of the Islamic State terrorist attack happened on April 7, 2017 in Stockholm. Again, a truck, driving through a boulevard and running into a department store, killing 4 and injuring 15, was the main feature of the attack [22]. The perpetrator, a 39-year-old Uzbek Rachmat Akilov, stated that he had a direct order to attack after being captured by the Swedish officers. Strong indoctrination and lack of remorse were confirmed by his words: "I'm pleased with what I have done" and "by doing what I wanted to do" [22].

The new strategy of the Islamic State is closely related to the process between terrorism and migration. The inflow of millions of immigrants can be a significant source as well as the reason for terrorism.

An example of a terrorist hiding among migrants was Anisa Amri, responsible for the attacks in Berlin on December 19, 2016. He arrived in Europe illegally, after the beginning of the Arab Spring in 2011. He ended up in a refugee camp on an Italian island – Lampedusa, where he became a notorious and petty thief. In October 2011 he was sentenced to 4 years of prison due to an attempt to burn down a school. After being released in 2015, he joined the wave of refugees and began his journey to Germany. When he arrived there, he often altered his personal data. His application for asylum was rejected. While being a member of the Salafi community in Germany, which is a radical faction of Islam, he was recruited by ISIS agents and started his path to jihad [23]. After taking an oath to the Islamic State,

he started to closely study the guidebooks for the terrorists, where he learned that killing infidel children was justified [24]. On December 19, 2016 Anisa Amri terrorised a Polish driver Łukasz Urban, stole his truck and then with the use of the vehicle ran into a crowd gathered on Breitscheid-platz in Berlin for a Christmas fair. 12 people died and around 50 were injured in the attack [25].

The bombings in Spain in August 2017 also show how powerless the national security organizations are in the fight with the 'lone wolves' and 'low-cost' terrorism. There are around 1.6 million Islamists in Spain, which accounts for almost 3% of the whole population. That is the reason why the Islamic State propaganda has a fertile ground for spreading its ideology. In the propaganda materials ISIS often uses the claim that Andalusia, a region that was under Islamic reign longer than under Christian one, will be 'reclaimed' [26, p. 3]. Despite the aforementioned arguments, Spain has specialized in effective prevention, which was why the terrorists could not perform even one attack in this country. Spain has a wide network of officers, analysts and informers, 3 thousand people in total – hence the Spanish police is the most effective force in fighting Islamic terrorists on the whole continent.

An exception to this rule was the Barcelona attack on August 17, 2017, when a speeding van, riding and zig-zagging on La Rambla, killed 13 and heavily injured 130 people. The methods of the attack, without any doubts, showed that the Islamic State was responsible for it. A day after, the perpetrators connected with the attack in Barcelona used a van to run into a group of people in a Catalan city of Cambrils [26, p. 3].

When analysing the attacks in Spain over the years, we can easily notice the differences in the strategy of terrorist actions. The attack in Madrid in 2004 had been prepared for months, 20 people were working on the preparations, 13 bombs were made, hidden in backpacks and detonated at the same time. While organizing the attacks in Barcelona, the jihadists did not have to use any networks to obtain guns despite a car and the Internet to perpetrate the attack. The achieved aim was the same – frightening the societies of European countries and provoking reluctance towards the Muslims.

Conclusions

In conclusion of the aforementioned research, it can be said that the self-proclaimed Caliphate in Syria and Iraq is falling. Shrinking of the influence of the Islamic State in the Middle East resulted in a rise of terrorist threat in Europe, in connection with the change of the strategy to the 'lone' attacks carried out with the use of cars. This tactic, called the 'low-cost' terrorism, without any prior plans for action or costly killing equipment, was used in the attacks in Nice, London, Stockholm, Berlin and Barcelona. The purpose of the listed attacks was to spread fear and mistrust among the citizens of Europe. The strategic aim of such actions was to create a long-lasting division between the indigenous Europeans and the Muslims. The concept was to make the Muslims in Europe feel that the European societies have nothing more than hate for them. Consequently, such situation is to lead to a religious war, which will be won by the Muslims, and allow the Islamic State to install a Caliphate.

The terrorist offensive in Europe is extremely hard to stop by the state defensive units. Today, the jihadists are able to carry out attacks with anything they have at their disposal, for example, a kitchen knife or a car. Universal access to such 'weapons' means that it is practically impossible to eradicate the threat and prevent the attacks. The success of the Islamic

State in the attacks on the cities shows that there has been a breakthrough in the strategy of the jihadists.

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Author contributions

The author contributed to the interpretation of results and writing of the paper. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Ethical statement

The research complies with all national and international ethical requirements.

ORCID

Miłosz Gac  <https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3006-7866>

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Biographical note

Miłosz Gac – Doctor, Assistant Professor in the Department of Security Sciences in Higher School of Banking in Gdańsk. Attorney of the Dean of Department of Finance and Management and the Manager of the Internal Security Faculty in Higher School of Banking in Gdańsk.

He specialises in research on shaping the political – military security in the Baltic region in the 20th and 21st centuries and the issues of modern terrorism.

Rozwój strategii Państwa Islamskiego w latach 2014-2017

STRESZCZENIE

Na przestrzeni ostatnich trzech lat Państwo Islamskie (ISIS – Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), wskutek nalotów koalicji antyterrorystycznej, musiało dokonać rede-finicji swojej strategii. Taktyka działania, przestała się skupiać na ekspansji terytorialnej oraz na utworzeniu własnej państwowości, ale wzorem konkurencyjny Al-Kaidy, zaczęła opierać się, na zamachach tak zwanych „samotnych wilków”. Idei samotniczego zamachu, towarzyszy nowa metoda, stosowana przez terrorystów, jaką jest taranowanie z użyciem samochodu. Zjawisko to, znane w terminologii antyterrorystów jako „ramming”, od lipcowych wydarzeń w Nicei z 2016 roku, zbiera swoje śmiertelne żniwo w Europie.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE

Państwo Islamskie, terroryzm, „low cost”, „ramming”

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