

Original article

Use of the Territorial Defence Forces (TDF) in counter-subversive operations

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ABSTRACT

The Territorial Defence Forces (TDF, Polish abbrev. WOT) are to participate in combat counter-subversive operations, alone or in cooperation with other security actors. Using both offensive and protective-defensive forms and methods, they will create freedom of action for operational troops. Precise reconnaissance of the area, infrastructure knowledge in permanent areas of responsibility (Polish abbrev. SRO), cooperation with the non-military system (Polish abbrev. UPM), and cooperation with the local population in combination with the training of the TDF commanders and soldiers equipped with modern weaponry, reconnaissance and object monitoring systems will ensure good quality of protection while reducing the number of human resources involved.

All forms and methods of conducting combat counter-subversive activities presented in the article are a compilation of the content contained in the literature on the subject and the practical conduct of training classes with cadets and officers at the Military University of Land Forces.

KEYWORDS

WOT, counter-subversion, protection, defense, ambush, search

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Introduction

The doctrinal document of 2016 assumes that the purpose of counter-subversive actions is to prevent or minimize the effects of the opponent's sabotage. Therefore, they should focus on recognizing and preventing diversion and fighting groups carrying out diversionary activities, as well as protecting and defending objects against such attacks [1, p. 19; 2, p. 80; 3, p. 25; 4, p. 171]. In the doctrine of 2017, the conduct of counter-subversive activities by WOT should consist in conducting an armed struggle with sabotage and reconnaissance groups of the opponent in the permanent areas of responsibility in order to eliminate them from the fight and restore stability. The TDF must carry out these actions independently, thus supporting

operational troops and other entities responsible for internal security (the Military Police, the Internal Security Agency, the Police, the Border Guard, etc.) [5, p. 16-17].

1. Combat counter-subversive operations

In general, counter-subversive activities boil down to fighting sabotage and reconnaissance groups (Polish abbrev. GDR) that operate in permanent areas of responsibility (SRO). Their essence is to prevent or limit the deep activities of the enemy or other hostile forces on the own territory, thus ensuring freedom of action for own troops, full use of the infrastructure, and an adequate level of protection. They should have an offensive character consisting in detecting, destroying, and overpowering diversionary forces of the enemy, or defensive – for protecting and defending critical infrastructure, located in the permanent areas of responsibility¹ [1, p. 19].

The TDF shall specify the areas of operation, lanes, directions, or terrain boundaries. Their borders are marked along rivers, canals, roads, power lines, and other characteristic terrain points. Forces intended to carry out offensive activities, and forces for additional protection and defense of objects and the reserve are separated from the accepted combat grouping. It is used to enhance the intensity of action in the area of the main effort or where enemy forces have been detected, or increase the impact at the decisive moment of the fight [2, p. 100].

Fighting the enemy in counter-subversive operations is realized through [1, p. 19; 4, p. 172]:

- isolation of places and areas,
- a search of the area,
- taking up pursuit,
- laying ambushes,
- blocking areas and important road/rail junctions.

More specifically, counter-subversive activities are an element of counter-subversive defensive undertakings oriented at preventing diversion activities and making it impossible for the enemy to conduct them, as well as physical combating of diversionary groups. The TDF's counter-subversive activities aim to recognize and prevent sabotage activities, conduct armed combat against groups using sabotage forms of struggle, and directly protect objects against attacks of diversionary forces. The TDF will implement this goal within the framework of counter-subversive operations covering two basic types [2, p. 98; 6, p. 394]:

- offensive (maneuver),
- protective and defensive.

2. Counter-subversive offensive operations

The division as mentioned above is justified due to “activity” [2, p. 98; 4, p. 171; 6, p. 395; 7, p. 117-8]. Maneuver actions are the basic type of combat counter-subversive actions. They

¹ About the difficulties of this kind of activity. Vide: R. Jakubczak. *Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej w sztuce wojennej*. Ante Portas. Studia nad Bezpieczeństwem. 2016;2(7):42-3. The list of objects and forces needed for their protection and defense is presented in: S. Bożek, M. Cieśla. *Obrona Terytorialna – wybrane problemy*. Wrocław: Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych imienia generała Tadeusza Kościuszki; 2002; Annex 39.

involve the use of such forms and methods that will lead to the detection and contact with the diversionary forces and result in their destruction or capturing [2, p. 98; 6, p. 395-6].

The effectiveness and efficiency of the counter-subversive action is conditioned by [2, p. 98]:

- the need to focus forces on specific directions (regions, areas) so as to create an advantage (saturation) that will enable the complete elimination of the opponent,
- high mobility and maneuverability of the TDF,
- the speed of response to manifestations of the enemy's activity (presence).

The above points will be possible to achieve with:

- well-functioning, continuous reconnaissance, which will provide information about the enemy (their landing sites, bases, marching routes, and areas of operation) and other sources, including the non-military system (UPM) and the local population²,
- maintaining full readiness, forces for pursuit and raids,
- having maneuverable reserves that can replace exhausted troops or take action in new directions (in new areas),
- continuity of activities consisting in continuous fighting regardless of the time of day, year, and weather conditions.

These activities are carried out to eliminate the state of threat of subversion in a specific area, but not smaller than the province. The following forms of operations can be distinguished [2, p. 99; 4, p. 172; 6, p. 396]:

- intelligence,
- reconnaissance and assault,
- pursuit,
- blocking,
- liquidation.

Intelligence activities involve the application of various undertakings aimed to obtain information to confirm the location of diversionary forces and establish contact with them, as well as about their isolation and liquidation possibilities. They are also carried out for defensive purposes (restrictions on the enemy's freedom of action or covering important objects [2, p. 99; 6, p. 396].

They are organized in the cases as follows:

- when there is a lack of precise data on the diversionary forces in operation,
- when it is necessary to confirm or complete data obtained from other intelligence sources (e.g., intelligence actions conducted by the UPM),
- during pursuit activities when fire or visual contact is lost.

² An element of the state defense system comprising all executive links of public administration except the Polish Armed Forces, other state institutions, as well as companies and associations on which defense tasks are imposed or recommended to be performed in accordance with the applicable national law. Vide: *Zasady użycia Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej (2 projekt studyjny)*. Bydgoszcz: CDiS; 2016, p. 62. Non-military defense structures are formed by: government administration, territorial self-government, and other state entities and institutions, as well as entrepreneurs on which the obligation to perform tasks for the benefit of state defense has been imposed. Vide: *Doktryna Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej DD-3.40 (projekt)*. Warszawa: CDiS; 2017, footnote 1, p. 5.

Depending on the situation, they are combined with other actions organized in the directions and in reconnaissance lanes (blocking, protective and defensive) [2, p. 99].

Reconnaissance and assault actions are a form of counter-subversive actions used in irregular actions. It aims to detect, locate, and destroy the enemy in the area of responsibility [6, p. 396-7].

Pursuit operations boil down to an organized and decisive movement of troops following the retreating diversionary forces to prevent them from breaking away and coming into the fire contact with them, their encirclement, and liquidation. Such actions are carried out in combination with blocking (or other) actions organized in the directions (areas) of guerrillas' withdrawal [2, p. 99; 4, p. 172; 6, p. 397].

Moreover, pursuit operations are undertaken while performing other forms of counter-subversive attack or during protective and defensive actions when diversionary forces try to retreat after an attack on an object or when they manage to get out of the encirclement, and when they try to avoid fighting with reconnaissance troops.

Blocking actions are characterized by a hidden distribution of forces and resources on one or more terrain borders, on the direction of probable diversion of forces. They are organized to limit the maneuverability of sabotage groups and thus create conditions for identifying their location and then liquidation. They are employed together with other forms of combat counter-subversive actions (pursuit and reconnaissance ones) [2, p. 100; 4, p. 172; 6, p. 397].

Liquidation operations consist in encircling the place, i.e., the area of deployment (hiding) of diversionary (reconnaissance) forces, their destruction, or taking them captive [2, p. 100; 4, p. 172; 6, p. 397].

The following means of combat: searches, pursuit, raids, and ambushes, as well as barriers and encirclement are used as part of the counter-subversive operations. The manner of action each time depends on the recognition of the enemy, the terrain, the time of day and year, and the completion of subunits.

An ambush is organized to acquire documents, prisoners of war, armaments, destroy the enemy forces by performing a surprising and simultaneous fire attack with all the forces. It is deployed on the probable routes of the enemy's march or in areas where the approach is expected. A single ambush or their network can be set. Their organization consists in the subunit's appropriate preparation to the task execution, secret approach (waiting) to the area of ambush, setting the combat task, the arrangement of cooperation inside the ambush, as well as proper selection and masking of fire positions [2, p. 114; 8, p. 243; 9, p. 21-2].

The location of the ambush depends on field conditions and the likely direction of the enemy's approach. It should ensure optimal use of the terrain, a convenient point for observation and firing, easy command, quick maneuvering of some or all the forces, and the use of the retreat. When organizing cooperation, mutual assistance and the way of action (fighting); all elements of the grouping should be established while taking account of the probable enemy's response and the handling of disturbances, as well as establishing the identification marks, signals and passwords [2, p. 114].

A network of ambushes is set up on the probable directions of the enemy's approach, usually along a convenient field line (river, forest edge, railway track, etc.). It should be grouped as deep as possible. The strength and composition of individual ambushes in the network may

vary from several soldiers to a section and sometimes a platoon. The reserve (reserves) is deployed in the most convenient place for its use, in the situation of an unforeseen development of the situation to support or execute the pursuit of the enemy who managed to get out of the ambush [2, p. 114-5].

Ambushes are an essential element of a barrier and include the following elements [2, p. 116]:

- observation posts,
- mobile patrols in places difficult to observe,
- reserves.

Observation posts are deployed between ambushes with the task of observing the foreground. Mobile patrols shall be sent when the terrain prevents continuous observation from permanent observation points. The patrol moves secretly along the marked route between ambushes, stops at the points where the best observation is possible, and recognizes the foreground of the barrier. The patrol reports its observations to the commander of the barrier and neighboring ambushes [2, p. 116].

The reserves are deployed around the hidden commander's observation points in the middle of the grouping, or where it is most likely to break up the enemy forces. They can be used to support the fight of the barrier elements, or to perform a maneuver to close the withdrawal route or to commence pursuit [2, p. 116].

A barrier is created to liquidate the enemy in the direction of their approaching the object or their attempts to move away from it. It consists in the hidden deployment of soldiers on the field edge and the use of the surprise factor, fire and visual communication between individual elements of the barrier, appropriate depth, and interaction with other protective team grouping elements [2, p. 116].

If no information about the enemy is possessed, the basic way to act will be a terrain search [6, p. 398]. It boils down to a thorough check of objects or terrain that is supposed to be where the enemy is located or hidden. The objective is not only to locate the enemy but also to capture or liquidate them in direct combat [2, p. 115; 8, p. 212-4].

The combat grouping of the searching subunit may change due to the terrain, the combat situation, and the results of the reconnaissance to date. The principle is to maintain secrecy and camouflage. It is not allowed to give out commands aloud, call, talk, break branches, etc. [2, p. 115].

Due to the terrain conditions, the search is carried out on foot, choosing the array relevant to the terrain conditions. It can also be carried out with off-road passenger cars along the roads and clearances. Places that are difficult to access are searched by foot patrols (searchlights) after the vehicle has stopped. Searching of single objects and groups of buildings (colonies) is preceded by an encirclement that is performed in a hidden way on the directions of the expected enemy's retreat. Next, a building search commences and is executed with particular attention paid to a thorough examination of cellars, attics, cells, and places convenient to hide [2, p. 115].

In the mountainous terrain, reconnaissance patrols are sent on the dominant hills to check the terrain and conduct observations of the opposite slopes, ridges, ravines, forest edges, and others.

Forests and wooded areas are searched in the skirmish line³. If forces and means allow, it is advisable to use several skirmish lines at the appropriate depth to ensure communication between them. It is purposeful to cooperate with the UPM in this respect and, if possible, include a guide with a tracking dog in the searches. During the forest search, attention should be paid to treetops, brushwood, and places located near streams, springs, and water reservoirs, as there may be enemy hiding places [2, p. 115-6].

3. Protective and defensive operations

In accordance with the operation plan, the TDF is responsible for protecting and defending objects essential for the achievement of the operational objectives, and protecting cultural assets in cooperation with the government and self-government administration, local population, and non-governmental organizations. In case of such a necessity, they strengthen the protection and defense carried out by full-time (designated) forces [1, p. 25; 6, p. 296-7, 304-5, 398; 10, p. 34, 43, 49; 11, p. 58].

The activities mentioned above are to ensure adequate, direct protection and defense of objects that can be the subject of reconnaissance and sabotage enemy forces. They constitute an auxiliary type of combat counter-subversive operations [2, p. 100-1; 4, p. 172].

The protective actions are to prevent unauthorized persons from entering the object in a hidden way. They require a pass system for coming into the facility, which should be protected by guards, guarding posts, observers (eavesdropping), patrols, covers, engineering safeguards, and alarm signaling installations [2, p. 106-7].

The protection is intended to [2, p. 108]:

- counteract subversion, sabotage, or other manifestations of hostile activity threatening the efficient functioning of the facility (and people staying in it),
- prevent unauthorized persons from entering the facility,
- control people and vehicles on the roads leading to the facility,
- maintain an internal regime in the facility (e.g. traffic, parking),
- ensure safety and order in the facility in case of various threats.

Defensive actions comprise actions that make it impossible to take control of an object or cause significant damage to it by force. They include an organized fire system, engineering development, and reconnaissance on approaches to the facility [2, p. 107].

Protective and defensive actions do not always occur in their pure form, as they are accompanied by some undertakings typical of offensive counter-subversive operations, such as reconnaissance or pursuit in a limited area or zone [2, p. 102; 6, p. 398]. Their effectiveness depends on adequately organized and conducted reconnaissance in the foregrounds of protected facilities and appropriately arranged cooperation with the UPM and local population.

³ Due to their capabilities, the type of activities was carried out in detail during training classes at the Military University of Land Forces at the training field in Raków. The distance between the soldiers during the search of the forest was established at about 10-15 meters. It ensured visual contact. Because of the lack of precise reference points, it was challenging to maintain the skirmish line, despite marking a few alignment lines.

The activities as mentioned below are organized within the framework of protection and defense [2, p. 103; 6, p. 398]:

- covering districts or facilities,
- direct protection and defense of objects,
- supervision of facilities,
- protection of the object deployment zones,
- surveillance in the area of protected objects,
- reconnaissance of areas or directions in the vicinity of protected (shielded, defended) objects threatened by diversion.

Covering regions or objects is a form of protection of operational troops located in the areas of concentration, mobilization, regrouping, dislocation, waiting, reconnaissance of combat readiness, and others before reconnaissance and unexpected impact of diversionary forces. This undertaking has a twofold character: activities on the move (patrols, on-duty covering groups, searchlights) and site – ambushes, eavesdropping, checkpoints, guard posts, and so forth [2, p. 103; 6, p. 399].

The supervision of facilities takes the form of continuing concern about their safety status and consists in their systematic control. The method is applied to objects protected by structures other than the TDF, which, however, are also the subject of their interest from a defensive point of view. It is implemented on an ad-hoc basis by post holders, non-technical operational teams of staff cells, and superiors of people who are part of the TDF system. That activity is carried out both during the period of a direct threat of military action as well as during the alleged impact of diversion in time of peace when matters of the threat of subversion will still be in the process of planning undertakings facilitating its combating [2, p. 103; 6, p. 399-400].

Patrolling the area where the facilities are located is an auxiliary undertaking for other protective and defensive actions to counteract the subversion, and might be the only one in a given area. Then the patrols closely cooperate with various “local” sources of information, which provides them with an insight into the threat of subversion of less critical objects. After gaining data about the threat, the way of their protection should change [2, p. 104; 6, p. 400; 8, p. 207-8].

The protection of the areas where the objects are located consists in the organization of undertakings (covering, patrolling, barriers, surveillance, etc.) preventing subversion into the area of objects protected by the TDF or the UPM forces [2, p. 104; 6, p. 400].

The surveillance around the protected objects boils down to systematic or ad hoc observation, guarding, watching, and patrolling of selected places, directions, and terrain objects in the area where the objects protected against diversion threats are located. Thereby, the protection zone in a critical area is extended and thickened. In this case, surveillance is a complementary way. In justified situations, it may be an independent activity, but only in the area with a channeling effect on the movement of sabotage (reconnaissance) groups or significantly limiting their movement; e.g., mountain passes, swamps, etc. [2, p. 104; 6, p. 400].

Reconnaissance of areas or directions in the vicinity of the protected (sheltered, defended) objects is carried out in order to detect undertakings connected with the enemy’s preparation for subversive actions. The reconnaissance intensifies after receiving data indicating that the diversionary action has started or there is a high probability of attack. As for such

operations, selecting the areas and directions of approach or basing of the saboteurs and “checking” their presence through observation, listening, environmental inquiry, and others [2, p 104; 6, p. 401].

Then, a subunit operates with the sections or platoons scattered around the space. They are attached to stationary objects, but in exceptional situations can act as the entire force [2, p. 104-5].

Individual objects are protected (strengthened) by forces of sections, platoons, sometimes a company. For protection, a guard is set up; it is supported by patrols in the foreground, observation posts, and eavesdropping at night. Approaches to the object are closed with engineering barriers, and positions for guards and posts are fortified. A reserve to intervene in the endangered direction (facility) and to pursue the detected diversionary group is organized in the facility [2, p. 105]. In the areas of protection subunits’ operation, their commanders establish cooperation with the UPM and thus obtain information about the situation around protected objects. It is essential to cooperate with the population living in the vicinity to gain information about suspicious persons and events.

Warning boards are placed on approaches (driveways) around the object [2, p. 106]:

- “MILITARY AREA”,
- “NO ACCESS ALLOWED”,
- “NO PHOTOGRAPHY”,
- “NO TRAFFIC”.

Defense and protection should be implemented systematically as an organized, mutually supportive set of undertakings. The predominance of individual system elements depends on the nature and dislocation of the object, the assessment of the risk degree, and the size of forces assigned to its protection and/or defense [2, p. 106].

Critical economic, administrative, and military facilities are protected and defended. Due to their shape, they are divided into the surface (handling areas, airports, warehouses, etc.), linear (roads, power lines, pipelines, railway routes, etc.) and point (bridges, viaducts, significant power and administrative structures, etc.) ones [2, p. 107; 6, p. 405].

The defense of surface and point facilities covers [2, p. 107; 6, p. 405]:

- activities in the foreground of the facility,
- the first line of fire positions 200-400 m away,
- the second line of posts located along the fence (in the close proximity to the object),
- protection of the most important elements of the facility infrastructure, which determine its proper functioning,
- sending out ad hoc patrols at a distance that makes it difficult to fire at the object under observation.

The defense of linear objects is carried out using [2, p. 107; 6, p. 405]:

- crews posted at the most important elements of the object,
- patrols and surveillance posts, and recognizing the belt adjacent to the object,
- activities carried out in the foreground of the facility,
- electronic devices that transmit images day and night.

For the benefit of the protected and defended objects, surveillance is organized, which may take place when the subunit using them has two shifts of guards. Maneuvering operations in the foreground of the protected facility shall be carried out only by the forces of the protection crews which may set up three shifts of guards from their own manning [2, p. 107; 6, p. 405-6].

The reinforcing subunits shall be designated as the protected areas where the objects remaining in the range of the subunit's operation and the area adjacent to these objects are located. The border of the guarded area should run along clear, characteristic (preferably linear) terrain objects – e.g., rivers, canals, slopes, embankments, roads, power transmission lines, railways, etc. [2, p. 107-8; 6, p. 406].

Effectiveness of protective and defensive activities depends on their skillful combination with offensive activities actively conducted on approaches to the facilities, as well as the active reconnaissance and cooperation as for the exchange of information with the UPM and local population [2, p. 108; 6, p. 406].

The protection and defense of the facility should be treated as a coherent action. The prevalence of protective or defensive elements depends on the type and character of the adjacent terrain, the level of threat, and the forces and resources available.

Direct protection and defense of objects are carried out by the TDF subunits, sometimes with reinforcement or support from other the UPM forces and resources. This action aims to prevent diversionary forces from approaching the area of the protected facility and, once they are found to be approaching or present, to destroy the enemy troops immediately [2, p. 109].

It is necessary to organize the fire support system accurately, perform engineering extension, conduct continuous reconnaissance, and be prepared to carry out hook-up activities in the foreground of the protected objects and keep reserves ready for use to implement the task as mentioned earlier.

4. Organization of protection and defensive activity

Depending on the importance of the facility, its location and the nature of the terrain, as well as the available capabilities, protection, and defensive measures are implemented by separating a protection team (Polish abbrev. ZO) maintaining the independent performance of tasks for a longer time (from a few days to a few weeks) or by organizing protection by setting a guard⁴ [2, p. 109].

A subunit (several subunits under joint command), which can assign a guard, a subunit for close approaches, and the reserve (reserves) composed of not fewer soldiers than a guard, may constitute a protection team. The ZO may consist of assigned specialist soldiers who are not part of the subunit, or their number is insufficient to carry out the intended tasks [2, p. 109].

⁴ Due to their capabilities, the type of activities was carried out in detail during training classes at the Military University of Land Forces at the training field in Raków. A 30-people infantry platoon and one off-road truck were needed for its protection and defense. A camera system did not monitor the object, and a reconnaissance drone was not available. Therefore, it is difficult to say to what extent these measures would reduce the number of people necessary for its protection and defense.

The ZO conducts protective and defensive activities around the facility, including the facility and the adjacent area several hundred meters deep and on close approaches up to 3-4 km from it.

One of the main elements of the group in the protection and defensive activities is a guard service, whose assumptions should be based on the principles of its performance in the garrison conditions with some modifications resulting from the specific requirements for protection and defense of facilities. A system of fixed and mobile posts should be organized from the manning of the guard service. The composition of the post must be at least two-person, and it should be camouflaged by firing positions [2, p. 109-10]. Depending on the needs determined mainly by the size of the facility, the guard team can be positioned in one or two (and more) guardhouses, and then the commander of the guardhouse is in one and his/her assistant(s) in another (next) guardhouse [2, p. 111].

The guards are on duty at the posts in a camouflaged manner. Only at some of the posts they serve unmasked, e.g., at a post at the entrance (exit) gate, on the tower (roof, attic), or for the traffic control. The objective is that it is not possible to identify the size of the guard team from outside [2, p. 110].

The time of service is determined by the commander of the guard in consultation with the ZO commander. Changes should be made secretly at irregular intervals [2, p. 110].

In the directions that are endangered but ensure the effective use of the striking power, the personnel of machine guns, rifles, and anti-tank measures shall be put into operation. Sectors of observation and firing are designated for all posts. Trenches that are, if time permits, connected by ditches, are built on the potential (convenient) enemy attack direction. Each post must be in direct contact with the guard commander and should be equipped with alarm devices (even if made temporarily) [2, p. 110].

In covered and easily accessible areas, the system of engineering wire barriers and the system of light and sound signaling must be extended. If conditions permit, an additional barbed-wire fence should be built around the entire facility or only in some sections, at a distance from the main fence [2, p. 111]. Designated checkpoints (control points) should stop and check persons and vehicles going to the facility. Access to the object should be restricted by designating 1-2 entries (entrances) and exits. It seems appropriate to introduce one-way traffic; namely, it is to be impossible to leave the facility through the entrance gate and vice versa. The remaining posts must be tasked to stop people (vehicles) heading towards the facility or trying to get out of it in a different place than the designated one, and immediately notify (alert) the commander of the guard (security subunit), whose duties include precise control of the detained person and vehicle [2, p. 112].

A person (vehicle) approaching the facility from the side where all movement is prohibited may not leave (go) without being checked and identified by the guard commander. The power to check the documents that allow entry/exit is limited to strictly defined posts (checkpoints) set up in a squad of 2-3 (and more) guards. Documents must always be checked by one soldier only, and the others should observe the behavior of the controlled persons and secure his/her actions [2, p. 111].

Check ought to be realized as follows [2, p. 112]:

- control of documents authorizing the entry of every person in the vehicle and the pass allowing the entry (exit) of the vehicle to (out of) the facility,

- besides the pass, requesting identity cards, and careful comparison of the data contained in the pass with the identity card,
- control of the inside and outside of the vehicle, and the permission for it to bring in (out) the cargo, comparing the cargo content with the transport documents,
- no grouping of several people (vehicles) is allowed directly in the area of the post (checkpoint); the ZO commander shall establish and designate a properly marked waiting area (parking lot) for the control at a distance to prevent an unexpected attack,
- if the password is valid, the guard checks the knowledge (response) so that unauthorized persons cannot hear it,
- whenever there is a suspicion that unauthorized persons are trying to enter the facility, the post commander shall report to the guard commander, while preventing the controlled persons from leaving at the same time.

Activities in the area of the facility and on closer approaches include the organization of observation posts (eavesdropping), control posts, patrols, ambushes, searches, and barriers.

An observation post (Polish abbrev. PO), consists of 2-3 observers, one of whom is appointed as a commander (senior observer). The PO is equipped with observation instruments, a map (city plan with a fragment of the site) or a detailed sketch of the area, an observation log, a compass, a watch, means of communication, and contamination detection instruments. The specifics of the TDF activities requires that soldiers from the town or area where the post is located are included in the operation, since they know the characteristics of the terrain perfectly well and can easily see even minimal changes that occur in it. Depending on the size (extent) of an object, there can be one or more observation posts (e.g., a network of posts) – according to the needs [2, p. 112-3; 8, p. 208-9, 242].

The control post (Polish abbrev. PK) consists of 2-3 soldiers (in justified cases, even a section), one of whom is appointed as a commander. It should be equipped with a means of communication, specimens of documents authorizing movement in the vicinity (zone) of the facility, and other necessary devices (flashlight, ladder, platform, mirrors on booms for visual inspection of the vehicle chassis). It should be extended in engineering terms to provide protection and the right conditions for firing.

The others should cover the soldier(s) performing the inspection from the station. It is not allowed to group the inspected vehicles (people). If more than one vehicle or person arrives at the facility, there must be a waiting area (parking lot) at a safe distance from it, and the traffic to the facility should be directed (e.g., by a traffic controller). If people are arriving at the facility, it is advisable to carry out a separate check, that is, make the passengers get out of the vehicle before the checkpoint, check the vehicle, send it back to the waiting point behind the checkpoint, and then check the people individually and direct them back to the waiting vehicle in turn. Special attention should be paid to the vehicles (persons) that secure the facility's logistical functioning (e.g., special vehicles replacing garbage bins or delivering fuel, etc.) [2, p. 113; 8, p. 209-10].

A patrol (patrols) consists of 2-3 soldiers. It should be equipped with a means of communication, and, it, depending on the facility's size, may be provided with a means of transport [2, p. 113; 8, p. 243].

Eavesdropping is based on the hidden deployment of soldiers in a specific area of operation, aiming to obtain data about the enemy. It can be organized interchangeably in the place of observation posts under conditions of limited visibility. After detecting an enemy, it observes their actions and reports their movements to his/her superior [2, p. 114; 8, p. 243; 9, p. 18-9].

Conclusion

The article presents only the use of the TDF in counter-subversive operations. In essence, their planning and organization are very complicated and time-consuming and require the involvement of considerable forces, both human and material.

It is indispensable to know the principles of such activities and the form and methods of their implementation to efficiently and effectively carry them out. That includes thorough reconnaissance of the area, knowledge of the infrastructure in the permanent areas of responsibility, cooperation with the UPM, cooperation with the local population, and training of TDF commanders and soldiers. Combining modern weaponry and equipment, as well as top-class systems of object reconnaissance and monitoring will ensure the high and sufficient quality of protection and defense while reducing the number of human resources involved.

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All authors contributed to the interpretation of results and writing of the paper. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Ethical statement

The research complies with all national and international ethical requirements.

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Biographical note

Marek Pytel – Col., PhD, is the author of publications in the field of national and international security, participation of the Polish Armed Forces in overseas operations, as well as changes in the tactics of the Polish Armed Forces subunits. In his career he was a commander at the tactical level, as well as a lecturer at the Military University of the Land Forces in Wrocław, where he taught subjects related to the operation of troops on the battlefield. He is a doctor of military sciences. He took part in a mission within the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan. Currently he is an officer performing his duties in the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces in the Management Board of P 3/7.

Mariusz Cieśla – Maj. (ret.), PhD in the discipline of history with the specialization in military history. President of the Lower Silesian Stowarzyszenie Miłośników dawnej Broni i Barwy (Association of the Lovers of Old Arms and Color). Former WSOWL's scientific and didactic employee dealing with Territorial Defense. Author of publications, among others: *Wojska obrony terytorialnej w działaniach nieregularnych* (Territorial defense troops in irregular actions), *Zabezpieczenie bojowe i logistyczne działań nieregularnych* (Combat and logistic protection of irregular actions), *Obrona terytorialna – wybrane problemy* (Territorial defense – selected problems), *Obrona pododdziałów OT w terenie zabudowanym* (Defense of TDF subunits in built-up areas). At present, he is the head of the Military Museum, Branch of the City Museum of Wrocław, and a research and teaching staff member at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the Jan Długosz University in Częstochowa. Co-author of the textbook *Education for Safety for Upper Secondary Schools*, Warsaw 2019.

Wykorzystanie wojsk OT (WOT) w działaniach przeciwdywersyjnych

STRESZCZENIE

Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej (WOT) będą uczestniczyć w bojowych działaniach przeciwdywersyjnych, samodzielnie lub we współdziałaniu z innymi podmiotami odpowiedzialnymi za bezpieczeństwo. Stosując formy i sposoby, zarówno zaczepne i ochronno-obronne, stworzą swobodę działania wojskom operacyjnym. Dokładne rozpoznanie terenu, znajomość infrastruktury SRO, współdziałanie z układem pozamilitarnym (UPM), współpraca z miejscową ludnością w połączeniu z wyszkoleniem dowódców i żołnierzy WOT, wyposażonych w nowoczesne uzbrojenie, systemy rozpoznania i monitoringu obiektów, zapewni dobrą jakość ochrony, ograniczając przy tym ilość zaangażowanych zasobów ludzkich.

Wszystkie formy i metody prowadzenia bojowych działań przeciwdywersyjnych, przedstawionych w artykule są kompilacją treści zawartych w literaturze przedmiotu oraz praktycznego prowadzenia zajęć z podchorążymi i oficerami w Akademii Wojsk Lądowych.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE WOT, przeciwdywersyjne, ochrona, obrona, zasadzka, przeszukanie

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