

Original article

Role and importance of national strategies in Poland

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ABSTRACT

The work on the new edition of the national security strategy requires a reflection on its role and importance in Poland. The analysis of the strategic achievements to date indicates the existence of political, organizational, theoretical, and cultural problems related to the development of the strategy as documents regarding national security, national development, and defense. Special attention should be paid to the problem of formulating a strategy as well as thinking and acting strategically in the military dimension. The problem of the shortage of formal-legal and structural framework of the strategy creation process in Poland indicates that one should strive to formulate a national (state) strategy together with its consolidation in the legal system.

KEYWORDS

strategy, national security, national development, defense, art of war, operation, campaign



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Introduction

The organizational culture of a given entity manifests in the ability to formulate and employ a strategy. The culture is also characterized by a systemic ability to identify one's overriding interests, critically assess the situation, formulate objectives, and choose the ways of their enforcement concerning the resources available. Bearing in mind the experience to date, the process of developing subsequent *National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland* or *National Development Strategy* should be accompanied by reflection on the actual role and significance of national strategies in Poland with national interests and political goals.

The role and significance of a strategy is usually the aftermath of the developmental advancement and maturity of a given community (an organized social group, organization, or state), whose political system is – according to priorities – ready to think and act in an orderly manner. Under the assumption that it is impossible to operate in the long run without strategic thinking, an indispensable condition for such supposition is the ability to create and implement strategies, plans, programs, and the ability to communicate them effectively to the society. That requires properly prepared human teams (strategists and analysts) with

comprehensive knowledge, the potential for creative thinking with the habit of continually improving skills, and the ability to correct previous findings with the habit of regularly repeating analytical processes.

In the state, the place of strategy will be defined through the political elites, which are its part, realize the relationship between the terms “policy” and “strategy”. In theory, the hierarchical relations between these concepts are not universally defined and understood, which frequently influences practical actions in the public sphere of the state¹. That results from the proximity of the meaning of both concepts, the widespread use of strategic and political approaches in all fields, and areas of contemporary communities’ social activity. Regardless of the primacy given to one of these concepts, contemporary theories – political, management and organization, development, security, economy, and military ones – presume that strategy cannot exist without politics.

The strategy pursues the main policy objectives of the organization through methods and all available means, both internally and externally. They are to be finalized in the long term, and they address the organization’s existential, most vital interests, as well as the image of its desired future in a changing environment. As a structured long-term vision of the main goals and directions of development with a plan to achieve them, a strategy can be both a way of thinking [1, p. 27; 2, p. 35; 3, p. 1281] and a way of achieving these goals. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that since a strategy is a tool of politics, and following Max Weber, the term “politics” is understood as any sovereign leadership [4, p. 55], the fact that an individual state entity has its own strategy confirms the sovereignty.

In the Polish context, strategic actions remain within the scope of tasks of the bodies forming the highest authorities, which have the power to take any action in the areas remaining within their competence. Having at disposal tools in the form of a structure of subordinate institutions and acting as entities responsible for developing and implementing state policy in a given dimension, these bodies should strive to fulfill their essential functions by formulating a concept of this policy (specific policies) and applying it (them). This activity should be reflected in current decisions and legally binding political declarations in the executive layer. They should be expressed in the content of relevant documents² such as strategies, directives, plans, programs, and concepts. The processes of formulation and enforcement of those strategic documents should be cyclical, hierarchically consistent, formally and procedurally defined, and legally binding. In the case of state strategies, while bearing in mind the need to maintain continuity in the functioning of the country and thus to have the ability to respond to changes in its environment, the final result of the authorities’ efforts should be the formulation and selection of the *Strategy*, formally binding on its implementers in a given dimension, sector, or area of state activity.

¹ The literature on the subject is dominated by two fundamental views, one of which assumes the primacy of strategy over policy (by its very nature ad hoc, subject to the economic situation and the changeability of conditions), and the other – assumes the primacy of security policy over strategy, thereby defining strategy as a tool of state policy. For more see: S. Wojciechowski. *Polityka i strategia w wymiarze bezpieczeństwa i rozwoju Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej*. Bellona. 2015;680(1):45-65. See also: K. Komorowski. *Kłopoty z najnowszą strategią bezpieczeństwa RP*, Przegląd Nauk o Obronności. 2016;(1-2):35-49. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0012.9689>.

² Due to the lack of a binding definition of the “State strategic document”, the author assumes that it is a publication concerning long-term actions to be taken at the state level in a specific field of its functioning, announced (published) by the central authority in Monitor Polski.

National security

Nowadays, national strategies in Poland are relatively recent, and their emergence is related to the process of political transformation in the 1990s. Initially, in response to the demand, such documents were to serve the enforcement of the state security policy (national security) primarily. The first strategies were initially created at critical moments in the history of the country, which referred to changes in the assessment of external threats or shifts in Poland's geopolitical situation. As strategies in the field of security and defense, they were to be an expression of the ambitions and sovereignty of the state, as well as a derivative of efforts to ensure its independence, security, and conditions for development. In a broader context, these strategies were also an expression of changes in strategic culture.

Over time, a conceptual framework of the strategy was formed, and its legal basis was established since it was intended to define the competences of the state authorities responsible for its preparation and approval. The methodology of their development was changing, and in subsequent editions, a certain logic and order of argument were consolidated. It consisted in specifying the subject of the security strategy, defining national interests (with time limited to those in the field of national security) and strategic goals, analyzing the internal and external security environment as well as the available policy instruments and indicating ways of implementing the adopted assumptions and preparing optimal conditions for that. Equally important was the effort to improve the process of developing the strategy, combining the efforts of various state institutions, scientific circles, analytical centers, and non-governmental organizations [See more: 5]. The open character of the emerging strategies and their continually growing scope of subject matter had a significant impact on their narration, thus influencing the synthesis of their description and a significant degree of generalization (conciseness of the language used). That, in turn, was often the main object of criticism of "reviewers" of the content of documents.

The issuance of subsequent security strategies and national security strategies took place in the absence of a comprehensive vision of the state's policy and its derived security policy (national security). Despite the lack of an overarching state strategy, the efforts to publish subsequent editions of security strategies for the last quarter of a century have not been stopped. Moreover, the absence of efforts to develop a systemic approach to the matters of relationships between politics and strategy in Poland, both internally and externally, was a side effect of raising the pursuit of membership in the structures of the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union to the rank of great strategic objectives. As far as it is known how and who is to create national security strategies, there is still a deficit of regulations placing them in the legal system of the state. With time, the strategy has become somewhat a concept of action, perceived informally as a planning document of the executive authorities. Experience has quickly proved that such a strategy (understood as a concept/guideline) is only valid as long as a given body exercises its authority, according to the principle: if a strategy is not a legal norm, it does not have to be continued or recognized by another authority.

The ambiguity of the legal status of the strategy has put the following question on the agenda: what is the strategy to be? A normative document or rather a political declaration? An expression of the executive authorities' will or a legislative basis for security work? The lack of an answer to the above questions and the type of legal regulations situating the strategy as not a normative, nationwide document, the systemically restrictive policy with the state's

strategy in the overall dimension and unambiguously confirming the relationship between policy and security strategy diminished the importance of the strategy [See more: 6]. Moreover, national security strategies were created and functioned without reference to national security policy, which is also not defined on a formal basis [See: 7]. Consequently, it can be considered that all national security strategies, in the face of no administrative formalities, should, in practice, be treated as conceptual documents. Therefore, its enforcement sphere is also a side effect of the lack of legal regulations and a significant shortcoming reducing the importance of the security strategy. While a certain level of strategic culture has been achieved in the process of strategy development, its implementation effectiveness is questionable. Neither the enforcement of the strategy provisions nor evaluation of the degree of its execution is monitored. Such an evaluation has not yet been the subject of research of the *Strategic National Security Review* or even one of the three *Strategic Defense Reviews* in selected scope. Although references to these strategies can be found in documents that are included in plans and programs, they are not binding for the implementation of the provisions of the documents. As a result, there is no reliable information about the extent to which any provisions of the strategies³ were introduced.

Observation of the processes of creating the latest security strategies enables the statement that the cycle of work on them was similar⁴. Its nature was collective (assuming the participation of all possible stakeholders ended with public consultations), consensual (based on striving for compromise solutions and provisions proposed by the participants of the process), long-term (in force for at least two or three years), reactive (showing susceptibility to take into account the current signals coming from the environment), and formalized (depending on procedures and relations linked to the functioning of government institutions)⁵. Besides, the planning approach (the future can be predicted, and the effect of the process should be a document that is ready to implement strategy and says what, by whom, and how to do it) [See more: 8, p. 31] characterized it. Furthermore, it was dispersed (without a single body or institution with responsibility for state security issues) and discretionary (no specific and sanctioned procedure for its development).

National development

A special moment for the development of contemporary national strategies in the country was Poland's accession to the European Union and, with it, the challenges facing the country in terms of choosing the directions of social and economic growth. The specific needs and previous experience have led to the creation of the country's development strategies initially as a tool for implementing the European cohesion and sustainable development policy in Poland, mainly in connection with the need to absorb EU aid [See more: 9, p. 91 ff]. The state authorities considered it necessary to introduce an appropriate and more effective system

³ Out of 10 security and defense strategies issued since 2000, only one – the 2013 Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland – gave an opportunity to assess the degree of its implementation.

⁴ The above remark also applies to processes and procedures related to works within the framework of the SSP and the PSDO strategies.

⁵ The provision refers to the constitutionally and statutorily defined features of the Polish political system, as well as the mode of work of the Council of Ministers, as defined in the Regulations of the Council of Ministers.

of managing the country's development. They agreed that it would be necessary to issue state documents that would allow for increasing the effectiveness of the realization of the development policy, also by improving the quality of public institutions' functioning. Within the so-called new strategic order, appropriate strategies were developed as instruments of a formally (statutory) adopted country development policy, which is part of the state general policy. Using the provisions of the law and strategies as a platform for communication of government administration decisions, the principles and legal framework of other (equivalent and lower-ranking) national documents related to the enforcement of this policy were specified in more detail [10]. These strategies were characterized by a uniform methodology, analytical tools available at that time, an extensive implementation system based on indicators of the main objective's main objective, the so-called operational objectives, and the financial framework.

Despite the ambitious objectives, the enforcement layer of the plan did not go smoothly. Working out the development strategy, despite the desire to unify its structure and harmonize its thematic and time scope, was accompanied by frequent changes in the provisions of the law regulating the types, hierarchy, as well as the procedures for their adoption. As a result, also due to the aspiration to adjust the content of the documents to the changes in European documents, they were not created in a chronological and resultant way. It influenced the degree of their mutual cohesion, or even its lack, and the repeatability of similar provisions in several documents. In the assumptions, the strategies were to set objectives and define actions in the critical areas for the state, which would improve the level and quality of Polish citizens' lives. The social and economic development executed in a sustainable manner (taking account of the requirements concerning natural environment protection) was to be stimulated through state institutions undertaking necessary interventions in selected areas. The scope of areas covered by the strategy did not concern only social, economic, or environmental issues, but also extended to such matters as internal, foreign, national security, and defense policy.

The *Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland 2022 (SRSBN RP)*⁶ can be an example of achieving gradual dominance in the dimension of drawing up state documents by creating development strategies. It is a document defining the conditions and ways of developing the national security system regarding the increase in its effectiveness⁷ [See: 11, p. 8], thereby being a "new generation document from the area of national security"⁸. The strategy has been formulated as an implementation part of the country's development policy, taking into account the requirements of the current development management system [11, p. 8]. The main objective to be pursued is to "strengthen

⁶ The document adopted based on Resolution No. 67 of the Council of Ministers of 9 April 2013 on the adoption of the "Strategy for the Development of the National Security System of the Republic of Poland", M.P. of 2013, item 377 [Uchwała Nr 67 Rady Ministrów z dnia 9 kwietnia 2013 r. w sprawie przyjęcia "Strategii rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022" (M.P. z 2013 r. poz. 377)]. Thus, the Strategy was the first since 1992 and so far the last state document concerning the issues of national security, published in Monitor Polski.

⁷ It was an implementation of the provision of the country's development strategy, which postulated the need to "undertake and quickly complete works on the integrated system of state security".

⁸ The provision proves, on the one hand, the lack of an unambiguous identity of the document developed as part of the implementation of the state development policy, and on the other hand, it means acceptance for security measures through the development dimension of the state's activities.

the effectiveness and coherence of the security system”⁹. Its enforcement is to take place within the framework of six operational objectives, including stability of the international security environment in the regional and global dimension, the state’s defense capabilities, resistance to national security threats, integration of public policies with the security policy, and conditions for the development of an integrated national security system. Although the document was intended to be a tool of the country’s development policy, it focuses on combining the security policy with the social and economic development policy to improve the national security system’s operation.

Due to the precisely defined relations between the policy and strategy in the development dimension of the state’s activity, factors influencing the way the strategy in this field is formulated and issued should be stressed. What distinguishes them from the security strategy is first the reference to the theory and practice of public management as a basis for the activities of government (public) administration. In the second place, it is assumed that public institutions are, like market-oriented organizations [12, p. 5], entities that produce and exchange social values (e.g., services, social acceptance, political support) with their contractors, which give them a chance to survive and develop.

If one compares the national security and development strategies in force in the years 2012-2016, while overviewing the position and role of individual strategies in the hierarchy of strategic state documents in the dimension of development and security, one can notice the lack of coherence between the strategies in question. In the development dimension, there is a multi-stage pyramid of various, numerous documents with the character of a strategy, which are instrumental to the development policy. The strategy system is understood here as a set of documents identified on a multi-level scale. The tools for implementing the strategy are programs, i.e., operational documents containing detailed implementation schedules, specific base, target indicators, as well as sources of financing and a specific budget. In the security dimension, there is one superior strategic document regulating strategic activities at the state level, which is the basis for developing directives, plans, or programs (Fig. 1). The figure reflects the identified lack of a clearly defined national security policy regarding the objective and tasks to be achieved (directions of intervention). This gap is to be filled by the *National Security Strategy*.

Defense

When discussing national strategies, one cannot overlook the defensive and military aspects of this issue, as in recent years, armed conflicts of varying intensity, also in Poland’s immediate vicinity, have been witnessed. This fact has significantly influenced the public perception of national security and has become a motivating factor for the revision of views on the stability of peace in international relations. The conviction that armed conflict between states or a group of states is possible and the use of force becomes real again has emerged in the

⁹ Achievement of the main objective is to guarantee more effective implementation of national interests, which are defined in the National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (Strategia Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej – SBN RP). In this respect, the 2007 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland is the reference document. See: Uchwała Nr 67 Rady Ministrów z dnia 9 kwietnia 2013 r. w sprawie przyjęcia “Strategii rozwoju systemu bezpieczeństwa narodowego Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej 2022” (M.P. z 2013 r. poz. 377), p. 6 and 38.




Fig. 1. Position and role of a strategy in the security and development dimension

Source: Own study.

universal consciousness. After all, the concept of strategy in its essence is rooted in the art of war and the theory of preparing and conducting battles, operations, and commanding troops by a commander-in-chief¹⁰. Unfortunately, the evolution of the notion of strategy and the inclination to include it in a strictly political sense caused a strategy to become one of the elements of the broadly understood state policy, and it has been reduced to the field of war art.

Poland has seen a gradual expansion of the spheres of understanding contemporary security and its evolution in the national security strategy concept. Admittedly, with the domination of the new understanding of strategy, such strategies as defense strategy (defense preparations of the state) or military strategy (use of the armed forces to achieve the objectives of defense policy) began to appear. However, with time the work on them was abandoned. That was the outcome of a process of work in the shape of a (national) security strategy, which was associated with the desire to give it a superior role and an integrated character,

¹⁰ However, in the modern sense, which is rarely noted in the Polish literature on the subject, the term “strategy” (la stratégie) was first used by French officer Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy in the late 18th century. The contemporary connotation of this concept is linked to the process of secondary translations of the work of Emperor Leo VI from Greek into several Western European languages. Vide: B. Heuser. *The strategy makers: thoughts on war and society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz*. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO; 2010, p. 1-3; M. van Creveld. *The Transformation of War*. New York: The Free Press; 1991, p. 96.

conceptually linking the external and internal, civil and military, peaceful, crisis and war (defense) dimensions of security¹¹. Thus, a logically structured, sequential model of strategic documents¹² was shaken, namely, national security strategy – defense strategy – military strategy. So far, the only *Military Strategy of the Republic of Poland* was created as a sector strategy for the *2003 National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland*. The Ministry of Defense prepared it with the decisive contribution of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces. It was secret and was introduced into official use in 2004 by the then President of the Republic of Poland. The document specified the risk assessment included in the SBN RP, defined the missions and tasks of the Polish Armed Forces, and indicated the directions and priorities of their development, i.e., those elements which are now included in the *Main Directions of Development of the Armed Forces* and their preparations for state defense. The current lack of a defense or military strategy is not compensated for by the fact that in May 2017, the Ministry of National Defense issued a document called the *Concept of Defense of the Republic of Poland*, presenting “a vision of Polish defense in the future” [13]. Firstly, the document was not set in the formal context of the state policy and strategy (and thus was not adopted by the Council of Ministers). Thus, it has remained more a political declaration of the Minister of National Defense than a real tool for shaping the defense policy¹³. Secondly, as an auxiliary study (despite its structure and content similar to the standards of the national security strategy), the *Concept...* by definition remains a substitute for a military strategy.

While the defense strategy remains the responsibility of the Council of Ministers, the military strategy's leading role should be played by the Ministry of National Defense with the decisive participation of the General Staff of the Armed Forces. That is justified both by the current and planned position of the Staff as a strategic commanding body of the Armed Forces for “peacetime” and “wartime.” In the time of peace, it deals with ensuring the compliance of implemented plans with the assumptions of the state's defense policy and strategy, planning the strategic use of the Armed Forces and programming their long-term development, as well as representing the Polish Armed Forces in the highest collegial bodies of political and military international organizations having Poland as a member¹⁴. The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, cooperating through the Minister of National Defense with commanders of the Armed Forces, representatives of the President of the Republic of Poland, the Council of Ministers and the Parliament, should prepare a draft military strategy and legalize its

¹¹ The National Security Strategies of 2007 and 2014 were of such nature.

¹² Such a model is in force e.g., in the USA, where the National Defense Strategy has been issued. It is the second most important government document providing guidelines for the U.S. defense and security policy, and the U.S. Department of Defense is responsible for preparing and developing it. The Defense Strategy is consistent with the National Security Strategy and superior to the National Military Strategy, for which it is the most important reference document. The main objective of the Defense Strategy is to ‘underline how it contributes to the objectives of the National Security Strategy’. See: R.M. Gates. *Foreword*. In: *National Defense Strategy 2008*. The United States Department of Defense; 2008.

¹³ The findings and recommendations of the Strategic Defense Review have not been officially submitted to the Council of Ministers for consideration and acceptance, and thus have not gained the status of government documents.

¹⁴ Pursuant to Article 8 of the Act of 14 December 1995 on the Office of the Minister of National Defense (as amended in 2013), the scope of activities of the Head of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces shall include, among others: 1) planning the strategic use of the Armed Forces, 2) programming the multi-annual development of the Armed Forces.

status by submitting it to the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces¹⁵ for approval. The significant benefit of issuing a military strategy would be a single document containing all the views on how the Armed Forces should be used to fulfill the constitutional obligation to protect the independence of the state and the integrity of its territory and ensure the security and integrity of its borders. That document, being in line with the Polish National Security Strategy, the Strategy for Responsible Development and the defense strategy (if ever), would concretize the missions and tasks of the Polish Armed Forces and set out the directions of their development and preparations for the defense of the state.

The military strategy as a document should consolidate the existence of three levels of command: strategic (the Ministry of National Defense with the General Staff of the Armed Forces), operational (one joint command of the operational level), and tactical (command of the branches of Armed Forces and support forces), as well as campaign primacy (activity focused on meeting the requirements of the commander responsible for conducting many Armed Forces' operations). It would also allow systematizing views on the doctrine of operation of individual branches of the Armed Forces, making it possible to determine the directions of their development rationally.

War

The issues related to the state understood as a legally organized human community living in a specific area, which has been formed to be able to rule itself [14, p. 264], are inseparably connected with the state of war, and its functioning in a situation of external conflict solved employing armed struggle. In this respect, the issues of formulating a war strategy in Poland should be considered. Such a strategy is seen as a formally accepted idea (concept) or a set of ideas (concepts) relating to the use of instruments of the national potential in a synchronized and integrated way to achieve the state's objectives. Although, as Carl von Clausewitz pointed out almost two centuries ago, war is a tool of politics and, at some point in history, it, in its original meaning, ceased to be considered an unavoidable, logical way of achieving the political goals of the state. Also, in Poland, as the size of the military potential and the "alliance" of our military actions after joining NATO has decreased, in the last years of the 20th century, opinions questioning the need to think about military actions on a strategic scale became apparent. It is a peculiar paradox that, despite the military origins of the word strategy, today's strategy is not dealt with by effective military action. As a result, the art of war appears today as a somewhat neglected field.

An example illustrating this state of affairs can be the deliberations of some war art theorists [15, p. 225; 16, p. 30-5; 17, p. 29; 19, p. 32-3] on a campaign, which is one of the basic strategic concepts in the art of war. It can be defined as a series of operations carried out on a given theatre of warfare, under the leadership of the highest level of command, and aimed at achieving the assumed political and military-strategic objectives of the state (coalition, alliance). The conclusions and arguments concerning the incompatibility of this notion with contemporary times in Poland are surprising, if only since both the campaign and the strategy should not be understood as a function of the number of troops or the scale of the forces involved. The scientifically justified "underestimation" of the national level of ambition

¹⁵ The President of the Republic of Poland, using his special powers regarding the Polish Armed Forces, has a natural delegation to approve the military strategy.

concerning planning and conducting strategic activities initiated a period of domination of “operability” in the perception of military and war operations. War strategy has given way to the operational art and operation, or rather to joint operations. Perhaps it is not yet too late to reverse this dominant trend in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland and not to treat a campaign as a purely historical phenomenon but as a category containing the sum of warfare in the country, and not to confuse it with a (joint) operation. In the strategic discourse, the need to move away from the division is a strategic (defense) operation¹⁶ – the national dimension and a campaign – the allied dimension. What is more, perhaps the moment has come to stop referring to the size of the Armed Forces and consider the campaign to be the highest form of action in the country. While the planning of a joint operation¹⁷ concerns small scale and short duration operations, a campaign refers to large scale and long duration operations [19, p. 100], including the sequence of individual operations (deterrence, defense, restoration of national integrity, and others). After all, there is still no consensus on national definitions [19, p. 102] of the terms of a campaign and an operation. It is worth noting the emerging phenomenon of “resignation” by the military from strategic categories, which threatens the disappearance of their use at all and the loss of ability/skills to recognize them. Such notions as an operation, an operational level of art, a joint operation, operational planning, a strategic defense operation (why not “operation” only?) focus their attention on a few recurring problems concerning objectives, a plan, an environment, concentration, time, a change, a chief executive [15, p. 225; 16, p. 30-5]. They do not mention the principles of combat, defeating the opponent, and overcoming – that is, the immanent features of war strategy.

Considering the role and importance of national strategies in Poland in the context of the development of the international situation, one can ask the question about the sense of returning to practicing strategies in the classical sense that refers to the art of war and ways of conducting war. It is worth considering why, in a situation of increased probability of the outbreak of armed conflict, should the highest-rank military practice strategic thinking and action with the help of a strategy? Or maybe, has the NATO membership caused the military to give up the practice of a strategy consciously?

National strategy

Thus, strategies should cascade from the highest state level to lower levels. Poland still lacks one crucial link to meet this requirement. It is the state (national) strategy, which includes the relations (cause-and-effect relationships) between objectives and means (resources) as well as power and tasks, possibilities, and intentions (general, understood as *a grand strategy*). It should be understood here that the national (state) strategy is an overarching concept of the implementation of state policy, defining in a specific time perspective a national vision of how to apply and coordinate all instruments of state potential to maintain an adequate level of national security, increase the welfare of society, and promote national values.

¹⁶ This term appeared in the 1990s and still functions today. See: *Doktryna prowadzenia operacji połączonych (D-3(B))*. Bydgoszcz; 2015, p. 173.

¹⁷ “Joint” in this sense should be understood as an inherent feature of modern operations. It is a way of thinking/approach to conducting operations at the level of branches of the Armed Forces. That does not mean that within the framework of NATO forces’ activities in the theatre of warfare, components could participate in the campaign.

At the state level, its political leadership ensures and maintains its control and influence over the instruments of power through the hierarchical nature of national documents. Thus, strategies should cascade from the highest state level to lower levels. So far, Poland still lacks one crucial link to meet that requirement. It is the state (national) strategy, which includes the relations (cause-and-effect relationships) between objectives and means (resources), and power and tasks, possibilities and intentions (general, understood as grand strategy). It should be recognized here that the national (state) strategy is an overarching concept of the state policy implementation, defining in a specific time perspective a national vision of how to apply and coordinate all instruments of state potential to maintain an adequate level of national security, increase the welfare of society, and promote national values.

The essence of the national (state) strategy should be to strive to determine the position of the state concerning its environment and to choose ways of adapting to the changes occurring. Its essential feature should be the long-term character of the defined objectives and the same manner of achieving them. The strategy, like any other one, should refer to a set of decisions related to coordinated and purposeful action at the highest level of the hierarchy of power about such fundamental interests of dominant social groups as sovereignty, the position of the state in the hierarchy of potentials in the global system, the systemic and cultural identity of the society within the framework of state institutions, freedom, security, as well as development opportunities. Such a strategy should be implemented through "supportive" strategies, i.e., development and security strategies, and then, for example, military, economic, diplomatic, social, and other. It would be the highest level of state strategy, which should refer to the use of all available (political, diplomatic, economic, military, information, etc.) means to achieve the objectives set by the policy. Figure 2 displays the proposed position of the state strategy in the hierarchy and structure of public documents.

The structure of the strategy issued as a state document should correspond to the fundamental canons related to the nature of strategic thinking. Its essential parts should relate to the division into the external and internal dimensions of the state's actions for all factors (opportunities, threats, challenges, risks, etc.). The dichotomous division will make it possible to consider national security problems and the country's development issues on an equal footing in interdependent dimensions. The strategy as a state document should contain the following elements: a definition of national interests, a diagnosis of the situation (assessment of one's position in the environment, assessment of one's own capabilities, potential, one's own advantages and weaknesses), forecast (identification of phenomena, trends and possible directions of their changes, possible risks), an indication of objectives (priorities) to be achieved in a distant time horizon while assuming that the strategy validity does not need to have a clearly defined time horizon.

When starting to develop the *National Strategy for Security and Development of the Republic of Poland*, it should be assumed that any attempt to build a uniform national strategy will require the creation of regulations to attach this document to the existing legal system. They specify its state character, indicate its place in the hierarchy of strategic documents, thus defining its relationship with detailed policies and other state strategic documents. When undertaking legislative initiatives to improve the system of strategic management, one should first strive to eliminate the competence problems of the authorities responsible for drafting and approving national strategic documents. Bearing in mind the national (state) nature of the future strategy, the competences of the executive power, and the fact that the




Fig. 2. Position and role of the national strategy in the system of strategic documents of the country

Source: Own study.

interaction of authorities is a constitutional norm, it seems practical that the strategy should be developed by the Council of Ministers and approved by the President of Poland. In this way, the constitutional and statutory competences of both executive bodies would be satisfied, and the problem of the simultaneous functioning of two national security strategies would be removed.

Conclusion

The way the strategy is perceived is often limited to representative functions and makes the model of creating a national security strategy that is present in Poland ineffective. Therefore, it does not fulfill its fundamental role, which is the pursuit of the assumed strategic goals. Attempts to organize and prioritize strategy-type documents have so far failed. They continue to be created in separate processes, are not created at all, or remain a dead letter. State activity in this field is often politicized and undertaken on an ad hoc basis, serving current needs rather than long-term objectives.

In the military dimension, the strategy remains a function of state policy, regardless of whether it is due to the prevailing view that it is the highest hierarchical discipline of the art of war, i.e., science and practice dealing with the preparation and active conduct of the war, or whether – in the political sense – it is a means of implementing state policy by military means. In the second case, the objectives and tasks resulting from the state defense policy

(military policy – if any) should be carried out, among other things, through military strategy or, if necessary, war [See more: 17, p. 23, 25; 18, p. 27; 20, p. 14-6; 21]. Therefore, the issues of preparing for war should be considered within the framework of an appropriate strategy, while its conduct within a campaign involving a sequence of several operations. In 2018, the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, when speaking of “strategic today and strategic tomorrow”, pointed out that “the General Staff sees the strategic day after tomorrow, and the Armed Forces are a function of threats whose understanding is essential. The General Staff must have this perspective” [22]. Therefore, as regards personnel at the strategic level of State and Military Governance, the choice and application of a national military strategy should be the responsibility of the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces and its implementation, should another person be appointed to this post than the Head of the SG of the HR, would be the responsibility of the Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief.

The strategy is a policy instrument and should, therefore, address the issues at stake comprehensively and coherently. The evolution of creating and putting into practice national strategies in Poland is not yet over. At the same time, it is not sure in what direction these changes will be delivered. However, the real proof that the full maturity of strategic culture has been achieved will be the formulation and introduction of the National (State) Strategy into the system of state documents.

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Conflict of interests

The author declared no conflict of interests.

Author contributions

The author contributed to the interpretation of results and writing of the paper. The author read and approved the final manuscript.

Ethical statement

The research complies with all national and international ethical requirements.

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Biographical note

Sławomir Wojciechowski – Lt-Gen., PhD, Commander of the Multinational Corps Northeast. He commanded an anti-aircraft regiment and then a mechanized brigade, in the meantime holding the position of Chief of Staff of the Polish Military Contingent in Iraq and Commander of the Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan. He also prepared and then commanded the first Polish Combat Group of the European Union. During his career, he held high positions in the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and was subsequently appointed Director of the Department of Strategy and Defense Planning at the Ministry of Defense. Before he was appointed Commander of the Multinational Corps Northeast, he served as Deputy Commander and then Operational Commander of the Armed Forces. He graduated from the National Defense Academy in Warsaw, the UK Joint Services and Command Staff College in Shrivenham, and the US Army War College in Pennsylvania. General Wojciechowski's interest

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Rola i znaczenie strategii państwowych w Polsce

STRESZCZENIE Prace nad nową edycją strategii bezpieczeństwa narodowego skłaniają do refleksji nad rolą i znaczeniem strategii w Polsce. Analiza dotychczasowego dorobku strategicznego wskazuje na istnienie politycznych, organizacyjnych, teoretycznych i kulturowych problemów związanych z opracowywaniem strategii jako dokumentów w dziedzinie bezpieczeństwa narodowego, rozwoju kraju i obronności. Na szczególną uwagę zasługuje problem formułowania strategii oraz myślenia i działania strategicznego w wymiarze wojskowym. Problematyka niedoboru formalnoprawnych i strukturalnych ram procesu tworzenia strategii w Polsce wskazuje, że należy dążyć do sformułowania strategii narodowej (państwa) wraz z ugruntowaniem jej w systemie prawnym.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE strategia, bezpieczeństwo narodowe, rozwój kraju, obronność, sztuka wojenna, operacja, kampania

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