

Original article

Cooperation of the Territorial Defense Forces with a non-military system during armed conflict

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ABSTRACT

The article presents the conditions for organizing the cooperation of the newest type of armed forces, the Territorial Defense Forces, with non-military institutions. When presenting individual issues, it was emphasized that the essence of cooperation between various entities is to coordinate their actions to achieve a common goal, while maintaining the autonomy of individual parties to this action.

Concerning not only military threats, the coordination of the activities of various entities in the regional (voivodeship, powiat, commune) but also nationwide dimension has become particularly important due to the introduction of a new element to the national security system – the Territorial Defense Forces (WOT). The underlying assumption of activities in this area has been to increase the state's defense capabilities and link the operation of Territorial Defense Forces units to a given area. The activities related to the establishment and development of the WOT are mostly the result of the strategic analysis carried out since 2016 at the Ministry of National Defense as part of the Strategic Defense Review (SPO 2016).

Bearing in mind the regional nature of the activities (in permanent areas of responsibility) of the Territorial Defense Forces, the article presents what tasks this formation can perform in cooperation with public administration institutions and units of the Police, Border Guard, State Fire Service, health protection, and civil defense formations. The basic requirements for planning and organizing joint activities of such different entities are also indicated. The essential of them is the unity of action (planning, organizing, conducting activities), which primarily concerns acting in accordance with the same intention (concept), which in turn is a consequence of the proper definition of the chain of command (control), in which the relations between individual entities and decision-making powers have been precisely defined. This will make it possible to build an operational system in which the presented procedures of action planning are understandable to everyone and above all, allow for making rational decisions that enable achieving the synergy effect during the WOT's operation with elements of the non-military system. It will be facilitated by getting to know each other's procedures, potential,

and specifics of action, and mainly being aware of the possibilities and scope of joint action.

KEYWORDS

security, cooperation, Territorial Defense Forces

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Introduction

The Russian Federation's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the conflict in eastern Ukraine significantly changed the perception of threats affecting Poland's security. The answer to these threats is, among others, strengthening the Polish Armed Forces' potential by creating the Territorial Defense Forces (Polish abbrev. WOT). As another branch of the Polish Armed Forces, the WOT troops were brought to life on November 16, 2016 [1]. The *concept of establishing the Territorial Defense Forces*, approved by the Minister of National Defense, provides for the formation of seventeen WOT brigades (BOTs) – one in each voivodeship, and two in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship. It was assumed that, ultimately, approximately 53,000 professional soldiers and territorial military service soldiers would serve in the WOT¹. According to the afore-mentioned concept, the troops are to be operational in 2021.

It should be emphasized that during an armed conflict, the main task of the Territorial Defense Forces should be to support operational troops. At the same time, any new formation activities can be performed only in the regional dimension (in permanent areas of responsibility).

Due to the functioning of WOT troops in permanent areas of responsibility, it is expected that they will undertake joint actions with the non-military system, among other things, when military threats appear. Hence, the reason for the authors of the material to take up the issues related to the cooperation of WOT troops with public administration, services, guards, and other forces of the non-military system during an armed conflict.

The essence and purpose of cooperation

To cooperate means to *act jointly with someone; contribute to something together with other factors; about mechanisms, organs, etc.: function in conjunction with others* [2]. Cooperation is *multi-entity activities, the participants of which help each other* [3, p. 273]. According to the *Military Knowledge Lexicon*, cooperation (...) *consists in the concerted concentration of efforts and activities (...) in terms of tasks, time, place (...) following the general intention to achieve the operation's goal* [4, p. 496]. Z. Galewski defined cooperation similarly: *it is the efforts of all combatants to achieve a common purpose agreed in time and space* [5, p. 13]. When simplifying the above explanations, it can be said that cooperation is aid agreed between various entities to achieve common goals.

It should be emphasized that the essence of cooperation is coordinated action to achieve a common goal while maintaining the autonomy of its performers. It is organized when it is impossible or impossible for one contractor to fulfill a task [6, p. 203]. Usually, it is expected from the collaboration participants that undertaking tasks by them together will bring much

better results than their separate activity [6, p. 203]. Therefore, the cooperation of territorial defense with non-military forces should boil down to the most effective use of the operational capabilities of WOT troops and the organizational and executive capabilities of government and local government authorities, services, inspections, and guards in joint action for the military defense of the state, including protection of the population and the environment. Coordination of these two components' activities should allow for the multiplication of defense capabilities in the regional (voivodeship, district, commune) and nationwide dimension.

Military threats to the state and a new combat space

Various institutions in our country deal with the assessment of threats; however, concerning military threats, institutions subordinate to the Minister of National Defense should play a leading role. Tasks in this area are carried out by boards of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, which are responsible, among other things, for *acquiring, identifying, and analyzing information about phenomena that may constitute a source of political and military threats to state security* [7, § 37 (3) point 2] (Zarząd Analiz Wywiadowczych i Rozpoznawczych – P2 Management of Intelligence and Reconnaissance Analyzes – P2). Besides, they plan the strategic use of the Armed Forces for the period of a threat to state security (political and military crisis) and war in national and allied operations as part of collective defense (Zarząd Planowania Użycia Sił Zbrojnych i Szkolenia – P3/P7 Armed Forces Use Planning and Training Board – P3/P7), including [7, § 38 (3) point 1]:

- a) development of national plans (concepts) for the use of the Armed Forces and participation in the allied operational planning process,
- b) initiating and coordinating the operational planning process in the Armed Forces as well as supervision over the storage and circulation of operational planning documents,
- c) conducting analyzes and assessments and presenting recommendations regarding the participation of the Armed Forces in missions and operations conducted by NATO, the EU, and other international organizations, initiating the process of planning and using Polish military contingents in these operations, as well as preparing proposals for the participation of the Armed Forces in the initiative of the NATO's Response Force,
- d) determining the needs of the Armed Forces in terms of structures, equipment, operational preparation of the territory of the country and their support by the non-military part of the state defense system,
- e) development and updating of a mobilization plan.

The activities carried out by the boards of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces are classified as risk assessment and planning for the use of the Polish Armed Forces. Still, analytical work is conducted as part of the planning and programming process for the Armed Forces development, the results of which are presented to the public in part.

The challenges related to the current operating conditions of the Polish Armed Forces and the need to define the nature of threats, combat space, and their future structure, size, tasks, and operational capabilities requirements were the basis for the decision to start the next Strategic Defense Review (SOP 2016) on July 14, 2016. The Strategic Defense Review

is a strategic management tool that is used in response to the need to anticipate change. Its main goal is to identify factors that will affect the organization in the future and formulate a strategy. It is an activity aimed at applying a comprehensive approach to defense issues and determining the national defense system's future shape [8, p. 27].

When assessing our state's security environment, SOP 2016 focused on the most critical threats and challenges to the interests of the country, which primarily concerned the potential aggression against Poland or an allied state, as well as repelling irregular actions below the threshold of war. It was assumed that the military must also be ready to respond to non-military crises and participate in foreign operations [8, p. 15].

It was also emphasized that operational troops would remain the basis of the modern Polish Armed Forces supported by the Territorial Defense Forces. The contemporary military must have operational capabilities enabling a flexible response to increasingly diverse threats, including neutralizing hostile actions below the threshold of war. Regarding changes in the security environment, it was also noted that future defense tasks would be performed not only on the battlefield but also in cyberspace [8, p. 31].

The SOP 2016 authors indicated that the global trends mentioned in the Concept translate into the situation in our region, and thus co-shape local threats and challenges. The threats below were considered as the greatest ones [8, p. 33]:

- a) Russia's power policy,
- b) unstable neighborhood of NATO's eastern and southern flanks,
- c) terrorism,
- d) economic and social environment,
- e) new battlefield dimensions.

The Russian Federation's aggressive policy has been indicated as striving to strengthen its position in the global balance of power using various methods, including violations of international law, the use of force and coercion in relations with other countries, and attempts to destabilize Western integration structures. The Concept emphasizes that it poses a threat mainly to Poland and other countries, especially since Russia openly recognizes NATO as the main threat to its security, thereby it steadily increases military spending and conducts dynamic modernization and training of its armed forces. According to SOP 2016, a real prospect is that Russia will cause a conflict on a regional scale, involving one or more the NATO Member States. It is also possible to provoke proxy conflicts in various parts of the world to create new levels of pressure on Western countries [9, p. 24].

The analysis of the Russia's use of armed forces to achieve political goals in Georgia, the Crimean Peninsula, and the territory of Ukraine showed that the purpose of these actions, often masked and carried out below the threshold of the war, has been to destabilize the situation in other countries and undermine their territorial integrity.

The unstable neighborhood of NATO Forward Presence. It was assessed within SOP 2016 that the Russian Federation that, using various tools, influences the situation in the former USSR countries, is the main source of instability. It was indicated that in the perspective of 2032, Russia is highly likely to play on social tensions and carry out activities in relation to Ukraine and Moldova, strive to increase Belarus' dependence on Russia, and destabilize the

situation in the Caucasus, especially regarding the “frozen” conflicts in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia [9, p. 25-6].

When presenting the SOP 2016 findings, it was also stressed that, among other things, the threat of Islamic terrorism would remain at a high level in Western Europe. More organizations, terrorist cells, or individuals’ actions can be expected to emerge in the European Union. According to the SOP 2016, a potential terrorist attack in Poland – a NATO and EU Member State identified with Christianity – may be used by the so-called Islamic State to extend the “war with infidels” and to intimidate members of the coalition fighting against it [9, p. 29].

The outcomes from the analyzes and assumptions concerning variants of the new structure of the command and control system were subjected to two-stage verification. In the first stage, a strategic war game was conducted, and on February 20, 2017, the Minister of National Defense initiated the command and staff exercise under the code ZIMA-17 attended by the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, commanders of the Branches of Armed Forces, representatives of the National Security Bureau, and other ministries. One of the results of these activities was the definition of the future combat space.

The apparent assertion is that the battlefield future will change in strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. The SOP authors state that it will be much more chaotic than today [9, p. 32]. This claim is justified by the increase in the fire exchange intensity and the operation of numerous human-controlled platforms operating remotely or even performing autonomous tasks in the combat space. At the same time, the increasing efficiency of systems integrating sensors and combat measures will be offset by new disruptive measures. However, it is indicated that despite these changes, in the perspective of the next 15 years, “conventional” military equipment, such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, and multi-purpose unmanned aircraft, will continue to play a primary role. At the same time, new means of reconnaissance (including satellite), masking, and destruction will be developed, which will become cheaper and easier to use as their number grows. The role of automated systems for command and control of combat means will also continue to enhance, and the high development pace of radio-electronic and information warfare tools will be maintained. The significance of the technologies that make up the anti-access complexes will also grow². In the assessment of SOP 2016, their implementation and the resulting change in the approach to defense operations will provide Poland with security more effectively than costly investments in systems used primarily for power projection. It also points out that technologies being at a relatively early stage of development today can bring significant cost savings in the future. Nevertheless, they will require a high investment in research and long implementation time [9, p. 34].

Concerning new technologies and despite the prevailing conventional nature of the battlefield, the next dimension of cyberspace and the information battlefield will play an increasingly important role, especially since they have already become the battlefield of institutional and non-institutional actors. It is the dimension of the combat space that allows entities with diverse, often asymmetric, potential to compete. It is difficult to distinguish between states of peace, crises, or open conflicts. The SOP 2016 findings indicate that technological progress will have a considerable impact on the Armed Forces’ economic and social environment.

² Integrating the operation of air means, missile systems, sensors, unmanned aerial vehicles, land platforms and other elements that effectively block the enemy from entering our country and prevent freedom of maneuver in this area.

However, at the same time, it will generate various threats, including the possibility of uncontrolled use of various types of technologies by non-state actors, and the likely increase in disproportions in development between individual countries.

Territorial Defense Forces in the model of the Polish Armed Forces

The Defense Concept indicates that the most important result of the 2016 Strategic Defense Review is the future Polish Armed Forces model. The model specifies the general directions of changes that should be introduced in the next fifteen years. At the same time, the model will be a reference point for further analyzes of the national security environment. It should also enable a quick and effective response to identified threats. The model was drawn from the results of the conducted research, and the command and staff exercise ZIMA-17. The model assumes that NATO remains the most powerful military alliance, and Poland will make every effort to ensure that it persists the guarantor of peace and prosperity in Europe. It was also emphasized that integration in the North Atlantic Alliance and membership of the European Union contribute to the overall stability of the European continent. The Defense Concept's authors point out that an essential element of this architecture will be maintaining the military and political commitment of the United States, with whom Poland wishes to develop bilateral cooperation further.

In line with the adopted model, it was determined that by 2032 the Polish Armed Forces would be one of the most modern and numerous armies in Europe. They will consist of five types of armed forces: the Navy, the Air Force, the Land Forces, the Territorial Defense Forces, and the Special Forces. Following the SPO 2016 results, units of the Land Forces and the Air Force will remain critical for the Polish defense. It was also indicated that efforts should be made to ensure that the Land Forces divisions play the role of tactical combat unions, not administrative entities, to an even greater extent.

It is also indicated that the future Polish Armed Forces must be ready to cooperate with other services in crisis management operations, both on the territory of Poland and allied countries. This task becomes particularly fundamental in the context of the growing use of irregular operations in our neighborhood. Certain situations may require a coordinated response from the military and non-military institutions [9, p. 41].

Therefore, in the presented model, a significant role will be played by the Territorial Defense Forces, which, under the adopted schedule, will fully develop and will have an increased fire potential to fulfill various tasks. However, their primary mission will be to cooperate with operational forces, mainly as light infantry. They will also be prepared to counter irregular activities and support public administration activities in crisis management. The focus of the Polish Armed Forces on building anti-access capabilities means that their primary task will be to stop the enemy's aggression at the state border and inflict massive losses on it so that aggression ceases to be profitable. The critical assumption of the system of operations created in this way is that defense can be a more effective form of warfare. Especially that the defending party, including, in particular, the units of the Territorial Defense Forces know the area better, have their facilities closer, and can use their potential much better based on the support of other elements of the national defense system. Such a way of operating requires adapting the command system to new conditions and preparing it to constantly and flexibly react to changes in the situation.

Tasks carried out as part of the WOT cooperation with the non-military system

The Territorial Defense Forces will fight during an armed conflict with the enemy, and they should be prepared to carry out tasks for the non-military subsystem, above all: public administration, the Police, Border Guard, the State Fire Service, health protection, and civil defense formation. The possibilities of supporting the entities' and others' activities by the WOT troops stem mainly from their armament and equipment and the training of soldiers. Thus, the forces can support the activities of public administration in the field of:

- evacuation of the population from areas where military operations will be conducted,
- conducting rescue operations,
- warning and alerting people about threats,
- providing information to the public about contaminated areas,
- isolation of contaminated areas, including water intakes and devices,
- water and food supply,
- providing humanitarian aid,
- protection of crops and livestock,
- protection and evacuation of cultural property,
- protection and defense of public utility buildings, warehouses with supplies of food, water, fuel, and other materials necessary for the functioning of the population,
- protection and defense of objects included in the critical infrastructure.

During hostilities and before their commencement, the enemy may strive to paralyze the functioning of public administration bodies, for example, by influencing the facilities where the main and backup positions for governors, heads of combined and non-combined administration, as well as local government bodies are developed. Hence, the Territorial Defense Forces' role is vital in the protection and defense of the places and many other facilities. For instance, the places where strategic reserves are stored will be critical. They are to support tasks related to national security and defense, restore critical infrastructure, mitigate disruptions in continuity of supplies for the economy, meet the basic needs of the population, save their lives and health, and satisfy international obligations [10, Art. 3]. It is equally essential to provide the protection and defense for plants performing tasks for the state's defense needs.

As regards the tasks carried out by the WOT troops to support the Police, the most important ones should be mentioned:

- assistance in evacuating people from endangered areas,
- participation in the protection of property left behind by the evacuated population,
- assistance in counteracting public order disturbance and terrorist acts.

Also, the Police, during the organization and conduct of defense activities, should support the WOT troops, mainly in the field of:

- providing information on enemy troop movements,
- counteracting identification of the sites of fortification works, buildings, streets, shelters, and other infrastructure prepared for defense purposes,

- counteracting acts of sabotage, terror, panic, and others disrupting preparatory defense works,
- ensuring protection and defense as well as regulation of traffic along the evacuation routes as well as transport of materials and military maneuver,
- protection and defense of military deployment regions,
- combating enemy subversive and reconnaissance groups and enemy landings,
- monitoring people (organizations, media) suspected of carrying out activities for the enemy,
- protection and defense of objects included in the critical infrastructure.

In the event of the imposition of martial law, the actions of the Border Guard may be supported by the WOT in the border area, primarily in the field of:

- conducting reconnaissance,
- monitoring sites of illegal migration of people,
- patrolling,
- counteracting the penetration of reconnaissance and subversive-reconnaissance enemy elements,
- building dams and abatises on forest paths and dirt roads,
- organizing ad hoc camps for refugees,
- strengthening border crossings,
- expansion of fortifications of institutions,
- evacuation of people from border areas.

It should be emphasized that when the enemy forces cross the state border, units of the Border Guard are withdrawn into the country. Thus, the WOT troops deployed in permanent areas of responsibility – along the state border, should be prepared to secure the departure of Border Guard units from the state border and fight the enemy in border regions.

The Territorial Defense Forces may support the activities of the State Fire Service (PSP), mainly in the field of isolation of areas affected by fire or contamination with hazardous substances, and evacuation of people from these areas. Alarming and liquidation of chemical and biological contamination and infections take place within the framework of the National Contamination Detection and Alerting System. The WOT should be prepared to support the State Fire Service in counteracting these threats by conducting reconnaissance from air and contamination observation posts, controlling suspected persons, patrolling the likely sites of terrorist attacks with the use of CBRN weapons³. Particular attention should be paid to road, rail, and bridge interchanges used by troops for mobility, as well as airports and seaports. The population centers such as shopping malls, bus and train stations, highways, and expressways.

The joint operations of the Territorial Defense Forces and the State Fire Service in securing the moving of operational troops across the country will be of great importance. Tasks in this area may include providing fire protection along the roads and railway lines of the moving troops, and fighting fires in the areas where troops are deployed.

³ CBRN – chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.

In addition, the WOT and PSP troops can carry out joint activities in towns affected by fighting, such as conducting search and rescue operations, evacuation of residents from endangered areas, and extinguishing fires.

During the armed conflict, the WOT troops will also carry out joint tasks with medical entities. In the event of mass losses among the population, the WOT troops should be prepared to support them in the evacuation of the wounded. Moreover, it should be taken into account that during an armed conflict, the population will be evacuated from the areas of direct fighting into the interior of the country. Hence, it will be necessary for medical units to provide assistance along the evacuation routes, and thus the WOT troops should provide these units with protection and defense against enemy subversive and reconnaissance groups' attacks.

Cooperation of the Territorial Defense Forces troops with civil defense also seems necessary. Joint actions of these entities during an armed conflict should focus on protecting and ensuring the survival of the population, including:

- warning and alerting the public,
- undertaking rescue activities,
- carrying out the evacuation of the population,
- indicating and isolating danger zones,
- ensuring security and public order,
- ensuring the functioning of public services,
- saving goods necessary for the survival of the population,
- providing humanitarian aid.

It should be noted that the cooperation of both formations, i.e., the Territorial Defense Forces and civil defense, should include joint actions within the framework of the already mentioned National Contamination Detection and Alerting System and the Common Armed Forces and Civilian Population Warning System about threats from air strikes.

Factors improving the WOT's cooperation with the non-military system forces

The formation of the Territorial Defense Forces created a new reality of planning and organizing activities in response to threats to the state, region, and local communities. The analysis of the conclusions received during their preparation and the existing cooperation with public administration entities and their subordinate services and institutions allows for the presentation of factors that should increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their future operation. The most important of these factors include legal, organizational, procedural, technical, and social aspects.

As far as legal aspects are concerned, efforts should be made to prepare regulations defining the joint operation of the WOT troops (in the broader context of the entire Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland) with elements of a non-military system in the dimension of the state, region, and local communities. The current legal status, efforts should be simplified mainly by codifying the law on defense (military security) issues. The best solution would be one act constituting the legal basis for the activities of the Polish Armed Forces, including the Territorial Defense Forces, and their cooperation with the non-military system. The essential part

of such an act should be a clear and precise definition of all public authorities' competences, powers, and responsibilities within preparation and conduct of defense activities, relations between them, and institutions performing tasks in this area. The authors of SOP 2016 also point out the necessity to unify the law concerning the issues and develop a single comprehensive act on defense matters and the fact that this legal act should describe the unique role of the WOT in this respect [9, p. 63]. The apparent consequence of adopting such a solution is the audit of the entire legal system to establish a transparent system of regulations and internal law regulating government and local government administration activities.

The afore-mentioned necessity to build a qualitatively new legal system in the field of defense requires the verification of existing or the definition of new operating procedures. Procedures for the cooperation of the WOT troops (more broadly, the Polish Armed Forces) with the non-military system should precisely specify, above all, the situations, competences, relations, methods of operation, financing rules, and other aspects during the joint operation of various entities. Operating procedures should be structured in such a way as to facilitate joint action, not complicate them. They should also take account of the principles of one-person control (command) and unity of action. The essence of one-person control should be a precise definition of the competences of a given body (person) and, above all, responsibility for achieving goals during various entities' operations. It is imperative during the preparation and conduct of activities by entities "on a daily basis" subordinate to various authorities (ministers) and operating in various legal systems. This approach requires unity of action (planning, organizing, conducting activities) since it concerns primarily acting according to the same intention (concept). Maintaining unity is expected to increase the efficiency of operations, and above all, the precise definition of tasks during joint operation and the best use of the potential possessed by individual entities.

Referring to the organizational aspects aimed at improving the cooperation of the WOT troops with the non-military system, it should be noted that the regulations in force stipulate that the "link" between the Polish Armed Forces and the public administration in the field are provincial military staffs and military replenishment commands. Therefore, the cooperation of the commands of the WOT brigades operating in voivodeships should occur through voivodeship military headquarters. In turn, the function of the "liaison" between the commanders of battalions, companies, and starosts and village heads should be fulfilled by military replenishment commands. This cooperation should be divided into the stages of planning activities and organizing and conducting them (Fig. 1). When planning the use of troops to support the administration, the provincial military staffs and military replenishment commands should play a fundamental role. It also applies to matters related to supporting the Polish Armed Forces by entities of the non-military system. Such a solution is dictated by the fact that the field military administration bodies (TOAW) have an appropriate organizational structure, procedures, and information that allow them to coordinate the Armed Forces' activities, including the WOT units, with entities of the non-military system. One should be aware that during an armed conflict, or before it begins, many military units will operate in the provinces. Hence, the TOAW operation is necessary to ensure the effective use of their potential, including the WOT troops, for entities of the non-military system, and to plan the needs for the support of these units by public administration, services, guards, etc. The decisions made regarding the cooperation of WOT units with the non-military system should be reflected in the relevant plans functioning in the voivodeship military headquarters and




Fig. 1. The idea of cooperation of the WOT with a non-military system
 Source: Own study based on: [11, p. 143].

military replenishment commands. For example, they may concern cooperation during the defense of localities, joint rescue operations, or the evacuation of the population, etc.

In the second stage of cooperation between the WOT troops and the non-military system, which, as a reminder, should be the organization and conduct of activities, the participation of the TOAW is to be limited to the minimum necessary, which will shorten the “chain of command”.

It should be emphasized that undertaking joint actions by WOT soldiers with services (the Police, State Fire Service, Civil Defense, Border Guard) requires the appointment of one commander who will make decisions and will be responsible for them, which should also be reflected in the documents of command: orders, ordinances, etc. The experience of, for example, joint actions of the Armed Forces and non-military system within the crisis management system shows that it is a complicated issue to resolve since there is no official dependence between soldiers and, for example, the Police or Border Guard officers. Therefore, the right solution seems to be the adoption of the principle that if non-military entities support the WOT troops, then an officer commands, whereas if officers support the WOT troops, then the commander of a WOT subunit commands. At the same time, it should be considered that there will be cases during the fight, where it will be difficult to resolve this issue. However, in challenging situations, there should always be one commander who will be able to make decisions and bear responsibility for them.

Another element facilitating the cooperation of the WOT troops with entities of the non-military system could be the adoption of similar procedures for planning and organizing operations before and during an armed conflict. Planning, as the first phase of the command process, is based primarily on a detailed analysis of the task received from the superior. The effect of the planning should be a task set by the commander. It may seem that, for example, due to the difference in structures and tasks, it is not possible to work out joint planning procedures for the operations of the WOT and non-military forces. However, the experience

of joint exercises conducted by students of the War Studies University with the Border Guard officers and public administration at the voivodship and poviats levels show that it is possible. Of course, not Representatives of the non-military system do not have to participate in all undertakings implemented by the WOT troops while planning activities. Their involvement in planning may include the presentation, during the briefing, of the possibility of supporting the WOT activities, or the development of a concept of supporting the options for the operation of own troops, or participation in the analysis of operating options.

It should be emphasized that the planning procedure should enable commanders to efficiently and effectively assign tasks to their subordinates. At the brigade and battalion level, planning can be executed in 7 stages:

- Stage 1 – assessment of the situation,
- Stage 2 – task analysis,
- Stage 3 – development of options for action,
- Stage 4 – analysis of options for action,
- Stage 5 – comparison of options for action,
- Stage 6 – commander’s decision and intention to act,
- Stage 7 – development of an action plan and combat order.

The main activities performed by the commands at individual stages are presented in Table 1.

Technical aspects should concern providing the WOT subunits and units with equipment enabling the fulfillment of individual tasks. It should result from identifying the operational capabilities that these units should possess. Operational abilities should be understood as potential efficiency, the ability of the entity to undertake actions aimed at achieving the desired effects – the implementation of the mission and tasks [12, § 2 point 4]. Having identified the operational capabilities of the WOT troops when cooperating with a non-military system, it is necessary to take actions to complete (supplementing) individual components of operational capabilities, such as doctrines, organizational structure, training, military equipment, personnel resources, leadership, infrastructure, and interoperability. The “capability approach” that first defines the role and tasks of a given entity, and then its structure, equipment, and methods of operation (doctrine) also allow defining the competences of commanders and personnel as well as the content and scope of their training (improvement). Such an approach to planning and then organizational aspects allows for the preparation of the WOT troops adequately to the forecasted tasks that they will (may) carry out in the future.

As for social aspects, it should be noted that the synergy effect during the cooperation of the WOT troops and the non-military system will be achievable when all participants of these activities show mutual understanding, will know the essence and possibilities of partners’ actions, will be acquainted with the operating procedures and, above all, their role in achieving common objectives. Therefore, actions should be taken to increase the awareness, knowledge, and skills of people holding managerial positions in the state, voivodeship, poviats, and commune in the field of planning, organizing, and conducting activities using the potential of the WOT (more broadly, the Polish Armed Forces) and the non-military system.

Table 1. The procedure for planning operations by the WOT troops – an example

Stage	Main activities
Stage 1 – assessment of the situation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – duplication and distribution of the superior’s order, – getting acquainted with the superior’s order, – calculating the time necessary to carry out the planning and deciding on the method of planning activities: detailed or cursory planning, – development and publication of the command work plan
Stage 2 – a) task analysis b) factor evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – analysis of the superior’s order, – development of a specific own task, – formulation of the commander’s initial intention*, – development of commander’s planning guidelines, – assessing the environment for future activities, – development of enemy operating variants (the selection of the enemy variant for further planning of own troops’ activities takes place during the briefing), – defining the limitations of own troops in the implementation of the task (forces, time, space), – defining tasks for subordinate troops to prepare them for the planned operation and issuing a preparatory order
Stage 3 – development of options for action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – for each of the options of action, the following is determined: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • how the task was performed, • combat group, • initial division of forces, • distribution of the SD, – acceptance of variants of action by the chief of staff, – preparation of a briefing regarding the presentation of options for action
Stage 4 – analysis of options for action	<p>Preparation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – definition of critical and decision-making points, – selection of the method for carrying out the analysis of options for action, – preparation of an art table, a sketch of activities, introduction of a combat group to a computer system simulating the operations of troops. <p>Leading:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – analysis of options for action with the use of one of the methods, – identification of the strengths and weaknesses of the various options (disadvantages and advantages), – rejection, correction or unqualified acceptance of policy options, – preparation of options for action (except for rejected ones) for the next stage – comparison of options for action
Stage 5 – comparison of options for action	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – comparison of options for action, – selection of the recommended variant.
Stage 6 – decision of the commander and intention to act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – commander’s decision to select an action option, – announcement of the intention to act by the commander, – issuing a preparatory order
Stage 7 – the development and distribution of a combat order	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – preparation of a combat order with an action plan, – approval of the combat order, – issuing a combat order

* According to the document *Dowodzenie i kierowanie wojskami lądowymi, DT-3.2.2(B)* [Command and command of land forces, DT-3.2.2 (B)]. Bydgoszcz: CDiSz; 2018, the commander’s initial intention is determined during the task analysis.

Source: Own study.

Conclusion

The contemporary geopolitical situation in our region has resulted in a number of actions in our country that are a response to the identified threats and a new dimension of potential armed conflicts.

The underlying assumptions of the state's security activities were reflected in the basic strategic document – *Strategy for Responsible Development until 2020 (with a perspective until 2030)* and in the *Defense Concept of the Republic of Poland*.

These documents present the contemporary conditions of Poland's activities in the field of security, and above all, define goals, indicate priorities and actions that should be taken to achieve them.

As regards military threats, the Territorial Defense Forces have an essential role to play. The creation of this new type of armed forces is the result of a series of analyzes and an expression of the desire to increase the Polish Armed Forces' potential. According to the adopted assumptions, the WOT units are also to work closely with elements of the non-military system during the implementation of tasks in times of peace, crises, and armed conflict.

The effective use of the WOT's potential will be determined by the knowledge of the state and capabilities of the available forces and how to use the values of territorial defense and non-military systems. That can be achieved in peacetime as part of the joint training and exercises of both components. Properly trained troops operating in a given region, entirely familiar with the area of future operations, and having the support of the society, may constitute one of the essential elements deterring potential aggressors.

An essential aspect of the effective WOT's utilization is the knowledge of their operational capabilities to carry out various tasks. Such knowledge will allow the non-military system elements, and most of all, public administration bodies to formulate tasks for them properly. The key in this respect is to get to know each other, understand their specificity, and test in practice the possibility of implementing crisis response procedures and joint action of representatives of various institutions in situations of military and non-military threats.

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Conflict of interests

All authors declared no conflict of interests.

Author contributions


All authors contributed to the interpretation of results and writing of the paper. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

Ethical statement

The research complies with all national and international ethical requirements.

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Współdziałanie Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej z układem pozamilitarnym podczas konfliktu zbrojnego

STRESZCZENIE

Artykuł przedstawia uwarunkowania organizacji współdziałania najnowszego rodzaju sił zbrojnych, jakim są Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej, z instytucjami układu pozamilitarnego. Przedstawiając poszczególne zagadnienia podkreślono, że istotą współdziałania różnych podmiotów jest skoordynowanie ich działania dla osiągnięcia wspólnego celu, przy jednoczesnym zachowaniu autonomii poszczególnych wykonawców tegoż działania.

W odniesieniu do zagrożeń militarnych, ale nie tylko, koordynacja działań różnych podmiotów w wymiarze regionalnym (województwo, powiat, gmina) ale również ogólnopolskim nabrała szczególnego znaczenia z uwagi na wprowadzenie do systemu bezpieczeństwa państwa nowego elementu – Wojsk Obrony Terytorialnej (WOT). Zasadniczym założeniem działań w tym zakresie było, i jest, zwiększenie zdolności obronnych państwa oraz dowiązanie działania jednostek WOT do danego terenu. Działania w zakresie utworzenia i rozwoju WOT są w znacznej mierze wynikiem analizy strategicznej, jaką od 2016 roku prowadzono w Ministerstwie Obrony Narodowej w ramach Strategicznego Przeglądu Obronnego (SPO 2016).

Mając na uwadze regionalny charakter działań (w stałych rejonach odpowiedzialności) WOT, w artykule przedstawiono jakie zadania może realizować ta formacja podczas współdziałania z instytucjami administracji publicznej oraz jednostkami Policji, Straży Granicznej, Państwowej Straży Pożarnej, ochrony zdrowia oraz formacjami obrony cywilnej. Wskazano także na zasadnicze wymagania wobec planowania i organizowania wspólnego działania tak różnych podmiotów. Zasadnicze z nich to jedność działania (planowania, organizowania, prowadzenia działań), która dotyczy przede wszystkim działania w myśl tego samego zamiaru (koncepcji), co z kolei jest konsekwencją właściwego określenia łańcucha dowodzenia (kierowania), w którym precyzyjnie określono relacje pomiędzy poszczególnymi podmiotami oraz określono kompetencje decyzyjne. Pozwoli to na zbudowanie systemu działania, w którym przedstawione procedury planowania działania są dla wszystkich zrozumiałe, a przede wszystkim pozwalają na podejmowanie racjonalnych decyzji, które pozwalają na osiągnięcie efektu synergii podczas działania WOT z elementami układu pozamilitarnego. Przyczyni się do tego wzajemne poznanie procedur, potencjału, specyfiki działania, a przede wszystkim uświadomienie sobie możliwości i zakresu wspólnego działania.

SŁOWA KLUCZOWE bezpieczeństwo, współdziałanie, Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej

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