Competition law enforcement in Ukraine: challenges from on-line giants

• Authors: Anzhelika Gerasymenko , Nataliia Mazaraki

Abstracts

FR

Le droit de la concurrence, l’économie et la politique sont confrontés à une métamorphose réglementaire due à l’essor de l’économie numérique. Les juridictions des États-Unis, de la Chine et de l’UE ont annoncé et introduit partiellement des changements systémiques dans leurs cadres juridiques de la concurrence pour suivre le rythme des développements technologiques. Le Comité anti-monopole de l’Ukraine suit le principe des ‘trois singes’, il ne voit aucune plate-forme en ligne, n’entend aucune plate-forme en ligne, ne parle d’aucune plate-forme en ligne. En conséquence, rien n’a été entrepris, ni même annoncé. La structure du papier est double. Premièrement, il analyse le contexte économique et les caractéristiques de l’économie numérique et montre pourquoi les instruments disponibles d’application de la concurrence sont inefficaces. La deuxième partie de l’article montre pourquoi le cadre juridique ukrainien actuel de la concurrence est (in)capable de faire face aux défis des géants en ligne. En ce qui concerne la nécessité de recalibrer les approches réglementaires sur les marchés numériques, l’Ukraine est confrontée au dilemme de la bonne combinaison ex ante et ex post.

EN

Competition law, economics and policy are facing a regulatory metamorphosis due to the rise of the digital economy. US, China and EU jurisdictions have announced and partially introduced systemic changes to their competition law frameworks to keep pace with technological developments. The Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine is following the principle of ‘three monkeys’, it sees no on-line platforms, hears no on-line platforms, speaks of no on-line platforms, so nothing has been undertaken or even announced. The paper is twofold. Firstly, it analyses the economic background and features of the digital economy and shows why the available instruments of competition enforcement are ineffective. The second part of the paper shows why the current Ukrainian competition law framework is (in)capable of dealing with challenges posed by on-line giants. Regarding the need for a recalibration of regulatory approaches in digital markets, Ukraine faces the dilemma of a proper combination of ex ante and ex post measures.

Keywords

EN

digitalisation; on-line platform; market definition; gatekeeper; competition enforcement

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2022
• Volume: 15
• Issue: 26
• Pages: 57-74

Dates

published

2022

Contributors

author

Anzhelika Gerasymenko

• Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics

• https://orcid.org/0000000303136942

author

Nataliia Mazaraki

• Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics

• https://orcid.org/0000000217297846

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2022.15.26.3

Biblioteka Nauki

2159087