Selective Enforcement and Multi-Party Antitrust Infringements: How to Handle "Unilateral Agreements"?

• Authors: Jan Polański

Abstracts

FR

Dans les affaires de cartel, il existe de bonnes raisons politiques d’enquêter sur tous les membres du cartel et d’adresser une décision à chacun d’entre eux. Toutefois, le cas est différent lorsqu’il s’agit d’infractions verticales. Ces dernières impliquent souvent un plus grand nombre d’entreprises, mais leur existence dépend de la participation, par exemple, des grossistes. Par conséquent, les autorités de la concurrence pourraient être intéressées par la poursuite d’une politique d’application sélective et de ciblage des enquêtes sur des entreprises uniques, même si ces infractions sont multipartites. Cela soulève toutefois des questions quant à la validité d’une telle approche et à la manière dont elle affecte les droits de la défense. Compte tenu du fait que le retour de la Commission européenne aux affaires relatives à l’imposition des prix de ventes (retail price maintenance – RPM) en 2018 a davantage incité les autorités nationales de concurrence (ANC) à enquêter sur les affaires verticales, cet article réfléchit à ce que pourrait être la réaction de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) si l’approche susmentionnée devait être remise en question, soit au cours d’une procédure d’appel, soit dans le cadre d’une demande préliminaire.

EN

In cartel cases, there are good policy reasons to investigate all cartel members and to address a decision to each of them. Yet, the case is different when it comes to vertical infringements. Vertical infringements often involve more undertakings, but their continued existence depends on the participation of e.g. wholesalers. In consequence, antitrust authorities might be interested in pursuing a policy of selective enforcement and targeting investigations at single undertakings, even despite the fact that such infringements are multi-party ones. This, however, raises concerns whether such an approach is valid and how it affects the rights of defence. Taking into account that the European Commission’s return to RPM cases in 2018 provided national competition authorities (NCAs) with additional incentives to investigate vertical cases, this article reflects on what might be the reaction of the European Court of Justice (CJEU), if the aforementioned approach is questioned either during an appeals procedure or within a preliminary request.

Keywords

EN

selective enforcement; procedure; vertical agreements; procedural autonomy; due process

• Publisher: Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Nauk Ekonomicznych
• Journal: Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies
• Year: 2023
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 27
• Pages: 83-110

Dates

published

2023

Contributors

author

Jan Polański

• Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKiK)

• https://orcid.org/0000000240481860

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Identifiers

DOI

10.7172/1689-9024.YARS.2023.16.27.3

Biblioteka Nauki

20679103