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1997 | 59 | 69-82

Article title

Waszyngton wobec francusko-brytyjskiego kompromisu morskiego 1928 r.

Content

Title variants

EN
Washington and the Franco-British naval compromise 1928

Languages of publication

Abstracts

EN
The collapse of the Three Powers Naval Conference in 1927 and the deadlock in the American-British negotiations in the 5th session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference constitued the background of the U.S. attitude towards the so called Franco-British Naval Compromise of 1928. The agreement was a surprise for Washington who considered the Franco-British proposal offered to the United States to be an offensive one since it was based on the principles ignoring all the principal needs of the US Navy well know n to the British and the French since 1927. The Americans, unlike the Britons, beeing short of naval bases deployed in the world wide empire, needed large vessels having long radius of operation. Franco-British agreement put limitations exclusively on those clases of ships that were needed by the USA all the others leaving free of any limitation. This determined the American standpoint. Franco-British suggestion was rejected and the Congress passed new naval building program that however has never been put into force. Thus the diplomatic clash between Washington and London on naval superiority resulted in the deterioration of the American-British relations that in 1928 reached their lowest point in the whole interwar period.

Keywords

Year

Issue

59

Pages

69-82

Physical description

Dates

published
1997

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

Biblioteka Nauki
18055591

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.ojs-issn-0208-6050-year-1997-issue-59-article-615215db-cdbf-34e0-8ac0-47d3760c0684
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