Kripkeański Wittgenstein, faktualizm i znaczenie

• Authors: Adam Łukasik , Alexander Miller

Title variants

EN

Kripke’s Wittgenstein, factualism and meaning

Abstracts

EN

The paper provides a detailed discussion of George Wilson’s factualist interpretation of Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language and presents a new non-factualist interpretation. After exposition of Wilson’s construal of Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument and sceptical solution, it is argued that this interpretation ultimately fails. Two possible interpretations of Wilson’s Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s meaning-fact are considered; one of them is based on Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s remarks on normative conditionals, and the other involves minimalism. It is claimed that on either of these interpretations the meaning-fact proposed by Wilson falls prey to Kripke’s Wittgenstein’s sceptical argument. Regardless of this, it is admitted that Wilson’s factualist interpretation has important advantages. One of them is that it highlights the importance of distinguishing between basic sceptical conclusion and radical sceptical conclusion. In concluding sections a new non-factualist interpretation of Kripke’s Wittgenstein is proposed that preserves this distinction and some other benefits claimed by Wilson for his interpretation.

Keywords

EN

Kripke, Kripke’s Wittgenstein, George Wilson, factualism about meaning, meaning fact

PL

Kripke, Kripkeański Wittgenstein, George Wilson, faktualizm w kwestii znaczenia, fakt znaczeniowy

• Publisher: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
• Journal: Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
• Year: 2015
• Volume: 29
• Pages: 5-43

Contributors

author

Adam Łukasik

author

Alexander Miller

• Department of Philosophy, University of Otago, New Zealand

Identifiers

Biblioteka Nauki

1622267