

Changing Narratives: Civil Society as a Condition of Balanced Governance in Contemporary Taiwan

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Abstract

The article delivers an extensive view on the genesis and development of civil society in Taiwan, and presents the results of the analysis of a role that civil society in Taiwan plays in the shaping of institutional order, co-governance (local and national), the intermediation and representation of the individual (also summed in group interest) as well as the public interest in relation to the other actors of the social system (the state, the market and family). Taiwanese socio-political transformation is a model example of the transition from authoritarian rule into a democratic system. Conglomeration of socio-economic prerequisites lays as the basis for specific political culture of Taiwanese society, which not only has a significant impact on the participation of different groups of citizens in the public sphere, on their position in the social and civil dialogue, but primarily on their relationships with state institutions.

Keywords: Taiwan's civility, civil society, social and political transition

Introduction

The study aimed at narratives concerning civil society in today's Taiwan is still undeveloped field of scholars' interests. Westerners using the term 'Taiwanese civil

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society' are referring it to something that is well identified as Taiwanese civility or citizenship, but one may easily realize that they pay only weak attention to the phenomenon related to the current situation of 'not-existing nation' and by this they are losing a chance to understand it's true nature as a cultural and political structure of Taiwan's public life. If we consider that the level of social and cultural exchange as well as social communication between West and Taiwan increased significantly in recent decades, we will bring some popular knowledge to the realm that allows the important question, whether we speak about Taiwanese citizenship developed among islanders during the historical process of the social identity formation on the island or Chinese citizenship established by the state of the Republic of China created in Mainland after 1911 and later adopted on Taiwan after the end of Japanese colonial rules? The answer to this question, which social scientists should find, takes on many significant implications for scientific studies, political discussions (including negotiations of the patterns of governance in society) and civil practice shaping values and attitudes utilized by Taiwanese society.

In the presented study, we define 'civil society' as a moral idea referring to the social conduct of individuals and groups, legitimizing their public presence, participation in political decision making and self-organization in matters which are important for them personally or for their social environment. This conceptualization of the presence of specific individuals and groups in society is the outcome of two immutable moral principles: the principle of individual sovereignty and the principle of individual empowerment (see Gliński 2006, Siciński 1991)¹.

Referring to above-mentioned notion of civil society, we can denote that the Taiwanese civility has at least three historical sources of values and attitudes determining behaviours inside public environment or as Moore defined 'public space'. The first one is the tradition of Chinese statesmanship founded on the basis of Confucian ethics, traditional socialization patterns and state-legal-related conventions developed during the imperial period (de Bary 1970). The second one concerns the habits of Chinese conservatism as a main mean of survival containing three elements: patience, indifference and cynicism or 'old rogue' mentality (see

¹ Gliński's definition of civil society has been constructed on the basis of all the major trends and theoretical propositions deriving from the rich and heterogeneous tradition, including contemporary ones, and it is more multidimensional than here presented. Its nature is structural-normative and it refers to a certain scope of structural-residual attributes and cultural-social norms (civic skills and abilities). Siciński's approach refers to the horizontal networking of social bonds allowing certain degree of society's freedom and independence of civil actors inside spaces between state and power agents, market and families.

Lin 1935). All of these three elements of the Chinese conservative consciousness appeared as a defence mechanism against the unpredictable reactions of tyrannical or authoritarian ruling power of imperial and aristocratic governing circles. The patience gave Chinese people the ability of waiting for better times. The indifference helped them to survive without any engagement into supporting controversial political conducts. And the 'old rogue' mentality pushed them toward the cold calculation and opportunism. All of these three elements affected flight to familism and establishment of underground or second (secret) social bounds allowing so-called 'rebel society'. In less radical form this 'alternative between' appeared as religious practices of local societies and 'neighbour-kinship-like' relationships. The third one basis on Taiwanese social identity formed under the Japanese colonial period. For the development of 'modern' Taiwan and for Taiwanese civility the period of Japanese colonization was paradoxically a turning point in 'going own Taiwanese way'. Japanese governmental and economic institutions treated most of the people of Taiwan different from Japanese. By having limited access to the Japanese culture Taiwanese could not find identity there, they were located outside Japanese cultural axis and, what more important, they were separated from the cultural changes of mainland China. They initiated their own Formosian-islanders-culture. Having such an identity and creating own intellectual and leading elites, Taiwan's society became closer to the model of civil and self-organized body. In 1920s Taiwanese society switched from violent rebel resistance against Japanese rulers into protest and demanding civil society which could utilize its ability to act independently inside colonial legal system. Later during Republic of China (especially from 1950s until the end of 1980s) this specific identity and 'latent' political culture helped Taiwanese to adopt democratic governance and civil society.

The story of Taiwan's civil society highlights the weakness of contemporary homogenous approach providing simple one-way explanation of the patterns of Formosian civility. It seems that historical experiences of Taiwanese introduced two different kinds of civility: the first one is institution based structural model that should be identified with legal rights and commitments of citizens of a given state; and the second one refers to the model of citizenship based on civil morality as the 'community of values' established among people during the process of [national] culture formation and it should be identified with internalized 'habits of the heart' of people belonging to the society. The first model we have mentioned consists with outer regulations for public conducts, but second model consists with a set of self-regulations and moral obligations, which are not codified in institutionalized laws.

The Western normative-structural model and moral-self-regulating models of citizenship cannot fully reconstruct whole practice of civil society that was adopted by the Taiwan's social and political culture. It is easy to see how institutionalized civil practice, such as that developed by Sun Yat-sen (1924/1990) and his successors and lately incorporated into official state ideology of ROC, tended to absorption of the specifics of the state/society identification among Taiwanese. Such a model did not differentiate legality and publicity, and it resisted their relocation into single spheres of institutional life (state and civil [society] related areas), which is possible only in the form of pluralistic, corporate organization of civil-political society (see Luhmann1982, Cohen and Arato1995, and classical approaches of Gramsci 1971).

Kuomintang: the founder of civil society in Taiwan?

Thomas Gold (1994) wrote that approaches to Taiwan's civil and political development *must* start with the Kuomintang (KMT) party-state. In his analyses the KMT party-state was not isolated from society, as it was in the cases of totalitarian-communist states and to some extent in the case of Poland during socialist period. 'State is a relational concept – Gold says – expressing to a certain degree the balance among social forces in any society. The most powerful social forces try to influence state policy, but the members of the government – the organizations that comprise the state – may have their own agenda, which, in some instances, might bring them into conflict with social forces. In theory, then, the state can attempt to preserve some degree of autonomy from social forces, including foreign economic and political interests' (Gold 1994: 47)².

The KMT has been established as an alliance of revolutionary progressive forces in August 1912, after the successful, republican revolt of 1911. As a political party KMT was like something new for the Chinese political and public life.

² Gold also argues that the state-society relationship is not a static one. 'Especially in a society undergoing rapid structural change, new social forces emerge which might present demands to the state it never faced before. The state very likely has no institutional mechanisms for dealing with such demands from below. In a prolonged period of structural change, the state and the societal elites have problems reproducing themselves or selecting suitable successors to deal with unprecedented problems. Mobilized social forces might compel new policies, form alliances with segments of the state, introduce members into state organs, etc. (1994: 48)'.

Neither it was a confederation of influential nobility, nor a [secret] association of common people fighting for their rights to good life. In elections to ROC first congress in 1913 KMT took majority of seats and became the prime political force in newly born Chinese parliamentary democracy. In China the ideas of political parties had just developed during that time. But one may say that the social demiurge of modern politics rose as a grass-root, endogenous social movement, but it was like natural consequence of traditional social organization well known by the people of China. That was explosion of absolutely pure civil, bottom-up activity that rose in people's mind for a long time. The new was the law of politics and openness of the ideas of political parties, which became inclusive and public representation of different people's interests. One must say that the story of the very beginning of Chinese civil uprising (appeared as a democratic social movement of common good) has found its moral end after a long time when DPP rose up as a democratic parliamentary opposition in 1986 (Keating 2006).

For three decades, until the 'first Chinese democracy' has been established, KMT suppressed internal resistance of Taiwan's society. Quasi-corporate, one-party state with great success destroyed autonomous civil consciousness and enforced democratically legitimized, by interests of society, pluralistic public sphere (Chao 1998).

KMT chose the anti-communist way of politics that led the state to necessary reforms and to exercise punitive politics. Social response for any top-down reforms was unexpectedly positive (Greene 2008). The state regime created a set of conditions to promote meritocratic system of social stratification. The education-based success of social policy of KMT led to emergence of new social actors such as private capital holders, professionals and Taiwanese intelligentsia. With a shift in quality of life in that time, rose up the feeling of sovereignty of well-educated and well-rewarded society. People started to think independently, and the critics of government started to be whispered among them. The need for relocation of the state, party and social civility (including the need of resurgent Taiwanese identity) appeared (Hsiao 1994).

Among today's authors (Hung 1989, Hsiao 1989, Ho 2010), there is shared a thesis that the extremely repressive KMT's party-state regime could not utilize sharpest means to enforce rising new (but potentially influential) social forces. To keep control over the society and the state KMT replaced brutal force of power with 'silky' sociotechnics. So the regime erected a structure of ideologically sanctioned positive incentives for cooperation, or at least, acquiescence (Hsiao 1989).

The rising ambitious group of social leaders of Taiwanese communities received certain opportunities to act politically. They participated in elections for provincial

and sub-provincial administration that had limited autonomous power over localities. KMT candidates, including Taiwanese, dominated these elections. Such a practice was similar to that observed in many [pre] post-communist countries. Autonomy of the party-state achieved the highest point in the moment of rising mobilization of social forces acting in the several fields related with fundamental rights (that had been broke up by repressive authoritarian state apparatus). As an effective means party-state utilize safety valves, namely, limited access to low-level administration for concessioned representation of disappointed and repressed people. This was a short-time solution for saving the power and excellent starting point to creation of controlled relationship with [shadow] political opposition (Taylor 2000).

The lifting of the martial law in 1987 [on Taiwan] was fundamentally a political calculation to avoid the worst-case scenario of escalating challenges from the opposition party and the social movements that had come onto the scene around the mid-1980s (Ho 2010). In Poland there members of communist state and party apparatus have seen things identically and they have decided to lift hard-core socialism in 1989 on the basis of socio-political contract with underground opposition. On Taiwan, 'the longer the KMT incumbents procrastinated, the more unforeseeable and uncontrollable the consequences would be' noted Ho. But the coming political liberalization stimulated the emergence of civil society groups (social movements) 'by removing the invisible psychological fear' (Ho 2010, Chang 1989). Using socio-technical practices allowing autonomous state to create the conditions for the emergence and consolidation of social forces participating in transition the KMT in Taiwan and to some extent PUWP³ (Polish Unified Workers' Party) in Poland, saved the influences inside the states and economies. The direct outcome of such a process was the rise of social apathy observes in Poland as well as on Taiwan in next decades after the periods of 'great transitions' (Hung 1989). One may say that it is hard to indicate when exactly the transitions have been ended, but it is obvious that the transitions' results missed the point in which the strong autonomous state could be captured by sovereign social forces aimed in co-governance based on democratic pluralism (Kagan 2007). We can find a lot of adjectives describing Polish or Taiwanese democracy, but we are sure that one is perfectly adjusted to the reality of both political cultures, namely, 'empty' [democracy]. Why such a name. Answer is simple, because young institutions created after transitions became the facades of effective and

³ The PUWP has been transformed and today its name is the Alliance of Democratic leftists where former communist elites still hold their influences.

transparent governance, the people did not fit them with plural and civically sovereign consciousness of being the state co-governors.

Contemporary Sources of Narratives Concerning Civility of Taiwanese Society

Taiwanese civil society rising in the situation of the strong state authority has been correlated with traditional society that respects authoritarian political leadership legitimized in certain moral order and bases on local, direct ties similar to these often described as endogenous civility or locality (see Pye 1968). Civil society thus existed as a true practice in state system of post-war Taiwan mainly as a collective guardian of state lawfulness, but its modernity should be questioned.

This historical reconstruction responds to the problem of modernization and institutionalization of civil society in Taiwan far better than any other description, which roots the model of Taiwanese civil society outside the heir of cultural influences of local and Chinese life-worlds. The differentiation between the two patterns of the citizenship/civility or civil society not only indicates the sources of civil society but also allows researchers to indicate the basic characteristics of Taiwan's civil society as a practice placed between traditional, Confucian state and institutions of modern co-governed democratic polity as well as placed between Chinese and Taiwanese socio-cultural identities.

The distinctions between normative-structural model and moral adjustment model of civil society and between the two origins of the citizenship or identity (Chinese or Taiwanese) point a way beyond the one-sided simplified investigation of adoption of the Western way. What should be the choice for Taiwan: insisted of institutionally organized, civil society based on democratic rights and citizens' commitments incorporating universal Sino-Formosian identity, it should be entered and justified a kind of agenda of political and ethnic differentiation that has no place for actual civil society except separated and atomized local communities or personal networks aimed in non-political issues.

As it has been showed by Cohen and Arato (1995), the constitutional bounds of a civil society lie not on the level of institution, organization, or even a shared unquestioned normative order. Authors pointed out that cultural-linguistic background as a source of the cultural perception of the life-world (they call it

'unity' of life-word), is neither an institution nor an organization but a network of resources for institutions and organizations. Additionally they said that it can have a shared, unquestioned normative content only in traditional society, and even then this is not necessary. Traditional society (in our case Taiwanese society) is in fact defined not in terms of a common tradition but by its relation to traditions and ultimately to the life-world itself. The modernization of the life-world, or better to say defundamentalization of 'generalized cultural explanation of social ties' that is shared by given community, implies – Cohen and Arato add(1995) – two interlocking processes: a differentiation and internal rationalization of the structural and institutional components of the life-world; and the rationalization of the cultural-linguistic constitution of the life-world. In this case the rationalization means basically the process of institutionalization and consolidation of morality and cultural-linguistic constitution of life-world within the clear, secularized and open system of public rights and commitments of citizenry. The direct effect of such a processes is the rise of the public sphere and growth of institutionalized secondary ties which are reflecting different social interests, and which have been built on the basis of indirect presence of members and generalized social trust. However the fact of Taiwanese modernization of the life-world cannot be negated, the specifics of Taiwanese Confucianism, conservative culture and public-political life highlighted ongoing conflict of values between institutional (modern) and non-institutional ([semi]traditional) modes of civil identities that is deeply rooted in everyday life.

How do Cohen and Arato explain their idea of modern life-world? Let us see the following citation: 'It is difficult to separate these two processes (mentioned above institutionalization of the social differentiation and rationalization of cultural-linguistic roots of life-world) and impossible to prioritize them. To some extent, each presupposes and fosters the other. The differentiation on the sociological level precludes the already somewhat illusive possibility of treating society as a single organized network of institutions (of kinship or of civil-political society). What is involved is the differentiation not only of institutions of localization (family, education), social integration (groups, collectives, and associations), and cultural reproduction (religious, artistic, scientific) but also of the constituents of the spheres of personality, 'society,' and culture. In the process, social institutions gradually become uncoupled from worldviews and concrete persons, the scope of contingency for forming personal identities and interpersonal relations is freed from traditional values and institutions, and the renewal and creation of culture is freed from the dominance of social

institutions with other than cultural purposes; the result is the emergence of a critical and reflective relation to tradition'. (Cohen, Arato 1995: 45)

Thus the narratives of civility in contemporary Taiwan derive from two trajectories of narrations. The first one engages all of the values and attitudes shaped Taiwanese identity as a result of historical experiences of the lost independence (Manthorpe2009). And second one shows the new critics toward state-society relations, conservative culture and toward inadequate tension dominant ways of forming identities (Hsiao 1995, Meseznikov 2013). The existence of both forms of civil society driving forces causes dualistic patterns of being active citizen. Primary form of civility is looking for independence from institutionalized state powers and mostly it is represented by different kinds of associations (including large scope of 'folk associations'). But the secondary form of civility is going beyond the institutional orders keeping society as one body and entering new zones of networking, diverged identities, flexible social roles by which it offers extremely extensive opportunity of actions outside private spaces (outside family, state, market, religion, and even civil society as a conservative social institution).

'First Chinese civil Society' Statistical Picture of Taiwan's Civility

The picture we gave to our readers has been drawn according the Taiwan's Social Change Survey carried out by Academia Sinica, Taipei in the year2014. Presenting the numbers below we have aimed in showing how the Taiwanese society utilize the opportunity to form a kind of civil attitudes and engagement.

For being an active citizen people need to find themselves as citizens in the context of specific scope of values and convictions telling them that they are inside the mainstream of civil institutions. We decided to organize our analysis around the category of citizens who 1) are actively working for civil society organizations (CSO) and 2) keeping and expressing conviction that acting as a member of CSO is an important quality of good citizens. We call them in brief 'volunteers'.

In Taiwan, in 2014, the image of civic activity, outlined in the analysis of the expectations on 'good citizenship' and of pro-public actions, clearly indicates that there are general differences in the type of civil activity between the population

of Taiwan and a group of conscious and active citizens, named in this article as volunteers.

The serious rupture inside model of a good citizen is well illustrated by the numbers in Table 1. Breaking this trend shows the scope of attitudes existing among volunteers. Average values on the scales, listed in the Table 2, are higher than in the general population of Taiwan. Higher positioning of civic activity (participation in political parties and CSOs) in the citizen's pattern seems to be very significant part of the general image of civil society in Taiwan. Tables 3 and 4. An important difference is also that volunteers often undertake activities that engage their time and other resources. Taiwan's total population rather shows a conservatism and passivity in relation to pro-public activities. Volunteers often take interventions in the name of public benefit. Other Taiwanese often limit their public activity to donations to the certain (religious and charity) organizations or actions. One can risk hypothesis that the Taiwanese tend to very careful presence in the public space. Donations do not require disclosure of their personal identity; often their actions are associated with participation in temples or churches and religious movements, which expect donations and alms as a duty of believers and participants. But volunteers significantly try to break the popular citizen's pattern and enter into cultural conflict with so-called mainstream of Chinese identity.

In Taiwanese society, volunteers' populace (ie, people who are actively working for the CSO and convinced that such activity is a kind of duty of a good citizen) is very small and is only 4.4%. And if one associates it with the fact that volunteers are mostly residents of large cities and their suburbs, Table 5; and that they are people with at least a secondary education, and for the majority with higher education of different types, Table 6; one easily assumes that there is limited to certain enclaves ,elite' civil society in Taiwan.

In Taiwan enclaves of civil society are well determined by the demographic conditions and they are not difficult to identify by using statistical methods. The first investigational field that previously mentioned is the issue of education. The Taiwanese education system produces a kind of treasure on formal obligations regarding participation in the CSO. Of course, this does not mean that it reveals true mature of civil society. Practically adolescents are trained in actions for public use, may result a good habit manifesting through conscious citizenship in the lives of adults people in the future. Among people with higher education especially those with a doctoral degree, important feature, supporting their civil activity, is specific type of academic culture containing a ,four duty', ie. the duties a teacher, a researcher, a tutor leading students and social activist. Partly this type of academic culture is

rooted in the Confucian tradition and modern pro-public attitudes. An important element of this 'enclivity', is also a flight beyond the educational system. Among those declaring 'self-study' up more than 14% are volunteers working actively in civic space, Table 6. The decision to 'self-study' requires a certain degree of nonconformity, but also an ability of engaging in self-organized initiatives, that can provide education of good quality outside the system. This is certainly the type of enclave, which mobilizes certain, mostly rebel-like, type of social activism. During Japanese colonial rule rising Taiwanese intellectual elite started underground-like education mostly organized by cultural associations and identity-saving self-organized initiatives. One may suppose that such a cultural innovation, developed under serious prohibition of Taiwan's autonomy, survived until now as a kind of social and cultural relict mobilizing national potential of Taiwanese identity.

Another enclave is associated with belonging to a particular ethnic group. In recent years, the Taiwanese government has taken broad circled action to combat social exclusion, especially such of Aboriginal people. Significant funds (from the lottery tax) were transferred for purposes related to professional activation, development of local communities and the fight against social pathologies (youth delinquency, alcoholism, prostitution). The result of these activities highlights flourishing local initiatives leading by representatives of Taiwanese Aborigines. Significant number of volunteers among Aborigines also provides key proof for the fact that they are placed outside the Chinese traditional culture, Table 7. Their 'social personality' allows them more easily to overcome the limits of familism, or ordinary particularities. Perhaps, even though intense Chinese actuation, Aborigines developed schemes of constructing human relationships other than Han origin people, e.g. the relationship based on the agency and sovereign will of human being, what is missing in the Chinese tradition of the public life. This allows them better to shape the civic ties with local communities outside the family, the state and the market.

Another aspect of the enclaves of citizenship in Taiwan is religious associations and churches membership and belonging. Some researchers (eg. Madsen, Weller) emphasize that the inability to develop the civil structures, both in times of Japanese colonization and a hard hand governments of the Kuomintang, was the reason for locating the civil society outside the public space (and politics). For this purpose best serve religious organizations, which were suitable as camouflage for political activities and as an institution of self-organizing local community. Currently, this division volunteers in various religious groups points to the fact, and some of them take action in the public space, and the others hold on the sidelines of active civility, Table 8. Taoist and Buddhist organizations try to maintain their neutrality in political issues

and rather represent their own group of interest than common good. The situation of the Taiwan's Catholic Church, that makes voice and actions on moral issues, is solely different. Catholic Church often deals with matters relating to the prohibition of abortion, death penalty and also it starts serious fight against teenage prostitution (the church also takes a number of civic initiatives and charitable intervention). Protestant churches are focused on political issues. Presbyterian Church is a leading CSO, which has the largest contribution to the civic struggle for human rights and democracy on the island. Also in opposition to the old regime of KMT was a religious movement of Yiguan Dao, which in the late 1980s has been legalized. Its activities outside religion are not entirely clear. It is an organization highly exclusive and oriented toward own interest. However, it has a strong ability of social mobilization. In the other category, although this speculation may comprise a group of participants mobilized in Falun Gong, which presence in the public space is visible in Taiwan's cities. As for the civic mobilization of traditional folk religions, this myth seems to be overthrown. Chinese tradition of family and locality not entirely corresponds to what we call civility. Often this tradition stands in deep conflict with the civic sphere, which reveals itself in discussions about the future of Taiwan. Local religious communities are trying to preserve its political neutrality in the same way as Buddhists do.

The above-mentioned civil enclaves probably do not complete the entire catalog of this type of phenomena. Enclavity may also be determined geographically or by social structure (here the strong positions have competitions forming interest groups through the development of professional associations and competitions involving eg. the politics on the different floors).

It was commonly thought that Taiwan is China's first stable democracy. In Poland, despite the historical facts, it was thought that the political system gives Taiwanese citizens civil, economic, social and, above all, political freedoms. Taiwan was called 'the Free China'. Mobilization policy and the necessity of living in constant uncertainty reveal the functioning of political socialization patterns, which allowed citizens of different origins – Taiwanese as well as Mainlanders – to create kind of depoliticized civil life. This resulted in the erosion of public trust, creation of non-conflicting relationship with the state, empowerment of civic minimalism (in extreme cases turning into passivity). Imposing these circumstances Taiwanese-Chinese political culture resulted in a domination of civic prudence, aversion to civil disobedience, attitudes accepting various forms of despotic state practices. Great effort to the first-found way to active public and political participation has been put actually by small allied intellectual elites. For many years, matter that moved

Taiwanese political activity was the question of the sovereignty and independence of the state of Taiwan.

The effects of active ,anti-mainstream' socialization are visible in the attitudes of volunteers. They are characterized primarily by non-conformist attitude that allows cross the threshold of passivity. More often than other members of society, Taiwanese volunteers present stronger social trust, Table 9. They are increasingly taking the risk of civil disobedience, and even a conspiracy against the state in case of violations of their rights under democracy, Tables 10 and 11. They want to have a greater impact as citizens on governance in the state, which is manifested in significant approval of referenda as a form of co-governing of Taiwan, Table 12. They also well-evaluate the estate of democracy in Taiwan, especially in regard to the continuation of the Taiwanese state, Table 13, and they have greater confidence in their government, Table 14. Volunteers present reasonable optimism related to the issue of independence and political future of Taiwan, Table 15a. and 15b. An important feature of Taiwanese volunteers is the fact that they are both willing to work to a wider public, as well as for their own neighbourhood communities, Tables 16 and 17.

The picture that emerges here clearly indicates that the enclave nature of civic society Taiwanese operating in very difficult conditions. We may call these conditions as a dualism of cultural contradictions in the sphere of public life. Probably questioning of existing state - the Republic of China on Taiwan - promotes different political attitudes. Dominated political attitude typical of traditional Chinese culture, which was associated with that which was mentioned earlier, conservative conformism, cynicism drive out people from repulsive watchfulness of important social and political issues. Confucianism, with its *laissez-faire* moral focus and family ritualism gave the political culture of Taiwan's deep political division on those who focus on balanced existence thought unity in families and state and those who have a bad tendency to rebellion.

Conclusion

One of the prominent Chinese political thinkers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, Liang Chicao has been convinced of the need to change the relationship between the individual and the state, by giving to the human being a wide subjectivity. Only the implementation of this condition it was possible to reform

the Confucian statesmanship and creation of the 'new citizen'. Liang noticed that the Chinese community acting in ideal conditions for the development of republican citizenship, as it was created in the United States of America, stay away from fully absorbed in the affairs of society and the state. Republican system causes a kind of fear from freedom of action among members of these communities. People at that time (1902 circa) were flocking to known safe areas of family, neighbourhood, and friendship (Chang 1971).

Due to appearing experiences of the Chinese 'escape from sovereignty', Liang, who at that time was a political and social liberal, was deeply disappointed, and this prompted him to change all of his political projects. Selfishness, cynicism, withdrawal from public life, imitativeness and focus on the good of the own group (tribality) pushed finally Liang's thought in the direction of 'enlightened despotism', which not only has been power tool adapted to inactivity of citizens but what is important ensuring the survival of the national community (Chang 1971).

In China, but especially in Taiwan, one can easily see the functioning of the two dichotomous systems of public culture and politics. The first based on Confucianism form of harmonized stable political order. And the second one which is looking for rules of political action opposing passive politics, as a type of cultural order that can be called rebel society. Madsen holds that the Confucians always searched for a possibility to establish a stable political order and in East Asian society today to 'suppress much of what would be considered part of civil society in the West' (Madsen 2002: 191), and sees contemporary Taiwan as probably the most open society in East Asia (Madsen 2002). Ho adds that 'familial collectivism inherent in Confucianism is largely responsible for the development of the 'democratic' civic person in Taiwan' (Ho 2003: 168).

Taiwanese civil society as an institution subject torn between two forms of presence in the public space. This is the result of conflicting cultural pressures for social purposes and the means of achieving them. An important element in explaining this is the tension between the individual self and the generalized self (in Chinese *da wuo* 大我). Confucianism as well as a mixture of ethical systems with which in Chinese culture we have experienced since the Han Dynasty emphasized self-sacrifice, and even its annihilation, to *da wuo*.

Lucian Pye (1968) in the dichotomies and contradictions of Chinese political culture sees one of the most important obstacle for sustainable politics. This is also great consequence for the civic culture in Taiwan.

The data presented above shows what we stressed that the dominant style of citizen action is passivity. It also means a kind of focus on own group, in this sense assumed as *da wuo*. This type of socialization has another important characteristics. *Da wuo* is also focused on the ethnic group carrying the ability to act for its own benefit. Closing inside the 'tribe' prevents any civil action for the public good, which is distant and abstract category.

Generating non-conformist attitudes and type of alternative lifestyle promotes citizenship what is clear shown by the experiences of Taiwanese Aborigines. It is assumed elite form of civil society (outside Chinese culture). Taiwanese volunteers are the people who broke the bonds to give the *da wuo* (family and other similar relationships) another more social oriented dimension. They shaped the specific forms of individualism, which mediated by another individualism results in the appearance of the common good.

Taiwanese society seems to be doomed to civil enclivity. That will happen until the traditions of public life rooted in the historical experience of the Taiwanese and Chinese traditions will be redefined and located lower in the hierarchy of institutions supporting active measures *pro publico bono*. Rebel society and society harmonized are creating narratives defining the attitude to civic activity of the Taiwan's society. But balance between them at the moment seems to be very difficult.

Civil society in Taiwan does exist in a shape of dualistic structure. In many cases it is the only force governing and providing solutions for serious social problems. The Taiwanese civil society is 'handy crafted'. It is also networked as a result of the traditional foundations of society. In the end we should emphasize that Taiwanese civil society consists of both modern institutionalized forms of civil actions, realized by NGOs and/or local governments, and semi-civil actions that are realized outside the institutions through the resurrective networks (including modern and traditional ties) of citizens whom share the same moral order and the same common 'public good'. Those resurrective networks emerge when causes of mobilization appear, and become hibernated when the common goal is reached or the mobilization causes have vanished. As for the Taiwanese transition to democracy, the social movements, as a popular form of civic participation, encompassed all social problems and often mobilized the masses to demonstrate in the streets (Meseznikov 2013). These movements addressed to some specific issues, consumer, environmental and ecological protection, human rights, social welfare, gender inequality, anti-nuclear power.

TABLES

Table 1. Qualities of ‘good citizen’ (general population of Taiwan)

[7 points scale] Good citizen:	Mean
1 Always obey laws	6,5
2 Never try to evade taxes	6,2
3 Help less privileged people in Taiwan	5,8
4 Keep watch on actions of government	5,4
5 Always vote in elections	5,3
6 Understand other opinions	5,2
7 Help less privileged people in the rest of world	4,7
8 Choose products for political or environmental reasons	4,6
9 Active in social or political associations	3,8

Table 2. Qualities of ‘good citizen’ (volunteers)

[7 points scale] Good citizen:	Mean volunteers
1 Always obey laws	6,5
2 Never try to evade taxes	6,4
3 Always vote in elections	6,0
4 Help less privileged people in Taiwan	6,0
5 Keep watch on actions of government	5,9
6 Understand other opinions	5,6
7 Help less privileged people in the rest of world	5,1
8 Active in social or political associations	5,0
9 Choose products for political or environmental reasons	5,0

Table 3. Citizens’ activities (in %)

Have done it in the past year	Volunteers
Contact media	16,7
Contact a politician	12,5
Take part in a demonstration	10,5
Donate money or raise funds	10,1
Boycott certain products	8,0
Attend political meeting or rally	6,9
Express views on the internet	6,1

Table 4. Citizens' activities (in %)

Have done it in the past year	Taiwan's population
Donate money or raise funds	15,3
Boycott certain products	14,1
Express views on the internet	6,1
Contact a politician	4,3
Take part in a demonstration	4,1
Attend political meeting or rally	3,1
Contact media	2,6

Table 5. Place of living

Would you describe the place where you live as:	Volunteers
A big city	6,0
The suburbs or outskirts of a big city	4,4
A small city or town	3,4

Table 6. Education level (in %)

What is your education level?	Volunteers
Self-study	14,3
Elementary school	4,1
Junior high school	3,7
Senior high school(General subjects)	6,5
Senior high school(Vocational subjects)	4,9
Vocational senior high school	1,9
Five-year junior college	3,6
Two-year junior college	4,8
Three-year junior college	11,8
Military/police 2-year junior college	11,1
Military/police college	16,7
Institute of technology	2,5
University	7,9
Graduate school (Master's degree)	5,4
Graduate school (Doctoral degree)	11,1

Table 7. Ethnic background (in %)

What is your ethnic background?	Volunteers
Fukienese of Taiwan	5,2
Hakka of Taiwan	3,2
Aborigine	10,3
Mainlander	6,2

Table 8. Religion belonging (in %)

Do you have any religious belief at present?	Volunteers
Buddhism (R has converted to Buddhism)	4,7
Buddhism (R has not converted to Buddhism)	3,4
Taoism	4,5
Folk religion	4,0
Yiguan Dao	9,1
Catholicism	11,8
Protestant	14,8
None	2,5
Other	14,3

Table 9. Social trust

[4 point scale]	<i>Mean</i> Taiwan' population	<i>Mean</i> Volunteers
How often people try to take advantage and how often try to be fair?	2,8	2,7
People can be trusted or can't be too careful in dealing with?	2,7	2,7
People try to be helpful or looking out for themselves?	2,4	2,4

Table 10. Civil disobedience acceptance

[7 point scale] Rights in democracy:	Mean Volunteers	Mean Taiwan's population
Acts of civil disobedience	4,8	4,6
Respect of democratic rights by government	6,2	6,2

Table 11. Ani-government meetings acceptance (in %)

Allow public meetings – people overthrow government	Others	Volunteers	Taiwan's population
Should definitely be allowed	1,1	5,0	1,3
Should probably be allowed	8,7	12,5	8,8
Should probably not be allowed	34,2	31,2	34,0
Should definitely not be allowed	56,0	51,2	55,8

Table 12. Need of referenda as a tool for democratic governance

Referendum – a good way to decide political questions	Others	Volunteers	Taiwan
Strongly agree	16,4	18,1	16,5
Agree	49,6	53,0	49,7
Neither agree nor disagree	6,0	8,4	6,1
Disagree	18,2	18,1	18,2
Strongly disagree	2,2	1,2	2,2

Table 13. Assesments on estate of democracy in Taiwan

[10 point scale] Democracy in Taiwan:	<i>Mean</i> Taiwan' population	<i>Mean</i> Volunteers
Today	5,3	5,6
10 years ago	5,3	5,5
10 years from now	5,7	6,2

Table 14. Confidence in government

[5 point scale] Have confidence in:	<i>Mean</i> Taiwan's population	<i>Mean</i> Volunteers
Taiwan's government	3,45	3,51

Table 15a. Future of Taiwan

What is your view about the Taiwan-Mainland China relationship?	Others	Volunteers	Taiwan
Unification as soon as possible	1,7	0,0	1,7
Independence as soon as possible	7,7	8,4	7,7
Maintain the present situation, but go towards unification in the future	9,8	7,2	9,7
Maintain the present situation, but go towards independence in the future	14,1	20,5	14,3
Maintain the present situation, what to do in the future would depend on the future situation	31,2	33,7	31,3
Maintain the present situation forever	29,7	28,9	29,7

Table 15b. Future of Taiwan (in %)

Overall, how much do you worry about the future of Taiwan?	Others	Volunteers	Taiwan
Worry a lot	17,8	12,0	17,5
Worry somewhat	22,7	20,5	22,6
Worry a little	38,6	50,6	39,1
Not worry at all	18,0	13,3	17,8

Table 16. Community engagement (in %)

Participate in community organizations in your neighborhood	Others	Volunteers	Taiwan
No such community organizations in my neighborhood	6,1	6,0	6,1
Never	78,7	57,8	77,8
Seldom	4,4	9,6	4,6
Sometimes	5,5	12,0	5,8
Often	4,5	14,5	5,0

Table 17. Community activism (in %)

Participate in activities held by your neighborhood community organizations	Others	Volunteers	Taiwan
No such community activities in my neighborhood	3,1	2,4	3,0
Never	56,8	43,4	56,2
Seldom	17,8	18,1	17,8
Sometimes	17,2	21,7	17,4
Often	4,6	13,3	5,0

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