

ANALYTICAL FUTUROLOGY AS A TOOL FOR STRATEGIC PLANNING IN SOCIAL WAR GAMES*

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ABSTRACT

Futurology (also futures studies) is a field of knowledge which has emerged as a result of the interdisciplinary problematisation of specific cognitive issues. The main objective of futurology is the creation of hypothetical scenarios for an alternative future in every aspect of human life, from changes relating to the life of an individual human being to changes within complex social structures, and, ultimately, in e.g. nations. The assumptions of cognitive futurology generally boil down to the maxim „probability and predictability in every aspect of human life”. In other words, the subject of futurological considerations encompasses all products of human activity, both material and abstract. However, here futurology is divided thematically and distinguished in accord with a given specific specialised task, e.g. within the framework of social anthropology (or, broadly understood, cultural studies) as well as of philosophy. Thus, one can point to popular futurology, or the popularisation of specific fields of knowledge through science-fiction literature, e.g. *The Road* (2006) by Cormac McCarthy. In addition to popular futurology, there is also analytical futurology, whose task is to create and analyse alternative futures. The proposed presentation will be devoted to this latter issue as well.

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INTRODUCTION

The subject matter discussed in this article is difficult for two reasons. The first is the objective of the discussion, which concerns the establishment of an independent scientific discipline whose subject of cognition is security¹. The difficulties that must be overcome in this case relate to the integration of security sciences into a single discipline that meets contemporary scientific requirements such as consistency, predictive and explanatory power, etc. This naturally integrates security research into the traditional sequence of rational cognition: (1) observation of a phenomenon; (2) formulation of a communicable but unstable description of the phenomenon (metaphors, comparisons, allegories, associations, etc. can be used in the description); (3) development of a communicable and stable description of the phenomenon in the form of hypotheses (statements in the logical sense) on the origins and essences of the phenomenon, i.e. theory; (4) development of procedures to test the hypotheses or theory; (5) development of a model of the phenomenon; (6) problematisation of the phenomenon within the model and development of theoretical and cognitive studies.

In the case of security research, the above research procedure is unsatisfactory due to the following differences: (I) ontological – the existence of the object of cognition; (II) epistemological – the specificity of the object of cognition; and (III) ideological – the requirement to justify the need for development of the research (political as well as economic or religious).

The primary purpose of security sciences is to plan and predict. This approach is called structural and strategic planning (hereinafter referred to as SSP). The object of cognition of SSP depends on the type of hazards involved, which are basically divided into natural (natural disasters) and social hazards (racism, ethnocentrism, etc.).

In the case of natural hazards mentioned above in terms of stages (1)–(6), the sequence of rational cognition is epistemically and ideologically accepted to a limited extent, e.g. items (5) and (6) often remain in the sphere of artistic creativity associated with science fiction. Let us note that no campaigns justifying the need for SSP research on natural hazards are required in order to convince the public of the need to spend money.

¹ Cf. L. F. Korzeniowski, *Securitology – Security of a Subject*, “Securitologia”, 2016, 1, p. 111–120.

The case of social hazards is very different, as they are speculative, and spending money on developing this knowledge may seem dubious. Every change in the social structure entails specific consequences that are either directly expressed in public discourse or hidden for ideological reasons. In other words, social hazards must actually exist in order for the society to be able to take reasonable countermeasures. Therefore, the rational sequence of cognition in the case of social hazards is easily rejected, while strong ideological adherence, supported by social pressure (public opinion), often results in erroneous decisions that either fail to counteract the effects of the existing hazard or accelerate them, thus preventing rational change. An example of such acceleration is the introduction of „national” and not „Polish” values to the consciousness of members of social groups through mass communication. Accepting „national” values as the basis category for reasoning results in changes in two perspectives, one broader, the other narrower. From a broader, long-term perspective, it leads to isolationism and deepening of ethnic stratification, as well as anthropological conflict, and, consequently, even to open conflict. In a narrower or short-term perspective, it leads to family divisions and emigration, which translates into the loss of human resources and capital. For example, let us consider a mixed marriage, e.g. Polish-Russian. Here, one of the family members is denied the right to exist in public space, because he/she does not become „national” through naturalisation, but only „Polish”; „nationality” is reserved for „indigenous members of social groups”². This phenomenon (hazard) is particularly evident in neo-populist discourse in post-communist countries, e.g. Poland.

In terms of social hazards, achieving a satisfactory level of generalisation and truthfulness for SSP theory is difficult. It is also difficult to de-

² In the case of „renunciation” of „nationality-origin” in favour of „nationality-naturalisation”, other important issues, such as differences in worldview (e.g. the social role of women), lifestyle (e.g. culinary habits), etc. come into play. The „national” idea analytically excludes any „naturalisation”. Theoreticians of nationalism do not acknowledge this logical result. An example of this may be the idea of „national democracy” currently being developed (2017) in countries such as Poland (aggressive form) or Estonia (mild form). More on „national democracy” can be found in a separate article. My attention was drawn to this problem by Ms Yelena Karetina, cf. Y. Karetina, *Zrozumieć propaganda. Obraz Polski w kinie radzieckim lat 30. XX wieku na przykładzie filmu Obrona granic*, [in:] *Artyści sceny i ekranu dwudziestolecia międzywojennego Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w ujęciu semiotyki antropologicznej*, R. Boroch, Y. Karetina (ed.), Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw 2017, p. 150–158.

velop a set of axioms that might serve as the basis for reasoning for integrated security science in general and to make it possible to effectively predict hazards. Let me remind the reader that the cardinal goal of integrated security research should be the effective elimination of hazards or the preparation of procedures to mitigate their effects. In the case of social hazards this is a very difficult task. It becomes even more complicated due to the predictive nature of SSP in the area of social hazards and the high degree of uncertainty regarding the occurrence of predicted phenomena. Additional difficulties are the values recognised by certain social structures as principles, e.g. in post-communist societies, the priority of (measurable) utility over the quality of (unmeasurable) human capital. One reaches here a special kind of *aporia*. Empirical verification of the truth of SSP theory is possible only in the case of natural phenomena that exist (or have existed) as facts. Such verification is not possible in the case of social hazards, although the consequences of the latter exert a greater influence on the world. Simply put, social hazards are verifiable when they are no longer hazards but facts – or rather, let us say, cataclysms. Consequently, natural hazards that have become facts are called natural cataclysms; social hazards that have arisen as facts can become social cataclysms.

The task of SSP in the natural context is to prevent cataclysms as well as to minimise the consequences of cataclysms that cannot be prevented. In a social context, SSP tasks are problematic because the overarching goal is cataclysm prevention, that is, effective counteraction, which causes the obvious „resistance of societies” for ideological and other reasons. SSP in the social context is used as a tool for waging war, e.g. an anthropological war, and a tool to improve the quality of social coexistence (applied ethics).

The other difficulty that needs to be overcome is the lack of a specialised SSP language; this lack is the result of a „spontaneous increase in knowledge” (i.e. involving lack of methodological control) that leads to epistemic chaos. Such a state of affairs needs to be rationalised in order for rational foundations of reasoning to be adopted and for theoretical and cognitive SSP research to be developed. Furthermore, it is necessary to define basic terms such as *hazard*, *cataclysm*, and *security*. These terms do not exhaust the inventory of concepts, but I focus on their importance only, because their meaning, culturally and ideologically determined, affords insights into the axiological system of particular social groups and the strategies adopted by these groups.

In this article I propose to consider the potential for constructing an analytical discipline which I call analytical futurology (hereinafter referred to as AF). Research and analysis in terms of strategic or structural planning are nothing new. Even the name should not be a surprise³. In my opinion, it is necessary to make an effort to methodologically develop theoretical and cognitive research. In this sense, one will note the presence of a civilisation-cultural controversy, because the research as defined in the article is not universal, and depends on the value systems adopted by particular societies.

1. AF – PRELIMINARY ASSUMPTIONS⁴

In terms of its scope, the name Analytical Futurology (AF) refers to the integrated SSP sciences that are used, *inter alia*, in economics, education, social anthropology or, more broadly, in security sciences. The adjective *analytical* indicates a strong inclination towards methodical order and profound theoretical reflection. The name also distinguishes futurology as an academic discipline from futurology as an artistic practice, i.e. expressed through art, e.g. science fiction, although the discipline and the artistic practice complement one another, while performing different functions. This division is clearly shown in Fig. 1.

AF analyses are based on data obtained within the frameworks of social sciences and natural sciences. Based on this data, it is possible to develop, as the basis for reasoning, a model called alternative prospects (APs).


Within APs, two paradigms are developed: (1) the human impact on the environment, which is called anthropopressure; and (2) the pressure of social environment on individuals as well as smaller social structures, which is called *social milieu* (or social pressure).

³ Futurological studies in English-speaking countries are a fixed discipline (cf. Ø. Sande, *Future Consciousness*, „Journal of Peace Research”, vol. 9, p. 271–278; G. L. Rocca, *A Second Party in Our Midst: The History of the Soviet Scientific Forecasting Association*, „Social Studies in Science”, 1981, 11(2), p. 199–247). The purpose of futurological research accurately reflects the metaphorical term *acceleration of history*, which should be understood as looking to the future; however, looking beyond the „event horizon” in this way must be done rationally and methodologically, cf. R. W. Cox, *On Thinking About Future World Order*, „World Politics”, 1976, 28, p. 175–196.

⁴ The works of Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) and his method of looking at history as a series of repeating events – the history of philosophy – are worth recalling here. Vico’s works became an inspiration for Isaiah Berlin (1909–97; the history of ideas) and Hayden White (1928– ; metahistory).

Paradigms (1) and (2) can be freely refined according to analytical needs and the degree of theoretical advancement of a particular AP model.

FIG. 1: AF: THEMATIC DIVISION



Abbreviations: AF: Analytical Futures Studies; APs: alternative prospects

2. AF ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES: HAZARD, CATAclySM, SECURITY


The basic AF analytical categories, irrespective of the subject and depth of analysis, are: (1) hazards: phenomena that may arise, causing changes in the initial state; (2) cataclysms: existing phenomena that create irreversible effects through altering the initial state; and (3) security: a constant associated with the state of affairs. Perspectives (1)–(3) are general perspectives.

2.1. Hazards

Hazards are divided according to their ontological status, that is, those which can lead to cataclysm, i.e. real ones, and those which are merely hypothetical. These hazards are then divided according to their origin: natural or social. This division is shown in Fig. 2.

It is assumed that the nature of natural phenomena (earthquakes, fires, floods) and the power of the anthropopressure exerted by a given social structure are the causes of natural hazards. The cause of social hazards is the complexity of the social milieu, e.g. the technical and cultural advancement of a social group and the power of the anthropopressure exerted by a given group.

FIG. 2: ANALYTICAL DIVISION OF HAZARDS



In fact, the above division is theoretical, because in practice natural and social hazards interact, as is evident in the case of cataclysms.

2.2. Cataclysm

Cataclysms are divided into those resulting from the action of superior factors, that is, independent of humans, and those resulting from human activities. Another division is based on range: either local or global. These relationships are shown in Fig. 3.


2.3. Security

Security is the most structurally complex practical and analytical category. This complexity is influenced by the level of civilisation and cultural advancement of the social structures, the social behaviour of the leadership, and the decision-making mechanisms prevalent in these social structures.

In practical terms, security is an indicator of the degree of resilience of the social structure to hazards and of the existence of real opportunities to counteract the effects of cataclysms. This perspective is called the sociology of security⁵.


⁵ Cf. L. Stampnitzky, *Toward a Sociology of "Security"*, „Sociological Forum”, 28(3), 2013, p. 631–633.

FIG. 3: ANALYTICAL DIVISION OF CATAclysms



In the analytical dimension, security is of a specific nature, in reference to specific hazards and cataclysms. However, security as a practical (and applied) as well as an analytical category is associated with the processes of safety, refuge, or protection. These relationships are shown in Fig. 4.

FIG. 4: STRUCTURAL COMPLEXITY OF SECURITY



3. AF OBJECTIVES

The main objective of AF is to construct AP models in every aspect of human life, from changes related to individual lives to those within complex social structures. Here, the ontological-epistemological assumptions of AF are reduced to probability and predictability.

FIG. 5: AP INVARIANTS



4. AP – AP INVARIANTS

AF assumes a possible AP model as the foundation of reasoning. Under this model, specific variants are developed and problematised by means of introducing a constant change factor called an AP invariant. The mechanism of problematisation is presented in Fig. 5: the invariant AP_n exists if and only if the invariant AP_1 exists.

5. AF USE

The use of AF can only be strategic; it is assumed that AF can be either defensive in nature, i.e. preventing tactical or strategic advantages, or offensive, i.e. obtaining tactical or strategic advantages. Defensive and offensive use is a manifestation of aggression, which is understood as a set of actions aimed at change. These actions may be gradual (from initiating a change in the initial state to causing harm) or violent. Aggression is categorised in terms of type, i.e. active or passive aggression, and in terms of its subject, e.g. anthropological aggression, which is also called the war of cultures⁶. Regardless of the nature and sub-

⁶ Cf. E. Olzacka, P. M. Niechciał, *The Press in Constructing the Cultural Strategies of War. An Example from the Conflict in the Republic of Tajikistan*, „Securitologia”, 2015, 2, p. 83–93; R. Boroch, *Agresja-wojna antropologiczna a nauki o kulturze – wielkie tematy kulturoznawstwa na marginesie krytycznej analizy dyskursu*, „Kultura Bezpieczeństwa.

ject of aggression, it encompasses two aspects of action in the social dimension: (1) predatory; and (2) defensive. Both variants are a type of violence; however, actions under variant (1) initiate actions under variant (2). In the case of the war of cultures, no initial moment can be identified, implying a permanent state of war or ideological conflict. The problem of anthropological war or anthropological aggression is a relatively new issue in the contemporary literature on the subject. However, as a practice belonging to the realm of social activities, it has been known since antiquity⁷.

6. WAR OF CULTURES – SECURITY OF CULTURE – CULTURE OF SECURITY

The war of cultures may serve as the subject of AF discussions in a broad anthropological context in the dimension of application, called applied anthropology, in both civil and military terms. This division is purely academic and ideological in nature. The criterion for evaluation is „axiological value”, which depends on the current ideology. This state of affairs reflects so-called „positive science”, as opposed to so-called „negative science”. In practice, these perspectives are of populist-ideological origin. It is therefore important to undertake a rational discussion concerning the „security of culture” and „culture of security”. The former is understood as a condition that guarantees the continuity (stability) of e.g. historical traditions, habits, customs, problem-solving, or decision-making; the latter is understood to mean the implementation of security procedures within the limits of e.g. tolerance or the quality of social co-existence, that is, everything that contributes to human (or social) capital.

CONCLUSION

The establishment of a new scientific discipline is dependent on encompasses involves both practical and content-related dimensions. The former refers to institutionalised support, e.g. a place within university structures, or research funding. The latter indicates a research programme consisting

Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje”, 2016, 22, p. 81–94; R. Borocho, *Wywiad antropologiczny – przyczynek do antropologii stosowanej*, „Bezpieczeństwo. Obronność. Socjologia”, 2016, 5, p. 5–18.

⁷ Anthropological war or anthropological aggression is not defined in international law. The reason for this is the special nature of anthropological war (Cf. M. W. Kowalski, *Antropologia na wojnie. O „bródnej” użyteczności nauk społecznych*, Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, Warsaw 2015).

of specific tasks. Socio-cultural, historical-ideological, and economic factors are the most difficult to overcome, as all are related to the real social influence of elites. Theoretically, the actions of elites should take a positive direction, e.g. the strengthening of civic qualities (*civitas*), which consist of elements such as human capital (hereinafter HC) and social capital (hereinafter SC). HC is associated with qualities of an individual (e.g. ethical), SC with the quality of social organisation, such as the complexity or duration of the decision-making process. The determinant of both HC and SC is the specific model of leadership. The typology of leadership from an anthropological point of view is as follows: (1) leadership of a *leader* type (hereinafter L) and (2) leadership of a *chief* type (hereinafter CH). L-type leadership is characteristic of smaller social structures, whereas CH-leadership is specific to complex structures. This division results naturally from the specificity of human social organisations. L-type leadership is characterised by decision-making flexibility, which optimises decision-making in terms of benefits for all members of the group. CH leadership is the opposite of L leadership, adopting aggressive or persuasive strategies, whereas the effectiveness of action is geared to satisfying the needs of a specific interest group, bypassing or excluding other groups. Consequently, a conflicting situation develops, involving the spontaneous appearance in social structure X of another structure, Y, in opposition to X⁸.

AF can serve as a tool to support the establishment of new knowledge (e.g. within the scope of leadership conflicts, L vs CH) in the field of security sciences⁹; in this sense AF will play a supporting role in theoretical and cognitive studies. AF can also become a tool for gaining an analytical advantage in the field of social science, which directly translates into a modicum of so-called „ideological security”.

ANNEX (ROBERT BOROCH)

Analytical futurology: a list of abbreviations

AF – Analytical Futurology

⁸ CH leadership is characterised by the perception of all members of the group not as a „collection of individuals” (as in the L model), but as a „collective”, which has far-reaching consequences for e.g. the philosophy of law.

⁹ Anna Korzeniowska-Bihun, PhD (University of Warsaw) analyses the problem of anthropological resistance.

AP – alternative prospects/future

SSP – Structural and Strategic Planning

Anthropology as a weapon: a list of abbreviations

AD – anthropological data

AI – anthropological intelligence

AW – anthropological war

AA – anthropological aggression

AAW – anthropological aggression or war

AR – anthropological resistance

Glossary of concepts in the field of „anthropological wars”

Anthropological information/anthropological data – data obtained through anthropological intelligence activities. Examples of anthropological data include information on transport infrastructure, relations within the local population or intellectual elites, plans to use local natural resources, etc.

Anthropological intelligence (AI) – techniques for obtaining anthropological information (see Anthropological information). Information acquisition techniques depend on the degree of AAW. At the first AAW level, the following techniques are used (for example): (1) fieldwork within anthropological expeditions; (2) community interviews in the form of direct interviews or surveys; (3) contacting local leaders acting as opinion-forming factors, etc.

Anthropological war (AW) – aggressive actions aimed at depriving opponents of information and ideological background. Depending on its level, AW takes different forms; level one is disinformation. There are two types of anthropological war: (1) internal anthropological war, waged by state authorities against a native population; (2) external anthropological war against non-indigenous ethnic groups. An aggressor in the case of AW and AA (see: AA) exerts: (1) direct pressure, e.g. in the form of open conflict (hybrid asymmetric war); or (2) indirect pressure, e.g. using media or social instruments in the form of leaders-activists. Anthropological aggression is a preparatory element for anthropological war and vice versa; the term „aggression-anthropological war” is used to describe this combination (see: AAW).

Anthropological Aggression (AA) – aggressive actions aimed at gradual ideological control over an opponent’s information space. Depending on its level, AA is characterised by different forms of action. What distinguishes AA from AW is: (1) long-term planning, involving as long as several decades; and (2) indirect pressure. The first level of AA is the emphasis of the aggressor’s interests in key areas of the opponent’s state, such as informational, economic, political, educational, or academic space.

Anthropological Aggression or War (AAW) – a combination of some elements of activities typical of AW and AA. An example of AAW is asymmetric hybrid war. AAW activities may be internal or external (see: AW). In the case of external actions, there are approximately 10 AAW stages:

1. First stage – emphasising the aggressor’s interests in the key areas of the life of the state of the attacked party.
2. Second stage – gaining informational and ideological advantages.
3. Third stage – economic, political, and informational domination.
4. Fourth stage – strengthening of ideological, political, economic, and cultural relationships with the aggressor through the actions of the indoctrinated citizens of the attacked state.
5. Fifth stage – formal and informal political representation.
6. Sixth stage – rights of ethnic or national minorities.
7. Seventh stage – protection of ethnic or national minorities by the aggressor.
8. Eighth stage – civil disobedience, social unrest, paramilitary activities.
9. Ninth stage – encroachment of aggressive forces in order to protect democracy, human rights, ethnic or national minorities.
10. Tenth stage – the process of adapting the society of the attacked state to a new reality; fighting the opposition, for example through an aggressive ethnic-national policy (e.g. economic resettlement); or using secret services.

Anthropological resistance (AR) – organised or spontaneous resistance of citizens of the attacked state.

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