

THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE IRAQ WAR – LESSON LEARNED?

ING. KRISTÍNA BOLEMANOVÁ, M.Sc., M.A.
Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, SLOVAKIA

ASSOC. PROF. PHDr., RASTISLAV KAZANSKÝ, PHD. MBA
Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, SLOVAKIA

ABSTRACT

In his first address to the United Nations in September 2017, the American President Donald Trump blamed North Korea and Iran for developing missiles and nuclear weapons program, suppressing human rights and sponsoring terrorism. He also called Iran a “rogue state” what revived the memories from 2003, when President Bush used similar term of “axis of evil” to describe the regime of Saddam Hussein. Soon after, the US intervened to Iraq to launch a war against terrorism and the Hussein’s undemocratic regime.

This article seeks to analyse what impact had the Iraq war on the stability and security of the country and its region. The war in Iraq also teaches us a lesson of how dangerous and counterproductive it can be, when a world superpower labels other country a “rogue state” and decides to fight alleged threats by using military power. If the US President fulfils his promise of “destroying North Korea” if under threat and launching action against its government, it could result in a very similar situation as in Iraq. A creation of another failed state would not only bring more instability but also open new military threats for the US as well as the world economy.

ARTICLE INFO

Article history

Received: 27.04.2018 Accepted 03.06.2018

Key words

Iraq, rogue states, leadership, Saddam Hussein, Iran, North Korea, threats, weapons of mass destruction

INTRODUCTION

On 19 September 2017, President Donald Trump addressed for the first time the United Nations General Assembly gathering leaders from around the world. In his speech, he blamed North Korea and Iran for developing missiles and nuclear weapons program, suppressing human rights and sponsoring terrorism. President Trump also accused Iran government of “masking a corrupt dictatorship behind a false guise of a democracy by turning a wealthy country with a rich history and culture into an economically depleted rogue state whose exports are violence, bloodshed and chaos”¹. Moreover, he also vowed to “totally destroy” North Korea – which he called a ‘band of criminals’ if it threatened the United States or its allies. In addition, he stated that the United States is ready to take further action, because the policies of Iran and North Korea are against the interest of the entire world and therefore America would be prepared to act alone if needed².

Calling Iran a “rogue nation” relived the memories from 15 years ago, when another president of the United States President **Bush** stood in front of the same audience in the United Nations and warned of the “axis of evil” before launching a war in Iraq on the false premise of Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction³. This war had disastrous consequences on the stability of the country and plunged the region into chaos and further conflicts that are ongoing still nowadays. Moreover, it has also eliminated its leader **Saddam Hussein** and produced a country with no leadership. After almost a decade of the US – Iraqi administration, Iraq finds itself in sectarian conflicts, fight against ISIL and al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups and ethnic and religious unrest. Even in 2018, Iraq remains one of the most severely hit countries by the humanitarian crisis in the Middle East with millions of its citizens being displaced due to conflicts. How would Iraq look if the US would not interfere in its policies?

What will happen with North Korea and Iran if President **Trump** fulfils his promises in case of threat to the US or the world security? What measures would America undertake against the dictators of these countries – **Mr Kim** and **Mr Khamenei**? Have not the developments in Iraq

¹ D. Trump, *Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly*, United Nations, New York, 19.09.2017.

² Ibidem.

³ G. Segell, *Axis of Evil and Rogue States: The Bush Administration, 2000–2004*, Glen Segell Publishers 2005.

after the Iraq war proved that a military action and the elimination of a well-established dictator in such country bring no stability and security for the region and the world economy as such? What can we learn from the example of the war in Iraq?

DEFINITION OF A ROGUE STATE

The term rogue state was introduced to describe states that are considered dangerous for the world's peace. This term has mostly been used by American foreign policy makers to describe an "outlaw nation" ruled by a dictator or authoritarian government that severely restricts human rights, supports terrorism or engages in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

As we work for peace, we must also meet threats to our nation's security – including increased dangers from outlaw nations and terrorism⁴.

In the US politics, the term was first used in 1985 by the US President **Reagan** who stated: "we are not going to tolerate (...) attacks from outlaw states"⁵ but the Clinton administration elaborated on this concept further⁶. The US National Security Advisor **Anthony Lake** described five regimes as "rogue states": North Korea, Cuba, Iraq, Iran and Libya accusing them of the suppression of human rights, promotion of radical ideologies and usage of coercive techniques in their politics⁷. The American administration perceived itself as a guardian of world order responsible for neutralizing and transforming these regimes into stable and democratic regimes that would protect or restore the world peace⁸.

We are here to discuss the emerging threats to America's security as we reach a new century. How do we respond to the threat of terrorists around the world, turning from bullets and bombs to even more insidious and potent weapons? What if they and the rogue states that sponsor them try to attack the critical computer systems that drive our society? What if they seek to use chemical, biological, even nuclear weapons? The United

⁴ B. Clinton, *State of the Union Address*, 19.01.1999.

⁵ C.C. Joyner, *In search of an anti-terrorism policy: Lessons from the Reagan era*, "Terrorism" 1988, vol. 11, issue 1.

⁶ W. Rees, *The US-EU Security Relationship: The Tensions between a European and a Global Agenda*, Palgrave Publishers 2011.

⁷ R. Litwak, *Rogue states and U.S. foreign policy: containment after the Cold War*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2000.

⁸ T. Reinold, *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect. The power of norms and the norms of the powerful*, Routledge, New York 2012.

States must deal with these emerging threats now, so that the instruments of prevention develop at least as rapidly as the instruments of disruption⁹.

To punish and isolate the rogue states, the United States deployed different tools from tough unilateral economic sanctions, to military deployment or international action. Despite the fact that the **Clinton** administration was a leader in using the term of rogue states, the US State Secretary **Madeleine Albright** announced that the term would be abolished in June 2000 after realisation that three of the rogue states (Iran, Libya and North Korea) no more meet the criteria for being defined as rogue states. These countries were renamed to “states of concern”.

However, after the attacks of September 11 the **Bush** administration replaced this term by the term “Axis of Evil” – a concept covering Iraq, Iran, and North Korea. President used this term publically for the first time in his State of the Union address in January 2002.

States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic¹⁰.

President **Bush** based his rationale for war against Iraq on assertion that Iraq poses a terrorist threat to the US while also threatening the world peace, possesses the weapons of mass destruction and supports other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda. Many US officials also wanted to restore democracy for the Iraq people and end the repressive dictatorship of **Saddam Hussein**.

In response, many critics accused the US from using the concept of “rogue states” and the “Axis of Evil” as a justification for their imperialistic efforts and propaganda or against the states that openly criticized the US¹¹. Some critics also reproached that the US used this term against any state that was hostile or disagreed with the US foreign policy. However, the concept of rogue state has not gained wider acceptance.

⁹ National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, *On Keeping America Secure For the 21st Century*, 22.01.1999.

¹⁰ President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address, 29.01.2002.

¹¹ J. Freedland, *Homeland Insecurity*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/25/books/review/homeland-insecurity.html> (accessed 31.01.2018).

US RESPONSE TO PERCEIVED THREATS – WAR IN IRAQ

In response to perceived threat from rogue states regimes, the US undertook steps to punish and isolate them by economic sanctions or even a military deployment. In Iraq, the US deployed UN economic sanctions and political sanctions such as the Iraq Liberation Act seeking to undermine political stability in the country. The Iraq Liberalisation act was approved by the Congress and signed into law by President Clinton in 1998 stating that: “it should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq”¹². Moreover, it also sought to support democratic movements in Iraq by funding the Iraqi opposition groups and opponents. In October 2002, the US president cited the act for authorizing the military action against **Saddam Hussein** and his undemocratic regime¹³.

The US also stirred up international action by pushing forward adoption of international agreements and treaties such as:

- the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and technology¹⁴,
- the Chemical Weapons Convention increasing control over chemical weapons (OPCW, 2018),
- the Missile Technology Control Regime restricting the proliferation of missiles and the weapons of mass destruction¹⁵,
- the Wassenaar Arrangement controlling exports of conventional arms¹⁶.

Despite the fact that the US authorized the military action against Iraq, it had difficulties to persuade other countries to support the US policies of ostracism and punishment of Iraqi government for the alleged possession of the weapons of mass destruction and its political ambitions to become a military superpower in the Gulf region. The US sought to protect its national interests in the region, in particular, the free flow of oil from oil-rich states such as Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.

¹² The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.

¹³ Authorization for use of military force against Iraq resolution of 2002.

¹⁴ United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) 2018, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/> (accessed 31.01.2018).

¹⁵ Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), <http://mtcr.info/deutsch-ziele/> (accessed 31.01.2018).

¹⁶ Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar) 2018, <http://www.wassenaar.org> (accessed 31.01.2018).

Therefore, the main aim of the US administration was to maintain the US hegemony in the Gulf and ensure that there is a balance of power¹⁷.

The US officials accused **Hussein** not only from repressive dictatorship but also from supporting the radical Islamist militant group **al-Qaeda**. President **Bush** based his rationale for war on the presumption that Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda might have been preparing other terrorist attacks on the US¹⁸. However, there was no substantial evidence found on the collaboration between **Hussein** and **al-Qaeda**.

The Iraq war started on 20 March 2003 by the air invasion of the coalition led by the United States under Operation Iraqi Freedom to overthrow the regime of **Saddam Hussein**. The coalition consisted of military operations conducted by the US, United Kingdom, Australia, Poland and Spain¹⁹. Following the September 11 terrorist attack on the US, the intervention to Iraq was part of the 'Global war on terrorism' also called 'War on terror' declared by President Bush after the attacks²⁰. The invasion led to the collapse of **Saddam Hussein** Ba'athist government²¹ that was committed to pan-Arabism and adopted Iraqi secular nationalism²². **Hussein** led and maintained his power in the party through nepotism, intimidation, fear, operational control over Iraq's armed forces and corruption²³. After the invasion to Iraq, the international coalition established in May 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) that aimed to create a transitional government of Iraq and subsequently banned the Ba'ath party in June 2003. The CPA was in charge of executive, leg-

¹⁷ T.V. Paul, J.J. Wirtz, M. Fortmann, *Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, Stanford University Press, 2004.

¹⁸ G. Bush, *President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat*, Cininnati Museum Center, 7.10.2002.

¹⁹ S.D. Murphy, *Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq*, Georgetown Law Journal 2004, vol. 92, issue 4; Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), <http://mtcr.info/deutsch-ziele/> (accessed 31.01.2018).

²⁰ The 'war on terror' or 'global war on terrorism' is an international military campaign that was launched by the U.S. government after the September 11 attacks in the U.S. in 2001.

²¹ A government led by Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party that emerged from the split of the Ba'ath Party in 1996 originally established in Syria. The party's regional organisation governed Iraq from 1968- 2003, for many years under the leadership of Saddam Hussein.

²² T. Kafala, *The Iraqi Baath party*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2886733.stm (accessed 31.01.2018).

²³ A.R. Lewis, *The American Culture of War. The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Routledge 2007.

islative and judicial authority over the Iraqi government over the whole duration of the CPA's inception from April 2003 – June 2004. Middle East Report. Failing oversight: Iraq's unchecked government. Middle East Report N. 113, 26 September 2011. International Crisis Group working to prevent conflict worldwide.

The CPA also banned all the top four layers members and full members of the Ba'ath Party to participate in the new government, schools and universities. Due to the fact that under Ba'ath party rule, people could only reach higher ranked positions by joining the party, Iraq lost thousands of highly educated personnel who were removed from their jobs including teachers, doctors, professors or public officials²⁴.

Hussein himself was captured during Operation Red Dawn in December 2003 and sentenced by a military court to death by hanging in 2006. Despite the fact that the US forces defeated the Iraqi forces, the conflict continued for more than a decade due to insurgencies against occupying forces and the post-invasion Iraqi government²⁵.

Iraq held multi-party elections in 2005 with a victory of **Nouri al-Maliki** who became Prime Minister. His government enacted policies alienating the country's Sunni minority and worsening sectarian tensions. In order to securitize the situation in Iraq, the US increased the troop deployment in 2007. Moreover, the US also forced the new government to undertake the policy of de-Ba'athification by adopting the controversial Accountability and Justice Act in January 2008. The act defined the de-Ba'athification as "the procedures... to intellectually, administratively, politically, culturally and economically dismantle the Ba'ath Party system in Iraqi society, state institutions, and civil society institutions"²⁶. This measure led to the ease of the policy, however, many still feared of additional dismissals and further removal of work force from their positions.

Despite the military intervention by the coalition and different adopted measures to securitize the country, the situation has not improved and the fights continued. Moreover, the occupation also did not prevent sectarian violence between Shias and Sunnis. Until the 2003 Iraq War

²⁴ S. Talmon, *The Occupation of Iraq: Volume 2. The Official Documents of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council*, Hart Publishing 2013.

²⁵ *The rise and fall of a dictator*, <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/12/14/sprj.iqr.saddam.profile/index.html> (accessed 31.01.2018).

²⁶ Iraq's Accountability and Justice Law, <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Iraq/Law10-2008-En.pdf> (accessed 31.01.2018).

the governing regime under **Saddam Hussein** was composed of Sunnis while Shia opposition was suppressed and suffered persecutions, imprisonment, torture and murders resulting in 50 000 to 100 000 casualties and their successive repression²⁷. Many blamed the US from the de-Ba'athification that created new sectarian political system and destroyed old institutions, pulled out the intelligence from their positions and deprived Iraq of higher class officials and cadres that had been replaced by the sectarian-based militias resulting in higher imbalance in regional power in favor of Iranian Shias²⁸. As Fawaz Georges expressed in his book *ISIS: History*:

By destroying state institutions and establishing a sectarian-based political system, the 2003 US-led invasion polarized the country along Sunni-Shia lines and set the stage for a fierce, prolonged struggle driven by identity politics. Anger against the United States was also fueled by the humiliating disbandment of the Iraqi army and the de-Baathification law, which was first introduced as a provision and then turned into a permanent article of the constitution²⁹.

The purge of the regime of **Hussein** was accompanied by the release of revolutionary upsurge which resulted in sectarianism becoming a new 'key weapon' seeking to undermine the unity among the anti-regime population³⁰.

The war in Iraq and the continuous presence of the American troops on the Iraqi territory became a very contentious topic for the American public. Not many expected that the 2003 Iraq war would be followed by almost a decade-long US occupation on the Iraqi territory. The polls showed, that the American public opinion was shifting towards favoring the withdrawal of the US troops. In May 2007 Gallup Survey showed that 55% of Americans thought that the Iraq War was a mistake while 51% of them wanted the American troops to be withdrawn.³¹ To respond to the public opinion and despite the fact that Iraq was still far from

²⁷ *Justice for Iraq. A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper. December 2002*, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/background/mena/iraq1217bg.htm> (accessed 31.01.2018).

²⁸ *Shia-Sunni Divide*, <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/sunni-shia-divide#!/> (accessed 31.01.2018).

²⁹ A.G. Fawaz, *ISIS: A History*, Princeton University Press 2017.

³⁰ M. Lynch, *The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East*, Public Affairs 2017.

³¹ F. Newport, J.M. Mones, J. Carroll, *Gallup Poll Review: Key Points About Public Opinion on Iraq* Gallup 2007 (accessed 31.01.2018).

reaching military and political stability, the US President Bush and Iraqi government signed Security agreement – Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)³² in 2008. The SOFA established that the US will formally withdraw from Iraqi cities by June 2009 and subsequently all combat troops will be withdrawn from Iraq by December 2011³³. Several Iraqi groups did not welcome this agreement and protested against the prolongation and legitimization of the American occupation on the territory of Iraq. On the other hand, some Iraqi feared what would be the situation after the US forces leave Iraq after 2011 and wished for leaving some residual force on the territory of Iraq to ensure stability³⁴.

Moreover, the US and Iraq also approved a Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) ensuring international cooperation and covering all areas of life – political, economic, gender, security, education, communication, law enforcement and others. It also normalized the US-Iraqi relationship and served as a base for a long-term bilateral relationship³⁵.

In his speech in February 2009, President Obama confirmed his commitment to withdraw completely the American troops from Iraq by December 2011. However, he also announced a revision of the original deadline of the withdrawal from cities in June 2009 and its postponement to ten months later to August 2010. This transitional period was supposed to be used for “training, equipping, and advising Iraqi Security Forces as long as they remain non-sectarian; conducting targeted counter-terrorism missions; and protecting the ongoing civilian and military efforts within Iraq”³⁶.

Following the withdrawal of the troops, the insurgency continued and Iraq suffered from political instability reinforced by the increased violence and armed conflicts inside Iraq and the formation of a terrorist

³² Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their activities during their temporary presence in Iraq, 2008.

³³ O.R. Holsti, *American Public Opinion on the Iraq War*, The University of Michigan Press 2011.

³⁴ E. Bumiller, *Redefining the Role of the U.S. Military in Iraq*, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/washington/22combat.html?_r=1&chp (accessed 31.01.2018).

³⁵ Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq.

³⁶ B. Obama, *President Obama's remarks before troops at Camp Lejeune*, North Carolina, 27.02.2009, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/27/barack-obama-speech-iraq-war-end> (accessed 31.01.2018).

group the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) that seized control in Northern Iraq declaring a worldwide Islamic caliphate in 2014³⁷. Moreover, the conflict and violence between Shias and Sunnis continued taking place. The violent insurgent troops got support from al-Qaeda in Iraq as well as Iran)³⁸.

The Iraq war caused thousands of civilian as well as military deaths, most of them being a result of insurgency and civil conflict. Moreover, the instability in the country forced thousands of people to leave their homes and become internally or externally displaced persons. Iraq, being the center of conflicts in the Middle East since the first Gulf War in the nineties, has to cope nowadays with more than three million internally displaced persons, while more than half of those were added during the refugee crisis in 2014. However, most of the displacements in Iraq in 2016 were driven by joint Kurdish and Iraqi army military operations to retake key cities and areas in Iraq. The operation to retake Mosul in the north of Iraq caused one third of all the displacements in 2017³⁹. In conclusion, the humanitarian situation as well as displacements make Iraq one of the most severe crisis in the world. The internal sectarian conflicts, the conflict between the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the governmental forces and other ethnic and religious unrest divide the country and bring no chance for an early stabilization.

Another striking problem in Iraq is corruption. According to Transparency International, Iraq has one of the most corrupted governments in the Middle East. Its system is often described as a ‘hybrid regime’ – between a ‘flawed democracy’ and an ‘authoritarian regime’ (Democracy Index, 2018). This proves, that the US presence in Iraq has not helped to prevent corruption and establish a democratic and free nation.

In May 2018, Iraq holds new parliamentary elections. It is expected that two major camps will compete with each other: former Prime Minister **Nouri al-Maliki** against current Prime Minister **Haider al-Abadi** (Zaid, 2017). It is hard to predict yet who will be the winner and if his victory will finally bring stability and peace to Iraq and its citizens.

³⁷ S. Ackerman, *Kerry slaps down Maliki after he accuses Iraqi president of violating constitution*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/11/us-iraqi-maliki-accuses-president> (accessed 31.01.2018).

³⁸ O. Bengio, *Saddam's Word: Political discourse in Iraq*, Oxford University Press 1998.

³⁹ iDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2018, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/iraq> (accessed 31.01.2018).

POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

Although the Ba'ath Party was a single-party regime, its leader **Saddam Hussein** was strong enough to take personal control of the decisions and choose his own personnel⁴⁰. Once the party gained the power, it managed to eliminate its opposition and rule its population by repression, violence and surveillance. After the First Gulf War **Saddam Hussein** was still convinced that he won the war against Iran despite enormous human and material losses⁴¹.

According to sociologist **Max Weber**, there are three ideal types of legitimate authority whose capacity to rule is based on traditional, legal-rational and charismatic grounds.

- Traditional authority rests on “an established belief in the sanctity of immemorial traditions and the legitimacy of those exercising authority under them”⁴².
- Legal-rational authority relies on the set of impersonal principles and represents “a rule by virtue of legality, by virtue of belief in the validity of legal statute and the appropriate juridical competence founded on rationally devised rules”⁴³.
- Charismatic authority refers to a creation of a personality cult – “the entirely personal devotion to, and personal trust in revelations, heroism, or other qualities of leadership in an individual”⁴⁴.

Weber perceives state as “a relationship of rule by human beings over human beings, which rests on the legitimate use of violence”⁴⁵. This means that for a state to remain in existence, those who are ruled have to surrender to the leadership of the ruler whoever it may be at any given time. If political leadership is absent, it results in stagnation and ineffectiveness of the political regime. The absence of the leadership gives subsequently

⁴⁰ A.T. Garton, *The Truth About Dictatorship*, “New Your Review of Books”, vol. 45, no. 3, 19.02.1998.

⁴¹ J. Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime*, Cambridge University Press 2012.

⁴² M. Weber, P. Lassman, R. Speirs, *Weber: Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press 1994.

⁴³ Ibidem.

⁴⁴ Ibidem.

⁴⁵ Ibidem.

rise to a reinforced bureaucracy where the activity of political leaders is replaced by the activity of the officials⁴⁶.

The political leadership of **Hussein** can be characterized by Weber's definition of a charismatic authority. **Hussein** built a regime that used propaganda, repression and other methods to create an idealized and worshipful image of himself in order to build his cult of personality.

It is difficult to predict what would happen with the regime and with **Hussein's** leadership if the US would not intervene into Iraq. Nevertheless, it is quite probable that **Saddam Hussein** would retain the regime due to an effective control of power. Moreover, at the time of the US intervention, the Iraq's economy was improving and there was no other political or military leader threatening the status of **Hussein** as a leader of the party.

CONCLUSIONS

The Iraq war together with sectarian cleansing had disastrous consequences causing deaths of thousands of civilians and forcing three million people to flee their homes. Despite the fact that the US troops defeated the regime of Saddam Hussein, it has not helped to fight corruption and stop repression and atrocities. Moreover, after the US troops left, the creation of Al-Qaeda, and the self- declaration of a caliphate by ISIS brought new instability in the region and caused even more atrocities. The only precondition for peace is to fight these militant terrorist groups and ensure stabilization of the country. It would be beneficial if Iraq could find a new political leader that would be able to unite its population, restore peace and security. In addition, societal recovery would be of utmost importance to deal with the hundreds of thousands internally displaced persons as well as citizens that had to leave the country and might want to come back in the future.

Iraq war provides us with a lesson of what happens when a world super-power seeks to fight alleged threats by using armed actions against other governments by bypassing or ignoring the United Nations. It also shows that labelling countries "rogue states" might not be coherent and objective. The set of criteria for the determination of rogue states that pursue policies such as terrorism, development and deployment of the weapons of mass destruction and challenge international agreements might be rel-

⁴⁶ Ibidem.

ative and it could be possible to name more countries with roguish behaviors than those labelled by the US and the president Bush or Trump⁴⁷.

In conclusion, the US and its new President Donald Trump should take precautions when labelling other countries “rogue regimes”. It has proved difficult to establish stability and democracy in Iraq and the similar situation could happen in North Korea or Iran if the US decides to intervene. Moreover, creation of another failed state could only bring more instability and open new military threats for the US as well as the world economy.

REFERENCES

1. Ackerman S., *Kerry slaps down Maliki after he accuses Iraqi president of violating constitution*, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/11/us-iraqi-maliki-accuses-president>.
2. Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq on the Withdrawal of United States Forces from Iraq and the Organization of their activities during their temporary presence in Iraq, 2008.
3. Authorization for use of military force against Iraq resolution of 2002.
4. Bengio O., *Saddam's Word: Political discourse in Iraq*, Oxford University Press 1998.
5. Blum W., *Rogue state: a guide to the world's only superpower*, Zed Books 2006.
6. Bumiller E., *Redefining the Role of the U.S. Military in Iraq*, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/22/washington/22combat.html?_r=1&hp.
7. Bush G., *President Bush Outlines Iraqi Threat*, Cininnati Museum Center, 7.10.2002.
8. Clinton B., *State of the Union Address*, 19.01.1999.
9. Fawaz A.G., *ISIS: A History*, Princeton University Press 2017.
10. Freedland J., *Homeland Insecurity*, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/25/books/review/homeland-insecurity.html>.
11. Garton A.T., *The Truth About Dictatorship*, “New Your Review of Books”, vol. 45, no. 3, 19.02.1998.
12. Holsti O.R., *American Public Opinion on the Iraq War*, The University of Michigan Press 2011.
13. iDMC – Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2018, <http://www.internal-displacement.org/countries/iraq>.

⁴⁷ W. Blum, *Rogue state: a guide to the world's only superpower*, Zed Books 2006.

14. Iraq's Accountability and Justice Law, <http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Iraq/Law10-2008-En.pdf>.
15. Joyner C.C., *In search of an anti-terrorism policy: Lessons from the Reagan era*, "Terrorism" 1988, vol. 11, issue 1.
16. *Justice for Iraq. A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper. December 2002*, <https://www.hrw.org/legacy/backgrounders/mena/iraq1217bg.htm>.
17. Kafala T., *The Iraqi Baath party*, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/2886733.stm.
18. Lewis A.R., *The American Culture of War. The History of U.S. Military Force from World War II to Operation Iraqi Freedom*, Routledge 2007.
19. Litwak R., *Rogue states and U.S. foreign policy: containment after the Cold War*, Woodrow Wilson Center Press 2000.
20. Lynch M., *The New Arab Wars: Uprisings and Anarchy in the Middle East*, Public Affairs 2017.
21. Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), <http://mtcr.info/deutsch-ziele/>.
22. Murphy S.D., *Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq*, Georgetown Law Journal 2004, vol. 92, issue 4; Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), <http://mtcr.info/deutsch-ziele/>.
23. National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, *On Keeping America Secure For the 21st Century*, 22.01.1999.
24. Newport F., Mones J.M., Carroll J., *Gallup Poll Review: Key Points About Public Opinion on Iraq* Gallup 2007.
25. Obama B., *President Obama's remarks before troops at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina*, 27.02.2009, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/feb/27/barack-obama-speech-iraq-war-end>.
26. Paul T.V., Wirtz J.J., Fortmann M., *Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, Stanford University Press, 2004.
27. President Bush's 2002 State of the Union Address, 29.01.2002.
28. Rees W., *The US-EU Security Relationship: The Tensions between a European and a Global Agenda*, Palgrave Publishers 2011.
29. Reinold T., *Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect. The power of norms and the norms of the powerful*, Routledge, New York 2012.
30. Sassoon J., *Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime*, Cambridge University Press 2012.
31. Segell G., *Axis of Evil and Rogue States: The Bush Administration, 2000-2004*, Glen Segell Publishers 2005.

32. *Shia-Sunni Divide*, <https://www.cfr.org/interactives/sunni-shia-divide#!/>.
33. Strategic Framework Agreement for a Relationship of Friendship and Cooperation between the United States of America and the Republic of Iraq.
34. Talmon S., *The Occupation of Iraq: Volume 2. The Official Documents of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council*, Hart Publishing 2013.
35. The 'war on terror' or 'global war on terrorism' is an international military campaign that was launched by the U.S. government after the September 11 attacks in the U.S. in 2001.
36. The Iraq Liberation Act of 1998.
37. *The rise and fall of a dictator*, <http://edition.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/12/14/sprj.irq.saddam.profile/index.html>.
38. Trump D., *Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly*, United Nations, New York, 19.09.2017.
39. United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) 2018, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/>.
40. Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies (Wassenaar) 2018, <http://www.wassenaar.org>.
41. Weber M., Lassman P., Speirs R., *Weber: Political Writings*, Cambridge University Press 1994.

CITE THIS ARTICLE AS:

K. Bolemanová, R. Kazanský, *The Consequences of the Iraq War – Lesson Learned?*, "Security Dimensions", 2018, no 26, p. 188–202, DOI 10.5604/01.3001.0012.7250.

Licence: This article is available in Open Access, under the terms of the Creative Commons License Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0; for details please see <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided that the author and source are properly credited. Copyright © 2018 University of Public and Individual Security "Apeiron" in Cracow