

ANTHROPOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF AGGRESSION AND PERSONAL SAFETY ON THE EXAMPLE OF THOMAS HOBBS'S *LEVIATHAN*

TERESA GRABIŃSKA*

ABSTRACT

The phenomenon of aggression is the subject of neurophysiology, psychology, sociology and political science. The influence of cultural factors on the occurrence and the level of aggression between groups is raised especially in sociology. In the article – on the example of the analysis of Thomas Hobbes's philosophical anthropology and his theory of the state (*commonwealth*) – the deeper level of cultural sources of aggression is considered, namely the impact of ontological assumptions on the model of human functioning and their translation into social and political practice. The original analysis of the influence of Hobbes's anthropology shows that man-mechanism is especially exposed to aggression and depression. Such a diagnosis has consequences in low level of personal safety and in high demand for external security structure. Personal safety is here analysed in three layers: ontic-cultural, psychological-social, and instrumental-defensive.

* Assoc. Prof. Teresa Grabińska, Ph.D., Military University of Land Forces in Wrocław; correspondence address: Akademia Wojsk Lądowych, ul. Czajkowskiego 109, 51-147 Wrocław, Poland; e-mail: grabinska-44@wp.pl

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INTRODUCTION

The term *aggression* means in its basic sense 'assault'. It is used to describe at first asymmetrical relationship between individuals (the psychological aspect), social groups (the sociological aspect), and states (the political aspect). Then this relationship often transforms into a symmetrical (*reciprocated*) one. In each of the cases, aggression is characterized by hostility, the emergence of which has various causes. Predominatingly the psychological and political causes are discussed, as well as the biological (also: evolutionary) basis of aggressive behaviour.

The article presents a less frequently discussed context of aggressive behaviour, i.e. cultural conditioning. This does not mean that it is not raised at all: it is discussed in the sociological aspect of aggression, and today especially in connection with the phenomenon of terrorism of Islamic groups. Here, however, cultural conditioning is reduced to the ontic basis for understanding the identity of a man in a given culture, to the so called ontic-cultural layer (O-C) of personal safety.¹ It turns out that this most abstract level of reflection on the cultural roots of aggression explains the scale of aggression transfer from ontological to psychological, social and political layers. An example for the analysis of this problem of aggression will be the anthropology developed by a seventeenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes. The choice of his mechanistic philosophy of

¹T. Grabińska, *Bezpieczeństwo personalne. Koncepcja trzech warstw* [Personal safety. The concept of three layers], Wrocław 2019, ch. II. Personal safety is defined as "a state felt by an individual in which he or she is a) capable of implementing his or her own intentions, in harmony with human and natural surroundings, b) feels fulfilled in his or her relations with other people, c) is able to defend themselves and others in the case of threats. These three characteristics of personal security specify its three layers: ontic-cultural (O-C), (psychological-social (P-S), and instrumental-defensive (I-D)" (*ibidem*, p. 32).

man (mechanistic anthropology) and his mechanistic philosophy of society and state is not accidental for several reasons.

- First, the author himself constructed his work *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiastical and Civill*² in a systematic way, like ancient philosophers such as Aristotle.³ It became the basis for understanding the behaviour of humans, groups and nations.
- Secondly, Hobbes laid the foundation for the canon of entrepreneurial human activity, reinforced by competition in making a profit in the capitalist system of management.
- Thirdly, knowledge of Hobbes's fundamentally coherent philosophy marks British culture and contributes to some extent to understanding the processes in the modern world within the Euro-Atlantic circle, which is heavily influenced by British culture.

1. THE NATURALNESS OF AGGRESSION ACCORDING TO HOBBS

1.1. The importance of language

The ontology of Hobbes's philosophy is mechanistic. Being is a mechanism moving in all its parts according to the laws of mechanics, driven by the internal force and subject to mechanical action from the outside. Man is a natural mechanism, while the state (*Common-wealth* in the title of *Leviathan*⁴) is a human creation – an artificial entity, imitating the most perfect natural object, i.e. the mechanistic man.

² T. Hobbes, *Leviathan or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-wealth Ecclesiastical and Civill*, London 1651, <https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/3113/hobbes/leviathan.pdf>. References to this bibliographical item will continue to be indicated in the text as: [*Leviathan*, p. ...].

³ Hobbes criticized Aristotle and scholastic philosophy in a crude way. Hobbes's criticism is part of the negation of traditional Latin culture. [*Leviathan*, pp. 23, 75, 94, 379, 417–425, 433]

⁴ Hobbes's idea of the state as presented in *Leviathan* is inspired by the biblical Book of Job, Chapter 41, the last passage of which Hobbes quoted in the following form: "There is nothing on earth to be compared with him. He is made so as not to be afraid. He seeth every high thing below him; and is king of all the children of pride". [*Leviathan*, p. 196] In the Polish Millennium Bible, this passage contains slightly different essence: "He has no equality on earth, he was made fearless: Every strong animal is afraid of him, king of all creatures". Cf. *Pismo Święte Starego i Nowego Testamentu* [*Holy Bible: Old and New Testaments*], translated from original languages, Poznań 1991, Hi [Job.] 41,25–26; C. Schmitt, *Der Leviathan in der Staatslehre des Thomas Hobbes: Sinn und Fehlschlag eines politischen Symbols*, Stuttgart 2018.

Hobbes's man appears as a mechanical detector of external stimuli that, through the senses, reach the human mind (in Hobbes's work – the brain and the heart) *via* the nervous system. Thus, as a result of this mechanical process (pressure), a sensual impression arises [*Leviathan*, pp. 9–10] which is the basis of the concept in language.

Mechanistic ontology treats human and other organisms in a similar way because they all share the process of the reception of external stimuli and the reaction to them. Despite the fact that man is a rational being and usually rationality is put as a feature that distinguishes man from an animal, Hobbes extended the process of understanding (identified by him with *imagination*⁵) to animals. The higher, especially the human understanding Hobbes defined as “the understanding not only his [i.e. man's] will, but his conceptions and thoughts, by the sequel and contexture of the names of things into affirmations, negations, and other forms of speech”. [*Leviathan*, p. 15]

Imagination is an internal movement (*mental discourse*), and when the imaginations follow each other in a continuous manner, they form *train of thoughts, or mental discourse*, that is either inattentive (non-directed) or deliberate, driven by desire. The sequence of thoughts can be regulated in two ways – by searching for the causes of the imagined effect (also appropriate for animals) or by searching for all imaginable effects of applying this knowledge of the causes, which is a purely human feature. [*Leviathan*, pp. 15–16] The second type of regulating the sequence of thoughts, when aimed at predicting the effects, is based on the analysis of the experience of the past. Hobbes called this process foresight, prudence, and in some cases – wisdom. He noted, however, that signs of prudence also occur in animals that choose instinctively what is beneficial. [*Leviathan*, pp. 17, 18]

Essentially what makes animals and people different from each other is *speech* (language), which consists of names and their relationships in the form of assertions. Speech is used for four positive (or negative) purposes: 1) to encode human thoughts (*signs of remembrance*), i.e. for acquiring skills (or creating misconceptions kept in words); 2) to communicate informations, i.e. for teaching someone (or transferring false knowledge); 3) to let the users of speech get to know each other, i.e. for receiving help (or declaring

⁵ Imagination “is nothing but decaying sense; and is found in men and many other living creatures, as well sleeping as waking”. [*Leviathan*, p. 11]

false will); 4) to play with words, i.e. for giving oneself and others pleasure and contentment (or hurting with words). [*Leviathan*, p. 20]

Among the names and expressions, Hobbes distinguished those characterised by *inconstant signification*, i.e. those that stimulate the emotional sphere towards approval (causing desire) or disapproval (causing aversion), different for different speech recipients and variable for a particular recipient. Therefore, these elements of conceptual uncertainty cannot be the basis for reasoning, which in Hobbes's concept is presented as a specific arithmetic operation. [*Leviathan*, pp. 25–28]

1.2. The importance of feelings (*passions*)⁶

In the mechanisms of animals and humans Hobbes distinguished two types of movements – *vital* (made without the use of imagination) and *animal* (*voluntary*), i.e. deliberate feeling (*passion*), which begins with imagination and which directly results in the pursuit of a specific positive action (called *appetite* – aspiration which results in movement towards something) or negative action (called *aversion* – pursuit that results in a movement against something). Appetite can be congenital or acquired, while aversion is, according to Hobbes, always acquired. [*Leviathan*, pp. 31–33]

Despite the fact that all people are governed by the same mechanism of appetite and aversion, they do not behave in the same way because of the different levels of *wit*, i.e. Hobbesian intellectual disposition (*celerity of imagining*, steadiness in targeting, good judgment, orientation, prudence), enriched with good imagination – which is at the same time a natural and an acquired disposition. This differentiation of wit is caused by the individualization of the emotional sphere due to, partly, differences in physical constitution and, partly, upbringing. Hobbes reduced these differences in the emotional sphere to differences in so-called *desire for power*, i.e. desire to seize wealth, honours and knowledge, which gives an internal driving force to the human mechanism. [*Leviathan*, pp. 42–43, 45]

⁶ In his works, Hobbes consistently uses the word *passion* to denote a concept that would be contemporarily rather denoted as *feeling*. Therefore, the author resorted to quote the word *passion* in the text of the article to highlight the particular understanding of feelings (*passions*) in Hobbesian anthropology. In contrary to Aristotelian anthropology (which is a basis of Latin culture), Hobbes's anthropology does not at all include the notion of *feelings* understood as manifestations of emotional moderation and contrasted with extreme forms of emotions, called *passions*.

In Hobbesian anthropology, all human mechanisms basically work in the same way. Even more do they work alike in intellectual acts than in bodily ones. In this sense, all people are equal and therefore they have the same goals and similar hopes for achieving them. This state of affairs causes natural hostility to another human being, who thus becomes a competitor or even an opponent in the struggle to achieve the same goals, and above all, in the struggle for *self-preservation*. It causes “a condition of war of every one against every one, in which case every one is governed by his own reason, and there is nothing he can make use of that may not be a help unto him in preserving his life against his enemies; it followeth that in such a condition every man has a right to every thing, even to one another’s body”. [*Leviathan*, p. 80]

The need for constant increase of power (desire for power) serves to stimulate hostility and make the fight more dynamic. The diversity of the power results in a hierarchy of winners and defeated in the struggle for wealth and authority. In order to defend against enemies, people surround themselves with property acquired as a result of the robbery, and strive for honours by all means. Hence, in their natural state they remain in permanent, devastating war of everyone against everyone: there is “continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short”. [*Leviathan*, p. 78] Therefore, in order to preserve and develop the human race, the reason dictates two basic laws of nature, formulated by Hobbes:

- the obligation to care for peace
- and
- the need to exchange a part of one’s own peace and security for a comparable portion of other people’s safety and freedom. [*Leviathan*, p. 80]

The sovereign of this settlement between people is most often the state (commonwealth), that is, “one person, of whose acts a great multitude”, referred to by Hobbes in the following way: “[t]his is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence”. [*Leviathan*, p. 106]

Good and evil have no absolute or objective reference in Hobbes’s philosophy:

For these words of good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no Commonwealth; or, in a Commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up and make his sentence the rule thereof. [*Leviathan*, p. 33]

1.3. Determinants of the ontic-cultural (O-C) layer of personal safety

In *Leviathan* Hobbes created a precise concept of the human mechanism. In the previous subsections, the ontology of the human mechanism was outlined, and some directions of its impact on the **psychological-social (P-S)** and **instrumental-defensive (I-D)** layers of personal security were pointed out. Now the list of personal safety determinants in the **ontic-cultural (O-C)** layer will be reconstructed, that is based on the considerations already carried out.⁷

The general outline of the human being's existence which emerges from the first part of *Leviathan* is as follows: lack of transcendence, natural hostility to another person, egoism and individualism, quasi-instinctive initiation and direction of action, determinism of choices, so called moral principles being reduced to conventions of behaviour or identified with positive law; the human action is valued mainly with its utility and effectiveness. Thus these characteristics can be translated into three determinants of the personal safety of man-mechanism (in terms of the Hobbes's man)⁸:

- d¹O-C/M – the awareness of self-assessment only by the public,
- d²O-C/M – the awareness of the need to meet requirements of community relevance,
- d³O-C/M – the ability to assess the effectiveness of an act.

The high level of dⁱO-C/M, i = 1, 2, 3, allows for self-identification of the man-mechanism and self-realization in the environment of people and things. The more the man-mechanism feels to be prepared to receive signals from the environment (i.e. the richer is range of the detector) and

⁷ T. Grabińska, *Bezpieczeństwo personalne...*, *op. cit.*, ch. IV.3.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

the more he/she is to be able to imagine as well as distinguish the signals (i.e. the greater is the resolution of detector), the stronger is the O-C layer of man-mechanism.⁹

2. THE TRANSFER INTO THE LEVEL OF PSYCHOLOGY: AGGRESSION – DEPRESSION

2.1. Feelings that can result in aggression

Since the topic of the article is aggression, i.e. the attitude towards what is hostile, it is necessary first to present in more detail the mechanism of aversion. Aversion is always directed against an evil (perceived mainly in a subjective or conventional sense). Hobbes's *visible evil* is presented in a sensual impression as a feeling of *trouble of mind* (dissatisfaction), *aversion* (disgust), *grief* (sadness). [*Leviathan*, pp. 33–37]

The shape of the emotional sphere belongs to the problems of psychology. Before reconstructing aggression as presented in Hobbes's anthropology, his view on psychology will be discussed in the form of his theory of feelings (*passions*), which includes dozens of feeling (*passion*) types. [*Leviathan*, pp. 34–37] The list below includes those feelings (*passions*) that can cause aggression.

I – First, there are negative feelings (*passions*) that directly cause or stimulate aggression towards oneself, someone else, other people's natural and artificial surroundings.

- *Despair* is lack of hope, or lack of confidence, in the possibility of satisfying one's own appetite.
- *Fear* is an aversion based on the belief that its subject is harmful.
- *Self-diffidence* is lack of confidence in one's own assessment and ability.
- *Indignation* is anger caused by an unjust act done to someone else.
- *Superstition* is fear of a fictitious power not recognized by religion (in Hobbes's understanding – by Protestant Christianity).
- *Panic terror* is unreasonable fear of something, whose necessary property is that it occurs in the human community.
- *Grief* (sadness) is a belief that it is not possible to affect the course of things; this belief is caused by a fall of the spirit.

⁹ Hobbes called these last two abilities *good wit* (*good fancy*) as well as *judgement and discretion*, respectively. [*Leviathan*, p. 43]

- *Vainglory* (vanity) is the exaltation of oneself over the others as a result of imagining fictitious own talents and possibilities.
- *Impudence* (shamelessness) is “contempt of good reputation”.
- *Cruelty* means finding pleasure in harming other people.
- *Envy* is the sadness because of the achievements of others, combined with the desire to take them away or to annul the achievements.

II – Secondly, there are feelings (*passions*) which are, in Hobbes’s opinion, not negative in themselves because they are the consequences of appetite, but which can (under certain circumstances) cause aggression.

- *Covetousness* (greed) is the *desire for riches* (wealth).
- *Ambition* is the *desire of office or precedence* (recognition in the group).
- *Pusillanimity* is the desire of what is not important to achieve the goal, or the “fear of things that are but of little hindrance”.

III – Thirdly, there are feelings (*passions*) that are guided by appetite, but focused on the goals that are often obtained by means of aggression [*Leviathan*, p. 35].

- *Natural lust* is the feeling to like people so as to satisfy own sensual pleasures.
- *Imagining* is *the past sensual pleasure*.
- *Jealousy* is liking a specific person, combined with the fear of non-reciprocity.
- *Revengefulness* (vengeance) is the desire to hurt someone in order to make him/her condemn his/her mistake or vileness.

The analysis of Hobbes’s catalogue of feelings (*passions*) in terms of those that directly cause aggressive actions and those that favour such actions leads to the conclusion that Hobbes’s idea of the naturalness of aggression is not an effect of an original insight into the sphere of feelings (*passions*). This is traditional insight based on observation of human behaviour and its effects. The classified feelings (*passions*) alone do not still prejudice the naturalness of aggression. Only when combined with the malfunctioning of the mechanism of appetite and aversion does the anomalous strength of feelings, i.e. *madness* [*Leviathan*, pp. 45–46], necessarily cause an aggressive act. In Hobbes’s philosophy, in which man is in fact amoral, because he/she cannot objectively distinguish good from evil due to the objective inexistence of good, the only obstacle to aggressive acts is an external stimulus in the form of learning desired responses, a clear catalogue of religious orders, and prohibitions or legal regulations.

Madness, which manifests itself in great anger, is rage and fury which, especially when combined with feelings from group III, inevitably leads to aggression.¹⁰ The second face of madness is an abnormal decrease in the strength of feelings (a decrease of the desire for power), manifested by excessive, objectively unreasonable anxiety, i.e. melancholy, which from Hobbes's point of view could be classified as self-aggression. Some feelings from group I also predispose to melancholy: despair, fear, self-diffidence, superstition, panic terror, grief.

2.2. Aggression and depression

The ability of the mechanism to act and the level of the effectiveness of the mechanism are directly proportional to its power, its internal driving force. This is why Hobbes's man constantly strives to increase his/her power: because it ultimately determines the value of man, which is, "as [worth and value] of all other things, his price; that is to say, so much as would be given for the use of his power, and therefore is not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of another". [*Leviathan*, pp. 54–55] That is why the desire for power is natural and translates into outdoing others in gaining wealth and honours.¹¹ However, giving in to someone else, giving up benefits to someone else, showing him/her respect – all these are tantamount to giving him/her more power, with some kind of surrender. On the other hand, flattery and bribery (*great gifts*), when directed towards people who are higher in the hierarchy of property or power, are – according to Hobbes – correct actions, because they allow to increase the power of the doer. Also, using advice or help can increase power in two ways: by using good advice and by showing caution to the adviser. Everything, however, must be done, as Hobbes pointed out, in the canon of respect and care. [*Leviathan*, pp. 55–57]

Here, in the quest for continuous increase of power, there is a subtle border between dynamic outward action shaping the environment and aggressive action, as in the case of type II feelings (*passions*). The more so because "[c]ovetousness of great riches" and excessive ambition in social and

¹⁰ Cf. frustration–aggression hypothesis in: J. Dollard, N. Miller, L. Doob, O. Mowrer, R.R. Sears, *Frustration and Aggression*, New Haven, CT 1939; L. Berkowitz, *Roots of aggression: A re-examination of the frustration–aggression hypothesis*, New York 1969.

¹¹ Hobbes directly argued that the acquisition of knowledge, especially theoretical one (*science*), does not increase power, because only a few initiates are able to assess the level of advanced knowledge, and therefore the range of influence is small. [*Leviathan*, p. 54]

professional advancement are signs of power. “Covetousness, and ambition of little gains, or preferments, is dishonourable”. [*Leviathan*, p. 58]

The assessment of whether a given act is still the result of *entrepreneurship* (resourcefulness) and *mobility* (activeness) understood positively, or whether it is already an expression of aggression directed at a specific person, group or thing, depends on the cultural context. What in Hobbes’s anthropology and psychology is a normal fuel for someone’s own impact on the environment (regardless of the so-called moral norms, because they do not appear in Hobbes’s concept, but in accordance with contractual norms or norms approved by the public), could be assessed as an aggressive act in a culture consistent with Aristotelian ethics. In the Aristotelian ethics, the virtue is understood as

a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a rational principle, and by that principle by which the man of practical wisdom would determine it. Now it is a mean between two vices, that which depends on excess and that which depends on defect; and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme.¹²

The desire for power activates, however, *passions*, and although reason (intellect) is supposed to control the display of feelings, extreme behaviour, driven by passion in the event of a fight for *one’s own* is even expected in Hobbes’s psychology, as long as it does not bring dishonor. This is well illustrated by the quote from an excellent study of profit-oriented cultural conditions – from *The Promised Land* by Ladislav Reymont: “Reputation, morality, rectitude? Bah, who cared for these things in Lodz? Who even took such nonsense into consideration? And besides, rectitude – what was that? Had Bucholc been a man of rectitude? Who asked that? They only asked how many millions he left after him. To possess millions, grasp them, have them at his back, and dominate with them!”¹³

¹² Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, translated by W.D. Ross, Kitchener 1999, pp. 27–28, <https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/aristotle/Ethics>

¹³ L. Reymont, *The Promised Land*, vol. 1, translated by M.H. Dziewicki, New York 1927, p. 328. Reymont is a precursor in addressing the so-called ethics of business. His novel

Thus, aggressive behaviour testifying to the *wildness of manners* in a given culture, in another culture (close to that based on Hobbes's anthropology) can be the desirable tool for success in the economic or political sphere. It is worth, however, to consider the effects of normalizing aggressive behaviour on an individual using it. First, such a person may not keep up in the race for wealth and honours. Secondly, the effort put into a tough competitive fight can strain one's psycho-somatic condition. Thirdly, the goal of the fight may become devalued for objective or subjective reasons. In all these three cases of ineffectiveness in increasing one's power, human behaviour can turn into uncontrolled acts of aggression that destroy the environment¹⁴ or the human themselves, or transform into the psychological states of burnout, melancholy, acedia, or depression.

In Kępiński's psychological language,¹⁵ the guarantee of mental health would be the continuous increase in power that does not disturb *energy and information metabolism*. This state is difficult, if at all possible, to maintain in the long run. A detailed analysis of this problem¹⁶ has led, among others, to the following conclusion. The Hobbesian anthropology shapes man primarily as an individual, not as a person (as it is in personalistic anthropology¹⁷). And because the increase in power is to take place with the approval of the public opinion, when conditions change, e.g. politics or market, it is likely to both derail the individual from the rising line in the

was three-quarter century ahead of the formulation of this concept. Cf. T. Grabińska, *Problemy etyki przedsiębiorczości w „Ziemi obiecanej” Władysława Reymonta* [*Problems of business ethics in „The Promised Land” by Ladislas Reymont*], “Cosmos-Logos”, 2002, vol. VI, pp. 87–95.

¹⁴ Educators demand a change in the “philosophy of upbringing” of children and adolescents, especially to reduce the more and more frequent practice of shaping competitive and fighting attitudes, which is leading to the spread of aggressive behaviour. It should be replaced with shaping the attitudes of cooperation, camaraderie and responsibility for oneself and others. Cf. e.g. M. Constantinescu, C. Constantinescu, *Reduction of violence in schools and educational environments through the Program “Making Choices”*, “Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences”, 2012, vol. 76, pp. 219–225, DOI 10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.04.102.

¹⁵ A. Kępiński, *Melancholia* [*Melancholy*], Warszawa 1979, ch. III. Cf. T. Grabińska, *Uspობienie do melancholii w antropologii fundującej pesymizm moralny* [*Approach to melancholy in anthropology funding moral pessimism*], [in:] *Przeciw melancholii* [*Against melancholy*], A. Hennel-Brzozowska, S. Jaromi (eds), Kraków 2014, pp. 157–175.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ J. Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good*, translated by J.J. Fitzgerald, New York 1947, ch. III–IV.

social position and lead him/her to depression, as well as to provoke him/her to an aggressive fight to defend his/her own position. There are no other possibilities in mechanistically determined being. There is no room for *free will* in mechanical humanity, this concept being systematically ridiculed by Hobbes. [*Leviathan*, pp. 28, 50, 129–131]

3. THE TRANSFER TO THE SOCIAL LEVEL: MARKET AGGRESSION

Bringing down the value of man, as in the quotation from Hobbes at the beginning of subsection 2.2, to their price on the market of ad hoc services measured by service recipients, immediately suggests a different type of interpersonal relationship than that based on the exchange of mutual benefits, as in the Aristotelian idea of utilitarian, hedonistic, and perfect friendship.¹⁸ It is no longer about bilateral transaction agreements, but about creating a market governed by the law of demand and supply, in which man becomes the subject of a market game from which he or she can fall out at any time. Therefore, even more, developing the desire for power in aggressive action seems to be the only guarantee of security. “And the cause of this is not always that a man hopes for a more intensive delight than he has already attained to, or that he cannot be content with a moderate power, but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present, without the acquisition of more.” [*Leviathan*, p. 61]

Hobbes’s man remains in constant mobilization to fight for wealth and honours, and in constant competition with others (and thus with opponents) for the highest stakes on the market of these or other goods. One of them is work, which is also considered a good in another anthropology, namely the personalistic one. According to personalistic anthropology, work cannot be the subject of the market transaction, because the right to work constitutes a human person.¹⁹ In mechanistically understood entrepreneurship, there is a fight for jobs, especially for those that quickly generate wealth and honour. “And because of power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of other strength of one man opposes and hinders the effects of another”.²⁰ The force is simply measured by the advantage of one over the other.

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Nicomachean...*, op. cit., Book VIII.3.

¹⁹ Cf. John Paul II, *Laborem exercens*, encyclical letter, ch. 2, www.vatican.va/content/hf_jk_ii_enc_14091981_Laborem-exercens

²⁰ T. Hobbes, *The Elements of Law Natural and Politic*, London 1889, <http://library.umac.mo/ebooks/b13602317.pdf>.

The high position on the labour market can be achieved in various ways, which Hobbes acknowledged in his anthropology and in his concept of society. For example, a good birth of someone allows them to inherit contacts with employers offering good jobs and jobs in general.²¹ Gumption, bordering on aggressiveness in increasing power, allows to progress faster across career levels. Ruthlessness in eliminating other competitors increases the effectiveness of applying for a job.

Work experience results in high qualifications, which are usually valued by employers. These attributes, however, that improve the chances of *winning* a good job and a job in general are not yet given to most young job seekers. Moreover, from the point of view of Hobbes's market mechanism, youth unemployment is something natural, especially since in the era of automation unemployment increases the employers' power in general, and is therefore the most desirable phenomenon.

Lack of opportunities to get a job or losing it for a long time causes numerous psycho-somatic disorders for the unemployed. This is demonstrated by numerous studies.²² And so the shock of losing a job causes anger and aggression towards one's environment; not only towards those who are to some extent responsible for it, but also towards relatives, who are additionally economically affected by unemployment of a family member. Aggression caused by unemployment results, among others, in a measurable increase in crime and the increased number of divorces. Then it transforms into a state of resignation, which causes a wave of depressions and suicides.

4. DETERMINANTS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL-SOCIAL (P-S) AND INSTRUMENTAL-DEFENSIVE (I-D) LAYERS OF PERSONAL SAFETY

The ontic-cultural (O-C) layer of personal safety in Hobbes's human being (or: man-mechanism) can be represented by means of three determinants $d^i\text{O-C/M}$, $i = 1, 2, 3$, which are presented in subsection 1.3. Their influence on the psychological-social layer (P-S) manifests itself in fear of other people. At the same time the Hobbes's man compulsively seeks to adapt to social

²¹ "To be descended from conspicuous parents is honourable; because they the more easily attain the aids and friends of their ancestors. On the contrary, to be descended from obscure parentage is dishonourable". [*Leviathan*, p. 57].

²² Cf. e.g. M.W. Linn, R. Sandifer, S. Stein, *Effects of unemployment on mental and physical health*, "American Journal of Public Health", 1985, vol. 75(5), pp. 502–506.

conditions. Thus, he or she does not feel safe. His or her determinants of P-S layer of personal safety are the following:²³

- d¹P-S/M – the ability to constantly adjust the actions of one's own mental and physical condition to the human environment in order to minimize suffering and increase one's power,
- d²P-S/M – the ability to overcome fear, above all with soft offensive rather than defensive action,
- d³P-S/M – striving for a constant increase of one's own power of action as a result of gaining wealth as well as honours and power,
- d⁴P-S/M – the ability to enforce effectively the approval of public opinion by soft means,
- d⁵P-S/M – the ability to use culturally accepted norms of behaviour towards other people to achieve individual offensive goals.

The above determinants of personal safety in P-S layer depict the image of a man who is under constant pressure of other people and who is striving to defeat them as softly as possible, dominating them with wealth and power. This puts the Hobbes's man in a permanent conflict with the human environment. It is not seeking a compromise with other people (an ensuring safety in the P-S layer), but an attitude of valour (level of I-D layer) that is to increase the level of safety. The determinants of personal safety in I-D are given as follows:²⁴

- d¹I-D/M – the training of strong will and certain ruthlessness in achieving the assumed goals,
- d²I-D/M – the ability to transform the intended goals of dominating the environment into appropriate dispositions of one's own power of action and into means of security structure (such as law but also e.g. weapons),
- d³I-D/M – knowledge on immaterial means of security structure – constitutional law and the ability to shape and use it,
- d⁴I-D/M – the knowledge of the material structure of security and the ability to shape and use it.

²³ T. Grabińska, *Bezpieczeństwo personalne...*, *op. cit.*, ch. IV.2.

²⁴ *Ibidem*.

A high level of d^I-D/M determinants ($i = 1, \dots, 4$) increases the personal safety only when a small number of other people strive to achieve their set goal, because fight for the same is not common then. On the other hand, the people who are able to achieve their goal in a brutal way can ensure a high level of own personal safety on the I-D layer. This is usually, however, not stable, because such a Hobbes's man may lose his or her high position at any time. Therefore, he or she must constantly increase his or her own individual power and provide him/herself with structural security tools.

5. THE TRANSFER TO THE POLITICAL AND PUBLIC LEVEL: AGGRESSION OF THE WAR WITH EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL OPPONENTS

According to Hobbes, if people live in a state of nature they are in a permanent state of war of every man against every man. This does not occur in reality, because it would lead to complete destruction. Independent individuals fighting to achieve the same is, however, a common situation in inter-state relations and often also in civil wars. Hobbes assessed the war attitude (*the posture of war*) between states as much safer for human survival than war of one against one, because, he thought, without foreseeing the phenomenon of total war, the goal of wars is also to protect the freedom and existence of subjects. [*Leviathan*, pp. 76–79]

The Hobbesian genesis of the state (commonwealth) is based on the need to guarantee personal safety to all its citizens and to protect them from others, who are seeking their opponents. According to Hobbes, the antagonized mass of people voluntarily surrenders to the sovereign's care and agrees to give up part of their natural unlimited freedom (negative freedom²⁵ – freedom *from*).

The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able (...) to secure them (...) is to confer all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality of voices, unto one will (...). This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a Commonwealth; in Latin, *Civitas*. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence. [*Leviathan*, pp. 105–106]

²⁵ Cf. e.g. I. Berlin, *Two Concepts of Liberty*, Oxford 1969.

The *commonwealth* (state) is a person (artificial man), and a particular sovereign (natural person or collegiate representation) embodies that person, takes over the *sovereign power* over his or her *subjects*. This power can be gained by force (*Commonwealth by acquisition*) or obtained by agreement with subjects (*political Commonwealth, or Commonwealth by Institution*). [*Leviathan*, p. 106] The structure and function of the state is the scaling of the structure and function of natural man.

[T]he sovereignty is an artificial soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; the magistrates and other officers of judicature and execution, artificial joints; reward and punishment (by which fastened to the seat of the sovereignty, every joint and member is moved to perform his duty) are the nerves, that do the same in the body natural; the wealth and riches of all the particular members are the strength; *salus populi* (the people's safety) its business; counsellors, by whom all things needful for it to know are suggested unto it, are the memory; equity and laws, an artificial reason and will; concord, health; sedition, sickness; and civil war, death. [*Leviathan*, p. 7]

One of the important measures protecting against this death of the political body is that the will of the sovereign would cause effective action in the state. Therefore, it should translate into a possible coherence (agreement) of the will of subjects. One of the instruments to achieve this goal, advised by Hobbes, is the compulsion to profess similar views on matters which are vital for the state. Therefore, he proposed to distinguish *public conscience* and *man's conscience*. [*Leviathan*, pp. 198–199] The first is driven by law, while the second one by variable individual convictions. Therefore a censorship of knowledge and information is recommended by him. It prevents the dissemination of troublemaking doctrines that threaten social peace. [*Leviathan*, pp. 109–110]

The striving to unify views in the state by restricting the freedom to use knowledge and information, on the one hand, may (contrary to Hobbes's intentions) lead to rebellion, and thus cause social aggression, on the other – and this was what Hobbes had in mind – may cause that every subject (subordinate) whose views and opinions are correlated with the sovereign's doctrine, is able to somehow guess the intentions of power and duplicate some of the government's actions on a local scale. That is why the public

conscience is also to define interpersonal relations if the party to the relationship is the subject of the state with which the sovereign is at war or has broken off the alliance.

A good example of such a *scaling down* of the attitude of hostility is a historical fact of a sudden change in the attitude of ordinary English men (neighbours, colleagues and even comrades-in-arms) to Polish soldiers remaining in England after the end of World War II, when it turned out that their home country, Poland, found itself in a hostile political camp. The symptoms of friendship, kindness and gratitude suddenly disappeared and they were replaced by overtly manifested hostility and even aggression.

CONCLUSIONS RELATING TO STRUCTURAL SECURITY

Generally speaking, *personal safety* is the perception of the absence of threats by an individual, while *structural security* is the state of material and immaterial devices protecting people against these threats. Both kinds of security ensuring can be examined synchronously – as the condition of human safety in a given place and time, and – as the condition of external (tangible and intangible) tools which are to guarantee a proper condition. They can be also examined diachronically – like an ascending or descending process that results in a synchronously captured state of security.²⁶

Structural security is guaranteed by the system of law and the organization of preventive and intervention measures; technical equipment controlling the condition of the human; natural and technical environment; and rescue services, uniformed and other, aimed at maintaining the optimal condition of personal and social safety as well as the condition of monitoring devices which are to protect and defend people, nature and all human products. In this security programme even the most technicized devices of security structure seem to be necessary, so that the effects of their actions are constantly directed towards individuals or social groups.²⁷

The three-layered concept of personal security enables a more precise study of the impact of security structure devices on individual people

²⁶ T. Grabińska, *Bezpieczeństwo personalne...*, *op. cit.*, ch. V.3.

²⁷ Therefore, the project of transhumanists to make a fusion of nature and technology should be necessary revised. Cf. F. Fukuyama, *Our Posthuman Future. Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution*, New York 2003; T. Grabińska, *Bezpieczeństwo osoby i wspólnoty. Ochrona bytu osobowego w obliczu ideologii i praktyki transhumanizmu* [*The security of a person and community. The protection of personal being in the face of transhumanistic ideology and practice*], Wrocław 2018, part III.

and human communities. It has been presented above in relation to the man-mechanism (Hobbes's man). Now, on the same example, the influence of three layers of personal safety on structural security will be discussed.

As it was suggested in sections 4 and 5, the man-mechanism puts his or her own personal safety above all in the security structure that he or she creates, and exercises the control over it. Because of his or her weakness in distinguishing between good and evil acts [*Leviathan*, p. 33], he or she can only rely on the usefulness of his or her own actions, the purpose of which is to protect oneself against the hostile environment of people and nature (dⁱO-C/M layers, $i = 1, 2, 3$). Threats from people are to be overcome by political power and the exertion of the influence on people's opinions (in a soft or hard manner). Soft forms of coercion actualize themselves in law as well as in numerous regulations and procedures in various areas of life. The repertoire of hard forms of coercion is very rich: from the influence through the group pressure of various associations (*leagues*), through the ruthless enforcement of enacted laws, to the widespread physical elimination of the oppositionists (among others because of cultural differences).

Hobbes's man remains in constant fear. So, he or she is especially interested in studying the human and natural environment empirically, as well as in methods (legal, organizational and technological) of improving his or her social position. Those who fail to dominate the environment (fall of career, loss of property, failure to achieve success etc.) are doomed both by themselves and by the community to exclusion, which is very detrimental to the P-S layer of personal security, but it also weakens, to an even greater extent, the I-D layer. Such a low level of personal safety easily triggers states of aggression or depression.

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