The Paradox of Securitization within Uncertainty and European Integration

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ABSTRACT

This article is a contribution to security sciences which underlines, on the basis of the multidisciplinary approach, the importance of skill levels in relation to the resistance to the securitization of security issues in connection with the development of European integration. It enriches the field of security management using the method of securitization as well as the the perspective of political science, sociology, and economic theory. Through the example of French referendum on the European constitutional treaty, it demonstrates the importance of skill level for the susceptibility of different population groups to the securitization of the topics of the campaign,

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namely within the context of the deepening of European integration, which respectively threatens certainty and increases uncertainty. The paper also draws attention to the possibility of emergence of the so-called paradox of securitization.

ARTICLE INFO

Introduction

This article constitutes a contribution to the security sciences of the 21st century, underlining, on the basis of the multidisciplinary approach, the importance of the achieved level of knowledge in relation to the resistance against the securitization of security topics in connection to the development of European integration. In a similar way, also the issue of disintegration may be solved. The paper enriches the field of security management with knowledge stemming from economic theories, as well as political and social sciences. By applying the example of French referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (TCE), it demonstrates the importance of education and the achieved level of skills in relation to the sensitivity of different groups of population to the securitization of topics of campaigns within the context of deepening European integration which either undermine certainty or increase uncertainty. It also warns about the possibility of the so-called securitization paradox.

The objective of this article is, in particular, to define the securitization process in a deeper way for the purpose of method generalization, and to show the example of European integration. In this example originally economically rational worries grew bigger within the public discourse, as the rising intensity of the terms safety, threat, risk, or danger was used for boosting individual specific uncertainty, and, subsequently, also irrational collective fear or even panic. This, in turn, leads retrospectively (and as a paradox) to a threat to the safety of population. This "securitization paradox"

is a new theoretical contribution to the discussion in security sciences in which authors support the authority of previously stated arguments by a case study, investigating empirically the French referendum on TCE.

Theoretical perspective and methodology

In the past, the so-called narrow interpretation of security was dominant, focused in particular on military and political threats. The concept of inner and outer national security constitutes the basis for the authors of the article, specifying four dimensions of national security[1]: (1) ideals, values, human intellectual wealth; (2) social impacts, organisation, legal systems; (3) material aspects of human existence; (4) cyberspace. To understand it more clearly, a brief terminological commentary is attached, clarifying to an ever greater extent the efforts for universal securitization.

An academic dictionary[2] defines the term "security" as something related to (commercial, legal) certainty. The so-called Copenhagen school specifies securitization as a special kind of lingual act, determining the existence of threat by its performative power.[3] For the area of security management, probably Balzacq's interpretation seems to be a more appropriate one; he understands securitization as a social action, always situated within certain context[4] and defines it as a "long-term strategic acting, whose purpose is to persuade targeted audience … that a specific development of events represents such a significant threat that it justifies the use of urgent measures with the objective to avoid it".[5]

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[1] M. Kný, D. Junková, *Vlivové faktory bezpečnostního managementu*, "Kultura Bezpieczeństwa. Nauka – Praktyka – Refleksje", 2017, no. 28, pp. 124–135, DOI 10.24356/KB/28/5.

[2] V. Petráčková, J. Kraus *et al.*, *Akademický slovník cizích slov*, Praha 2000.

[3] Authors see threat as an external phenomenon that poses danger or may affect adversely certain aspects of one or more dimensions of the inner or outer security of the country. In this article, threats caused by an individual or a group of individuals are referred to, not natural threats. The probability that a certain security dimension could be affected is derived from a dependent variable (risk), in which the non-preparedness to face the threat is reflected as well.

[4] T. Balzacq, *A theory of securitization: Origins, core assumptions, and variants*, Milton Park, Abingdon – New York 2011, pp. 15–16.

[5] T. Balzacq, *The three faces of securitization: Political agency, audience and context*, "European Journal of International Relations", 2005, no. 11(2), DOI 10.1177/1354066105052960, p. 175.

In summary, authors find securitization[6] as an accelerative process of strengthening public awareness (i.e. that of the targeted subjects) about the security situation by the acting person (source subject). This process is analogical to the decision-making procedure when solving problems: problem identification – analysis – determination of options – choice according to criteria – decision and implementation (acceptation of the acting subject).

TABLE 1. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE ORIGINAL FORMULATION OF SECURITIZATION THEORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENTIFIC APPROACH

	Copenhagen school	**Social scientific approach**
Securitization in a form of:	lingual act (conventional procedure)	situated action, structured by habit and a given social field
Conditions of securitization	internal (security grammar), external (competence of the acting subject, objective properties of threat)	wider institutional and social context
Control of the process by the acting person	full	limited
Role of the public	the public as a formal category, passive	a variable category that must be reconstructed empirically, the public as an important co-creator of the social construction of threat

Source: T. Balzacq, *A theory of securitization: Origins, core assumptions, and variants*, Milton Park, Abingdon – New York 2011, [qtd. in:] M. Tkaczyk, *Mediální konstrukce hrozeb v kontextu politiky sekuritizace a výjimečného stavu*, "Mediální studia", 2018, no. 1, p. 56, https://medialnistudia.fsv.cuni.cz/front.file/download?file=2018%2001%20 03%20tkaczyk%2047-64.pdf (accessed: 21.09.2019).

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[6] In general, the tool of securitization within management contains ethical risk as it serves "positive forces".

The European economic integration has different impacts on population. From the perspective of economic theory, in particular the Heckscher–Ohlin model and the Stolper–Samuelson theorem should be mentioned. The core statement of the Heckscher–Ohlin model is the following: countries export goods whose production uses intensively production factors with which these countries are relatively abundantly equipped, and they import goods for whose production such factors are used intensively that are relatively scarce in these countries. An understandable impact of such trade is the change in wages and other revenues, resulting from different manufacturing factors.[7]

The summary of Wood's[8] interpretation of the Heckscher–Ohlin model and of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem brings one to conclusion that trade

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[7] A. Wood, *How Trade Hurt Unskilled Workers*, "The Journal of Economic Perspectives", 1995, vol. 9, no. 3, p. 58.

[8] For a more detailed explanation, the following prerequisites of the Heckscher–Ohlin model are adopted along with Wood: two economies (a developed one and a developing one), two production factors (qualified and non-qualified work), and two traded commodities (machines, manufactured with high demand for qualified work; and clothes, produced predominantly with the use of a non-qualified work). (A. Wood, *How Trade…, op. cit.*, p. 58). The developed country is relatively abundantly equipped with qualified work, which provides a comparative advantage to this country in the manufacturing of machines, while the developing country is relatively abundantly equipped with non-qualified work, having a comparative advantage in the production of clothes (*ibidem*, p. 59). Furthermore, the Heckscher–Ohlin theory expects a certain level of technology. This last prerequisite is a key one for the deduction of the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, which focuses on the impact of international trade on wages (through the price of goods). For example, a decrease in the price of clothes manufactured by domestic producers (as a consequence of "external forces") in relation to the prices of machines decreases the wages of non-qualified workers relatively to the wages of qualified workers. The prerequisite of a certain technology provides the unchanging functional relationship between the output in a form of goods and the input in a form of production factors to imply a similar unchanging relationship between the prices of goods and wages of production factors (here the qualified and non-qualified work). (*ibidem*, p. 59). Wood mentions two "external forces" that may lead to the change of the prices of products made by domestic producers. First, it is the limitation of trading barriers that was one of the key objectives of European integration. Under significant barriers of trade, prices of clothes are lower in developing economies than in developed ones, and the prices of machines are lower in developed economies than in developing ones. Thus, the reduction of trade barriers and the subsequent expansion of trade would decrease the relative price of clothes in developed countries. The second force are the changes in global supply of qualified and non-qualified work. Wood gives an example

with developing countries results in lower relative wages of unqualified workers in developed countries (with a relatively low number of unqualified workers when comparing it to the world) than it would be without such trade. This is caused by (regardless of whether trade in a developed country is specialized in machines or diversified between machines and clothes) a decrease in relative domestic prices of clothes.[9]

Also Hooghe and Marks point to the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, focusing directly on how European integration is seen by different citizens and stating that "according to the Stolper–Samuelson theorem, trade is beneficial for individuals owning production factors the national economy is equipped with abundantly, and affects individuals owning production factors that are relatively scarce adversely".[10] Thus, they come to conclusion that in the richest member states of the European Union, keeping most of the capital, to which France may be included, one may expect a Eurosceptic approach of unqualified workers and Euro-supportive approach of managers and professionals, while in the poorest countries, having the greatest work capacities, one may expect the opposite.

The validity of the Heckscher–Ohlin model during the verification if citizens are more or less supportive of trade liberalization is further confirmed by Mayda and Rodrik[11], and O'Rourke and Sinnott[12] in their empirical analyses.

However, with regard to the objective of this article, one more theoretical perspective, coming from political economy, is important. In their article,

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when the growth of population or improvement of basic education in a developing country leads to the growth of output and export of clothes through the increase of its supply of non-qualified workers. This reduces the price of clothes at global markets subsequently, also in developed countries. (*ibidem*, p. 59).

[9] A. Wood, *How Trade…, op. cit.*, p. 61.

[10] L. Hooghe, G. Marks, *Does Identity or Economic Rationality Drive Public Opinion on European Integration?*, "Political Science and Politics", 2004, vol. 37, issue 3, pp. 415–420.

[11] A.M. Mayda, D. Rodrik, *Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist than Others?*, "NBER Working Paper Series", 2001, Working Paper 8461, http://www.nber.org/papers/w8461 (accessed: 27.09.2014).

[12] K.H. O'Rourke, R. Sinnott, *The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence*, "Brookings Trade Forum", 2001, http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/25063160?uid=3737856&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104697566867 (accessed: 27.09.2014).

Jain and Mukand[13] come to conclusion that extensive economic reforms (TCE may be also considered as such) may be refused, as a paradox, even in case (despite the prerequisite of redistribution) majority of population can benefit thereof.[14] Here, they follow the work of Fernandez and Rodrik[15] stating that "in a situation of individual specific uncertainty about the identity of winners and losers of economic reform, there's a prejudice towards status quo".[16] Nevertheless, Fernandez and Rodrik do not expect the possibility of a redistribution scheme that would compensate losses to the "losers." Jain and Mukand confirm the validity of such conclusion also in case of the existence of a redistribution scheme, stating that the "inability to promise compensation credibly, facing individual specific uncertainty of identifying the reform winners, is what may defeat the reform".[17]

If the theoretical scheme above is applied to the TCE case, a statement may be concluded that in case trade liberalization (European integration) is beneficial for majority of population, it may be refused by majority of population at the end, as some of the "winners" are not aware of them belonging to the category of "winners", and under the conditions of insufficiently credible redistribution schemes (whose picture may be harmed by insufficient confidence of population in their government or political elite), they voted against the TCE at the end.

Yet, the source of this irrational behaviour could be the securitization of topics of a related campaign from the economic point of view, when the growing utilization of the sense of close terms like threat, risk, danger or security could strengthen the experience of individual specific uncertainty within a relatively large key group of voters in the qualified population.

Researchers agree that the equipment of respective respondents with human capital may be identified by the use of two variables (so, it can be done by means of questions too). The first one is the skill level that respond-

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[13] S. Jain, S.W. Mukand, *Redistributive Promises and the Adoption of Economic Reform*, "American Economic Review", 2003, vol. 93, no. 1, pp. 256–264.

[14] This conclusion does not apply if it relates to a significant majority of population.

[15] R. Fernandez, D. Rodrik, *Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty*, "American Economic Review", 1991, vol. 81, no. 5, pp. 1146–1155.

[16] S. Jain, S.W. Mukand, *Redistributive…, op. cit.*, p. 256.

[17] *Ibidem.*

ents have acquired in their work, which is discussed in this article.[18] The second variable is the age at which the respective respondent has finished their education.

In an instant Eurobarometer survey, respondents were offered different categories of occupations, corresponding to their situation.[19] For the purpose of this research, these categories were merged into three summarizing categories: (1) unqualified occupation; (2) qualified occupation; (3) highly-qualified occupation.[20]

Relative participation ratio of respective respondents in this representative research in France is stated in Table 2.

Table 2. Relative participation ratio of respondents according to occupation category (or according to achieved skill level) in France

	Highly qualified	Qualified	Unqualified
Skill level	22.8 %	74.3 %	2.9 %

Source: own preparation according to: GESIS, *GN0002: EB – Flash Eurobarometer*, 2014, https://dbk.gesis.org/dbksearch/gdesc2.asp?no=0002&db=d (accessed: 27.09.2018).

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[18] This approach was used in: K.H. O'Rourke, R. Sinnott, *The Determinants of Individual Trade Policy Preferences: International Survey Evidence*, "Brookings Trade Forum", 2001, http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/25063160?uid=3737856&uid=2&uid=4&sid=21104697566867 (accessed: 27.09.2014).

[19] These categories were: 11 (farmer, forester, fisherman); 12 (shop owner, craftsman); 13 (experts with the respective licences: lawyer, physician): 14 (company director); 15 (other persons with trade licences), 21 (expert employees: physician, accountant); 22 (CEO, director, top management); 23 (middle management); 24 (civil servant); 25 (clerk); 26 (other employee – seller, nurse etc.); 27 (other employee – specify); 31 (head/boss – team manager etc.); 32 (worker); 33 (non-qualified worker); 34 (other worker); 41 (housewife); 42 ("full-time" student); 43 (pensioner); 44 (unemployed); 45 (other without profession).

[20] The first summarizing category (non-qualified occupation) includes only the category 33 (non-qualified worker); the second summarizing category (qualified occupation) includes the categories 11, 12, 15, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 32 above; the third summarizing category (highly-qualified occupation) includes 13, 14, 21, 22, 23. Categories 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 were fully dropped from analysis as it is not possible to determine the level of human capital in these respondents.

The stated variable is considered to be an independent categorial variable in this analysis and results in three values. The dependent variable is then the sole voting of respondents in referendums on the TCE.[21]

For the purpose of evaluation of variables stated above, two statistical methods are used. The first method comes from contingency tables and using the chi-quadrat test reveals if there exists any statistically significant dependency in France and if the direction of this dependency corresponds to hypotheses: H1: In accordance with the Heckescher–Ohlin model (and Stopler–Samuelson theorem), support for TCE rose in France with rising qualifications of voters; H2: In accordance with the Jain and Mukand theory, TCE was refused in France, albeit the number of voters having highly-qualified and qualified occupations exceeded the number of voters having unqualified occupations (on the basis of individual specific uncertainty and incredibility of redistribution schemes).

A significantly higher binary logistic regression points to the fact how strong relationship is implied by the H1 hypothesis and if respective independent variable contributes to the explanation of variation of dependent variable markedly, so if the respondent voted for or against the TCE. At the same time, the method of binary logistic regression may include more independent variable we may consider as control within this article. For this reason, following control (independent) variables were added to the binary logistic regressions model testing the relation between skill levels of respondents and their vote in referendum: (1) gender; (2) respondent's age; (3) type of location; (4) opinion on the EU institutions; (5) opinion on the membership in the EU; (6) subjective ratio of knowledgeability of respondent about the content of TCE; (7) opinion on the necessity of the European constitution for the structure of Europe.[22]

In the article below, the results of binary logistic regression are preferred against the results of analysis of contingency tables, with regard to the fact that the binary logistic regression may reveal in a better way if respective relations between variables are really statistically significant, or if they are only so-called "spurious" relations. The data analysis was performed using

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[21] The following questions were given to respondents: "How did you vote in referendum? Did you vote »yes« to support the TCE or »no« against it?". Therefore, this variable reaches only two values (so a binary and a categorial one): yes and no. Respondents who did not participate in voting (non-voters) were excluded from the analysis.

[22] Detailed familiarization with the results of analyses of all these relationships exceeds the capacity of this article.

the SPSS statistical software, and the interpretation of results corresponds with Gray and Kinnear's publication.[23]

FRANCE – RESULTS OF VOTE AND DISCUSSION
Well-known refusal of the TCE in French referendum came on 29 May 2005. Under a relatively high participation rate (69.3%), 54.7% of citizens participating in the referendum voted against the TCE.[24]

On the basis of contingency tables and chi-quadrat test, one may come to conclusion that there is a statistically significant relationship (p-value < 0.001) in an expected direction between the level of achieved knowledge of voters and their voting in referendum. While the support of respondents with a low level of skills (having a unqualified occupation) for the TCE reached only 24.0%, support of respondents with a high (or medium) skill level (having a qualified occupation) rose to 40.1% and in case of respondents with a high skill level (having a highly qualified occupation) it reached even 64.9%.

The results of an advanced method of binary logistic regression, where the relationship between the skill level of voter and their voting in referendum was tested while taking into account other independent variables, point to similar conclusions.[25]

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[23] C.D. Gray, P.R. Kinnear, *IBM SPSS Statistics 19: Made Simple*, first edition, Hove and New York 2012.

[24] D. Kný, *Referenda o "Evropské ústavní smlouvě": evropská identita jako perspektiva zkoumání*, a diploma thesis prepared at Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, Praha 2012, p. 109.

[25] The model, tested by the method of binary logistic regression, meets all necessary statistical conditions to be considered as a useful model. First, the model is statistically significant (p-value < 0.001), so it contributes to a better estimation of respondents who voted for and who voted against the TCE, demonstrating the "omnibus test of model coefficients". Second, model summary provides the Nagelkerke R-square data, whose value reaches 0.316, meaning that the model explains more than 31% of variation of dependent variable. Such effect is considered as big (see C.D. Gray, P.R. Kinnear, *IBM SPSS Statistics 19…, op. cit.*, p. 407). Third, Hosmer and Lemeshow test confirms that each systematic variation is explained by the model and thus the model corresponds to the data (p-value = 0.894). Compared to the model explaining how many respondents voted for or against the TCE on the basis of incidental calculation, not containing independent variable and thus having the success rate of 53.8%, the percentage of properly assigned respondents in the examined model rose to 71.8%, meaning a significant improvement.

Furthermore, the model demonstrates that the skill level contributes statistically significantly, in fact, to the explanation of how voters voted. Compared to those with a low skill level, those with a high skill level voted with a significantly higher probability for the TCE ("odds" for the benefit of the TCE are 3.4 × higher, based on $\exp(B) = 3.41$, while the p-value < 0.05). However, similar statistically significant difference may not be observed between respondents with a lower skill level, having unqualified occupations, and those with a higher (or medium) skill level, having qualified occupations (p-value = 0.45).

The summarization of the results of statistical analyses leads to the confirmation of the Hecksher–Ohlin model (and Stolper–Samuelson theorem) under their application to the result of referendum on the TCE in France. Respondents sufficiently equipped by skills voted in favour of the TCE significantly more than the respondents having low skill level. So, the H1 hypothesis is confirmed as well.

However, it is appropriate to mention the medium category of respondents (with medium skill level) in this case, tending to favour the opponents of the TCE in their votes. It may be explained by their ambivalent approach to trade liberalization, uncertainty if the adoption of the TCE is really for their benefit, and also by the impact of an ongoing intensive campaign before referendum. In this way, certain explanation is provided by the H2 hypothesis. On the basis of statistical analyses stated above, one can consider it at least as probable.[26] In accordance with the Jain and Mukand theory, the TCE could be refused in France where the high number of voters abundantly equipped with skills exceeds the number of voters with low skill level, potentially due to the fact that voters performing qualified occupation (or with a medium skill level) rather favoured the side of TCE opponents, while under the pressure of campaign, they could come to conclusion that the adoption of this treaty could end in a disadvantageous status for them. Yet, the arguments stated below confirm that the securitization process represents a key moment of respective campaign.

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[26] However, this hypothesis needs to be tested beyond the frame of this article further as it must be proven that respective voters suffer from individual specific uncertainty and nonconfidence in relation to redistribution schemes (or in relation to government or political elite that ensure it).

The social and economic incentive for voting against the TCE was identified mainly among left-winged voters[27], whose portion corresponds, according to Robyn's[28] typology, to the profile of "unsatisfied populists"[29], who find the European Union as a part of the negative process of globalisation, and who are mostly affected by globalisation as, in particular, a manually working group.[30] From the perspective of theoretical models described above, their decisions may be considered as economically rational. Nevertheless, it seems that also the members of middle classes[31], favouring the European Union in principle and performing qualified occupations mostly, voted against the TCE markedly under the pressure of worries about globalisation and related social and economic risks. It would be possible to assign to them certain characteristic aspects of "optimistic pluralists" and "unsatisfied populists" in accordance with Robyn's typology.[32]

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[27] S. Brouard S., V. Tiberj, *The French Referendum: The Not So Simple Act of Saying Nay*, "Political Science & Politics", 2006, vol. 39, no. 2, p. 266.

[28] *The Changing Face of European Identity* distinguishes four types of French citizens according to their approach to their own European and national identity: "supra-nationalists"; "nationalists"; "optimistic pluralists"; and "unsatisfied populists." (R. Robyn (ed.), first edition, London – New York 2005). Theoretically expected existence of "supra-nationalists" and "nationalists" is postulated in the work on the basis of the research on the types of "optimistic pluralists" and "unsatisfied populists," see: D. Kný, *Evropská identita a "Evropská ústavní smlouva": referendum ve Španělsku a ve Francii*, a bachelor's thesis prepared at Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, Praha 2010, p. 22.

[29] See D. Kný, *Evropská…, op. cit.*, pp. 18–26. If the typology used in *The Changing Face of European Identity* is applied within French environment, then if there are mainly the voters of left-wing parties and manual workers in the group of unsatisfied populists, and these groups of French population vote mainly against the TCE (see European Commission – Flash Eurobarometer, *The European Constitution: Post-referendum survey in France*, June 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/flash/fl171_en.pdf (accessed: 27.09.2019), p. 13), then one may conclude indirectly that the category of unsatisfied populists voted mainly against the treaty.

[30] D. Kný, *Evropská identita…, op. cit.*, p. 41.

[31] For the voting method according to profession see S. Brouard, V. Tiberj, *The French Referendum…*, p. 262. For the impact of human capital on the voting of voters in referendums on the TCE, see also D. Kný, D. Junková, *Lidský kapitál jako faktor evropské integrace*, "MANEKO. MANažment a EKOnomika podniku", 2019, vol. 11, no. 2, 183–196, http://www.maneko.sk/casopis/pdf/2_2019.pdf (accessed: 15.06.2019).

[32] D. Kný, *Evropská identita…, op. cit.*, p. 40; D. Kný, *Referenda v kontextu prohlubování evropské integrace: koncept národní a evropské identity jako perspektiva zkoumání*, a dissertation prepared at Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, Praha 2019, p. 112.

Although the social and economic topics represented a key element of campaign and had a significant impact on the decision-making of voters, this fact needs to be considered within the scope of the voters' identities in French society, either in relation to the issue of immigration (and its impact on labour market) or to the tradition of a centralistic and protectionist state.[33] The securitization of topics such as immigration probably contributed to the economically irrational favouring on the part of middle classes of the negative vote in relation to the TCE.

Conclusion

This article discusses the process of the securitization of topics of the European integration, where originally economically rational worries are transformed in public discourse, using the rising intensity of terms security, threat, risk, or danger, firstly into an individual specific uncertainty, and, subsequently, into an irrational collective fear or even panic, leading retrospectively (and as a paradox) to the endangering of safety of population. This "securitization paradox" is a new theoretical contribution to the discussion in the area of security sciences. The authors base the power of their arguments on a case study in which they examine French referendum on the TCE empirically. Although the refusal of the TCE in the referendum held in 2005 did not mean a fatal danger to the security of population from the perspective of these days, the process of securitization was already visible in those days. The resulting serious paradox of securitization may be seen in following events in the European Union with rising intensity.

The most significant demonstration is the current development related to the exit of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland from the European Union. One may hardly doubt that the so-called Brexit represents a significant security risk, while its roots may be tracked in an irrational campaign before referendum that was completely overruled by the securitization of topics, whose security dimensions are not visible from a rational point of view (e.g. the feeling of economic danger posed by immigrants from the so-called new member countries of the European Union may be considered as economically rational only within a smaller group of unqualified labour force). This development would deserve a deeper empirical research, while an interdisciplinary theoretical perspective of the securitization paradox is offered thereto.

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[33] D. Kný, *Referenda v kontextu…, op. cit.*, p. 116.

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