In the Defence of Internalism. Searle vs. Putnam

• Authors: Krzysztof Gajewski

Title variants

PL

W obronie internalizmu. Searle versus Putnam

EN

In the Defence of Internalism. Searle vs. Putnam

• Languages of publication: PL

Abstracts

PL

The article concerns the problem of reference in general, and the controversy internalism - externalism in particular. The author presents and discusses John R. Searle's criticism of Hilary Putnam's famous arguments for causal theory of reference: the elms-beech example and the Twin Earth example. Instead of external theory of reference Searle proposes his own intentional theory of reference. According to that theory the reference of a name is determined by intentional content of that name. The name is used properly only when used to indicate an object contained in its intentional content. On the ground of intentional theory of reference this feature of names is called casual self-referentiality. Searle underlines that intentional content is not necessarily verbal. In fact he allows non-conceptual, for example perceptual content. The problem of direct reference is closely connected to the question of de dicto and de re beliefs. In conclusion some drawbacks of Searle's theory are shown. Namely allowing object a name refers to to be a part of the intentional content of the name Searle seems to be very close external theory of reference he is fighting against.

• Publisher: University of Warsaw, Institute of Philosophy
• Journal: Filozofia Nauki
• Year: 2008
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 3-4
• Pages: 177-190

Dates

published

2008-09-01

Contributors

author

Krzysztof Gajewski