Analiza gry monetarno-fiskalnej z wykorzystaniem makroekonomicznego modelu dla Polski

• Authors: Kruś Lech , Woroniecka-Leciejewicz Irena

Title variants

Monetary-Fiscal Game Analyzed Using a Macroeconomic Model for Poland

• Languages of publication: PL

Keywords

gar monetarno-fiskalna; model makroekonomiczny; policy mix; równowaga Nasha; Pareto optymalność

• Publisher: Główny Urząd Statystyczny
• Journal: Przegląd Statystyczny
• Year: 2017
• Volume: 64
• Issue: 3
• Pages: 285-304

Contributors

author

Kruś Lech

• Polish Academy of Sciences, Systems Research Institute

author

Woroniecka-Leciejewicz Irena

• Polish Academy of Sciences, Systems Research Institute

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Identifiers

DOI

10.5604/01.3001.0014.0819