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2018 | 25 | 4 | 473 - 494

Article title

SHOULD A CAUSAL THEORY OF REFERENCE BORROWING BE A DESCRIPTIVE-CAUSAL THEORY?

Content

Title variants

Languages of publication

EN

Abstracts

EN
In a reference theory a distinction can be made between a theory of reference fixing and a theory of reference borrowing. M. Devitt and K. Sterelny, and especially the former, have been relevant figures in the present debate on reference theories. They have supported a descriptive-causal theory of reference fixing for proper names and natural kind terms, but they have held a purely causal theory of their reference borrowing. Once the author has put forward the main elements of Devitt’s and Sterelny’s theory of reference fixing he will focus on their reference borrowing theory. In this regard the author will examine some of the differences between Devitt’s and Sterelny’s causal theory of reference borrowing and Putnam’s thesis of the division of linguistic labour concerning natural kind terms. After taking into consideration the views of some causal theorists who have not rejected or have even explicitly admitted that there are descriptive requirements in a reference borrowing theory for proper names and natural kind terms, he will allege that a causal theory of reference borrowing for competent speakers should not be a purely causal theory, but a descriptive-causal theory, where the minimum descriptive component is some general categorical term that is true or approximately true of the referent of the term.

Contributors

  • Department of Logic and Theoretical Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, Complutense University of Madrid, 28040 Madrid, Spain

References

Document Type

Publication order reference

Identifiers

YADDA identifier

bwmeta1.element.cejsh-1a08751a-2d7d-402a-afca-24484d29bd33
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