AGAINST THE BESIRE THEORY OF MORAL JUDGMENT

• Authors: Seungbae Park
• Languages of publication: EN

Abstracts

EN

This paper critically examines two objections and raises a new objection against the besire theory of moral judgment. Firstly, Smith (1994) observes that a belief that p tends to expire whereas a desire that p tends to endure on the perception that not p. His observation does not refute the sophisticated version of the besire theory that to besire that p is to believe that p and to desire to act in accordance with the belief that p. Secondly, Zangwill (2008) claims that the strength of motivation may vary while the degree of belief remains constant. Besirists would reply that a besire admits of both degree and strength. Finally, the author argues that the belief that p endures while the desire to act on the belief that p expires with the introduction of a new bodily condition, and hence that the belief and the desire are distinct mental states.

Keywords

EN

BELIEF; BESIRE; DESIRE; MOTIVATION; PERCEPTION

• Publisher: Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences and Institute of Philosophy of Academy of Sciences of Czech Republic
• Journal: Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
• Year: 2013
• Volume: 20
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 5 - 17

Contributors

author

Seungbae Park

• Division of General Studies, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Ulsan 689-798, Republic of Korea