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LIABILITY FOR LEGISLATIVE UNLAWFULNESS IN THE EVENT OF DEFERRED BINDING FORCE OF NORMATIVE ACT (COMMENTS ON THE RESOLUTION OF SUPREME COURT OF DECEMBER 7, 2007) (Odpowiedzialnosc za bezprawie legislacyjne w sytuacji ..utraty mocy .. aktu normatywnego

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Parchomiuk J.
Przegląd Sejmowy
|
2009
|
issue 1(90)
107-121
EN
In accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, in case of legislative unlawfulness (i.e. where harm was caused by the issuing of a normative act), compensation would be granted where a confirmation (in Polish: prejudykat) was obtained, within relevant proceedings, that this act did not conform to the Constitution, a ratified international agreement or a statute (Article 4171 § 1 of the Civil Code). The requirements of such confirmation is fulfilled, inter alia, by a judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal finding a normative act not to be in conformity with an act situated higher in the hierarchy of the system of the sources of law. The Constitutional Tribunal must predict the effects of its judgments in order to prevent a situation in which the derogation of a particular provision from the legal system, resulted from its judgment, would lead to 'even more unconstitutional' circumstances or inconsistency with fundamental rules and principles of the legal order of the State. Among the instruments to be used to balance the values whose collision would be a result from the judgment, is a possibility of deferring the date for the end of the binding force of a normative act (Article 190 para. 3 of the Constitution). In consequence of the deferral of binding force, the questioned provisions, even if their defectiveness has been declared by the judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal, should - by way of exception resulting from the content of that judgment and based on Article 190 para. 3 of the Constitution - be applied until the expiry of the time limit specified in the operative part of the judgment of the Tribunal, unless, prior to that date, the legislator has taken appropriate steps to adjust the defective regulation to the requirements ensuing from hierarchically higher acts. The adoption of such assumption excludes possibility of seeking compensation for damages caused by the said act. One the structural prerequisites of tort liability is that unlawfulness of the causative event must exist at the time of its appearance. If, by virtue of a universally binding judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal (Article 190 para. 1 of the Constitution), an act is declared defective, but formally is still in force, there is no ground to claim unlawfulness of its application.
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Odpowiedzialność odszkodowawcza związków wyznaniowych jako podmiotów wykonujących władzę publiczną

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Parchomiuk J.
Studia z Prawa Wyznaniowego
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2007
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vol. 10
161-180
PL
Mające podmiotowość prawną jednostki organizacyjne kościołów i związków wyznaniowych mogą ponosić odpowiedzialność odszkodowawczą na zasadach obowiązujących w stosunku do podmiotów władzy publicznej, jeżeli działające w ich imieniu i na ich rachunek osoby wykonują, czy to bezpośrednio z mocy przepisu prawa, czy na podstawie porozumień zwartych w oparciu o upoważnienie ustawowe, funkcje władzy publicznej, a więc podejmują działania związane z władczym kształtowaniem sytuacji prawnej jednostki w sferze prawa państwowego (a nie tylko w sferze wewnętrznych regulacji prawnych kościoła lub związku wyznaniowego).
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Glosa do wyroku Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z 11 grudnia 2019 r., sygn. akt P 13/18

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Parchomiuk J.
Przegląd Sejmowy
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2020
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issue 5(160)
201-219
EN
The commented judgment concerns the assessment of the compliance with the Polish Constitution of the provisions regulating the effects of removal of the entities entered in the former commercial registers which have not been entered to the new National Court Register. The property of these entities was taken over for the benefit of the State Treasury, and the rights of partners, cooperative members and other persons to a share in the liquidation of assets expired upon the removal of the entity from the register. The Tribunal did not question the mechanism of the arrangement of the ownership relations of the entities removed from the register. Nevertheless, the Tribunal considered that the legislator’s solution to this problem was not entirely correct, as it did not pass the proportionality test in respect of claims against this property of former company partners or cooperative members. The author agrees in principle with the Tribunal’s position, but in his commentary he raises polemical remarks about certain arguments cited in the justification of the judgment. In addition, the author points out that it is worth supplementing the Tribunal’s argumentation with certain threads that were omitted by the Tribunal for formal and legal reasons.
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