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EN
The book under review contains the essence of the thought of a respected researcher. It refers to economic, sociological, anthropological and philosophical issues. The review points in particular to those theoretical questions which are of interest to sociologists, economists and students oflaw. These are the origins and motives of collective action, the sustainability of the institutional framework of choice, and the relative meaning of justice.
PL
Recenzowana książka to kwintesencja dorobku znanej uczonej, który obejmuje zagadnienia ekonomii, socjologii, antropologii i filozofii. Artykuł recenzyjny zwraca uwagę szczególnie na te teoretyczne zagadnienia, które interesują socjologów, ekonomistów i prawników. To zagadnienia przyczyn zbiorowego działania, trwałości instytucjonalnych ram wyboru oraz względności pojęcia sprawiedliwości.
EN
The article, inspired by the ideas of the “public choice” movement, refers to the experiences of Japan from the late 1950s until the early ‘70s. The author describes a network of natural and institutional limitations that contributed to the unprecedented socioeconomic advancement of this country in the first decades after World War II. The article stresses the importance of institutions regulating the relationship between the economic administration and large businesses. In Japan, these contacts contributed to an impressive increase in production, making the country a standout example of constructive cooperation between the government and business. Cooperation between the business community and the government administration was promoted by the state’s control of foreign currency and savings deposits after the war. Communication between key economic ministries and business executives took place through a well-developed system of official institutions including mediation and various informal procedures, with a limited use of legal instruments. This helped prevent widespread corruption and state intervention, which usually spoil the market mechanism and negatively affect the allocation of resources. Limitations imposed on the behavior of Japanese businesspeople and officials by personal ties, shared values and responsibility also played an important role.
EN
The paper discusses the idea of the social market, developed by Karl Polanyi, among others, and by German ordoliberalism, and implemented by Western welfare states. Facing globalized competition the welfare state seems to be defensive and the idea of the free market overpowers that of the social market. Paradoxically, the European Union as the alliance of national welfare states seems to be walking down the path of economic liberalism. An alternative direction for the EU, propagated by social liberals, is democratization, collaboration and dialogue which seem to have produced good results in Scandinavian member states.
EN
When economic development is considered, political economy is at stake; in this perspective growth or counter-growth forces operate within the institutional framework. The analysis focuses on corporatist forms of social dialogue in the international environment of the EU and within the European structures. First, the notion of corporatism as opposed to other institutionalized channels of access is explained. Then, the paper presents corporatist forms at the national level under change. Next, it deals with interest coordination at the European Commission level. The paper concludes that an erosion of corporatist forms is visible; no embracing pattern in the EU should be expected instead; on the contrary, increasing fragmentation of lobbying is observed.
EN
Capital-based pension funds are built from the contributions of their participants and are invested in financial assets. Failed investments cause a fund’s capital to shrink, which generates a risk of low pension benefits and/or the insolvency of the fund. The risk can be shared between contributors, pension fund management companies, and the state (under a mandatory pension funds regime). This article attempts to emphasise that, particularly in the case of old-age insurance, the problem of who runs the most risk is pivotal and deserving of greater concern than the issue of whether the rate of return on investment is high enough. The aim is to draw attention to this rather neglected aspect of the recent reforms of the old-age insurance industry. The method relies on an ordered analysis founded on a review of the relevant subject literature. The point is made that the change from the Defined Benefit (DB) to the Defined Contribution (DC) formula shifts most of the risk onto contributors. On the other hand, this change makes the business relatively safe for private insurers and banks and reduces pressure on the public finance balance sheet. The shift from DB to DC schemes is rather common in Europe, hence the main issues tackled in the article are relevant to a fairly big group of countries (including Poland). The article discusses the issue of risk-sharing in reference to the modern experience of Chile, a country that pioneered changes with respect to capital-based pensions and DC schemes. It concludes that the element of social solidarity recently introduced into the Chilean system brings some relief to low-income workers and also supports the longevity of the fully-funded Defined Contribution system.
PL
Kapitałowe fundusze emerytalne są tworzone ze składek swoich członków celem ich inwestowania na rynkach finansowych. Nietrafione inwestycje powodują zmniejszenie kapitału emerytalnego, co rodzi ryzyko niskich świadczeń emerytalnych lub niewypłacalności funduszu. Ryzyko może się rozkładać na płacących składki, na firmy zarządzające funduszami i na państwo (kiedy oszczędzanie z kapitałowymi funduszami jest przymusowe). W artykule stwierdzono, że centralny problem – szczególnie w ubezpieczeniach na starość – stanowi to, kto ponosi największy ciężar ryzyka. Kwestia ta zasługuje na większą uwagę niż rentowność systemu. Celem jest zwrócenie uwagi na ten mało zauważany element współczesnych reform systemów ubezpieczeń emerytalnych. Zastosowana metoda polega na uporządkowanej analizie, opartej na znajomości literatury istotnej dla podjętego tematu. Zamiana formuły liczenia świadczeń emerytalnych, czyli przejście od zdefiniowanego świadczenia do zdefiniowanej składki, oznacza zwiększenie obciążenia ryzykiem dla płacących składki (ubezpieczonych). Z drugiej strony ta zmiana czyni branżę emerytalną relatywnie bezpieczną dla prywatnych firm ubezpieczeniowych i banków, a także zmniejsza napięcie bilansowe w sektorze finansów publicznych. Przechodzenie od zasady zdefiniowanego świadczenia do formuły zdefiniowanej składki jest w Europie raczej powszechne, a zatem postawione kwestie mają znaczenie dla dużej grupy krajów, w tym Polski. W artykule rozważa się zagadnienie podziału ryzyka, odnosząc się do współczesnego doświadczenia Chile – kraju, który jest pionierem zmian zarówno w sensie kapitałowych funduszy emerytalnych, jak i formuły zdefiniowanej składki. Analiza przypadku prowadzi do wniosku, że komponent solidarności społecznej wprowadzony ostatnio do systemu chilijskiego, ograniczając ryzyko pracowników o najniższych dochodach, zarazem podtrzymuje żywotność systemu opartego na kapitalizacji emerytur i na zasadzie zdefiniowanej składki.
PL
The paper outlines the fundamental division among the theorists who professionally deal with market economy, over the issue whether market economy promotes an individual’s freedom. The discrepancy starts with the very notion of freedom, next there is no consent whether there is a relation between freedom and economic liberty, etc. Since these philosophical issues cannot be solved by the most prominent minds in this field, the author of the paper is not to be expected to offer the ultimate answer, either. However, it can be agreed that the beginning of capitalism was accompanied by progress towards freedom, towards individuals rejecting the influence of the Church, the guild and secular authority. Although the new economy, which was coordinated by market forces, marked a significant progress towards liberty, the words of a philosopher who saw its birth remain valid: „Man is born free, yet everywhere he is in chains” (Jean-Jacques Rousseau).
PL
The article presents an approach to government-business relations which differs from a conventional perspective. The main stream of political science as well as the mainstream economics agree that business should be separated from the government. The article reveals that the concept of „business” is not homogenous and, accordingly, analyzes its five aspects. It shows the conditions under which collaboration between the government officials and businessmen needs not be harmful for economic growth, and may be even conducive to it. Examples in the article show that cooperation between government and business may be more beneficial than building barriers between them.
EN
The paper deals with entry barriers induced by public aid and actual monopoly in a given market segment. The EU law on competition constitutes the subject, being seen, however, from economic perspective, which is the method of law and economics. The focus are universal services which seem to be extremely vulnerable to the monopolization of public procurement and to unfair state aid, and to rent seeking as well. The overview of legal foundations reveals the EU regulations are too soft to bring a solution to these problems. Additionally, the soft stance of EU institutions by no means makes the situation sounder. As far as universal services are concerned, the member states are free to choose agents, with constraints imposed by the EU being of definitely general nature and the rationale for this saying that these services need to be delivered even on non-profit basis if necessary. Here, we see the EU aiming at two trade-offs that is liberalization on the one hand and mission of the efficiently performed universal service on the other hand. On the EU level common rules of providing universal services are made which are to be implemented on the national level. According to the European Commission, such “division of labour” allows an action which is suitable to peculiarities of every member state. In practice, such elasticity provokes national public bodies to moral hazard. This constitutes an actual challenge for common policies in the sake of gradual and controlled liberalization. There is a prolonged conflict between member states and the EU institutions concerning the issue in which direction rules in this field should be developed. The market segment under scrutiny, precisely market for universal services, reveals how controversial role in single-European-market building may be played by big companies. Most member states are prone to prefer agents vested in their countries. This peculiar alliance is supported with administrative devices that make the preferred group relatively narrow. Thus the state conserves actual monopoly and encourages rent seeking, and demonstrates its own weakness in promoting competitive order. Under such circumstances, by contrast to the EU endeavors to promote and to control economic liberalization in the member states, both the payer (public institution) and the provider (economic agent) may present an open aversion to competition. Obviously, this status quo is in contradiction to a general trend in the EU to guarantee equal access to public procurement, also in transnational dimension. Other conflicts arise on the ground that countries differ concerning a bare need for liberalization of universal services or with respect to advancement of the reforms. In some countries liberalization is advanced which means relatively open and equal access to public procurement, including foreign agents. Other countries discriminate agents, both foreign and non-privileged home operators.
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