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J. Fiszer (red.), Parlament Europejski po Traktacie z Lizbony. Doświadczenia i nowe wyzwania

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Kirpsza A.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
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2015
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issue 4(35)
473-477
2
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Hegemon or loser? Analysing Germany’s success in theCouncil of the European Union

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Kirpsza A.
Przegląd Zachodni
|
2023
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issue Special Issue 2023
27-51
EN
This paper aims to empirically test the hypothesis, derived from voting power theory, that Germany is the hegemon in the Council of the European Union (the Council), determining bargaining outcomes in this institution and being the most successful in attaining its preferences. This claim, deeply rooted in public opinion and academic literature, is tested by analysing the bargaining success of member states, including Germany, in the Council, as measured as the number of times they contested (voted against or abstained from voting) EU legislative acts in the years 2009-2019. To this aim, three statistical techniques are used: descriptive statistics, linear regression and multidimensional scaling. Overall, the hypothesis of German hegemony has not been corroborated. On the contrary, this country was found to be among the least successful countries in the Council. This conclusion comes from the following findings. First, the analysis of descriptive statistics showed that Germany is one of the countries that most often contests legislation and loses votes in the Council. Second, the linear regression analysis demonstrated that Germany’s success in the Council is statistically significantly lower than that of the other states. As a result, the country is in the narrow group of the three biggest losers in the institution. Third, the multidimensional scaling analysis revealed that Germany has serious difficulty in building winning coalitions and blocking minorities in the Council as it has essentially no permanent or close coalition partner. The paper argues that such a peripheral position for Germany in the Council is due to the radicalism of its preferences and its low propensity to grant concessions in negotiations. The article also predicts that after the UK leaves the EU, Germany will continue to be isolated in the Council and its voting success in this institution will remain low.
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Warunki sukcesu poprawek Parlamentu Europejskiego w zwykłej procedurze ustawodawczej

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Kirpsza A.
Przegląd Europejski
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2016
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issue 2(40)
48-69
PL
Celem artykułu jest identyfikacja warunków i technik negocjacyjnych, które wpływają na sukces poprawek Parlamentu Europejskiego w zwykłej procedurze ustawodawczej. W pierwszym kroku postawiono hipotezy dotyczące wpływu określonych czynników na skuteczność postulatów PE. Następnie zweryfikowano je za pomocą regresji logistycznej. Analiza empiryczna wykazała, że jeśli Parlament Europejski chce zwiększyć skuteczność swoich poprawek w zwykłej procedurze ustawodawczej, powinien podejmować siedem działań. Po pierwsze, łączyć kilka projektów w pakiet. Po drugie, formułować swoje postulaty w taki sposób, aby uzyskać dla nich poparcie ze strony Komisji. Po trzecie, negocjować projekty legislacyjne w trialogach. Po czwarte, prezentować w negocjacjach spójne stanowisko, czyli zgłaszać poprawki popierane przez znaczną większość posłów. Po piąte, przeciągać negocjacje na okres bliski końca kadencji PE. Po szóste, desygnować na sprawozdawcę projektu posła, który pochodzi z kraju pełniącego w tym samym czasie funkcję prezydencji w Radzie. Po siódme, prowadzić negocjacje z Radą w okresie, gdy państwo pełniące prezydencję jest bardzo zapracowane.
EN
The purpose of the article is to identify the conditions that affect the success of the European Parliament’s amendments in the ordinary legislative procedure. In the first step, hypotheses were delineated predicting the impact of specific factors on the effectiveness of EP demands. Subsequently, they were verified using the logistic regression. The results revealed that the EP is more likely to be successful in this procedure if it takes seven actions. First, it bundles several legislative proposals in one package. Second, it persuades the European Commission to support its amendments. Third, it negotiates the legislative proposals in trilogues. Fourth, it is cohesive during negotiations. Fifth, it prolongs negotiations with the Council until the end of parliamentary term. Sixth, it designates a rapporteur from a country acting at the same time as the Council Presidency. Seventh, it negotiates with the Council when the Presidency legislative workload is high.
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Hegemon czy przegrany? Analiza sukcesu Niemiec w głosowaniach w Radzie Unii Europejskiej

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Kirpsza A.
Przegląd Zachodni
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2020
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issue 2 (375)
7-28
EN
The purpose of the article is to empirically verify the hypothesis, derived from the theory of voting power, that Germany is a hegemon in the Council of the EU, determining the outcomes of negotiations in this institution and being the most successful in attaining its preferences. This claim– firmly rooted in both scientific literature and public opinion – is tested by analyzing the bargaining success of all member states, including Germany, in the Council, measured as the number of times they contested (voted against or abstained from voting) EU legislative acts in the years 2009-2019. Three statistical techniques are used for this purpose: descriptive statistics, linear regression and multidimensional scaling. Overall, the hypothesis on Germany’s hegemony was not corroborated. On the contrary, this country was found to be among the least successful states in this institution. Such a conclusion stems from the following findings. First, the descriptive statistics revealed that Germany is one of the countries that most often contest EU legislation and lose votes in the Council. Second, a linear regression showed that Germany’s success in the Council is statistically significantly lower than that of other member states. As a result, this country is among the three biggest losers in this institution. Third, a multidimensional scaling analysis demonstrated that Germany has major difficulties in building winning coalitions and blocking minorities in the Council, since it has virtually no permanent or close coalition partner. The article argues that such peripheral position of Germany in the Council is due to the extremity of its preferences and its low propensity to grant concessions in negotiations. At the same time, the article predicts that Germany would continue to be isolated in the Council and its success would remain low after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.
5
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Szara eminencja Konferencji Międzyrządowych. Rola Sekretariatu Generalnego Rady w negocjowaniu traktatów UE

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Kirpsza A.
Studia Europejskie-Studies in European Affairs
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2016
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vol. 4
51-72
EN
The article argues that, contrary to the common view, the General Secretariat of the Council has a visible impact on the outcomes of the Intergovernmental Conferences negotiations. The empirical analysis showed that during the IGC 1996–1997 and IGC 2000 the Secretariat was not only able to autonomously propose compromises on important issues, but also managed to push through its own proposals, introducing them into the fi nal version of the Treaties. The triangulation of qualitative and quantitative research also identifi ed a number of conditions, which more or less affect the position of the Secretariat during the IGC. The first factor is the attitude of the Council Presidency. If the Chair of the Conference supports or opposes the activities of the Secretariat in certain area, the impact of this body increases evidently. The second factor infl uencing the position of the Secretariat is the nature of negotiated issue. The impact of this body is the greatest in the case of technical and apolitical issues, while the Secretariat is less influential in regard to matters of medium and high political importance.
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Skuteczność poprawek Parlamentu Europejskiego w procedurze konsultacji (specjalnej procedurze ustawodawczej)

100%
Kirpsza A.
Politeja : Pismo Wydziału Studiów Miedzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
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2015
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issue 4(35)
419-444
EN
Parliament’s amendments in one of the special legislative procedures, namely consultation. In the first step, several hypotheses were developed predicting positive or negative impact of certain factors on the EP amendments success. Subsequently, those suppositions were quantitatively tested by logistic regression on special dataset representing 599 legislative acts adopted during the fifth and sixth parliamentary term, that is, between 1 May 1999 and June 2009, under consultation. The results revealed that the EP is more likely to be successful in this procedure if it implements five strategies. Firstly, it seeks to conclude a package deal, that is, it links a consultation decision to a codecision or budgetary proposal. Secondly, it delays its opinion on a legislative proposal. Thirdly, it persuades the European Commission to support its amendments. Fourthly, it prolongs legislative negotiations with the Council until the end of parliamentary term. Fifthly, it accumulates all its negotiation resources on salient proposals. In addition, the EP is more likely to succeed in consultation when it proposes democratic and financial amendments, whereas it is least likely to be successful when it tables institutional issues. The success of EP amendments is also significantly greater in directives than in regulations, decisions or framework decisions. On the other hand, voting rule in the Council, rapporteur experience and her/ his political affiliation with EPP‑ED, PES or ELDR/ALDE don’t have any impact on the EP amendments success.
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Koordynatorzy grup politycznych w Parlamencie Europejskim

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Kirpsza A.
Przegląd Zachodni
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2015
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issue 1(354)
103-123
EN
Party group coordinators are among the most influential figures in the European Parliament. They decide, inter alia, which of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) will be the rapporteur, shadow rapporteur, EP Bureau member or committee chairmen. However, despite their key role, the literature on coordinators is scarce. The article aims to fill this gap. It addresses the question of what factors increase or decrease the chances for the MEPs to obtain this position. For this purpose a special dataset comprising information on MEPs from four biggest political groups in the seventh EP term (2009-2014) was collected. Subsequently, on the basis of the above dataset, an empirical test of hypotheses was carried out, using a logistic regression method. The results are as follows. First, MEPs’ experience, expertise, voting loyalty to political group and high attendance rate in plenary sessions significantly increases their chances of becoming coordinators. Second, women are less likely to be appointed as coordinators than men. Third, MEPs from the member states that have acceded to the EU in 2004 or 2007 received considerably fewer coordinator positions in the seventh EP term than their peers from the old states. This means that the discrimination trend in the distribution of key positions to MEPs from the accession countries observed in the sixth EP term (2004-2009) was continued in subsequent years. Fourth, nationality was a crucial factor in allocating coordinators in the seventh EP term. The MEPs from Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany and Sweden were most likely to get this position, while the MEPs from Portugal and Slovakia were at a disadvantage.
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