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1

Antynomia kłamcy w ujęciu Tarskiego

100%

Nowaczyk A.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2012

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issue nr 20

5-14

EN

Jan Wawrzyniak maintains (in “Analiza i Egzystencja” 2011, Vol. 15) that Tarski’s solution of the liar antynomy is allegedand inconsistent. The author argues that such opinion is based on false assumptions and in order to demonstrate that Tarski’sreasoning is correct presents its detailed reconstruction.

2

Empirical Conceptions of Meaning

100%

Nowaczyk A.

Filozofia Nauki

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1998

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vol. 6

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issue 3-4

159-164

PL

Review of: Anna Jedynak "Empirym i znczenie". Wydawnictwo Wydziału Filozofii i Socjologii UW, Warszawa 1998.

3

Tarski's Relativised to Language Notion of Truth

100%

Nowaczyk A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2009

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vol. 17

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issue 1

5-12

PL

Tarski believed that the notion of truth should be relativised not to the notion of meaning - as many philosophers would claim - but rather to the notion of language. In general terms, he would identify a language with a structure L = containing an alphabet, a class of sentences and an operation of consequence. As to the specific languages of deductive sciences Tarski maintained that they should be inseparably conjoined with theories, so that the notion of language should be supplemented with a set of axioms and a set of true sentences: L' = . First four elements of L' are quite conveniently expressable in syntactic terms. About the set of Ver, to the contrary, it can be said only that it is one of many complete and coherent sets of sentences containing Ax and closed for the operation Cn. For a very general characteristic it could perhaps be enough. For a more specific definition of Ver, however, Tarski needed some semantic tool. As is well known, he used the notion of satisfying, defined for every particular language L* . Thus, as it seems, according to Tarski, the general notion of truth relative to language is a primary notion of the theory of formalized languages. Were we after introducing it as a secondary notion, we would have to enrich the notion of language with some semantic (referential) aspects, what in turn would require some standarization of syntax and thus narrow the notion of formalized language.

4

To Avoid Misunderstandings

100%

Nowaczyk A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2000

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vol. 8

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issue 3-4

127-132

PL

This is a reply to Ryszard Wójcicki's polemics against the view expressed in the author's paper „Ajdukiewicz's Theory of Meaning Many Years Later” which have been published together in the previous issue of Filozofia Nauki. Contrary to Ryszard Wójcicki, the author is of the opinion that Ajdukiewicz's theory of meaning is pragmatic, and more exactly syntactico-pragmatic. The reason for this claim is the indisputable fact that while formulating the meaning-directives and the definition of synonymity and meaning, Ajdukiewicz has used merely syntactical and pragmatical notions (the notion of meaning, which could have semantic implications, was the subject of explication). Since (for obvious reasons) Ajdukiewicz did not want to make use of the semantic notions as primitive notions, he had no other option.

5

Dwie (anty)filozoficzne „gramatyki” Ludwiga Wittgensteina

63%

Czesna E., Nowaczyk A.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2013

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issue nr 23

45-70

EN

Wittgenstein is the author of two conceptions of “grammar”, that were meant to be tools of reaching the same goal: discrediting of the traditional, i.e. “metaphysical” questions of philosophy. His early conception concerns logical grammar being the language of logic notation, which is devoid of logical constants. This idea was supported by the ontological thesis that there are no logical objects. In fact, it was not indispensable for achieving the intended purpose, since the elimination of philosophical problems was provided by the semantic argument that the only sensible statements are those of the natural sciences. The second concept of grammar, presented in the writings of the later Wittgenstein, seems more ambiguous. Grammar is a set of rules of the language game, having a status of grammatical statements. Examples of such statements are diverse, and desirable, according to the authors, reformulation of them all into concrete orders or prohibitions seems problematic. In the Investigations Wittgenstein distinguishes between deep and surface grammar, which serves to determine the proper task of philosophy as description of the deep grammar (especially the grammar of philosophically relevant words). In this sense New Philosophy is a kind of philosophical grammar. Wittgensteinian grammar is also anti-philosophical, as it aims at the elimination of erroneous (pseudo)metaphysical claims derived from misleading forms of surface grammar. Despite the differences in the concepts of language and grammar in the early and late Wittgenstein, he has not changed his critical approach to the traditional philosophical questions.

6

Ajdukiewicz's Theory of Meaning Many Years Later

63%

Nowaczyk A.

Filozofia Nauki

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2000

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vol. 8

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issue 2

101-113

PL

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Antynomia kłamcy w ujęciu Tarskiego

Empirical Conceptions of Meaning

Tarski's Relativised to Language Notion of Truth

To Avoid Misunderstandings

Dwie (anty)filozoficzne „gramatyki” Ludwiga Wittgensteina

Ajdukiewicz's Theory of Meaning Many Years Later