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Background: Duality in the microeconomic theory enables us to represent consumers’ preferences and production technology with various dual functions satisfying certain regularity conditions. Objectives: Since the basis for the application of duality in the microeconomic theory is the price taking behaviour, this paper takes the challenge of applying principles of duality to a monopolistic case where a single producer has an influence on the price which it charges for its product. Methods/Approach: The standard approach of deriving the profit function for the monopolist from the production function and the defined pseudoproduction function is accompanied by an alternative approach in which the starting point is the pseudocost function. Starting from the derived profit function, the pseudoproduction function and the pseudocost functions are recovered and a version of Hotelling’s lemma is given. Results: The structure of the profit maximization problem in a monopolistic case was made similar to the structure of the profit maximization problem in the perfectly competitive case and it is shown that all starting functions can be recovered back from derived functions. A version of Hotelling’s lemma is illustrated, which brings us indirectly from the profit function to the supply function. Conclusions: By introducing the pseudoproduction function in the profit maximization model of a monopolist, the structure of the problem becomes similar to the perfectly competitive case and duality results can be applied. The profit function is derived from the pseudoproduction and the pseudocost function, and all starting functions are recovered back from the derived profit function.
EN
Background: Our research assumes that the software quality affects the product validity. This assumption also refers to embedded software. Objectives: This paper analyses the Stackelberg equilibrium in which the consumer is the leader and the producer of embedded software is the follower. Methods/Approach: A comparative statics analysis of a producer's reaction is carried out and confirms our intuition that the product price is positively correlated to the number of employees and the software quality. Results: An increase in wage has an adverse effect on producer’s reaction. Derived results are illustrated numerically and Stackelberg and cooperative equilibrium are compared. It is shown that the welfare loss is smaller with higher quality software for any number of employees. Conclusions: Although the equilibrium involves less employed workers, the optimal software quality is higher. The optimal product price is lower, which puts the consumer and the producer in a better position
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