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1

Genidentity and the Metaphysics of Persistence: Endurantism, Perdurantism and Exdurantism

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

|

2005

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vol. 13

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issue 2

87-102

PL

The metaphysical explanations of genidentity are very important both for scien-tific researches and for everyday human activities. Endurantism, perdurantism and exdurantism (stage view and point-eventism) are the standard metaphysical theo-ries, which provide descriptions and explanations of relations of change and persistence. The descriptions and explanations in question give simultaneously the truth-conditions for statements about an identity of objects, which persist and undergo changes in time. The main aim of the paper is to formulate the above-mentioned metaphysical stances and to give the general account of the relation of genidentity within a conceptual framework of these theories. The second aim is to provide a suitable reconstruction of criteria of genidentity, which are appropriate for the three metaphysical doctrines.

2

An Eventistic Definition of a Thing in the Light of Adrian Kuźniar's Argument

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

|

2011

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vol. 19

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issue 1

53-56

PL

Kuźniar’s argument against the point-eventistic definition of a thing rests on the fact that its two important conditions - namely the spatial extension condition and the temporal continuity condition - cannot be jointly satisfied. The paper provides a detailed analysis and an assessment of Kuźniar’s objection and offers some strategies in order to overcome difficulties generated by it.

3

Events and Moments. An Outline of the Non-eventistic Interpretation

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Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2011

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vol. 19

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issue 1

39-51

PL

In the text Zdarzenia, rzeczy, procesy Zdzisław Augustynek argued against some versions of liberal reism that they are not able to deliver appropriate, non-circular definitions both of events and moments respectively. The main aim of the article is to show that the objection in question is not sound: indeed, we are vested with a procedure to find a way out from the indicated difficulty. In the text three forms of liberal reism are presented and their problems with the relevant definitions are analysed. Then the schematic method of defining the aforementioned categories is proposed and discussed. The presented considerations are crowned with the conclusion that in the light of the suggested reconstructions Augustynek’s pessimistic evaluation of reistic doctrines should not be seen as a correct one.

4

Axiomatic Definitions of Genidentity

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Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

|

2011

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vol. 19

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issue 1

25-37

PL

The main aim of the paper is to revive Zdzisław Augustynek’s attempts to define the relation of genidentity. The text embraces the following issues: (i) a presentation of three axiomatic definitions of genidentity; (ii) a reconstruction of the definitions in question in the language of the predicate calculus; (iii) a supplementing the above reconstruction by appropriate proofs; (iv) an analysis of the selected methodological and ontological assumptions of the discussed systems; (v) a comparison of Augustynek’s systems with Eugeniusz Żabski’s proposal; (vi) an outline of the definition of a thing as an abstractum (equivalence class, invariant) over the set of all punctual events under a relation of genidentity.

5

Criteria of Identity and Two Modes of Persistence

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Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2016

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vol. 24

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issue 2

17-29

PL

The purpose of this paper is, first, to present an alternative account of persistence of objects in time, as opposed to the dominant ones in the current philosophical literature, and second, to spell out an alternative role for criteria of identity. According to the proposed account, persistence is not ontologically homogeneous in nature and can be reconstructed two-sidedly either in terms of being fully present and identity, or by means of the notion of genidentity. In the latter case, objects persisting in time are described as invariants with respect to equivalence classes over certain occurrents under suitable relations of genidentity, that is, under a family of spatiotemporal and causal relations among timeslices of constitutive parts of those objects. The diversification of persistence coincides with the traditional dichotomous division of entities into entia per se and entia per aliud. There are also good reasons to be sceptical about the approach which regards criteria of identity as semantic-cum-metaphysical principles providing, in an informative and non-circular way, an ontological basis for statements about identity (i.e. as principles specifying truth-conditions of those statements). On the alternative account proposed in the paper, those criteria are regarded either as purely evidential (and individuational) or as criteria of genidentity in the metaphysical sense.

6

Principles of Mereological Essentialism

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2007

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vol. 15

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issue 3

27-40

PL

Mereologcal essentialism is a metaphysical doctrine formulated and defended originally by Roderick M. Chisholm. The main principle of mereological essentialism states, that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). The principle may also be put by saying, that every object has the parts that it has necessarily. In the paper the above mentioned doctrine is reconstructed and analysed. Some consequences of the theory in question as well as many variants of it are examined. The main purpose of the text is to provide a critical analysis of mereological essentialism in order to make this radical doctrine more acceptable.

7

Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2009

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vol. 17

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issue 2

5-20

PL

In the text Jaegwon Kim's epiphenomenalist objection to anomalous monism is critically discussed and refuted. The author tries to show that the objection in question originates mainly on the basis of disregarding of Davidsonian ontology - particularly his views on properties and events. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the epiphenomenalist objection does not arise, if we are prepared to take Davidson's ontology seriously.

8

Against Point Eventism. In Honour of Prof. Zdzisław Augustynek

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2006

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vol. 14

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issue 4

35-48

PL

The ontological theory of point eventism appears in the Polish philosophical literature as Zdzisław Augustynek's original work, belonging to the glorious philosophical tradition of the Lvov-Warsaw School. The author concentrates exclusively on "weak points" of Augustynek's eventism (skipping simultaneously all its unquestionable advantages); he examines basic notions and statements of the analysed doctrine. The main aim of this critical survey is to prepare a ground for a proper reconstruction of this ontological stance.

9

The Supervenience Argument and Non-constructive Naturalism

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

|

2008

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vol. 16

|

issue 3-4

91-103

PL

In a series of influential articles Jaegwon Kim has developed strong arguments against nonreductive physicalism as a possible solution to the problem of mental causation. One of them is the Supervenience Argument which states that assuming the mental/physical supervenience thesis, the causal closure principle, the exclusion principle with the no-overdetermination requirement and property dualism we obtain the conclusion that mental causation is unintelligible. On the other hand Collin McGinn has argued that a solution to the mind-body problem is forever beyond our reach: we can never understand how the brain produces consciousness and therefore the relation between them must remain mysterious. The main aim of the paper is to demonstrate that Kim's Supervenience Argument corroborates McGinn's pessimistic conclusion (of course, if we do not assume any form of reductive physicalism or epiphenomenalism). Thereby it tries to show that the Supervenience Argument could be treated as a justification of non-constructive naturalism (aka new misterianism): we do not understand mental causation, because we cannot understand how the brain generates consciousness. It also suggest considering possibility that the thesis of causal closure of the physical domain might entail the cognitive closure thesis (the claim that those properties of the brain which are responsible for conscious processes are in principle cognitively closed to us).

10

Invariantism and Transcendentism

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

|

2019

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vol. 27

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issue 1

49-71

PL

In a number of works, Peter Simons proposed an interesting theory of persistence in time, which he sometimes describes as invariantism. Unfortunately, in the last two decades, despite its unquestionable merits, invariantism has attracted little interest among thinkers engaged in the debate over persistence. The debate continues to revolve around well-known solutions, i.e., endurantism, perdurantism, and exdurantism. It seems to ignore the efforts of the few thinkers who try to break the theoretical deadlock that has for many years dominated the discussion. The purpose of this article is, first, to reconstruct and critically analyze Simons’ invariantist theory, and second, to compare it with another theoretical proposal, namely transcendentism, recently advanced by Damiano Costa and Alessandro Giordani. By means of a simple comparative analysis, I shall try to show that these views are convergent: they differ only in a few elements that are either negligible or could be accepted within both theories. This result should not, however, be interpreted as an attempt to formulate a hybrid position. On the one hand, transcendentism can be treated, to some extent, as a fairly natural foundation of invariantism, whereas invariantism canbe regarded as a technical development of transcendentism (providing it with a suitable remedy for some interpretative difficulties). On the other hand, invariantism and transcendentism interpret temporal location of objects completely differently, and so, at the end of the day, their paths must diverge. The indirect aim of the paper is to show that both invariantism and transcendentism should no longer be ignored in the debate on the nature of persistence.

11

Incendium Philosophiae

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2005

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vol. 13

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issue 4

103-112

PL

The text is a rejoinder to Mr. Wciórka's critical analysis of two author's arguments against nominalistic definition of abstract objects. The author shows that although his first argument is not sound, the second still remains correct. The paper also offers a modified definition of abstract objects inspired by E. N. Zalta's metaphysical theory of objects and some critical remarks, which Mr. Wciórka aimed at the earlier papers of the author.

12

In Defence of Mereological Essentialism

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2005

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vol. 13

|

issue 3

57-69

PL

The paper is an attempt to defend the Chisholm's metaphysical doctrine called mereological essentialism. The main thesis of mereological essentialism states that for any objects x and y - if x is ever a part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is a part of y, i.e. that all parts of y are essential to it (y has them at any time that y exists). This radical theory gives a categorisation of all objects via entia per se and entia successiva. The paper contains a critical survey of the theory of mereological essentialism: it deals with some important arguments against it and answers as well. The author tries to show that in defence of the theory and the categorisation in question the applicability of the doctrine of mereological essentialism must be somehow limited. He suggests that the best way in doing so is to restrict theses of mereological essentialism either only to objects qua occurrents or only to objects qua continuants or only to persons.

13

Eliminativism and Artefacts

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2010

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vol. 18

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issue 3

135-140

PL

The paper provides an answer to Paweł Garbacz's article Problem of Artefact's Existence, which is a critique of eliminativistic views presented in my book Identyczność i trwanie. Studium ontologiczne (Identity and Persistence. An Ontological Study). In the text crucial objections formulated by Garbacz are reconstructed and carefully discussed.

14

On E.J. Lowe’s Argument for Brobdingnagian Atomism

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2013

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vol. 21

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issue 1

113-120

PL

In a number of his essays E. J. Lowe has presented an interesting argument for the ontological simplicity of the self. This argument became the subject of Eric T. Ol-son’s polemic reaction, who tried - unsuccesfully - to discover a formal mistake in the argument. Eventually, the modified and improved version of Lowe’s reasoning came out in his paper Identity, Composition, and the Simplicity of the Self. It seemed that the argument for the ontological simplicity of the self has resisted criticism. In my paper, I present a few manoeuvres which can be used by advocates of animalism to dismiss conclusions of Lowe’s argument. An animalist may want to do that for a simple reason: on the basis of animalism it is difficult to argue for the thesis of the simplicity of the self, as persons are - according to animalism - human organisms, that is, composite objects. My analysis shows that the simplicity argument - al-though it remains formally valid - is not sound in the light of the shown difficulties and shortcomings. This enables me to insist on an animalistic interpretation of the subjectaccording to which the self is a composite material object, identical with a liv-ing human organism.

15

'Four-Dimensionalism': An Analysis and Interpretation

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2007

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vol. 15

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issue 1

105-120

PL

There are several faces of Four-Dimensionalism. Sometimes 4D-ism is formulated as the thesis that the material world is composed of spatial as well as temporal parts. Another version of 4D-ism states that persisting objects are extended over time in the same way that they are extended over space. Some Four-Dimensionalists defend the thesis that all objects persist by perduring i.e. by having different temporal parts at different times. Sometimes 4D-ism means the same as eternalism - the thesis that past and future objects (and times) are just as real as currently existing ones. Finally it can mean the thesis that all objects are in fact four-dimensional i.e. they are in every case a filling of some subregions of space-time. The author examines some varieties of 4D-ism and tries to formulate both a precise meaning of those doctrines and an evaluation of them.

16

Personal Identity through Time: Some Consequences of Essentialism

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2006

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vol. 14

|

issue 3

49-56

PL

The paper is an attempt to formulate some consequences of the metaphysical doctrine of mereological essentialism (ME) and the assumption that persons persisting through time remain identical in the strict and philosophical sense (Chisholm, following Butler and Reid). Those consequences are substantiality, non-constitutivity, constantiality, anti-identism (non-bodility), and simplicity of persons. The author tries to show that although the above stance has a great theoretical appeal, it leads to the many further difficulties, which remain without reasonable answers.

17

Argumenty na rzecz nieredukcyjnego ujęcia tożsamości osobowej

100%

Grygianiec M.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2016

|

vol. 34

5-28

EN

In the debate on personal identity many different criteria of identity are proposed and defended. Criteria of identity are usually taken to state necessary and sufficient conditions of identity and are viewed, in their metaphysical interpretation, as providing truth conditions of relevant identity statements. In my paper I argue that this view is misconceived and I present some arguments for the simple view of personal identity, according to which there are no noncircular and informative criteria of identity for persons. In particular, I argue that there are no other facts of the matter than identity itself which would serve as truth conditions of statements concerning numerical identity. I also try to justify the view that in most cases criteria of identity should be interpreted either epistemically as a means for finding out whether identity holds or not or metaphysically as criteria of genidentity, which provide appropriate persistence conditions for objects of a given kind.

18

The Theory of Temporal Parts – Theorems and Arguments

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2009

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vol. 17

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issue 4

49-70

PL

In the paper the most popular arguments in favour of the doctrine of temporal parts are presented and analysed. The author discusses the following arguments: (i) from analogy; (ii) from ontological parsimony; (iii) from intrinsic change; (iv) from mereological change; (v) against presentism; (vi) from time travel; (vii) from vagueness; (viii) from coincidence. The main aim of the paper is to show - in the light of examined arguments - that the 3D-ism/4D-ism equivalence thesis might be treated as a well-founded conjecture.

19

Edward N. Zalta's Theory of Abstract Objects: An Analysis and a Critique

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2005

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vol. 13

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issue 1

25-40

PL

The paper offers a sketchy reconstruction of axiomatic foundations of Zalta's theory of abstract objects. The theory is based on Ernst Mally's distinction between two types of predication: an exemplification of properties and an encoding of properties. The author shows how the theory in question could be used to reconstruct in a satisfying way many other metaphysical theories e.g. the theory of Platonic Forms, the theory of situations, the theory of possible worlds. The paper also provides several critical comments to some presumptions and consequences of the analyzed metaphysical doctrine.

20

Causal Relevancy and Nominalism. A Few Notes on Davidson's Ontology

100%

Grygianiec M.

Filozofia Nauki

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2012

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vol. 20

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issue 1

109-115

PL

The paper presents a rejoinder to Katarzyna Paprzycka's critique of my defence of Davidson's ontology. According to Paprzycka the epiphenomenalists objection to the doctrine of anomalous monism, considered as an internal objection, is unquestionably flawed, but when it comes to some external interpretations of the objection in question - it is justified. The text provides a couple of arguments and comments which are intended to show that in most cases the external objection to anomalous monism is in fact either uncharitable or inaccurate, thus unsound one.

Refine search results

Genidentity and the Metaphysics of Persistence: Endurantism, Perdurantism and Exdurantism

An Eventistic Definition of a Thing in the Light of Adrian Kuźniar's Argument

Events and Moments. An Outline of the Non-eventistic Interpretation

Axiomatic Definitions of Genidentity

Criteria of Identity and Two Modes of Persistence

Principles of Mereological Essentialism

Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism

Against Point Eventism. In Honour of Prof. Zdzisław Augustynek

The Supervenience Argument and Non-constructive Naturalism

Invariantism and Transcendentism

Incendium Philosophiae

In Defence of Mereological Essentialism

Eliminativism and Artefacts

On E.J. Lowe’s Argument for Brobdingnagian Atomism

'Four-Dimensionalism': An Analysis and Interpretation

Personal Identity through Time: Some Consequences of Essentialism

Argumenty na rzecz nieredukcyjnego ujęcia tożsamości osobowej

The Theory of Temporal Parts – Theorems and Arguments

Edward N. Zalta's Theory of Abstract Objects: An Analysis and a Critique

Causal Relevancy and Nominalism. A Few Notes on Davidson's Ontology