The following study deals with Aristippusʼ philosophy of hedonism and it is divided into three main parts. In the first part we analyse the problematic relation between Aristippusʼ philosophy and Socratic tradition of thought. In the second part we identify the possible affinity between Aristippusʼ philosophy and the so-called Sicilian way of life and we argue that Aristippusʼ hedonism represents a peculiar blend of Socratic and Sicilian philosophical tenets. In the third part we focus on crucial and fundamental theoretical notions that define metaphysical, ethical and epistemological aspects of Aristippusʼ philosophy. We identify three distinct features of Aristippean hedonism, namely presentism, aprudentialism and ethical hedonism. In the conclusive part of the study, we focus on the notion of situationism as another important feature of Aristippusʼ philosophy and propose to label his philosophy as ‘situationist hedonism’.
The paper re-examines the traditional view of the relationship between Diogenes of Sinope and Plato. The first part analyses one particular anecdote about Plato’s labelling Diogenes „Socrates who has gone mad“. This narration serves as a starting point of a closer examination of the whole anecdotal tradition of Plato’s encounters with Diogenes. The next part focuses on the Platonic themes of guardians in his Republic and madness in Phaedrus. In the last part of the study it is argued that due to the similarities between Diogenes’ religious beliefs and the opinions of Socrates’ devotees as well as of Socrates himself, Plato’s designating Diogenes with the label of Socratic madness is rather positive than negative.
Following paper offers a new interpretation of the fragments from Aeschinesʼ dialogue Telauges. The introduction briefly evaluates the literary sources of Aeschinesʼ fragments and problems related to their authorship and authenticity. In the first part we scrutinize ancient testimonies about general philosophical and rhetorical features of Aeschinesʼ dialogues. In the next parts we interpret all extant fragments from the dialogue Telauges and identify its putative Pythagorean background. We propose that the main theme of the dialogue was the question of the care of the self, articulated on the background of philosopherʼs material welfare and philanthropy. We conclude that Telauges probably reflected the consequences that chanced upon the first generation of Socratics immediately after Socratesʼ trial and that Aeschinesʼ Socratica stands in the middle between Platonism and Cynicism.
The first part of this study offers a contextual analysis of the terms mageia and goe-teia in the Greek literature of the 5th century B. C. These terms have obviously oriental, namely Persian origin. Consequently, the magical terminology of some of pre-Socratic philosophers is scrutinized. By textual analysis of Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen, Empedocles’ fragments, and various ancient reports on Pythagoras, an essential bond between „magic“ and „philosophy“ is established. These authors understood philosophy as a magical craft working primarily with verbal persuasion and alternation of emotions (Gorgias) that were part of a broader phenomenon including mysticism, eschatological beliefs (Empedocles) and oriental way of life (Pythagoras).
The following study scrutinizes Platoʼs account of Socratesʼ intellectual biography in the dialogue Phaedo. This account is crucial for the interpretation of Socratesʼ philosophy as an „anthropological turn“ that separates Presocratic philosophical tradition from its Socratic counterpart. The first part of this study exposes Platoʼs account in Phaedo as exaggerated and inaccurate treatment of Presocratic – especially Anaxagorean – philosophy. The study then proceeds to pinpoint common features between Platoʼs Socrates and Anaxagoreans. Subsequently, extensive Anaxagorean contaminations are found in Platonic theoretical (metaphysics, cosmology) as well as practical (ethics, philosophy as way of life) philosophy. The study concludes that Socratesʼ anthropological turn is in fact an artificial product of Platoʼs philosophy that calls for further examination.
The second part of the study analyses Platoʼs ambivalent use of magical terminology. On the one hand, magic is a synonym for sophistry and trickery. On the other hand, the description of Socratesʼ seductive personality is conveyed in the same magical terms used in the description of sophistry. Further, we focus on the persuasive function of Platoʼs myths, which are explicitly described as magical. The epistemic value of philosophical myths is rather problematic: Plato himself refers to them as „noble lies“. Thus philosophy, as conveyed by Plato, is a noble brand of sophistry, operating through divine enchantments and spells. In the last part we show possible Zoroastrian influences in the Socratic thought tradition.
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