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1

Semantyka anzelmiańskiego Imienia Boga

100%

Gomułka J.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

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2012

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vol. 40

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issue 3

5 - 22

EN

My paper considers the meaning of St. Anselm's Name of God: quo maius cogitari nequit. The definition is used in the ontological proofs in Proslogion 2 and 3 but, paradoxically, it is claimed to be inconceivable in chapter 15. I believe that Anselm realized the problem during his discussion with Gaunilo, who questioned Anselm's assumption that one can have in mind something than which nothing greater can be conceived. In his reply Anselm defended his assumption and finally changed his earlier theory of what it means to have a concept in mind. The new theory distinguishes vox ipsa (the mere word), res significata (the thing indicated), and intelligere aut cogitare quod dicitur (understanding or conceiving what is said). I call the latter the procedural meaning to distinguish it from the direct meaning which is res significata, because by it Anselm means a procedure for obtaining a thing. The procedure, however, is infinite and will never give us any thing. I thus conclude that quo maius cogitari nequit is a pseudo-definition which gives us pseudo-understanding. It allows us but does not force us, leaving the issue open to further considerations.

2

The Liar Paradox from the Wittgensteinian Perspective

63%

Gomułka J., Wawrzyniak J.

Studia Semiotyczne

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2017

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vol. 31

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issue 2

179–199

EN

Our approach to the liar paradox is based on the Wittgensteinian approach to semantic and logical paradoxes. The main aim of this article is to point out that the liar sentence is only seemingly intelligible, and that it has not been given any sense. First, we will present the traditional solutions of the paradox, especially those which we call modificational. Then we will determine what the defects of these solutions are. Our main objection is that the modificational approaches assume that we can express in languages certain senses which are improper. Next, we will explain why we think that the liar sentence is a mere nonsense. This sentence does not have any role in any language game – it is completely useless. We will also respond to several objections to our approach. 1. That it is not consistent with the principle of compositionality of sense. 2. According to the Quineian philosophy of logic, paradoxical sentences can be conceived as false assumptions leading to crises of logical paradigms. 3. The liar sentence seems to be, contrary to our approach, intelligible.

3

Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions

63%

Gomułka J., Wawrzyniak J.

Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne

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2013

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issue 24

61 - 86

EN

The main question of our article is: What is the logical form of statements containing expressions such as “… is true” and “it is true that …”? We claim that these expressions are generally not used in order to assign a certain property to sentences. We indicate that a predicative interpretation of these expressions was rejected by Frege and adherents to the prosentential conception of truth. We treat these expressions as operators. The main advantage of our operational reading is the fact that it adequately represents how the words, “true” and “truth,” function in everyday speech. Our approach confirms the intuition that so-called T-equivalences are not contingent truths, and explains why they seem to be—in some sense—necessary sentences. Moreover, our operational readingof truth expressions dissolves problems arising from the belief that there is some specific property—truth. The fact that we reject that truth is a certain property does not mean that we deny that the concept of truth plays a very important role in our language, and hence in our life. We indicate that the concept of truth is inseparable from the concept of sentence and vice versa—it is impossible to explicate one of these concepts without appeal to the other.

4

O różnicy między magią a modlitwą – krytyka stanowiska Saula Smilansky’ego

63%

Gomułka J., Sajdek Z.

Roczniki Filozoficzne

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2016

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vol. 64

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issue 1

17-26

PL

Zawarta w niniejszym artykule dyskusja z tekstem Saula Smilansky’ego O wątpliwej moralności pewnych form modlitwy składa się z dwóch części. W pierwszej bronimy tezy, że fikcyjne przykłady prezentowane przez autora albo nie stanowią powszechnie akceptowalnych form modlitwy, albo dają się interpretować tak, że nie stanowią etycznego problemu. Życzenie komuś śmierci jest bowiem zawsze nieetyczne, ale w każdej wyobrażalnej sytuacji zagrożenia życia możliwa jest modlitwa o rozwiązanie, które nie pomnaża śmierci. W drugiej części bronimy tezy, że prezentowany w przykładach Smilansky’ego stosunek ludzi do Boga w ogóle nie jest religijny, a w konsekwencji działania w nich opisane nie zasługują na miano „modlitwy”. Kiedy bowiem w naszym nastawieniu do Boga liczy się tylko to, że jest On zdolny zmienić bieg zdarzeń na naszą korzyść, a to, że jest On dobry umyka naszej uwadze, wówczas nie mamy na myśli Boga tradycji religijnej. W tym punkcie przywołujemy myślicieli należących do nurtu tzw. Wittgensteinowskiego fideizmu, których krytyka modlitwy błagalnej idzie być może zbyt daleko, skłania jednak do refleksji nad granicami właściwego stosunku do Boga.

EN

Our discussion of Saul Smilansky’s paper “A Problem about the Morality of Some Com¬mon Forms of Prayer” consists of two parts. In the first part, we argue for the thesis that the fic¬titious examples given by the author of the paper either are not commonly acceptable forms of prayer (being unethical), or are interpretable in a way which removes the ethical problem altogether. It is always unethical to wish someone’s death, but in each imaginable situation of deadly danger there is a sense of a prayer for a solution which does not multiply death. In the second part, we defend the thesis that the attitude towards God depicted in Smilansky’s examples is not religious at all, and the acts desrcibed in them do not deserve to be called “prayers.” When all what really matters to us about God is that He is able to change the course of events in our favor, and His goodness escapes our attention, then by “God” we do not mean the God of religious tradition. At this point we recall the thinkers belonging to the so-called Wittgen¬steinian fideism, whose critique of petitionary prayer goes maybe too far, but also invites us to rethink the limits of the right attitude towards God.

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Semantyka anzelmiańskiego Imienia Boga

The Liar Paradox from the Wittgensteinian Perspective

Some Arguments for the Operational Reading of Truth Expressions

O różnicy między magią a modlitwą – krytyka stanowiska Saula Smilansky’ego