Civil disobedience is the attitude which in the 20th century proved to be the only effective form of resistance to authoritarian regimes. So it was in the case of the events of August ’91 when the Soviet society objected to the activities of the State Committee on the State of Emergency. It would not have been possible without the reform programme known as perestroika initiated by the last USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev. Thanks to perestroika and the accompanying glasnost transparency of sociopolitical life the previously apathetic and alienated Soviet society felt responsible for their own life and for the fate of the State. By opposing the rebels through passive resistance, the citizens proved to the leaders of their own country, to the world, and above all, to themselves that they were aware of their rights and responsibilities. The process of sociopolitical socialization stimulated the development of civil society in the Soviet Union.
Apart from the public (first) and business (second) sectors, the third sector is one of the pillars constituting the modern democratic society. All the social interests are concentrated within the third sector and they are being implemented by the numerous non-governmental organizations cooperating with the state as well as business world. The birth of the third sector in Russia can be associated with the beginning of Mikhail Gorbachev reforms called the perestroika. The mental changes that the Russian society underwent influenced by the policy of glasnost led to the origin of public involvement into the social and political life, taking upon the role of the often ineffective state. The degree to which the citizens were involved in the activity of the NGOs was first of all associated with their quality of life and it depended on the attitude of the decision-makers towards the idea of social organizations. The time of Boris Yeltsin presidency was characterized by two phenomena: a drop in the standard of living accompanied by the intensification of criminalization within the public life and the positive attitude towards the introduction of the third sector. After the new president assumed the post, the approach of the new authority changed in a negative way and the politics implemented led to gaining full control over public associations. The so-called liberalization of the law in respect to the third sector was only a display of Kremlin’s political will and did not signify serious treatment of the principles of the democratic and civic society. The third sector, one of the pillars supporting the civil society is at present in the state of consolidation, dealing with numerous amendments of legal norms. After the period of mimicking western solutions, the Russian NGOs became a power that must be taken into account by the Russian decision-makers.Full text: http://bazhum.muzhp.pl/czasopismo/589/?idno=14762
The model of three-sector synergy in a contemporary state rests on cooperation between the first (state) sector, the second (commercial) sector, and the third sector – the civil one, also referred to as the non-commercial sector. The quest for an optimal solution and the establishment of mutual relations is underpinned by the concept of the reorganization of Russian society with regard to its political modernization; this is accompanied by a variant of social agreement that guarantees citizens equality before the law, and the protection of their rights along with simultaneous compliance with the law. What complements the image of Russia’s contemporary reality is the goal of non-governmental, non-commercial organizations – not only to survive but also to develop a modus vivendi in the circumstances of an authoritarian state.
On the basis of the discussion on civil society initiated at the beginning of the 21st century, the classic approach to this phenomenon was restored. The aim of analyzing the category of “civil society” was to develop the most adequate concept of this phenomenon occurring in Russia. This task was undertaken in numerous scientific and expert studies that referred directly to this concept. This article aims to present the discourse on the creation of an optimal concept of civil society conducted in modern Russia, using its endogenous and exogenous sources, particularly in the process of ongoing systemic transformation with a not fully diagnosed vector of these changes.
PL
Na kanwie zainicjowanej z początkiem XXI wieku dyskusji o społeczeństwie obywatelskim powrócono do klasycznych ujęć tego zjawiska. Celem analizy kategorii „społeczeństwa obywatelskiego” było wypracowanie najbardziej adekwatnej koncepcji tego zjawiska, występującego na gruncie rosyjskim. Służyły temu zadaniu liczne opracowania naukowe i eksperckie, odwołujące się bezpośrednio do tego pojęcia. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu przestawienie dyskursu prowadzonego we współczesnej Rosji wokół stworzenia optymalnej koncepcji społeczeństwa obywatelskiego, przy wykorzystaniu jego źródeł endogennych i egzogennych, szczególnie w procesie trwającej transformacji ustrojowej o nie do końca zdiagnozowanym wektorze owych przemian.
RU
На основе дискуссии о гражданском обществе, начатой в начале XXI века, классический подход к этому явлению был восстановлен. Целью анализа категории «гражданское общество» была разработка наиболее адекватной концепции этого явления, происходящего в России. Эта задача была предпринята в многочисленных научных и экспертных исследованиях, которые непосредственно касались этой концепции. Целью данной статьи является представление дискурса о создании оптимальной концепции гражданского общества, проводимой в современной России, с использованием ее эндогенных и экзогенных источников, особенно в процессе продолжающейся системной трансформации с не полностью диагностированным вектором этих изменений.
This article looks at the contemporary rebuilding of the sphere of influence of the Russian Federation, which covers the area of the so-called “near abroad”. The choice of the tactics results from the possible influence of the Russian state in this area. Thus, in addition to using the techniques of the so-called soft power, the catalogue includes primarily those activities that enable Russian decision-makers to manage conflict. The process of ‘claiming Russian land back’, initiated since the collapse of the bipolar system, should be interpreted as a political imperative to return to imperial politics. The instruments for their implementation were both traditionally understood leadership in the world, when the fate of all states and nations was decided by the greatest powers, to which Russia belonged from the first half of the nineteenth century. Another very effective tool for restoring the status quo ante of the ‘Russian empire’ turned out to be the ancient Roman strategy of divide et impera, an approach that has made it possible, from the very beginning, for the Russian Federation to strive to restore its hegemonic position in the territory of the countries that once formed the Soviet Union with it. The inability to impose sovereignty by such a soft influence or to inspire and extinguish potential conflicts has led to the armed assertion of its rights by Russia. Consequently, the policy adopted by Russian decision-makers may not only cause an armed conflict on a large European scale, but also other artificially induced cataclysms, difficult to predict, the consequences of which will have to be handled by the future generations.
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