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1

Epistemological Consequences of Antirealism

100%
Wieczorek R.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2007
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vol. 16
|
issue 2(62)
145-156
EN
Antirealism has some epistemological consequences that are inconvenient to its supporters. The essay shows how antirealism tends to mold views on meaning, reference, truth and reality.
2
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FICTIONAL OBJECTS WITHIN THE THEORY OF MENTAL FILES: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

80%
Vecsey Z.
ESPES
|
2020
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vol. 9
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issue 2
32 – 48
EN
A recent version of the mental file framework argues that the antirealist theory of fictional objects can be reconciled with the claim that fictional utterances involving character names express propositions that are true in the real world. This hybrid view rests on the following three claims: (i) character names lack referents but express a mode of presentation, (ii) fictional utterances introduce oblique contexts where character names refer to their modes of presentation, and (iii) modes of presentation are mental files. In this critical paper, I will argue that the proposed view runs into a number of theory-internal problems. These problems arise partly from the unclarities inherent in the notion of mental file, and partly from a mistaken semantics for character names. I will also argue that adherents of fictional realism can make use of the notion of mental file without encountering similar difficulties.
3

FILOZOFIA JE MŔTVA. NECH ŽIJE FYZIKA!

80%
Maco R.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 4
269 – 281
EN
Among theoretical physicists there is a relatively long tradition of commenting on the historical and philosophical questions of their discipline in the form of books aimed at the wider public. Hawking and Mlodinow 2010 book offers the model-dependent realism as an interpretive framework for contemporary science. The article aims at a critical examination of the main points of this framework and comes to the conclusion that despite their efforts the authors did not free themselves from the traditional dispute between realism and anti-realism in the philosophy of science.
4

HISTORICAL ANTIREALISM AND THE PAST AS A FICTIONAL MODEL

80%
Černín D.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2019
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vol. 26
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issue 4
635 - 659
EN
This paper focuses on the discipline of history, its methods, subject, and output. A brief overview of contemporary analytic philosophy of history is provided, followed by critical discussion of historical realism. It is argued that the insistence on the idea that historians inquire into the real past and that they refer to the actual past entities, events, or agents is widely open to sceptical objections. The concept of an abstract historical chronicle of past events which are explained or retold by historians is identified as misleading. The idea of historical antirealism is then introduced. It is argued that in the centre of historian’s attention are present phenomena that are identified as historical evidence and require historical explanation. Historical explanation consists of constituting an historical past— a fictional model that accounts for present data. The identification process of historical evidence and the discursive nature of historical enterprise are analysed and accompanied by several concrete examples. According to historical antirealism, historians are not interested in the real past, but in the present empirical data. In their pursuit of historical knowledge, they produce fictional models—an historical past. Lastly, several common caveats against historical antirealism are addressed. The historical antirealism is presented as a viable fictionalist account of the historical inquiry that is capable of avoiding sceptical attacks on historical method and it is argued that antirealism allows history to retain its worth as a distinctive kind of scientific discipline.
5

REALIZMUS, PERDURANTIZMUS A JEHO PRAKTICKÉ DÔSLEDKY

80%
Odorčák J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2012
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vol. 67
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issue 5
375 – 386
EN
The paper deals with the diachronic personal identity, defining two fundamental approaches to the problem: realism and anti-realism. The theory of D. Parfit serves as an illustration of anti-realism, while perdurantism as a specific case of realism. Contrary to D. Parfit, perdurantism is able to solve the problem of the split while preserving the realistic position as far as the diachronic personal persistence is concerned. Several problematic aspects of the perdurantism’s realistic position in practice are examined as well. According to the author and contrary to the widespread conviction perdurantism is compatible with responsibility. Nevertheless, there are some un-acceptable consequences concerning punishment and reward.
6

PRIAMOČIARY REALIZMUS A JEHO POZÍCIA V RÁMCI SPORU REALIZMU A ANTIREALIZMU

70%
Labuda P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
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vol. 20
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issue suppl. 1
64 – 78
EN
This paper analyses the nature of language and its role in realism-antirealism debate. The aim of the paper is (i) to present and defend the common-sense realism as a position, which enables us to offer a plausible explanation of the evolution of linguistic practice, and (ii) to present the realism-antirealism debate as a battle of an accent. The realists emphasize (a) the source of differentiation, while the antirealists accent the process of differentiation. Both of the aims are met via the conceptual analysis of the main realism-antirealism concepts such as language, differentiation, difference, reality, to constitute (construct) and by the assessment of the impact that the results of the abovementioned analysis would have on the position of common-sense realism.
7
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REALISM AND IDEALISM: THE STRUCTURE OF THE DEBATE (Realizm i idealizm: struktura problemu)

61%
Judycki S.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2009
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issue 9
7-34
EN
The aim of the article is to systematize fundamental concepts involved in the philosophical debate on realism and idealism. In the first (historical) part distinction between appearance and reality (which has its roots in ancient philosophy) is presented as one of the sources of the modern debate on realism and idealism. In this part different interpretations of realism and idealism (Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Kant, Heidegger, Moore, Carnap) are also analyzed. The second part is concerned with definitions of four fundamental oppositions: metaphysical idealism and epistemological idealism, metaphysical realism and epistemological realism. The third part discusses different forms of realism (naive realism, critical realism, scientific realism, transcendental realism and conceptual realism) and introduces the concept of antirealism. Fourth part deals with connections between realism and idealism debate and such philosophical standpoints as skepticism, agnosticism and solipsism.
8

THE CONTROVERSY OVER RES IN PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE AND THE MYSTERIES OF ONTOLOGICAL NEUTRALITY

61%
Bac M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 2
141-153
EN
Clarification of the terms 'realism' and 'antirealism' has always been a challenging task for philosophers of science, epistemologists, and metaphysicians. The first part of the paper offers a certain classification and critical exposition of realisms in philosophy of science. Next, the author takes up the issue of finding a middle or natural ground between realism and antirealism. Arthur Fine's Natural Ontological Attitude is generally considered as a highly interesting and promising attempt at combining the strengths of the two sides of the debate in philosophy of science while avoiding their excessive 'philosophical' claims. The author argues that while reconciliatory approaches are definitely welcome in this matter, Fine's project fails because of its inability to properly handle and carry certain significant and perhaps even indispensable features of realism and antirealism into the new position. Another indication of NOA's failure is Fine's notable misrepresentation of the main theses of the two camps that he strives to bring together. The resultant picture of NOA leaves a great deal to be desired because of Fine's Procrustean treatment and the inadequate ontological account emerging out of it.
9

INŠTRUMENTÁLNY REALIZMUS, ONTOLÓGIA ROZLÍŠENÍ A PROBLÉM ONTOLOGICKÉHO STATUS INŠTRUMENTOV

51%
Labuda P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2014
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vol. 21
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issue 2
180 – 197
EN
Scientific realism is a positive epistemic attitude towards the content of our best theories/models recommending belief in both observable and unobservable aspects of the world described by the sciences. This attitude has important metaphysical dimension. It is committed to the mind-independent existence of the world investigated by the sciences (Chakravartty 2013). In his papers Mathematics and Experience (2009) and Mathematics and Reality (2011) Ladislav Kvasz holds a position of instrumental realism. Kvasz claims that reality is instrumentally constituted and realism issue should be understood as a relation between two languages instead of world-language relation. Kvasz’s instrumental realism also suggests building up ontology of distinctions instead of ontology of fillings. The paper deals with Kvasz’s version of instrumental realism critically and it aims to show that Kvasz’s position is much closer to antirealism than to scientific realism because it does not meet the metaphysical dimension.
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